₦airaland Forum

As Colonel Etuk (rtd) said, and Generals Oluleye and Madiebo (among others) have documented, Biafran units took custody of well over 50% of the para-dropped supplies meant for the 16th Brigade during the siege of Owerri.  Air Marshall Alfa supports Etuk’s opinion that this was the result of inexperience on the part of federal pilots.   But Alfa also goes further to blame high-altitude drops and lack of operational coordination between the Army and Air Force.  According to him,
 
“The Air Force was faced with a lot of difficulties in convincing some Army Field Commanders of the need for joint planning and briefing, in that some Army Field Commanders who had little or no knowledge of air operations were impervious to useful operational suggestions from the relatively young NAF Commanders.  This action often resulted in crises of confidence which disrupted the smooth operation of the war.”
 
However, in addition, based on what we now know, the guile of Biafran officers, logistic requirements of the besieging Biafran units, and limited ability of the besieged Brigade to support airdrop operations in an increasingly small drop zone must be factored in.  Until towards the very end, although unaware at that time, NAF pilots tasked with the resupply of the 16th Brigade had no need to fly at high altitude because Biafran anti-aircraft units – fully aware of their flight times and drop arrangements - had no intention of shooting them down.  Neither, even if they wanted, at that stage of the war, was there any effective Biafran air combat or interceptor capability. The devastating ground attack of Count Von Rosen’s MFI-9B ‘miniCOIN’ aircraft against Port-Harcourt airport during “Operation Biafra Babies” took place on May 22nd – well after the Owerri situation had resolved itself.  Thus, maintenance of air-superiority – which is always a big concern for military transports – was not in the picture.  Airlift distance was not a problem for federal pilots either.  The airlift distance from Port-Harcourt to Owerri was only about 40 miles. The flight from Enugu was just over 60 miles.  There is no record of Biafran commandos attempting to sabotage federal airfields from which DC-3s were taking off for Owerri,

The DC-3 (and its various versions) was also known as the Dakota, and is arguably one of the most successful and resilient aircraft ever built.  It was not seeing combat for the first time, nor was it new to military airlift (when appropriately modified as the C-47).  By 1967 it had already seen action during the Second World War, Berlin airlift, Korean and Vietnam Wars.  The military version could accommodate 28 fully armed soldiers, 7500 pounds of cargo or 18 stretchers for casualties.  Fully loaded, however, the civilian version could carry no more than 6000 pounds of cargo.
 
Just as Biafran engineers had done with an old DC-3 in their possession, NAF engineers refitted the NAF DC-3s to carry bombs and machine guns.  In addition, they were used for casualty evacuation.  When additional forward operational bases were opened at Calabar, Benin and Lagos, the DC-3s were moved to Enugu, while subsequently acquired long range and larger DC-4s were later based in Lagos.  The DC-3s saw action over the strategic Biafran Uli-Ihiala airstrip.  They were used for nighttime high-altitude combat air patrol, waiting patiently in holding pattern high in the clouds for relief aircraft to arrive below. When the runway lights were briefly turned on for incoming relief and gunrunning planes, the DC-3 would swoop down to destroy the runway. Eleven relief aircraft were destroyed and 21 relief aircraft pilots killed at Uli-Ihiala in this manner.  In time to come, however, one of the “Ihiala” DC-3s was redeployed to Port-Harcourt to perform tactical airlift support for the besieged 16th Brigade at Owerri.  Meanwhile, fighter jets and bombers bombed the besieging Biafran forces

Be that as it may, to start with, no aerial resupply effort can proceed without appropriate quantities and quality of aircraft.  Such aircraft include not just transport aircraft equipped to do the job, flown by trained pilots in reasonably good weather and free from competing obligations, but fighter escorts to protect against intercepting opposing aircraft and bombers to suppress opposing anti-aircraft ground fire.   Such transport aircraft would need airfields to fly into, or possess the equipment and skills for low-altitude parachute extraction, ground proximity extraction, or para-drops of usually aluminium-based cargo pallets.    To ensure a high delivery/requirement ratio that in turn assures the appropriate tonnage per soldier ratio, such para-dropped cargo pallets should land within designated drop zones, preferably as close as possible to the desired combat impact zone. 
 
When, however, the civil war began in 1967, the NAF had only three aircraft types, namely, a few piston engine Piaggio P.149D trainer/liaison/utility and Dornier DO-27A general purpose light transport planes, along with some light Alouette Helicopters.  When the first wartime forward operational base was established at Makurdi under then Captain John Yisa Doko, the inventory expanded to include not only a few Jet Provosts handed down from Sudan and Egypt, but also two Douglas DC-3 twin-engine 21-passenger aircraft acquired from the Nigerian Airways.

The Owerri Airdrop
 
There is some disagreement about the duration of the Owerri air resupply effort.  A one-time Nigerian Chief of Air Staff, the late Air Marshall Ibrahim Alfa claimed the effort actually lasted for four months while Army sources claim it lasted for six weeks.  Clearly, therefore, for at least six long weeks, inclusive of the period from March 14th and continuing until April 19th 1969, air resupply was the method by which the 16th Brigade of 3MCDO was logistically supported while under Biafran siege.  Even then, there were complications.
 
Explaining how it all began, Colonel Etuk said:
 
“I got in touch with Adekunle and informed him that things were really bad.  He told me to find a location for drops and to let him know.   I never knew that as we were discussing, the rebels were picking the message.  So when that time came I told him I was going into the war zone and that there was going to be a big flame at so and so time and at so and so point. Of course, the rebels had got [the entire] message.  Before that time the rebels had gone down and prepared a big flame. Adekunle rang me and said his pilot had taken off [from Port Harcourt] with all the goodies for my troops. 
 
The poor pilot sighted that first lighting point and dropped everything there while I sat waiting because I heard the plane when it took off hovering around.  The pilot must have been a stupid man for I don’t know whether he couldn’t read his map to know exactly where I told my Divisional Commander things should be dropped.  The whole stock was released to the rebels. 
 
When I got back to the radio and then called Adekunle and said I have not seen anything, he said, “You bastard son of a bitch, do you think you are the only commander I have?”  The pilot went back and told him that he had delivered the goods and he said the pilot was there by him and he claimed to have dropped everything.  Of course I replied that I saw nothing.  That was the beginning of my woes, no supplies.” 
 
What the barely four year old Nigerian Air Force (NAF) was attempting to do at Owerri in 1969 was the resupply, by airdrop under potential hostile fire, of an army infantry brigade of about 2,000 - 3,000 men – whose numbers dropped as casualties mounted.  It is not as simple as it might appear on the surface

LIFE IN THE 16th BRIGADE UNDER SIEGE
 
According to Colonel E. A. Etuk (rtd),
 
“The rebels knew that we were helpless because the main route that we used from Port Harcourt to Owerri was blocked totally and there was no way to go in or come out.  Whenever morning came as we would sit praying, the next thing we would hear was the noise of airplanes bringing cargo to Ojukwu and soon as that was done, throughout that night the whole area would be on fire; bombing everywhere.“
 
Given this degree of sequestration, therefore, the only option available to 3MCDO HQ and AHQ was to resupply the beleaguered Brigade by air.   In aerial logistics jargon, this is known as a “tactical airlift in support of an isolated land battle area.”   Without water, ammunition, food rations, fuel, blankets, medical supplies, tents, spare parts and other equipment etc, no fighting unit can sustain morale, nor remain cohesive and effective for long.

If you find it interesting, i will continue

In fact AHQ received many petitions against Adekunle from some of his own Brigade Commanders and Staff officers.  Others simply abandoned the Division in protest against him, without authority.  Oluleye’s assessment is consistent with that of General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd).  In his opinion,
 
“The Federal victory in capturing Umuahia, the next rebel administrative headquarters after Enugu, was almost immediately effectively nullified by the loss of Owerri to the rebels. The rebels, strengthened and emboldened by their recapture of Owerri, swiftly advanced southwards to threaten Igritta, a distance of fifteen miles north of Port Harcourt on the Owerri road. The federal finger-tip hold on Aba was considerable weakened. The morale of the soldiers at least of 3 Marine Commando Division was at its lowest ebb. Desertion and absence from duty without leave was rife in the Division. The despondence and general lack of will to fight in the soldiers was glaringly manifest in the large number of cases of self-inflicted injuries throughout the formation. Some officers tacitly encouraged these malpractices and unsoldierly conduct by condoning such acts or withdrawing their own kith or kin or fellow tribesmen to do guard duties in the rear and in the officers' own houses. Distrust and lack of confidence plagued the ranks of the officer corps. Operations were unhealthily competitive in an unmilitary fashion and officers openly rejoiced at each other's misfortunes. With the restrictions imposed by the Federal Military Government on many items of imported goods and the country in the grip of inflation, the civilian population began to show signs of impatience with a war, which appeared, to them unending. In fact, some highly placed Nigerians started to suggest that the Federal Government should sue for peace at all cost to prevent the disaster that would befall it and its supporters if rebel victory seemed imminent.”
 
The Biafran high command sensed all of this.  Preparations were, therefore, made for an ambitious “hot pursuit” – which eventually began in mid-July.  With the 14 Division (under Brigadier Ogbugo Kalu) thrusting toward Port Harcourt from Owerri, the 12 Division (under Brigadier Eze) planned to seize Aba and then drive southwards to link up with Kalu in Port Harcourt followed by seizure of Bonny.  From there they would swing eastwards, in collaboration with other Biafran units, with the objective of recapturing Ikot-Ekpene and Calabar, thus evicting the federal army from the Biafran seaboard.
 
Nevertheless, in the weeks immediately following the Biafran recapture of Owerri, airwaves were preoccupied with news reports of the 3MCDO recapture of Okpuala, Olakwo, Obokwe, Eziama, Umukani and Umuagu.  These reports were punctuated by the subsequent kidnap of Italian oilmen at Kwale in the Midwest by Biafran commandos on May 9, 1969.  On that same day, quietly, behind the scenes, an Army HQ operational order was issued, changing all the federal divisional commanders.  Following an article by British Major General HT Alexander in the Sunday Telegraph of May 11 criticizing the Nigerian military, it was publicly announced on May 12, 1969 that Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo had replaced Colonel Benjamin Adekunle as GOC 3 Marine Commando.   On May 16, 1969, Obasanjo physically took over the Division in the field.  Simultaneously – to avoid ethnic interpretation - Lt. Col. G.S. Jalo relieved Col. Ibrahim Haruna of the 2nd Infantry Division while Col. I. D. Bissala was billed to take Colonel Shuwa’s place at 1st Infantry Divisional HQ. The actual change of command in the relatively well-organized and managed 1st Division, however, was delayed until the end of September

[b]Federal Nigerian consequences
 
On the federal Nigerian side, according to Major General Oluleye (rtd),
 
“With the loss of Owerri, Benjy’s [ie Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s] image was both militarily and politically dented. Army Headquarters pressed fanatically that Benjy had to be relieved to save further loss of lives.  The C-in-C did not agree until the rebels came close to Igritta and civilians in Port Harcourt started fleeing back to Lagos. I think the C-in-C was more concerned with political stability in the rear.  Had there been no set backs, relieving Benjy could have been impossible.  Benjy had become spent months before.
 
It was at this stage that the C-in-C directed me to implement an earlier recommendation of splitting the Division into two.  But I told him I had no resources and went further to state that there was no alternative to the removal of the Black Scorpion.  It was on this occasion that the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral [Commodore] JEA Wey described me as the ‘Ifa Oracle of the Army’ adding that I gave indication of a major disaster occurring sometime in the southern sector but that I could not predict the exact time.  On this note, the C-in-C gave up the idea of retaining Benjy in the front.  He then directed that I should head a panel to recommend the necessary changes.  The panel recommended the reliefs of all the Field Commanders so that tribal meanings might not be read into the changes. (Italics mine)
 
As at that time, the famous 3rd Marine Commando had been crippled and it required rebuilding through reinforcements of all forms.  The Black Scorpion had become completely worn out. He had become [so] unpopular among the rank and file of his division that he could not safely visit the front again for fear of dear life.”[/b]

Indeed, long after the war, in an interview a few years ago with the Nigerian Army Civil War Historical Investigative Team, Ojukwu himself said (among other things):
 
“……I sat in my office as Military Governor, Head of State, whatever it was, Army Commander, I was them all…(Italics mine)…”
 
“…..Believe you me, nobody went into battle on my side with more than 10 rounds in his rifle. Nobody!  I will go further.  As Head of State, I was the one to allocate mortar shells to various companies. (Italics mine)  Whenever, during the war, you heard of a serious bombardment from the Biafran side, that should be taken as a sign that I personally commanded that front…..I was in personal command so I could call for certain extra ammunition…...” (Italics mine)
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that “General of the People’s Army” Ojukwu’s proposed collegiate reorganization after the recapture of Owerri was not designed to be implemented.  Madiebo recalled that,
 
“All those privileges and changes were in effect an eye wash, designed to satisfy civilian and military pressures, which had existed since the beginning of the war, in favour of the establishment of a war council.  Civilians now had the impression that not only did we do joint planning, but also that the Army Commander controlled all ammunition.  The Joint Planning Committee met once a week from May 1969 to the end of the war but not one of the 14 operational plans, which it produced, was ever carried out.  The committee planned all the time without knowing what was available; and invariably at the end of each plan it discovered that there were no resources for such a plan which would then be discarded and a new plan produced.  The Planning Committee under Brigadier Okwechime worked like that until the end of the war.  However, we looked forward to JPC meetings because they were held in the State House, one of the very few places in Biafra where one could get a glass of cold beer.”

Interestingly, the recapture of Owerri also led to changes in the way General Ojukwu now proposed to conduct Biafran military affairs.  According to Madiebo:
 
“After the fall of Umuahia and the recapture of Owerri, General Ojukwu in May, 1969, took two significant decisions for reasons best known to him.  Thereafter I was allowed to see the Head of State on military matters at any time of the day or night without booking for an appointment in advance----a privilege I had not enjoyed before then.  Again the Head of State decided to set up a Joint Planning Committee chairmanned by himself, with the Chief of Staff, General Effiong, and the Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Force as members.  In addition, I was given the privilege of controlling for the first time, a small fraction of the national ammunition holding, but the bulk of it still remained under the control of the Head of State.”
 
These tepid changes reflected an effort on the part of Ojukwu to signal sensitivity to criticisms of his leadership style that dated back to the beginning of the conflict.  Civilians were often played off against soldiers. He created special units that reported to him and no one else, and regularly subsumed the authority and responsibilities of his military commanders.   As US Marine Major Stafford observed in his Staff College analysis of the war, Ojukwu “established directorates to control the logistical aspects of the war efforts, thus creating a rivalry not only with the military but also with the existing civil service.”   Stafford concluded “the cumulative effect of these special units and extra-organizational control groups divided the direction of the war effort. They took authority away from those most responsible for fighting the war--the military--and institutionalized Ojukwu's actions to mitigate any potential political opposition by producing a fragmented power structure that answered only to him. “

That said, favorable and unfavorable reactions within and outside the Biafran military to the victory at Owerri were not without high drama and recrimination.  For example, Madiebo, who had held the rank of Major General since September 1967 when he relieved Brigadier Hilary Njoku as Commander of the Biafran Army, observed in his memoirs that:
 
“The Head of State put out a long list of promotions to commemorate the recapture of Owerri.  He himself became a General while Okwechime, Eze and Kalu were all promoted to Brigadiers.  Various others were promoted except Onwuatuegwu, the darling of the people, who was left out of General Ojukwu’s list.  That omission became a national political issue.  “Jet 77,” the government sponsored propaganda company of Onwuatuegwu’s “S” Division accused the Army Headquarters of not promoting Onwuatuegwu because it hated him.  The “Jet 77” produced hand-outs for the public in which they revealed that the “S” Division under Onwuatuegwu had cleared the Ugba junction and Owerri and, on each occasion, the gallant Onwuatuegwu got nothing in return but humiliation from the GOC of the Army.”
 
“I was not worried by this propaganda which I knew was just one of those false rumours deliberately released against various individuals from time to time in order to control their popularity with the masses.  I often disagreed with Onwuatuegwu in the same way I disagreed occasionally with all other commanders under me.  To talk of an Army Commander in war loving or hating officers under his command is being childish in the extreme.  In such a game involving human lives, a commander’s aim is to end it successfully as soon as possible.  Onwuatuegwu, as an individual being the godfather of my first son and the officer closest to my family, knew I was putting the welfare of the people before family ties and friendship.”
 
Incidentally, newly promoted Brigadier Michael Okwechime, the first indigenous Commander of Nigerian Army Corps of Engineers, was the Adjutant General of the Biafran army at that time.   His last “Nigerian” posting was as the officer in charge of Engineering and Communications in the 4th Area Command HQ in Benin City.   Like Brigadier Conrad Nwawo, he too was based in the Midwest at the time of the Biafran invasion in August 1967, but folded into the Biafran rearguard as it retreated to Biafra.     Brigadier Anthony Eze, on the other hand, was then Commander of the Biafran 12 Division in the Aba sector.  He had served in the Nigerian Army as the first indigenous commander of the Corps of Signals.  His last “Nigerian” appointment was as the Commanding Officer of the Lagos Garrison before the July 29, 1966 coup.

The Recapture of Owerri by Biafra Forces

The Biafran recapture of Owerri following the breakout and fighting withdrawal of the 16th Brigade resulted in very significant consequences on both sides. 
 
Biafran consequences
 
Zdenek Cervenka identified five consequences to Biafra of the recapture of Owerri. They are:
 
1.        It sent a signal to Nigeria and the world that despite all the reverses of the war to date, Biafra was still capable of significant resistance. 
 
2.        It destroyed the myth surrounding the federal 3rd Marine Commando Division and its well known commander, Colonel B.A.M. Adekunle, a.k.a. “Black Scorpion”.
 
3.        It enhanced road and telecommunications links within the residue of Biafra. 
 
4.        It relieved the threat to the strategic Uli-Ihiala airstrip.
 
5.        It created a hinge point for subsequent aggressive Biafran probes towards Port Harcourt.
 
 
Former Nigerian and Biafran soldiers who bore direct witness to the event have amplified all of these consequences and more.  According to Madiebo:
 
“The Owerri victory revived the dying Biafra.  All Biafrans who a few days before wanted nothing but an end to the war, now pressed for a continuation of the struggle to the end.  The Umuahia disaster was soon forgotten and the only quarrel civilian military tacticians had against the Army was that they allowed the enemy to escape from Owerri. The enemy left a considerably large amount of ammunition of different calibres, but he managed to take away almost his entire heavy equipment including armoured vehicles and artillery pieces.  The town was completely ravaged and not a single building was habitable without major repairs.  All vehicles not taken away by the enemy were overturned and burnt by him.” 
 
In addition, Madiebo claims that:
 
“Mass graves were discovered all over the town and the victims appeared to be civilians and prisoners of war.”
 
It is more likely, however, that those graves were predominantly graves of the thousands of soldiers of the 16th brigade that died between September 1968 when they first arrived and April 1969 when survivors broke out of the siege.  No official casualty count has ever been rendered, but if Major General Shuwa’s estimate is correct, then it can be surmised that of the approximately 3000 soldiers that confidently thundered into the town in September 1968, about 300 made it back alive in April 1969.  Assuming they were all recovered and buried, the graves of over 2000 Nigerian soldiers killed in action were thus among those the besieging Biafrans “discovered” after retaking the town. In any case several independent international sources confirm that what was left of the 16th Brigade brought along a large number of civilians and prisoners of war out of the Owerri pocket.

ck in July 1967, shortly after the war began, then Chief of Staff (Army), Col. JRI Akahan, had died in a helicopter crash.  With the blessing of General Gowon, then GSO (1) at the AHQ, Lt. Col. Iliya Bissala, assumed the position of Acting Chief of Staff (Army).  Some observers interpreted this move as an act of nepotism since Bissala was from the same Benue-Plateau State as the C-in-C as well as the immediate past COS (A), Col. Joe Akahan.   In fact, with reference to the divisional commanders, Bissala was six months junior to Adekunle and a course-mate at Sandhurst to Shuwa and Murtala Mohammed, all of whom, therefore, decided to ignore him and deal with the C-in-C directly.  Indeed, some other staff and ‘general pool’ officers in the AHQ at that time were senior to Bissala.  They included Lt. Col. Oluwole Rotimi, Brigadiers David Ejoor, Emmanuel Ekpo and Hassan Katsina, among others.  For different reasons, Brigadiers Ogundipe and Adebayo, both combatants, were assigned non-regimental duties.   To compound matters, the man who replaced Bissala as the GSO (1) at AHQ was none other than Lt. Col. Sule Apollo, who had just been relieved of his position for alleged “ineffectiveness” as Commander of 1 Sector in the 1st Division by Colonel Shuwa.  Between Bissala and Apollo, therefore, AHQ was a ‘no go area’ for the Divisional Commanders – until Lt. Col. James Oluleye became GSO (1) in November 1967 and Brigadier Hassan Usman Katsina took over as COS (A) in January 1968.

Not until Adekunle destroyed his own name and mythical reputation, therefore, even among Yorubas, was Gowon finally comfortable enough – in the face of overwhelming military justification - to fire him.  Even then, mindful of his services to the nation, he refused to probe serious allegations made against him. Instead he promoted him substantive Colonel and gave him a desk job as Director of Training and Planning at AHQ. He was also careful not to tinker with the “Northern-Western” alliance against the “East” and expose himself to charges of tribalism by replacing ALL divisional commanders simultaneously – irrespective of military effectiveness.  To refine this further, he made sure another Yoruba officer – then Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo - replaced Adekunle at the now famous (some say notorious), albeit battered 3MCDO.
 
Three additional factors are often cited for Gowon’s ambivalence by Major General Oluleye (rtd), and others, who were in a position to see things at close quarters.  The first is that he was actually fond of Adekunle as a “can do” officer.  The second was that Gowon was basically a “nice man” who never wanted to hurt anyone’s feelings.  Some saw this as weakness, others as a virtue.  Lastly, Gowon – who maintained independent radio links to divisional commanders - was personally liable for encouraging Adekunle to disobey Army HQ back in September and October 1968 when he diverted resources to attack Umuahia after Aba instead of focusing on Uli-Ihiala as ordered by AHQ.  In other words, Colonel Adekunle’s Operation “OAU” was fully sanctioned by the C-in-C. 
 
The genesis of the situation described in the last paragraph needs explanation.  Nigeria’s first military leader, Major General Ironsi originally formalized the title “Chief of Staff (Army)” [COS (A)] in January 1966 – although plans for such a position were in place before he came to office.  Indeed, Colonel Kur Mohammed of blessed memory was the first COS (A) designate.  This position did not carry the same weight as the “GOC, Nigerian Army” or the current title “Chief of Army Staff (COAS)”.  The COS (A) was basically a Chief Clerk to the C-in-C in charge of Army matters.  He did not really “command” the Army – unless his roll seniority level compelled officers to defer to him.   Thus the C-in-C (or more correctly, Supreme Commander, as it was known at that time) was the real Army Chief.  This was the situation from 1966 until 1975

Let's discuss the Ouster then we talk abou the siege and how a ypung buhari survived it
 
Colonel Benjamin Adekunle (a.k.a. “Black Scorpion”) became a political and folk hero after stunning military successes at Bonny, Warri, Sapele, Calabar and Port Harcourt.  These successes, amplified by his penchant for national and international publicity, made him a household name in his native Western State.   He seemed to emulate American General Douglas MacArthur and likely saw himself as a Nigerian Caesar. Indeed, I recall that as a primary school student in Lagos and subsequently as a secondary school student in Warri, we often chanted songs that extolled Adekunle’s heroic contributions to the war.  In one example, we would chant:
 
Lead singer:                 “One Nigeria!”
 
Chorus:                  “Adekunle sector!”
 
And this would go on and on as if there were no other sectors, divisions and divisional commanders involved in the war.  As young and impressionable children, we were totally ignorant of his military errors and disasters, even less so his curious order directing troops to “shoot anything that moves” once he got into the core Igbo areas of Biafra.
 
Furthermore, given the initial political prevarication of the Yoruba West in joining the federal effort against Biafran secession (until the Biafran Midwest/West invasion), Gowon, a northern minority, even when privately admonished by senior Yoruba officers, was very leery of burning that ethnic bridge – shaky though it was.  After all, back in May 1967, just before the war began, a delegation of senior Yoruba officers including Colonel Olutoye, Lt. Col. Olusegun Obasanjo, Majors Sotomi, Akinrinade and Ayo-Ariyo had presented a demand to Gowon for northern troops to be transferred out of Lagos and the West.  They were doing this in follow up to a similar demand by Western region Governor, Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo.  Adebayo had not only asked for northern troops to leave the West but also told Gowon to shift the venue of Supreme Military Council meetings to Akure where he felt safer.  All of this was coming after Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s declaration that “if the Eastern region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then the Western region and Lagos must also stay out of the federation.”  Those were difficult days for Gowon and he had not forgotten. During that crisis, his loyal Commander of the Lagos Garrison Organization was none other than Major Benjamin Adekunle. 
 
To complicate Gowon’s position, the West was not politically stable during most of the war, particularly between 1968 and 1970.  Agitation for the creation of a separate Yoruba central state to include Oyo and Ibadan provinces (Oyo State) was the first shot in the saga and may have been an ongoing factor during subsequent events.  There was also the so-called “Omopupa” riot in Lagos, ultimately crushed by the Lagos Garrison Organization under then Lt. Col Anthony Ochefu.  Then there was restiveness among old farmers and hunters – also known as the “Agbekoya rebellion” – in the West.  Anger was driven by frustration with intrusive, violent and corrupt government tax collectors at a time of bad harvest of swollen shoots, inflation and economic recession caused by low cocoa prices.    Taking inspiration from the Maiyegun league of yesteryears, beginning around Ibadan, the revolt soon spread to Ogbomosho (Adekunle’s hometown), Ede, Ijebu-Remo and Egba areas of the West.  Local government offices were attacked and sacked, necessitating massive internal security operations by the Police and Army – particularly the Ibadan Garrison Organization led by then Colonel Oluwole Rotimi. Indeed, things got so bad at one point that then Western State Governor, Brigadier Adeyinka Adebayo, reportedly had to flee Ibadan for safety and rioters later killed the traditional ruler (Shoun) of Ogbomosho.  At another point insurgents freed prisoners at the Agodi prison in Ibadan.   Because of the government’s initial suspicion that the riots were linked – according to General Gowon - to “causes extending beyond dissatisfaction with the level of taxation,” a compromise was needlessly delayed.  It was not until October 1969 that then Federal Finance Minister and former Western region premier, Chief Obafemi Awolowo negotiated an agreement with the Agbekoya resulting in a reduction of the flat tax rate to £2 a year, accompanied by amnesty for tax defaulters.
 
With such political tensions in the Yoruba rear, and intelligence reports of Colonel Adekunle’s political and military ambitions, Gowon became fearful of a potential coup d’Etat staged by the “Nigerian Caesar” if he was rendered jobless lurking around in Lagos.  Indeed General Obasanjo (rtd) once wrote that “I knew of people of Western State origin who had felt politically victimized and who saw in Col. Adekunle a savior and told him so, and he believed them.”

mezebel:
I received this sms this morning. I actually applied for npower teach and am patiently waiting for second batch. Hi hw are u, hope u are fine u must be expecting ur name in the second batch i know the person that is in position to help u before the list is out u can call me is urgent thanks engr mathew npower office abuja

be careful. It's scam

AlanSugar:
I'm sure you and metuselah are age mates but does that change the fact that you know not poo between "kill any fulani herdsman you see around you" and "Christians defend yourselves"? Pls return the borrowed master's degree, it was lent in error!

i hate when idiots disturb my timeline

Something we have about 10 of them in my community.

MsDelilah:
Believe it or not, my dear. Except you want to see my birth certificate. But, then again, why do I have to prove myself to a stranger?

Speechless. Erased my doubt but let's not be strangers from this moment.

Waving a white flag

MsDelilah:
Lol. Why are you like this? I'm not up to 27 though.

Used to watch the movies with my parents back then. Could recite all the lines. Never really understood them till I was a bit older.

Mbanu. You can't list out even When the Sun Set and you tell me you are not up to 27. I watched that movie in 1995 and i was in college then

MsDelilah:
Kai!!! This movie!!! Back when Nigerian movies made sense. Not the crap of today.
Back then, we had:
Rattlesnake
Living In Bondage
True Confessions
Deadly Affair
When The Sun Sets
Etc.

I miss those times!

You are old. Hope you re married

Afam4eva:
Ahh, Jesnnifer Ossai nee Okere. RIP. These were the people making waves in Igbo movies those days.

Her hit movie was True Confession

This film that made my parents to flog us for watching it