₦airaland Forum

GreenandGold:
Never doing that again 😛

Odunayaw:
The Magnus MF212 with it's disgraceful 600 max take off weight is the more capable aircraft?
Only two aircrafts in that link fits COIN/Armed ISR and we have the best of it — Super Tucano.
I'm talking of NA Aviation, they cannot get that.

Magnus originally had a deal with NCAT to provide training aircrafts with local assembly before they pitched to NAF and later NA.

The MF212 is a waste of money for fixed wing. Slower, light weight and no track record.

Mwari is built for Africa COIN by Africans. Saffas will think I'm doing PR for them

GreenandGold:
I remember leaving a similar comment on the Internet a week ago. Some r-ednecks think we buy oil from Iran

Tinfoil:
Despite the upcoming fuel shortages African countries still don't want to buy fuel from other African countries and Russia.

They'd rather collapse their economies

GabrielYulaw:
I guess it might be better if it were remotely controlled inside the cab and had advanced radar and options for drone targeting.

GreenandGold:
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GreenandGold:
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GreenandGold:
Nevermind, Paramount Group asked to be part of the parade.

Exnavyboy62:
What Damen OPV was supposed to be constructed alongside the MMIPVs under project biro…??

Odunayaw:
Never trust the water guys. Mother Terra will never leave you stranded.

GreenandGold:
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South African Navy returns Cape2Rio race winners to shore after yacht sinks


After winning the Cape2Rio 2025 yacht race, three South African sailors had to abandon their sinking vessel on its return to South Africa, prompting a rescue at sea.

Skipper Sibusiso Sizatu, first mate Tshepo Renaldo Mohale and Andrea Myburg were returning from Brazil to Cape Town when their vessel, the Angel Wings, encountered serious difficulties in the early hours of Monday 2 February while approximately 800 nautical miles southeast of Rio de Janeiro.

Sizatu reported that he was preparing to begin his watch when he noticed the mast collapsing. With limited fuel reserves of approximately 200 litres and worsening conditions, the crew determined that returning to Rio was not feasible. Shortly thereafter, the vessel began taking on water, the SA Navy said in a statement.

“I immediately contacted the Royal Cape Yacht Club Commodore, David Garrard, who alerted the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre South Africa (MRCC),” said Sizatu.

Through satellite tracking systems, it was established that the nearest vessel to Angel Wings was the Marshall Islands-flagged merchant vessel Bryant, en route to Singapore. The vessel diverted from its course to respond to the distress call. The crew of Angel Wings were safely taken aboard Bryant.

Shortly after the rescue, the yacht sank. The decision to abandon the vessel was made in consultation with the Master of Bryant, taking into account the complete loss of spare equipment required to establish a jury rig and deteriorating weather conditions.

Following the rescue, the Royal Cape Yacht Club formally requested assistance from the South African Navy to transfer the three sailors from Bryant once the vessel reached South African waters. The South African Navy immediately activated arrangements for the Multi-Mission Inshore Patrol Vessel (MMIPV) SAS Adam Kok III to conduct the transfer operation, the Navy said.

SAS Adam Kok III rendezvoused with Bryant on Wednesday 11 February, approximately 63 nautical miles off Cape Point. The three sailors were safely transferred and arrived at Naval Base Simon’s Town on Thursday morning.

“The South African Navy commended the swift coordination between the Royal Cape Yacht Club, MRCC South Africa, and the crew of Bryant, whose decisive actions ensured the safe rescue of the sailors. Upon arrival in Simon’s Town, the crew expressed deep relief and gratitude, stating they are eager to reunite with their families after the ordeal,” the SA Navy said.

“The South African Navy remains committed to protecting the country’s maritime interest and safeguarding lives at sea by supporting maritime safety operations in partnership with national and international stakeholders,” it concluded.

Last month the Alexforbes Angel Wings youth team with sailors from the Cape Flats representing the Royal Cape Yacht Club Sailing Academy claimed first place on handicap in the 2025 Cape2Rio race. In doing so, they made history as the first such team to earn their place and take victory in the 3 300-nautical mile transatlantic crossing, which took 19 days. For the race, three other female crew took part, but they had already returned to South Africa for work and education commitments when the Angel Wings sank.

On 10 January, the team faced a major setback when their boom broke during a sailing manoeuvre mid-Atlantic. Its failure placed the crew in a severely compromised position and would typically force retirement from a race of this nature, Alexforbes stated. Faced with that reality, the team made the decision to continue, racing without a boom and spinnaker – the large, balloon-like sail used to maximise downwind speed. Despite the damage, Alexforbes Angel Wings not only remained competitive but extended their 25-hour lead by several hours, arriving in Rio ahead of their expected finish time.

“I’m incredibly proud of this crew. They were tested, and the way they stayed calm, solved problems and kept racing was impressive,” Sizatu said. “The support from home and other crews along the way meant a huge amount, and I hope this shows young people in South Africa that with commitment and teamwork, even things that seem impossible can be achieved.”

https://defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/south-african-navy-returns-cape2rio-race-winners-to-shore-after-yacht-sinks/

jl115:
I think we’re actually talking past each other a bit, you’re describing export competitiveness, not currency valuation, and those aren’t the same thing.

Yes, South Africa competes with other EM exporters and yes, the Rand is used as a proxy and “whipping boy” in EM baskets. But that explains volatility, not fair value.

If the Rand were genuinely overvalued below R14/$, we would have seen:

sustained import dominance,consumption-led growth, and capital inflows chasing a “cheap imports” story.

Instead, since 2009 (and particularly under Jacob Zuma), what we actually saw was:

capital flight, collapsing investment, and a rising risk premium completely disconnected from productivity or terms of trade. That is risk discounting, not equilibrium pricing.

Being an “export economy” also doesn’t mean a weak currency is correct — it just means it’s helpful to exporters. Germany, Australia, Chile, Canada all export heavily without needing structurally weak currencies. If competitiveness requires R18–20/$, that’s not efficiency, it’s a subsidy via currency debasement.

On the EM-peer point: the fact that the Rand weakens more than peers in bad times and strengthens less than peers in good times is actually evidence of undervaluation, not overvaluation. Liquidity and tradability explain overshooting, not fair value.

And the R18–20 “ideal range” may feel balanced tactically, but strategically it locks SA into:

imported inflation, higher capex costs, weak industrialisation, and permanent commodity dependence.

That’s a low-growth equilibrium, not a healthy one.

So yes, we agree the post 2009 damage under the African National Congress crushed credibility. But the conclusion is the opposite of yours:

The Rand didn’t weaken because R14 was too strong, it weakened because South Africa became too risky.

That means for much of the last 15 years, the Rand has traded below its economic value, even if exporters have benefited from that weakness.

A weak Rand may be useful.
That doesn’t make it fairly valued

jl115:
I agree, except I wouldn't say the rand has ever been overvalued in fact for the good part of 15 years its been one of the most undervalued currencies in the world.


We agree then, cos I have been consistent that our downward spiral started in 2009 when the ANC cursed us with Zuma. That aberration aside:
If one accepts that ours is an export economy, the Rand at anything stronger than R14 to $1 is overvalued. That figure is based not just on the technical evaluation of the value of our economy, but more important, on the value of the Rand vis-a-vis our EM competitors/peers (Pic 1 - I exclude China, S Korea, Taiwan, and India from the EM definition: SK & Taiwan cos they're developed; China & India cos sheer numbers give them outsized heft).
That's the basket of EM currencies dealers play with, and for better or worse, our Rand is the most tradable and therefore the whipping boy whenever something happens elsewhere in the "Emerging Markets".

We sell similar goods to the same markets as most of the countries on the EM list, and over-value of the Rand in this instance means a range where buying from RSA is more expensive.

And yes, I'm aware you farmers import R1million+ machinery and need a stronger Rand. Which is why we pitch the ideal range at R18-20 to the US$. Not too strong to make our exports expensive in relation to our competitors/peers; not too weak to make our main imports -oil & machinery - expensive and inflationary.
Additionally, we also do not want a Rand so strong that imports overtake exports! I started working when we still had exchange controls and people were more concerned about their overseas holidays/portfolios/imported goods, than local production/exports/domestic well-being.


I would also say there is definitely an improvement on all fronts of our economy, probably not as drastic as what we want but we are moving in the right direction.


Not on all fronts, but definitely an improvement on the indices that matter and drive the rest of the economy. And certainly not fast enough, across all sectors. An exercise we do for our clients: 1) where we were when we attained democracy in 1994;
2) the progress we made in the 15 years under Mbeki to 2009;
3) the regression to almost 1994 levels in the decade under Zuma; and
4) the Ramaphosa recovery from Zuma has been slower than Mbeki recovery from 94.

A bit of topic, can you explain to me how Groenewald has now become the new social media President?? ...

I do not place any store by social media when it comes to analysing politics. Were social media metrics any reliable, the EFF would have won the last 2 elections.

MiddleDimension:
Honestly your government needs to do something about your economy. When we started the other thread on best military in Africa, the exchange rate then between the rand and the dollar was about 1 to 7. Now, it has more than halved since then.

At a point in the future, the ANC will come under intense pressure both from home and abroad especially with your activist stands on Palestine and also the fact that other Africans percieve you as xenophobic.

Nigeria looks like things will get better for it going forward. You don't want to be having crisis at a time when you have younger Africans both in your country and elsewhere, who are a bit divorced from the Pan African ideal that saw solidarity across the board and a Nigeria that will be doing better at the time.

Yours is a great country; a testament that skin colour is just what it is: a skin colour and that it doesn't define the person and that people of different colour can live together in peace and harmony. It was the best decision Mandela took that you become a rainbow nation.

The experiment that your country is a success and has inspired many people including those who are antagonistic towards you. I would not like you to have issues especially when you have shown to the world that mankind is not completely a beast.

The age-old adage – a story always has three sides: yours, mine, and the truth – also applies here. Apt words to describe a truly remarkable book. For 40 years, readers of authoritative South African (SA) literature covering the aerial war over Angola (1976–1988) and the South African Air Force (SAAF) history, have believed that Johan Rankin (3 Squadron,SAAF) shot down two Cuban MiG-21s over southern Angola, when in fact one of the MiGs made it home, albeit on a wing and a prayer.
For 40 years, an SAAF C-130 crew believed they were targeted by an SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, when in fact they were nearly shot down by a Cuban MiG-23 flown by Eduardo Gonzáles Sarría himself. Only when two sides of the same story were analysed and timelines were compared, did the stories become one: the truth.

The MiG Diaries is a true and brilliant account of some of the aerial warfare encounters of the Angolan conflict during the 1970s and 1980s. In an SA context, most of these accounts are well known, and have been discussed and written about for many years.
These accounts however have all been marred by one big limitation: the stories were told based on reports of SAAF aircrew alone. Moreover, no matter how accurate and authentic these accounts are, no story can ever really be declared truthful if not validated by the other side. And this is exactly where Lionel Reid, a former SAAF pilot involved in the Bush War (1966–1989) and Lt Col. Eduardo Gonzáles Sarría, a Cuban pilot who flew MiG-21s and MiG-23s in Angola, have managed to fill a 40-year-old void. They have succeeded in addressing uncertainties that have been lingering for a very long time in the minds of those involved on both the SAAF and the Cuban and Angolan sides, providing a fresh and more inclusive view of the aerial war in Angola.

The MiG Diaries is in essence an account of the aerial war in Angola between 1976 and 1988, primarily from the viewpoint of the Cuban aircrew involved. Throughout the book, it is evident that the authors prioritised the factual correctness of all mentioned encounters. To this end, the authors made an effort to track down and interview numerous personnel involved, not just from the SA and Cuban sides, but also from the Angolan and even Soviet sides. No effort was spared to achieve a nuanced and detailed view of all the encounters.

Being the author of two previous books (in Spanish) on the subject, Eduardo Gonzáles Sarría was already in possession of various recorded encounters and photographs from former colleagues. These, in conjunction with similar books by SA writers, provided the perfect foundation for The MiG Diaries. In the book, particular emphasis is placed on the experiences and contributions of Lt Col. Eduardo Gonzáles Sarría, who completed three separate operational tours in Angola between 1976 and 1988.
His first deployment in 1976 was as a 26-year-old, rookie MiG-21 pilot. He returned as a MiG-23 squadron commander in 1985 for his second tour, during which he played a pivotal role in all MiG-23 operations. His final tour saw him being part of a safety board delegation in 1988.

As a former SAAF pilot involved in the war, full-time airline pilot, and avid military aviation enthusiast, Lionel Reid has always had a fascination with the details of the Angolan conflict. After reading one of Sarría’s books, Reid identified an opportunity to piece together a book project aimed at eradicating decades of one-sided narratives. A few emails between two old foes soon blossomed into a lasting friendship between Reid and Sarría, and the birth of The MiG Diaries.

The MiG Diaries aims to eradicate misconceptions and uncertainties related to the aerial war component of the Angolan conflict, and deliberately circumvents controversial politics. The events covered in the book are well known and have been covered in many books in the past, from an SA as well as a Cuban and Angolan viewpoint. For the first time, however, these well-known stories are synchronised, presenting a complete picture of numerous air encounters in detail. The book manages to effect an amazed “wow!-is-that-what-happened” response from the reader, especially among those who have been confronted with one-sided narratives for many years.

The prime example here is the subject of the air-to-air MiG-21 losses in November 1981 and October 1982. In both these cases, Maj. Johann Rankin (3 Squadron, SAAF) managed to engage a Cuban MiG-21 with the 30 mm cannon of his Mirage F1CZ. The first MiG-21 shootdown on 6 November 1981 was clear, and no doubt ever existed in the minds of either side about the outcome of that engagement. The second MiG-21 “shootdown” on 5 October 1982 could however never be confirmed by the SAAF. A large explosion noted on the gun camera footage led to the belief that the MiG-21 could not have survived the engagement. For many years, the SA narrative was that Johann Rankin downed two MiG-21s.

In fact, Raciel Marrero Rodriguez, the pilot of the stricken Cuban MiG-21, achieved a marvellous feat that day, and managed to land a very badly damaged aircraft at Lubango. For an avid reader of SAAF history, this revelation undoubtedly affected a very surprised response from the reviewer. Many more such examples are discussed in detail in The MiG Diaries. Another big revelation for the reviewer was to realise that most Angolan and Cuban aircraft shootdowns scored by a South African during the Angolan war was not by a pilot, but by an electronic warfare turned air-defence operator by the name of Flight Sergeant Johan Strydom. And the bigger “wow!” affected here was to realise that he shot these aircraft down with a Soviet-made SA-9 (self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system), captured from the Angolans. The mystery surrounding these encounters and many more have finally been debunked.

The aerial war turned well in favour of the Cubans during the mid-1980s. The access to MiG-23s equipped with all-aspect missiles stacked the odds squarely in their favour.
This was highlighted in September 1987, when Arthur Piercy’s Mirage F1CZ was badly damaged by an AA-8 air-to-air missile fired from a MiG-23. The aerial war was primarily conducted over Angolan territory, which inherently meant that SAAF aircraft often had to operate well outside friendly radar coverage, and well inside dense enemy radar coverage. This forced the SAAF to concentrate on low-level operations in an attempt to remain below enemy radar coverage for as long as possible. The ground attack tactics and doctrine developed by the SAAF during the Angolan conflict were extremely effective, and the SAAF carried out many successful strikes deep in Angolan territory.

As many similar books before, The MiG Diaries highlights the inability of the SAAF air combat component to attain and maintain air superiority over southern Angola during the mid- to late 1980s. This was primarily due to a lack of proper over-the-horizon friendly radar coverage (i.e. airborne early warning and control system or AWACS), the lack of proper all-aspect short-range missile systems, and the lack of proper beyond-visual-range missiles.

The MiG Diaries tells the story of the Cuban, Angolan, and SA pilots who fought during the Angolan conflict. The book was written by two pilots who were intimately involved in the conflict, and experiences are brought to life by a magnificent selection of pencil sketches by Sean Thackwray, a former SAAF fighter pilot himself. The book allows the reader to become part of the war, sitting in the cockpit, feeling the kick of the afterburner, and smelling the cordite from a fired cannon. It is a must-read for all military aviation enthusiasts and aerial warfare historians.

General Carlo Gagiano (former Chief of the SAAF) aptly noted to Lionel Reid that this was probably the last chance to tell the story of the aerial war over Angola correctly. With memories fading and war heroes passing on, the authors should be commended for achieving this objective. Although ideologies might differ, one certainty remains, pilots will be pilots. The camaraderie, crew room banter, passion for flying, and love for our machines cut across all differences.
Hano van Eck
Department of Military Technology, Stellenbosch University,
Saldanha, South Africa
https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/issue/view/189

Lurker4Long:
This was the logical outcome of a system that spoke the language of law while practising the politics of power.

That lesson matters now because we are again living through a credibility test of the international system — and once again, a great power has elevated an ideology around its racial identity, and black people are being made to feel they count less than others.

US President Donald Trump’s worldview makes this explicit. In his framing, international order rests on the rule of the “larger, richer, stronger.” Power — not law — determines outcomes. The world is divided into spheres of influence managed by great powers through deals, threats and transactions. Smaller states do not have rights; they have utility.

This is not a return to Cold War competition. As the political scientist Stacie Goddard has observed, Trump is not trying to defeat China or Russia. He seeks collusion, not competition — a modern “concert of powers” in which strongmen cooperate to manage the world above the heads of weaker states. Order is imposed, not negotiated; stability purchased, not guaranteed.

For Africa, this should sound chillingly familiar. It is the logic of Abyssinia updated for the 21st century: peace through partition, stability through extraction, diplomacy through coercion. The language has changed; the hierarchy has not.

Nowhere was this clearer than when Trump boasted, during what was meant to be the signing of a peace accord between the presidents of Rwanda and Democratic Republic of the Congo, that the United States was “getting … a lot of the mineral rights from the Congo”. The message was unmistakable: African conflict is not a humanitarian or security concern; it is an opportunity to secure resources, a pit to plunder from.

GreenandGold:
The SANDF

Odunayaw:
It's that walkie talkie banner I'm interested in.

I have been saying it for years now that we have no excuse to not have started developing our comms and electronics industry. Zinox is already there, leverage on it.

Namibia for example makes good radios. We need to learn