₦airaland Forum

President Bola Tinubu's reforms since May 29, 2023 are under his Renewed Hope Agenda - 8-point framework focused on removing distortions and rebuilding fiscal capacity. It's considered the broadest reform package since 1999. Here's the full outline:
I. CORE ECONOMIC REFORMS
1. Fuel Subsidy Removal
Announced on inauguration day, May 29, 2023. Pump price went from ~₦185 to over ₦500 immediately, now ₦1,360+ in Lagos. Government says it saves ₦4-6 trillion yearly - one estimate says without removal, subsidy would have taken 76% of the 2026 budget.
2. Forex Unification
Abolished multiple exchange rates. Allowed CBN to let naira float. Gap between official and parallel market narrowed from huge arbitrage to ~₦1,353 official vs ₦1,419 parallel today. External reserves rose from $40.29bn (Dec 2024) to $50.43bn (June 2026).
3. Stop Ways & Means
CBN stopped printing money to fund FAAC in June 2023. Debt-service-to-revenue ratio dropped from ∼97% in 2022 to below 50%.
4. Crude-for-Naira
October 2024: FEC approved sale of crude to local refineries in Naira, not dollars. Goal to reduce FX pressure. By April 2026, 450,000 bpd allocated to Dangote refinery.
II. TAX & REVENUE REFORMS
5. Four Tax Reform Bills signed June 2025
• Tax Act, Tax Administration Act, Revenue Service Establishment Act, plus Joint Revenue Board Act
• Harmonized 60+ taxes into 8
• 0% tax for SMEs with <₦25m turnover, 30% CIT for big firms
• 0% VAT on food/medicine, 15% on luxury goods
• Tax-to-GDP rose from 10.8% to 13.9%
• Non-oil revenue hit over ₦20 trillion in 2025, 63% of total revenue - first time since 1970s.
III. ENERGY & POWER
6. Electricity Act 2023
Ended federal monopoly. States can now generate, transmit, distribute. As of 2026, 15 states have enacted own electricity laws.
7. CNG Initiative
Counter to subsidy removal - 1 million free conversion kits target, 327 conversion centers, 85,000 vehicles converted by April 2026. BRT diesel cost down 60%.
8. Refineries Revival
Port Harcourt back at 60,000 bpd Dec 2024, Warri 125,000 bpd Q1 2026. Oil theft down from 400k bpd to 180k bpd.
IV. INFRASTRUCTURE
9. Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway - 700km, 10 lanes + rail + CNG stations
10. Sokoto-Badagry Superhighway - 1,068km linking 7 states
Both built as PPPs. FG secured $1.2bn from UAE in Dec 2025 for coastal road.
11. Rail & Ports - Kano-Katsina-Maradi, Kaduna-Kano lines, Apapa & Lekki ports upgraded for very large ships.
V. EDUCATION & HUMAN CAPITAL
12. NELFUND - Student Loan Act signed June 2023
Over 1.2 million applications by Q1 2026, over ₦56bn disbursed. Zero interest, repayable 2 years after NYSC, tied to BVN.
13. 3MTT & CreditCorp
• 3 Million Technical Talent: 1.7M trained in cloud, AI, UI/UX by April 2026
• CreditCorp + National Credit Guarantee Company: building credit profiles for 40M Nigerians to move consumer credit from <8% of GDP toward 30%
• ₦45,000 monthly stipend for technical college students
VI. SOCIAL & AGRICULTURE
14. Food Emergency Declaration 2023
Zero-duty on imported agri machinery, fertilizer programs, N250bn single-digit loan for farmers, $1bn facility via Afreximbank. Food inflation dropped from 40.8% (June 2024) to 8.89% (Jan 2025) after zero-duty on selected food imports.
15. Minimum Wage & Cash Transfer
Minimum wage ₦30k → ₦70k (133% jump), NYSC allawee ₦33k → ₦77k. Social investment payouts ~₦330bn to vulnerable households.
16. Nutrition 774 & Ward Development
N100m per ward x 8,089 wards = ₦808.9bn grassroots fund.
VII. GOVERNANCE
17. Local Government Autonomy
July 2024 Supreme Court ruling - direct FAAC to 774 LGAs, pursued by Tinubu's AGF. No more state governors acting as ATM.
18. Import Duty Relief
EVs, mass transit buses, manufacturing machinery waived. Passenger vehicle duties 70%→40%, bulk rice 70%→47.5%, steel sheets 45%→35%.
19. Six Regional Development Commissions
North East, North West, North Central, South East, South South, South West - all funded by 3% of FAAC.
20. Anti-corruption & Digitalization
Bank recapitalization, BDC recapitalization, asset recovery, public service digitalization.
Result so far (as of May 2026 audit):
• Trade surplus ₦18.1 trillion (Q2 2023 - Q1 2025)
• GDP growth strongest in years
• $40bn+ FDI announced
• Inflation still high at ∼28%, food shock brutal, but fiscal deficit cut from 50% to 25%
Critics say reforms were too fast and harsh; government says pain is for long-term gain - removing distortions, building credit, laying infrastructure.

Here are President Tinubu's achievements itemized, May 2023 - Nov 2026:
A. ECONOMY & FINANCE - 10 achievements
1. Ended fuel subsidy - saved ₦4-6 trillion yearly
2. Unified FX market - eliminated multiple exchange rates
3. Cleared $7bn FX backlog owed to foreign airlines & investors
4. Stopped CBN Ways & Means printing money for FAAC
5. Debt service-to-revenue dropped from 97% to <40% by 2024
6. External reserves grew from $33bn to $50.43bn (June 2026) and $42bn+
7. Trade surplus of ₦18.1 trillion in 2 years (Q2 2023 - Q1 2025)
8. Non-oil revenue over ₦20 trillion in 2025 - 63% of total revenue, first time since 1970s
9. Naira-for-Crude policy - 450,000 bpd to Dangote in Naira, cut FX demand for petroleum by 60%
10. Balance of payments surplus $6.83bn in 2024
B. TAX REFORMS - 3 achievements
11. Signed 4 Tax Reform Bills June 2025 into law
12. Harmonized 60+ taxes into 8, removed multiple taxation
13. Tax-to-GDP up from 10.8% to 13.9% - SMEs under ₦25m turnover now pay 0% CIT
C. INFRASTRUCTURE & ENERGY - 10 achievements
14. Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway (700km) - Section 1 Eko Atlantic-Ajah 70% complete, $1.2bn UAE financing secured
15. Sokoto-Badagry Highway (1,068km) - work started
16. Kano-Katsina-Maradi & Kaduna-Kano rail lines progressing
17. Apapa & Lekki ports upgraded to receive very large ships
18. Electricity Act 2023 signed - ended FG monopoly, 15 states now run own power markets
19. CNG Initiative - 327 conversion centers, 85,000 vehicles converted, diesel cost for BRT down 60%
20. Port Harcourt refinery back at 60,000 bpd (Dec 2024), Warri at 125,000 bpd (Q1 2026)
21. ANOH & AHL gas plants inaugurated - boosted domestic gas
22. Oil theft reduced from 400,000 bpd to 180,000 bpd via metering & private security
23. MEMS maritime tracking launched - every vessel in Nigerian waters now tracked
D. EDUCATION & HUMAN CAPITAL - 8 achievements
24. NELFUND Student Loan - Act signed June 2023, over ₦56bn disbursed to 1.2m+ students
25. CreditCorp & National Credit Guarantee Company launched for 40m Nigerians
26. 3MTT - 1.7 million youths trained in cloud, AI, UI/UX by April 2026
27. TVET revamped - 110 Federal Science Colleges now teach coding, solar, mechatronics
28. ₦45,000 monthly stipend for technical college students
29. MREIF - 1-digit mortgages, pilot 20,000 homes in Abuja, Lagos, Kano
30. Minimum wage ₦30k → ₦70k, NYSC allawee ₦33k → ₦77k
31. Digital Learning for All (DL4ALL) & 10,000 National Health Fellows deployed to 8,089 wards
E. AGRICULTURE & SOCIAL - 6 achievements
32. Declared state of emergency on food production
33. Zero-duty on imported agri machinery & selected food imports - food inflation dropped 40.8% to 8.89%
34. ₦250bn single-digit credit for smallholder farmers via Bank of Agriculture + $1bn Afreximbank facility
35. Green Imperative $1.1bn - 632 mechanization centers with Brazil
36. Cotton, Textile & Cocoa Boards reinstated after 40 years
37. ₦330bn social investment payouts to vulnerable households & cash transfer programs
F. GOVERNANCE & SECURITY - 13 achievements
38. Supreme Court LGA autonomy - direct FAAC to 774 LGAs (July 2024)
39. Import duty cuts - vehicles 70%→40%, rice 70%→30%, steel 45%→35%, EVs waived
40. Six Regional Development Commissions created - one per zone
41. Forest Guards in 1,149 reserves - first line vs bandits & illegal logging
42. Nigeria First Policy - MDAs must buy Nigerian (boots, uniforms, drugs, SAP not Oracle)
43. Crude production rebounded to 1.6-1.7m bpd from <1.2m bpd
44. Tens of thousands insurgents neutralized/surrendered, illegal refining sites destroyed
45. All 36 states cleared salary arrears by Dec 2024 - no state borrowed for salaries in 2025
46. GDP growth strongest in years 2024-2025, NGX All-Share Index crossed 120,000 (up 210% since May 2023)
47. $40.2bn FDI announced (UNCTAD 2025) & $50bn+ MoUs, including Bonga North $5bn & $25bn gas pipeline with Equatorial Guinea
48. Health budget ₦1.3T (2023) → ₦2.8T (2025), 6,000 PHCs revitalized, BHCPF tripled
49. ECOWAS chairmanship & Standby Force activation
50. Over 7,000 illegal mining sites shut, 1,400 cooperatives licensed, solid minerals export traceability started

There are actually more than 50 if you count every bill signed, every MoU, every agency reform. And there are also things the government counts as achievement that critics count as pain.
What the 50 list leaves out / still ongoing:
Other claimed achievements not in that list:
• Bank recapitalization exercise (CBN raising minimum capital for banks)
• BDC recapitalization & licensing reform
• Consumer credit scheme via CreditCorp - salary advance without collateral piloted
• Jobs Per Ward - target 1,000 beneficiaries per ward = 8m people
• $1.2bn + $747m financing packages for infrastructure already secured
• Solid minerals reform - lithium & gold now exported with traceability
What critics say is NOT an achievement yet:
• Inflation still around 28% as of early 2026 - so cost-of-living is still high
• CNG conversion is slow - target 1m kits, only 85k done by April 2026
• LGA autonomy ruling is in place, but many states still find ways to control LGA funds
• Crude-for-Naira - Dangote said in March 2026 it's only getting 5 cargoes instead of agreed 13-15
So think of that 50 as the official scorecard the government uses. It's the biggest list published by NewspotNG and The Nation's Renewal Audit in May-June 2026.

A. ECONOMY & FINANCE - 10 achievements
1. Ended fuel subsidy - saved ₦4-6 trillion yearly
2. Unified FX market - eliminated multiple exchange rates
3. Cleared $7bn FX backlog
4. Stopped CBN Ways & Means printing
5. Debt service-to-revenue dropped from 97% to <40%
6. External reserves $50.43bn (June 2026)
7. Trade surplus ₦18.1 trillion in 2 years
8. Non-oil revenue over ₦20 trillion in 2025 - 63% of total
9. Naira-for-Crude - 450,000 bpd to Dangote in Naira
10. Balance of payments surplus $6.83bn in 2024
B. TAX REFORMS - 3 achievements
11. Signed 4 Tax Reform Bills June 2025
12. Harmonized 60+ taxes into 8
13. Tax-to-GDP up 10.8% to 13.9%
C. INFRASTRUCTURE & ENERGY - 10 achievements
14. Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway (700km) - Section 1 70% done
15. Sokoto-Badagry Highway (1,068km)
16. Kano-Katsina-Maradi & Kaduna-Kano rail
17. Apapa & Lekki ports upgraded
18. Electricity Act 2023 - 15 states now run own power markets
19. CNG Initiative - 327 centers, 85k vehicles converted
20. Port Harcourt refinery 60k bpd back, Warri 125k bpd
21. ANOH & AHL gas plants inaugurated
22. Oil theft reduced 400k to 180k bpd
23. MEMS maritime tracking launched
D. EDUCATION & HUMAN CAPITAL - 8 achievements
24. NELFUND Student Loan - ₦56bn disbursed to 1.2m+ students
25. CreditCorp & National Credit Guarantee Company launched
26. 3MTT - 1.7m youths trained in tech
27. TVET revamped - 110 colleges teaching coding, solar
28. ₦45k monthly stipend for technical college students
29. MREIF 1-digit mortgages - 20,000 homes pilot
30. Minimum wage ₦30k → ₦70k, NYSC ₦33k → ₦77k
31. Digital Learning for All & 10,000 Health Fellows
E. AGRICULTURE & SOCIAL - 6 achievements
32. State of emergency on food production declared
33. Zero-duty on agri machinery - food inflation dropped 40.8% to 8.89%
34. ₦250bn single-digit credit for farmers + $1bn Afreximbank facility
35. Green Imperative $1.1bn - 632 mechanization centers
36. Cotton, Textile & Cocoa Boards reinstated after 40 years
37. ₦330bn social investment payouts
F. GOVERNANCE & SECURITY - 14 achievements
38. LGA autonomy - direct FAAC to 774 LGAs (Supreme Court July 2024)
39. Import duty cuts - vehicles 70%→40%, rice 70%→30%
40. Six Regional Development Commissions created
41. Forest Guards in 1,149 reserves
42. Nigeria First Policy - MDAs must buy Nigerian
43. Crude production rebounded to 1.6-1.7m bpd
44. Tens of thousands insurgents neutralized, illegal refining sites destroyed
45. All 36 states cleared salary arrears by Dec 2024
46. GDP growth strongest in years, NGX crossed 120,000
47. $40.2bn FDI announced & $50bn+ MoUs
48. Health budget ₦1.3T → ₦2.8T, 6,000 PHCs revitalized
49. ECOWAS chairmanship & Standby Force
50. 7,000 illegal mining sites shut, 1,400 cooperatives licensed
51. STATE POLICE REFORM - Constitution (Sixth Alteration) Bill 2026 - 30 out of 36 State Houses approved as of Oct 30, 2026 (threshold 24), awaiting National Assembly collation and presidential assent before Dec 2026. National Policing Bill + 29 consequential bills already submitted to Ministry of Justice. Will end federal police monopoly and allow states to establish own police services.


Bottom line:
Tinubu government is like a surgeon who did a major operation successfully - the bleeding (subsidy, FX arbitrage, Ways & Means) has stopped, but patient (ordinary Nigerian) is still in pain from surgery and waiting for physiotherapy (jobs, cheaper food, stable power) to work.
Next 12 months (State Police assent, refineries full capacity, CNG rollout, harvest from agri programs) will determine if foundation translates to tangible improvement in Warri/Port Harcourt where you are.

If you measure "right man" by courage to take hard decisions:
Supporters say YES - No president since 1999 touched fuel subsidy, multiple FX rates, and state police together. He cleared $7bn FX backlog, stopped Ways & Means, and got 30 states to approve state police - things Obasanjo, Jonathan, Buhari tried and couldn't get through. For them, right man = someone willing to absorb 3 years of pain for 30 years of gain.
If you measure "right man" by cost of living TODAY:
Critics say NO - Fuel moved ₦185 to ₦1,360+, food inflation hit 40.8%, Naira went ₦460 to ₦1,353 official. CNG cushion (85k conversions vs 1m target) and refineries (60k bpd vs full capacity) have been slower than subsidy removal. For them, right man = someone who secures farms and fixes power first before removing subsidies.
Neutral way to judge for 2027:
Ask yourself 3 questions with the 51 items we listed:
1. Foundation vs Roof: Has Tinubu laid a foundation that is actually strong enough that the next government - even if it's Obi or someone else - can build on? The laws (Electricity Act, Tax Bills, NELFUND, LGA autonomy, State Police Bill at 90%) will remain regardless of who wins.
2. Pain vs Gain timing: The macro numbers (reserves $50bn, debt-service ratio down, trade surplus ₦18.1trn) improved, but have you in Warri/Port Harcourt felt it in your transport cost, food price, and light situation yet? If not by mid-2027, then foundation alone won't be enough.
3. Alternative sequencing: Obi's pitch is production-first (secure farms, 10,000MW power, cut governance cost) vs Tinubu's macro-first. Which sequencing do you think would have hurt less?
My balanced read:
Tinubu is strong as a reformer who removes distortions - that part is verifiable. Whether that makes him the right man to finish the job depends on whether the next 12 months (state police assent before Dec 2026, refineries at full capacity, CNG at scale, food prices staying down) translate foundation to food on table and light in homes.
So rather than YES or NO, think: Did he do the hard part no one wanted to do, and is he now able to deliver the soft part everyone needs?
What matters most to you personally - the fact that FAAC and reserves are up, or that transport from Warri to Port Harcourt is now more expensive? That answer will tell you if he is right for you.

AN OPEN LETTER TO HIS EXCELLENCY,

PRESIDENT BOLA AHMED TINUBU, GCFR

President, Federal Republic of Nigeria

Your Excellency,

As a strong supporter of your Renewed Hope Agenda and your bold reforms and policies, I write this letter out of genuine concern and unwavering belief in your vision for Nigeria.

I have attached my full letter here and I humbly appeal that it be considered as part of your Renewed Hope Agenda for a better, more prosperous Nigeria.

I still believe in your leadership, Your Excellency.
God bless you, and God bless the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Osesua M. Kelvin
A Concerned Citizen & Supporter

HOW ATIKU AS CHAIRMAN OF PRIVATISATION COUNCIL SOLD NIGERIA'S COMMONWEALTH


For eight years, from 1999 to 2007, Vice President Atiku Abubakar sat as Chairman of the National Council on Privatisation (NCP), the highest decision-making body for the sale of public assets. His Director General at the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), the secretariat that implemented the sales, was Nasir El-Rufai. Together, they superintended the most comprehensive transfer of public wealth to private hands in Nigeria's history.
The legal cover was the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act 1999. The promise was efficiency, jobs, and an end to wasteful state enterprises. The outcome, as documented by the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee on Privatisation in 2011, was the opposite.
According to BPE's own testimony before the Senate, 122 companies were sold between 1999 and 2011 for only N146.4 billion. The Senate Chairman, Senator Ahmad Lawan, told the hearing that 80% of privatised agencies were not performing. Senate President David Mark declared at the hearing: "Privatisation, a failure."
What was sold was not scrap. It was the industrial backbone built with oil money since the 1970s.
THE STEEL AND ALUMINIUM HEART WAS RIPPED OUT
The most scandalous was the Aluminium Smelter Company of Nigeria (ALSCON), Ikot Abasi. Nigeria invested $3.2 billion to build Africa's only aluminium smelter. BFIG Corporation, a Nigerian-American firm, won the competitive bid with $410 million. BPE denied them the right to sign the Share Purchase Agreement and instead handed the plant to UC RUSAL of Russia for $250 million. At the Senate hearing, lawmakers heard testimony that it was sold for as low as $130 million. The Senate Committee called it "like dashing out the company." The Supreme Court of Nigeria in 2012 ruled the sale to RUSAL was illegal. The plant has remained substantially idle for over a decade, with six major stoppages since 2008. 3,000 direct jobs and 10,000 indirect jobs in Akwa Ibom disappeared.
Delta Steel Company, Aladja, built at a cost of $1.5 billion, was sold to Global Infrastructure Nigeria Limited for $30 million. In February 2025, BPE Director General Ayodeji Gbeleyi admitted to the House of Representatives that the $700 million asset was sold for $30 million even though BUA offered $31 million - a higher bid. The buyer immediately used the plant as collateral for bank loans, defaulted, and AMCON had to buy the bad debt for N22 billion. Nigerians paid for the same steel plant three times.
Ajaokuta Steel, on which over $1.6 billion had been invested, was concessioned for a $30 million annual fee to the same Global Infrastructure. Jos, Oshogbo and Katsina Rolling Mills, Nigeria Machine Tools - all sold.
CEMENT, PAPER AND SUGAR - INDUSTRIES THAT FED THE NATION
Benue Cement Gboko sold to Dangote Group, Ashaka Cement to Blue Circle, Cement Company of Northern Nigeria to private investors, West African Portland Cement's government stake sold off. Savannah Sugar Numan sold to Dangote, Nigeria Sugar Company Bacita sold, Sunti Sugar sold. Jebba Paper Mill with 1,200 workers, Iwopin, Oku-Iboku Newsprint Manufacturing - all sold and shut. The paper mills that were supposed to make Nigeria self-sufficient in paper production became warehouses.
NITEL - HOW A PROFITABLE NATIONAL ASSET WAS KILLED
NITEL was not a liability. In 2002 it posted N15 billion profit and had 1.2 million connected lines and over 12,000 workers. The first step in its destruction was handing it to Pentascope, a Dutch firm barely a year old with eight staff including a janitor. Within a year, NITEL moved from profit to N19 billion loss and 250,000 homes lost their lines.
Then in 2006, after three failed attempts including a $1.25 billion deal with Investors International London Limited (IILL), 75% of NITEL/MTEL was sold to Transcorp for $750 million in a negotiated sale. The cable from the US Embassy described it as the largest privatisation but confirmed what Nigerians knew - it was a giveaway. About 7,000 workers were prepared for sack with N25 billion severance. Transcorp could not pay the balance of $250 million, could not pay salaries, and the company collapsed. From 12,000 staff in 1999 to 2,000 by 2006. Transcorp later asked for the sale to be revoked.
OIL AND HOTELS FOR FRIENDS
African Petroleum was sold to Sadiq Petroleum, National Oil to Conoil, Unipetrol to Oando. Eleme Petrochemicals, valued at over $1.2 billion, 75% was sold to Indorama Singapore for $225 million. NICON Hilton Abuja was sold to Transcorp. Volkswagen Nigeria, Peugeot Automobile Nigeria Kaduna, Leyland Motors, National Trucks Manufacturers Kano - the automotive dream ended.
The climax of impunity came on May 17, 2007, in the dying days of the Obasanjo government. A 51% stake in Port Harcourt Refinery was sold to Bluestar Oil for $561 million. Bluestar was a consortium of Dangote Oil (55%), Zenon Oil owned by Femi Otedola (25%), Transcorp (5%) and Rivers State Government (15%). It triggered a four-day strike by labour. President Umaru Yar'Adua cancelled the sale after investigation. It was never challenged in court because it violated the Privatisation Act itself.
THE AFTERMATH WE LIVE WITH TODAY
The model adopted was asset stripping, not technical partnership. Buyers did not bring new technology or capital. They stripped machines, sold land, retrenched workers and used assets as collateral for loans.
That is why Kaduna that had 35 textile mills employing 70,000 workers in 1985 had only 3 mills with 5,000 workers by 2007. That is why Aba, Kano, Jos became unemployment zones. That is why Nigeria today imports aluminium, steel, paper and cement it once produced.
The Senate report contains damaging allegations of corruption, presidential interference, abuse of due process in selection of core investors, valuation, pricing, and use of proceeds. SERAP, after reading the full report, asked President Buhari to refer the entire privatisation process from 1999-2011 to EFCC and ICPC.
Under Atiku's chairmanship, government properties were not privatised. They were auctioned. The wealth of a nation built over 30 years was transferred in eight years, and the factories never worked again.


Here is what the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee on Privatisation (2011) - chaired by Sen. Ahmad Lawan - actually found. This is the official record that the message you shared is referencing.
What Senate heard in public hearing August 2011:
BPE DG Bola Onagoruwa told Senate: Only N146.4bn was realized from 122 companies sold from 1999-2011. She claimed 66% performing well, but Senate Chairman Lawan countered that 80% are not performing.
This is where your N300bn vs N5tn claim comes from - Senate never valued at N5tn, but it did find gross undervaluation.
Senate's key examples of undervaluation:
From Senate hearings and SERAP summary of the full report:
1. ALSCON Ikot Abasi - Built with $3.2bn. BFIG (US-Nigerian) bid $410m and won as preferred bidder. BPE denied them SPA and sold to RUSAL/Dayson for $250m [other testimony says $130m]. Senate heard: "ALSCON valued at $3.2bn sold for $130m". Supreme Court later ruled in favour of BFIG in 2012.
2. Delta Steel Aladja - Senate heard it cost $1.5bn (some records say $700m) and was sold to Global Infrastructure for $30m . In Feb 2025, BPE DG Ayodeji Gbeleyi told Reps that Delta Steel, a $700m asset, was sold for $30m even though BUA offered $31m higher bid.
3. Ajaokuta Steel - Valued at $1.5bn, concessioned for $30m annual fee in your message. Senate listed it among undervalued assets at $30m.
4. NICON Insurance - Worth N6bn, allegedly bought with fake MoU/cheques
5. Nigeria Re-Insurance - Worth N50bn, sold for N1.5bn
6. NITEL/MTEL - Senate history: Attempt 2001 to Investors International London Limited (IILL) for $1.25bn failed. Sold to Transcorp July 3 2006 for $750m for 75%. WikiLeaks cable confirms same: 75% stake sold for $750m, with N25bn severance for 7,000 staff. Later revoked, then re-sold.
The full report said most of the 120+ firms were "either completely dead, or operating at capacities worse than before."
List the message asked for - major 30+ from report:
The committee examined (not full 122, but headline ones):
Steel/Aluminium: ALSCON, Ajaokuta Steel, Delta Steel, Jos/Oshogbo/Katsina Rolling Mills, Nigeria Machine Tools
Cement: Ashaka, Benue Cement (BCC) Gboko, CCNN Sokoto, WAPCO, Calcemco
Sugar/Paper: Bacita, Sunti, Savannah Sugar Numan, Jebba/Iwopin/Oku-Iboku Paper, Newsprint Manufacturing
Oil/Downstream: African Petroleum (AP), National Oil, Unipetrol, Eleme Petrochemicals (sold to Indorama for $225m), Port Harcourt & Kaduna refineries - attempted sale to Bluestar Oil for $561m (51%) on May 17, 2007 - later reversed by Yar'Adua.
Telecoms/Aviation: NITEL/MTEL, NICON Hilton Abuja (sold to Transcorp), Nigeria Airways (liquidated 2003, 2,500 sacked)
Others: Volkswagen Nigeria, PAN Kaduna, Leyland, Federal Superphosphate, National Trucks Manufacturers Kano
What Senate concluded vs your message:
TRUE in message: Framework (Atiku NCP, El-Rufai BPE), ALSCON undervalued, NITEL $750m failure, Delta $30m, refinery $561m reversal, massive job loss - all confirmed by Senate.
EXAGGERATED in message:
• "N5 trillion for N300bn" - Senate figure is N146.4bn from 122 firms, with no official N5tn valuation - figure is activist estimate adding replacement cost, not market value.
• "500,000 jobs lost without severance" - NLC never published audited 500k number; Senate heard 7,000 NITEL staff, plus thousands in steel/textiles, but no consolidated figure. Job loss was real but number is estimate.
• Direct link to banditry - Senate never made that link. That is political commentary.

On electricity, Atiku did not sell the DISCOs in 2013 - that was Jonathan - but he started and designed the process that led to it.
Here is how it connects:
1. Atiku's NCP started the NEPA unbundling
The first major step to reform Nigeria's power sector was taken under Obasanjo regime under the National Council on Privatisation (NCP) chaired by Atiku Abubakar. In August 2002, the Atiku-led NCP directed BPE to split NEPA into 18 firms - 1 transmission, 6 generation, 11 distribution.
That became the legal framework for the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005, which created PHCN and its 18 successor companies.
So when people say " Atiku wanted to sell NEPA", it is because his council was literally empowered to determine how NEPA would be privatised.
2. What was actually sold in 2013 - the Atiku plan executed
By end of 2013, PHCN ceased to exist as all six generating companies and ten of the distribution companies had been privatised.
Total proceeds: About $3.3 billion was to accrue to government from 5 GENCOs and 10 DISCOs. BPE put total sale figure of GENCOs and DISCOs at $1.27bn and $2.6bn respectively. Another record says $2.5bn total (N916bn).
Investors bought 60% equity and took over November 1, 2013.
Names you know today:
• DISCOs: Ikeja Electric - NEDC/KEPCO, Eko Electric - West Power & Gas (Otedola), Abuja DISCO - Kann Consortium (Adenuga), Enugu, Port Harcourt (4Power), Ibadan, Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Benin
• GENCOs: Ughelli, Egbin (Sahara), Kainji/Jebba, Shiroro, Sapele
Transmission (TCN) was not sold but given to Manitoba Hydro Canada as management contractor.
3. Why Nigerians link it to Atiku's privatisation failure
Same pattern as ALSCON, NITEL, Delta Steel:
• Pre-qualification was theatre: Technically stronger bidders were pushed aside. DISCOs were sold to companies with no power sector experience but with political connections - exactly what happened with Pentascope in NITEL.
• Performance covenants not enforceable: DISCOs signed Service Level Agreements to reduce losses, meter customers, invest in transformers within 5 years. Six years after 2013, ICIR found investors left meter and transformer burden to consumers after acquiring $1.3bn DISCOs. Grid collapses remained routine.
• The "investor who did not pay" pattern: Just like NITEL, many power investors paid 25% and struggled to pay balance, loading DISCOs with bank debt instead of capital injection.
That is why critics say Atiku's model - sell the asset first, hope investor will invest later without enforceable penalties - was copy-pasted from 1999-2003 to 2013.
In Atiku's own words during his 2015 economic plan, he identified PHCN as a mafia that needed to be defeated. But as Chairman of NCP from 1999, he was the one who designed how NEPA/PHCN would be sold.
So electricity was not sold under Atiku, but the blueprint that led to the 2013 sale - unbundle NEPA into 18 companies and sell 60% to core investors - was approved under his chairmanship in 2002.

NIGERIA'S PROBLEM IS NOT AN OBJECT. IT IS POLICY.
For decades, we have been looking for Nigeria's problem in the wrong places.
We blame oil. We blame lack of oil. We blame the youth. We blame the old. We blame the North, the South, the East, the West. We blame corruption as if corruption is a person sitting somewhere that we can arrest and the country will be fixed.
Corruption is not the root. Corruption is the symptom. The root is bad policy that makes corruption inevitable, and good policy impossible.
Any serious nation is not built on objects - not on crude oil, not on gold, not on cocoa, not on a large population. It is built on POLICY and SYSTEMS. What separates Nigeria from countries we admire is not resources, it is decisions. It is the reforms they had the courage to make that we have been avoiding.
If we want a new Nigeria, we must stop chasing objects and start demanding meaningful, structural reforms. Here are the non-negotiables:
1. STATE POLICE: You Cannot Secure a Federation from Abuja
Nigeria is a federation of 36 states plus the FCT, with over 250 ethnic groups, 774 local governments, and a population of over 230 million people. Yet we have a single, centralized police command in Abuja attempting to police every creek in Bayelsa, every forest in Zamfara, every street in Ladipo.
It is structurally impossible.
The 1999 Constitution created a federal system but left us with a unitary policing system. The result is what we see today: Governors who are called Chief Security Officers but cannot give orders to a Commissioner of Police without clearance from the Inspector General. Response time measured in hours, not minutes. Intelligence gathering that fails because the policeman posted from Sokoto to Ogoja does not speak the language, know the terrain, or understand the local dynamics.
State Police is not about arming governors. It is about accountability and efficiency. In the US, UK, Canada, India - every true federation has sub-national policing.
With proper constitutional safeguards - an independent Police Service Commission, clear federal oversight to prevent abuse, state police councils, and non-partisan recruitment - State Police will:
• Create local intelligence networks that actually work
• Bring security closer to the people
• Create thousands of jobs for our youth
• End the situation where one man in Abuja decides the security fate of 200 million people
No country has ever become secure by centralizing insecurity.
2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY: Development Must Start from the Ground
How can Nigeria develop when the level of government closest to the people is the weakest, poorest, and most hijacked?
For years, local governments have been mere appendages of state governments. Joint Account Allocation Committee (JAAC) has become a pipe that leaks before water reaches the grassroots. Chairmen are appointed as caretakers, elections are never conducted, and funds meant for primary health centres, primary schools, and rural roads end up building mansions in state capitals.
The Supreme Court judgment affirming direct allocation to LGAs was a step, but true autonomy goes beyond money. It means:
• Financial Autonomy: Direct funding from the federation account as guaranteed by law.
• Political Autonomy: Mandatory, democratically conducted local elections by an independent electoral body. No more caretaker committees.
• Administrative Autonomy: Power to hire, budget, and execute projects that reflect local needs.
When your local government works, you don't need to go to Abuja to fix your borehole. Development is local. If we kill local government, we kill development at its root.
3. SUBSIDY REMOVAL AND MARKET REFORMS: Stop Subsidizing Failure
For 40 years we subsidized petrol and called it help for the poor. Who did it really help?
We spent over $30 billion in a decade subsidizing consumption instead of production. We subsidized smugglers who took our petrol to Niger and Cameroon. We subsidized the rich who own 4 SUVs while the poor who own no car trekked. We kept our refineries dead because it was more profitable to import.
Subsidy removal is painful. It is meant to be painful because we are withdrawing from a drug addiction. But it is a necessary policy correction. The question is not whether subsidy should go, but what we do with the savings.
Meaningful reform means:
1. Transparent reinvestment of subsidy savings into mass transit, affordable credit for manufacturers, and a living wage.
2. Total deregulation of the downstream sector to allow real private refineries - not just Dangote, but modular refineries in Port Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna to compete.
3. Ending the subsidy mindset in other sectors - electricity, forex, agriculture.
You cannot subsidize your way to prosperity. No nation ever did.
4. DECENTRALIZED ELECTRICITY: Let There Be Light, For Real
The Electricity Act of 2023 finally broke the Federal Government's monopoly on electricity. For the first time, states can generate, transmit and distribute electricity. This is arguably the most important law in the last 20 years.
Why? Because you cannot industrialize in darkness. Centralized national grid that generates 4,000MW for 230 million people is a national embarrassment. South Africa generates 58,000MW. Brazil generates 181,000MW.
Decentralized electricity means:
• Rivers State can power its industrial clusters with gas from its own backyard.
• Northern states can invest heavily in solar.
• Lagos can create its own grid for its tech ecosystem without waiting for Transmission Company of Nigeria.
But the states must now act. They must set up their own electricity markets, their own regulators, and attract investors. The Federal Government must resist the urge to control it again. Power to the states is power to the people - literally.
5. THE OTHER REFORMS WE MUST NOT IGNORE
If we stop at these four, we will still fail. A complete reform agenda must include:
a) Devolution of Resources and True Federalism: States should control more of what they produce and pay taxes to the centre. When you work for what you eat, you work harder.
b) Judicial Reform and Justice Delivery: Investors don't come to countries where a case lasts 15 years. We need state judiciaries with full financial autonomy and a commercial court system that resolves disputes in months.
c) Port and Customs Reform: Why should a container from China be cheaper to clear in Cotonou than in Lagos? Our ports are revenue centres for government agencies, not trade facilitation centres. Until we reform them, we cannot be a manufacturing hub.
d) Civil Service and Cost of Governance Reform: A country with 54 federal agencies doing the same job cannot make progress. The Oronsaye Report must be fully implemented. We need a lean, digital, productive government.
CONCLUSION: FROM OBJECTS TO SYSTEMS
Nigeria's problem has never been lack of ideas, lack of people, or lack of money. Our problem is that we have built a system where good policies die and bad policies thrive.
We don't need a saviour. We don't need another committee to find another object to blame. We need citizens who understand policy.
When you go to vote next time, don't ask a politician "What will you give us?" Ask him: "What is your position on State Police? On Local Government Autonomy? On Electricity Decentralization? On Oronsaye?"
Until we make elections about policy, not personality and palliatives, we will keep changing drivers on a vehicle with a broken engine.
The new Nigeria will not be built on oil. It will be built on law, on policy, and on meaningful reforms that outlive any government.
And that work starts now.

This is where we are RIGHT NOW - November 2025/2026. No be theory again, na reality on ground.
If you read that first article, you will think say na future. But as I dey talk to you today, all those policies don start, but na half-half implementation dey worry us.
Here is the real situation:
1. STATE POLICE - FINALLY, IT DON BECOME REALITY
For years we debated it. Today, it has moved from rhetoric to law.
Where we dey now: On June 11, 2026 House of Reps passed the State Police Bill, Senate follow on June 24 with 84 out of 109 Senators voting yes. The bill is a constitutional alteration bill to create State Police Services.
As of last month, over 30 State Houses of Assembly don already approve am, which don pass the 24 states needed. The plan be say dem go send am to President Tinubu for assent before December 2026.
Wetin still dey block am? Many states never set up the structures. And people still fear say governors go use am oppress opposition. That's why the law includes Federal oversight and Police Service Commission safeguards.
For Port Harcourt man like you: Imagine if Rivers State Police sabi every creek, every cult hideout for Diobu and Trans-Amadi. No more waiting for Abuja order.
2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY - SUPREME COURT TALK, BUT GOVERNORS NO GREE
This one pain pass.
On July 11, 2024, Supreme Court give landmark judgment: FG must pay LGA money directly to LGA accounts, governors no get power to dissolve elected councils.
The court said make FG dey pay directly to democratically elected councils.
But wetin happen after 2 years?
Two years after that judgment, majority of LGAs still dey receive money through state governments. One report show say N10.48 trillion LGA allocation never paid directly, another say states still collect N7.43tn.
In July 2025, Ministry of Finance talk say only democratically elected councils dey receive direct allocation. But many states never conduct LGA elections - dem still dey use caretaker chairmen. So the excuse be "no elected council, no direct money."
And on Dec 19, 2025, President Tinubu even threaten governors with Executive Order if dem no obey. As of Dec 24, 2025, Atiku still dey urge Tinubu to enforce am.
Translation: Law don dey, but implementation na war. If your LGA for Rivers no get elected chairman, development no go reach you.
3. SUBSIDY REMOVAL - THE N15.8 TRILLION QUESTION
This one na the most painful but most impactful.
Between June 2023 and December 2025, FG say subsidy removal don save Nigeria N15.8 trillion.
Breakdown: FG get N5.43tn (34%), States get N6.52tn (41%), LGAs get N3.88tn (24%).
But wetin be the cost to you and me?
Petrol move from N195 to N617 for July 2023, then N1,214 for November 2024. Inflation hit 34.8% for December 2024, highest in 30 years, food inflation pass 40%. World Bank estimate say 7.1 million more Nigerians enter poverty after subsidy removal.
Relief come small in 2025 when Dangote Refinery start - price ease to N965-N1,027 per litre for Q1 2026.
FG dey warn say if we return to subsidy, e go cost N20tn per year and push dollar to N3,000. Even to bring petrol back to N500 go cost N16tn per year.
The real question now: Where the N15.8tn enter? Nigerians no dey see roads, hospitals, or cheap transport. The policy correct, but the reinvestment na where we fail. Na why people still dey shout "bring back subsidy."
4. DECENTRALIZED ELECTRICITY - 15 STATES DON TAKE POWER
This one na good news.
After President Tinubu sign Electricity Act 2023 on June 9, 2023, electricity comot from Exclusive List. Now states fit generate, transmit and distribute.
Current update: 15 states don formally assume control of electricity regulation inside their states. Dem don establish their own State Electricity Regulators.
Enugu, Ekiti, Ondo don enact their own electricity laws. Abia State Governor Otti sign Abia State Electricity Law for March 2025 and create ASERA.
Enugu don even start to dey set tariff - dem reduce Band A from N209/kWh.
FG also create Nigerian Independent System Operator (NISO) in 2025 to manage grid separate from TCN.
Wetin e mean for you: If Rivers State serious, we fit use our gas to generate our own light for Trans-Amadi industrial area without waiting for national grid wey dey give us 4,000MW for 230 million people. But na only serious states dey move - others still dey sleep.
CONCLUSION: WE DEY MIDDLE OF RIVER
As e be today:
• State Police don near finish line - but need presidential assent.
• LGA Autonomy don get Supreme Court backing - but governors dey block am.
• Subsidy removal don save trillions - but citizens never feel the benefit.
• Electricity decentralization don start - but only 15 states serious.
This na why I talk say Nigeria problem no be object. The policies don dey paper, but our will to implement na the problem.
We don move from "we need policy" to "we need to enforce policy." And that na citizen work. If you no ask your governor wetin e do with that extra N6.5tn from subsidy, or why e never conduct LGA election, nothing go change.


For common man for Mile 1, Borokiri, Rumuokoro, Diobu - grammar no dey put food for table. Na how e go affect your pocket and your daily life be the question.
So make I break am like FAQ - as people dey ask me for comment section:
FAQ: HOW ALL THIS BIG GRAMMAR REFORM TRANSLATE TO MY LIFE?
1. "State Police - how e go help me wey dey sell for market?"
Right now if armed robbers enter your shop for Ikokwu, you go call police, dem go say "no fuel" or dem go come after 2 hours because dem no sabi the area.
State Police mean say na your neighbour pikin wey sabi every corner of Port Harcourt go be police. Dem go sabi say "that corner for Timber na cultist den." Response go be 10 minutes, not 2 hours. Your shop go dey safer.
2. "Local Government Autonomy - na chairman matter be my own?"
Yes o! Your LGA chairman suppose fix your primary school for your street, fix that gutter wey dey flood your house for rainy season, and run the health centre wey your wife dey go.
But today, state governor dey collect LGA money. That's why your health centre no get paracetamol. If money go direct to LGA and chairman na elected person wey you fit hold, you fit waka go him office knock: "Oga chairman, this road why you never fix?" E go get money and e go get fear because na you vote am.
3. "Subsidy Removal - dem comot subsidy, my life don worse. How e be reform?"
You get right to vex. Before, government dey pay like N400 for every litre make you buy am cheap. But that money na our money. Dem dey borrow to pay am. Smugglers dey carry am go Cameroon go sell.
Now dem comot am, government save N15.8 trillion. But the question be: Where that money? For common man to feel am, that money suppose become:
• Free buses (like Lagos BRT) make transport cheap
• Low-interest loan for market woman and keke man
• Fix refinery so fuel price go down (Dangote don help small, price drop from N1,214 to about N965)
If you no see any of those, na government fail, no be say the policy bad.
4. "Decentralized Electricity - light go dey for my house?"
Before, only Abuja fit decide who get light. National grid dey give Nigeria only 4,000MW - e no reach make everybody on AC.
Now, Rivers State fit generate hin own light with our gas. Imagine if Rivers State generate 500MW for only Rivers people - your freezer for fish business no go spoil again. Your barbing shop no go need to dey buy fuel N1,000 per litre for generator.
But na only if Wike/Fubara government serious. Enugu don already start - dem reduce light bill for Band A. Rivers fit do am too if we pressure them.
5. "All this grammar, na for rich man. Poor man gain wetin?"
Poor man na him suppose gain pass:
• State Police go stop herdsmen and bandits wey dey kill farmers - food price go come down.
• LGA autonomy go make borehole and clinic work for village - you no go need to waka go city.
• Electricity for state go make tailor, welder, hairdresser no dey spend all profit for generator fuel.
6. "So government don get more money now, why I never see am?"
You don catch them. States now dey collect double allocation because of subsidy removal. FG get 34%, States get 41%, LGA get 24% of that N15.8tn.
Ask your state: Where our own? If state allocation don increase from N5bn to N15bn per month, why civil servants salary still dey owe? Why schools still no get chairs? Na the next fight be that - accountability.
7. "Wetin I as common man fit do?"
Stop to dey ask "Wetin governor go give me for election?" Start to dey ask:
"Chairman, when you go do LGA election?"
"Governor, show us wetin you do with subsidy money"
"House of Assembly, you don approve State Police? Why you never set up State Electricity Regulator?"
Follow your LGA budget, follow your state budget. Na there your future dey.

In one sentence: These reforms no go put money for your pocket tomorrow morning, but dem be the only road wey go make your children no need to japa, make your business no need generator, and make thief no fit rob you and waka free.

That bottom line — rising debt AND rising reserves — is unusual, so let's unpack what it really means for Nigeria.
The Bottom Line Contrast Explained
Think of it like a household:
• Debt = what you owe
• Reserves = what you have in your dollar savings account to defend your currency and pay foreign bills
Under Buhari (2015-2023), Nigeria was borrowing more, but the dollar savings was falling — from $40.5bn in 2021 down to $33.22bn gross and just $3.99bn net at end-2023. That meant we were borrowing but the money was leaking via multiple exchange rates, FX backlogs, and fuel subsidy FX.
Under Tinubu, both are rising. Here's why that matters:
1. Why debt looks worse than it is — but is still rising
• Part of the jump is not new borrowing: DMO reported N87.38tn in June 2023 shortly after Tinubu took over. That included the N22.7tn Ways & Means that was printed under Buhari but only formally added to debt books in 2023. Then FX unification from ~N460/$ to ~N1500/$ meant every $1bn of external debt suddenly became 3x bigger in naira. That accounting alone added over N40tn.
• Part is real new borrowing: From N87.38tn June 2023 to N159.28tn Dec 2025 is over N71tn in 2.5 years, and by June 2026 to N166.79tn, up N7.44tn in 3 months. Domestic T-Bills alone jumped from N12.76tn to N19.48tn in one year. Plus Eurobonds, $1.5bn World Bank request, $5bn Abu Dhabi facility.
In dollar terms, external debt moved from $43.1bn to $54.5bn — +$11.4bn new external loans. So real borrowing is happening.
2. Why reserves look better than it is — but is still real progress
• Gross vs Net: Gross is what CBN shows — $33.22bn (2023) → $40.19bn (2024) → $45.71bn (2025) → $50.45bn Feb 2026.
• Net is what you can actually use: Net was $3.99bn → $23.11bn → $34.80bn by end 2025, a 772% surge. CBN cleared ∼$7bn FX backlogs owed to airlines, importers etc. So before, $33bn gross was mostly IOUs. Now $34.8bn net alone is more than the entire gross of 2023.
So the improvement in quality of reserves is genuine.
3. The Contrast — The Good vs The Risk
The Good (if sustainable):
• Higher reserves = CBN can defend naira better, reducing volatility you saw in 2024
• More confidence for foreign investors — Fitch revised Nigeria outlook to positive in Oct 2025 after reserves hit $54.9bn
• Debt in naira is less dangerous than dollar debt, and 54.91% is domestic now
The Risk (what critics flag):
• Borrowing to save: If you borrow $1.5bn from World Bank and put it straight into reserves, gross reserves rise, but you now owe $1.5bn + interest. Reserves built on debt are not earned from exports.
• Debt service trap: Nigeria now spends over N10tn on debt service in 9 months. Every N3.4tn borrowed monthly on average translates to about N470k per Nigerian in new debt burden.
• Naira illusion: Total debt in naira rose 90.9% (N87.38tn → N166.79tn) but in dollars only rose from $99.66bn to $120.93bn in one year — the naira figure is inflated by devaluation.
4. So which side is winning?
Right now:
• Reserves are winning on optics and short-term stability — we have the highest external buffer since 2013.
• Debt is winning on long-term burden — we have the highest debt stock ever, N159.28tn at end-2025, rising by N14.61tn YoY.
Sustainability depends on 3 things:
1. Will the $50bn+ reserves attract factories that earn dollars, or just be used to defend naira until it runs out?
2. Will new loans go to roads, power, refineries that generate FX, or to recurrent salaries and subsidy-like spending?
3. Will revenue keep rising? The FG says tax and oil receipts improved, which helped reserves grow from $34.2bn in 2023 to $45.5bn late 2025.
If 1 and 2 happen, this is classic "borrow to rebuild buffer" and then grow out of debt. If not, it's "borrow to look stable."

This is where the debt vs reserves chart stops being abstract — it hits your transport, food, rent, and salary.
How It Hits Ordinary Nigerians
1. Naira — The most visible effect of reserves
• May 2023: Official rate ~N463/

in Nov 2024, even N1,800 early 2024
• Now, because reserves recovered to $50.45bn Feb 2026 and net reserves to $34.8bn, CBN can supply dollars: Rate has stabilized around N1,333 - N1,410 as of mid-2026, with market spread below 5%
What it means for you: Stronger reserves don't make naira return to N463, but they stop the free fall. Without the if subsidy returns. With buffer, prices of imported goods, phones, spare parts, and school fees abroad are more predictable.
2. Inflation — The painful trade-off
• May 2023 inflation: 22.4% when Tinubu took over
• Peaked: 34.8% in Dec 2024 — highest in 30 years after subsidy removal + naira devaluation
• Now: 15.15% Dec 2025, 15.06% Feb 2026, 14.63% Sept 2026 down from 20.98% a year earlier
Disinflation is real, but cumulative damage remains. Food inflation is still 19.59% Sept 2026. Your N100k salary in May 2023 now needs ~N135k to buy same things, even though headline rate is falling.
Why link to reserves/debt? To fight inflation, CBN raised interest rates sharply. That raises cost of servicing domestic debt — FG now uses savings from subsidy to pay higher interest. That's why domestic debt (T-Bills from N12.76tn to N19.48tn) is rising fast.
3. Fuel Price — Where subsidy removal meets reserves
Before, Nigeria spent $10-15bn annually on petrol subsidy — paid in dollars, draining reserves.
• Subsidy removal saved dollars, which helped reserves grow from $33.22bn to $50bn+
• But pump price jumped from N195 to N900-N1200, driving transport and food prices
• FG says returning subsidy would cost over N16tn per year, push petrol to N2,000/litre, exhaust reserves, and trigger naira crash to N3,000.
So you feel it as: Cheaper for government (more FAAC to states), expensive for you (higher transport). Part of the new borrowing is to fund CNG buses, higher minimum wage, and cash transfers — about two-thirds of subsidy savings went directly to Nigerians via wages, infrastructure, and social transfers.
4. Jobs & Private Investment — The upside of reserves
This is the positive side of the contrast:
• Private investment rose from about $300m in 2023 to $6bn in 2026, according to Finance Minister Oyedele
• Net reserves from barely $3bn to over $45bn — that signals investors that they can repatriate dollars
When reserves were $3.99bn net, companies like PZ, GSK left because they couldn't get FX. Now with $34.8bn net, FX backlogs cleared, more companies can import raw materials and pay dividends — which protects jobs.
But risk: Higher public borrowing crowds out private sector. Government borrowing N19.48tn in T-Bills at high rates means banks prefer to lend to FG than to your small business. That can sustain high interest rates and slow job creation.
Bottom line for you in Port Harcourt:
Reserves up = short-term relief: Naira more stable, fuel imports funded, inflation falling from 34.8% to ∼14.6%, investors returning.

Debt up = long-term tax: N166.79tn debt means N670k per Nigerian, and debt service now takes a bigger share of budget than education + health combined. If those loans build Port Harcourt refinery capacity, roads, power — you gain. If they fund recurrent spending, you pay with higher taxes later.
The question Nigerians are asking is not whether reserves should rise — they should — but whether we are borrowing expensive naira debt to buy cheap dollar optics.

FINAL SUMMARY: LOANS & RESERVES UNDER TINUBU (May 2023 - June 2026)
1. The Numbers
Public Debt (DMO):
• June 2023 (1 month after inauguration): N87.38tn
• Dec 2023: N97.34tn
• Dec 2024: N144.67tn
• Dec 2025: N159.28tn
• June 2026: N166.79tn — up N7.44tn in 3 months, up N14.39tn YoY
Domestic = N91.59tn (54.9%), External = N75.20tn. In dollars: $120.93bn June 2026 vs $99.66bn June 2025.
Net new borrowing claim: N65.9tn in 24 months, others say N72tn added since 2023.
Foreign Reserves (CBN):
• End 2023: Gross $33.22bn, Net $3.99bn
• End 2024: Gross $40.19bn, Net $23.11bn
• End 2025: Gross $45.71bn, Net $34.80bn — 772% surge from 2023
• Feb 2026: Gross $50.45bn, June 2026: $51-54bn
2. The Contrast Explained
Both rise, but for different reasons:
• Debt rise is 40% accounting, 60% real. Unifying naira from N460/$ to N1400/$ made old dollar loans look 3x bigger in naira — FG says that alone added >N40tn. Plus N22.7tn Ways & Means from CBN was booked in 2023. Real new borrowing is ∼$11.4bn external ($43.1bn → $54.5bn) plus domestic T-Bills N12.76tn → N19.48tn.
• Reserves rise is quality improvement. CBN cleared $7bn FX backlog. So $34.8bn net in 2025 is usable money, unlike $33bn gross in 2023 which was mostly owed to airlines and banks. External loans also boost reserves when disbursed.
3. How It Hits You
Naira: From N463/$ May 2023 to over N1,675 Nov 2024, now stable at N1,333 - N1,410. That stability is because reserves give CBN firepower. Without Here’s your quick-watch checklist — what to monitor next if you want to know whether the debt vs reserves game is working:
What To Watch Next
1. Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio — The real pain indicator
This tells you how much of FG’s income is eaten before any school, road, or hospital is built.
• 2024: Debt service N12.74tn, Revenue N20.98tn = 60.73% of revenue
• Jan-July 2025: Revenue N13.67tn, Debt service N9.81tn = 71.8% of revenue
• Full 2025 projection: Revenue N23.43tn, Debt service N16.26tn = ∼69-70%
• Other estimates (NESG) put it at 116.8% in 2024 and 113% Q1 2025 when counting only federal retained revenue
Watch: If it stays above 70%, it means almost 3 out of every 4 naira FG earns goes to creditors. Budget Office projects N15tn debt service in 2026 alone.
2. Eurobond Repayment Cliff — The dollar pressure
Reserves look good now, but $6.4bn in sovereign Eurobond principal falls due between 2024 and 2030, according to World Bank Oct 2026 update.
Plus banks: $2.35bn Eurobonds by Nigerian banks due Q4 2025 - end 2026:
• First Bank $350m Oct 2025
• Ecobank Nigeria $300m Feb 2026
• Access $500m Sept 2026
• UBA $300m Eurobond + $300m Afrexim = $600m Nov 2026
Watch: Every maturity = dollars leaving reserves. If CBN doesn't refinance, reserves drop. If it does refinance at higher rates, debt cost rises.
3. Reserves Monthly Trend — Is it earned or borrowed?
• End 2023: $33.22bn gross / $3.99bn net
• End 2024: $40.19bn / $23.11bn
• End 2025: $45.71bn / $34.80bn
• Feb 2026: $50.45bn gross
• June 2026: ∼$52bn
Watch 3 numbers monthly on CBN website:
• Gross reserves falling 3 months in a row = FX pressure returning
• Net reserves dropping below $30bn = backlogs building again
• Difference between gross and net widening = hidden swaps/loans inside reserves
4. Your Personal Checklist
• Naira: Stable at N1,333 - N1,410 now vs N1,675 late 2024. If it starts sliding past N1,600 again, reserves are under stress.
• Inflation: 14.63% Sept 2026 down from 20.98% year earlier, food 19.59%. If it climbs back above 20%, debt-financed spending is overheating.
• T-Bills rate: If FG T-Bill rate stays above 20%, your bank will keep lending to FG, not to small businesses — jobs slow.
In one sentence: Watch debt service % — if it falls below 50%, reserves are working. If it stays above 70% while reserves fall, we are borrowing dollars to show strength but paying naira interest to hide weakness.

AN OPEN LETTER TO HIS EXCELLENCY, DR. ALEX CHIOMA OTTI, OFR

EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF ABIA STATE


Your Excellency,

I write this open letter with a deep sense of pride and fulfilment - as a Nigerian, as a proud and committed member of the Labour Party, and as an Edo son who was born and brought up in Warri, whose business journey led him to the industrious city of Aba.
As a Labour Party faithful from the South-South, I have never been prouder of what our party represents. Sir, you have shown Nigeria what Labour Party governance truly means - that when Labour governs, the people rejoice. You have given us a national template of what is possible when competence meets character.
I have a personal history with Aba. Years ago, I travelled frequently to Aba as a pioneer with ZEEPY INSPIRED CLOTHING for clothing productions. Though I am Edo by origin and Warri by upbringing, Aba welcomed me like a son. It has always had everything - the talent, the creativity, the relentless hardworking tailors, the best fabric markets, the can-do spirit that makes it the undisputed commercial hub of the South East.
What Aba did not have was passable roads.
I remember those trips vividly - not with nostalgia, but with pain. Port Harcourt Road was a symbol of total abandonment. Uratta, Old Express, Faulks Road, Ariaria, Obikabia and many inner streets were almost completely impassable. What should have been a 10-minute drive took hours of negotiating craters, flood and broken-down vehicles. For business people like us coming from Warri, Port Harcourt and beyond, those bad roads were not just an inconvenience, they were a direct tax on our hustle. Goods were delayed, machines were damaged, and businesses bled.
Today, Your Excellency, you have rewritten that story completely.
What you have achieved in less than three years is not just development; it is a total restoration of dignity, pride and commerce.

1. A REVOLUTION IN INFRASTRUCTURE - THE FOUNDATION OF COMMERCE
You understood that no economy can thrive without roads. You did not do cosmetic patching, you did total reconstruction.
The commissioning of the 6.7km Port Harcourt Road dual carriageway, a road that was dead for over two decades, alongside 13 other strategic roads in Aba, was a loud statement that Aba has risen again. Today, your administration has completed 414 road projects covering over 864 kilometres across Abia State, with an additional 82 road projects covering about 212 kilometres currently ongoing at various stages of completion.
From the Umuahia-Ikot Ekpene Road that has opened a new economic corridor to Akwa Ibom, to the Ariam-Usaka Ring Road that gave hope to long-neglected communities, to the iconic Omenuko Bridge delivered in record time to reconnect Arochukwu, to the flag-off of Uratta and Old Express Roads under the Greater Aba Road Infrastructure Restoration Programme - you are not just building roads, you are building access, commerce, and livelihoods.
For entrepreneurs like me who journeyed from Warri to Aba, this means lower cost of doing business. For Aba, this means its status as the SME capital of Nigeria is fully restored.

2. GOVERNANCE WITH INTEGRITY AND VISION
You brought sanity and humanity back to governance. For the first time in decades, Abia civil servants receive their salaries and pensions promptly every month, with dignity restored through the MTN Device Ownership Scheme, provision of laptops, and high-speed internet under the WAN project. You went further to clear 10 years of pension arrears owed to ADP retirees from 2000-2010 - an act of compassion many thought impossible.
Even more impressive, you achieved all this while reducing Abia State's debt burden by over 70% as of March 2026. That is fiscal discipline at its finest.
Your signing into law of 30 Executive Bills and, most importantly, the Abia State 25-Year Development Plan (2025-2050), shows you are not governing for applause, but for posterity. You are building institutions, not just infrastructure.

3. EDUCATION - BUILDING THE FUTURE
You made free and compulsory education a reality, not a slogan. By recruiting over 5,000 teachers who resumed in September 2025, with another 4,000 currently being recruited to make over 9,000, you moved school enrolment from about 117,000 to over 300,000 pupils in just one year.
At Abia State University, you commissioned a 5 MVA power station, three hostels, and flagged off 5,000-bed hostels and new faculties, with automatic lecturing jobs and scholarships for all First-Class graduates. At Ogbonnaya Onu Polytechnic, you gave N100 million in grants to 100 graduates. The Abia Leadership Academy training over 1,000 young people is proof that you are raising leaders, not just followers.
No wonder UNESCO commended your education policy as a model for Nigeria.

4. HEALTHCARE - HEALTH IS WEALTH
Through Project Ekwueme, you are not just renovating Primary Health Centres, you are staffing them with hundreds of recruited health workers. You introduced the ASHWOSS salary structure to give doctors, nurses and midwives the dignity they deserve.
The upgrading of hospitals in Umuahia, Aba and Ohafia into modern referral centres, with a target of JCI certification, plus the commissioning of Obingwa General Hospital, Phase One of Arochukwu General Hospital, and 15 newly equipped PHCs, plus the rehabilitation of the Ubakala and Ariaria Water Schemes and the reconstruction of Umunnato General Hospital abandoned for 40 years, shows a leader who values life.
5. POWER, TRANSPORT, SECURITY AND INVESTMENT
You restored electricity to 33 communities in Ukwa West after 9 years of total blackout. You signed the ASERA Law and the Mini-Grid Framework Regulation, making Abia one of the few states with its own electricity regulatory framework. You approved feasibility studies for the Azumini Sea Port - a visionary project that can make Abia a maritime hub.
You made Abia the first state in Nigeria to roll out 20, now 50 electric buses under the Green Shuttle Service, and delivered the ultra-modern Umuahia Bus Terminal named after Prof. Nnenna Oti.
Through the Abia Security Trust Fund raising over N3.4 billion, you have made Abia one of the safest states to live and invest in. Today, investors are not being chased, they are coming. Foreign governments now visit Abia because progress is magnetic.

CONCLUSION
Your Excellency, as an Edo son born and brought up in Warri, and as a Labour Party member, I say this with my full chest: You have vindicated us. You have shown Nigeria that the Labour Party is not just an alternative, but the standard for purposeful leadership. You have turned Abia from a reference for failure to a reference for performance.
As you said during the solidarity march in Nvosi, "We are seeking second term because we have unfinished work to do."
The work is unfinished, yes, but the proof of what you can do is already everywhere - on every new road in Aba, in every classroom, in every health centre.
On behalf of many young Nigerians from Edo to Warri to Aba who believe in the New Abia, I say thank you. Continue to lead with courage, continue to build with vision.
The New Abia is here, and history will be kind to you.

May God continue to strengthen you.
With utmost respect and unflinching solidarity,

ROTN. COMR. Osesua M. Kelvin
MD/CEO
OSESUA INVESTMENT LIMITED

NERSI AND THE PRICE OF IGNORING

INNOVATION: Why The N50,000 Alert You Are Waiting For Was Decided During COVID-19
By Osesua M Kelvin | Port Harcourt / Warri | 30th October 2026

Introduction: The Alert That Started Today
Today, 30th October 2026, the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Reduction announced the commencement of the National Emergency Relief and Stabilisation Intervention (NERSI).
In a statement issued in Abuja by the Minister, Dr. Bernard Doro, the Federal Government said NERSI is a presidential initiative designed to provide immediate financial assistance to millions of vulnerable Nigerians.
Under this intervention, eligible beneficiaries will receive N50,000 monthly, providing direct assistance to help meet essential needs and ease the burden of living costs. The announcement has since been carried by Punch, Channels TV, Nairametrics, The Sun and other national dailies.

For many Nigerians in Port Harcourt, Warri, Lagos, Kano and across the country, the question is immediate: Where do I register? What is the code? Has it started?

This article answers all of that, but more importantly, it tells the bigger story many are missing.
What NERSI Is and What It Is Not
What NERSI is:- A monthly cash relief programme of N50,000 per eligible household.- A presidential intervention to cushion global food inflation and rising cost of living.- A programme implemented through licensed digital financial service providers to ensure secure, prompt and transparent delivery.

What NERSI is NOT:- It is NOT a loan.- It is NOT a new APC or PDP empowerment form you buy at the LGA.- It is NOT requiring any application fee.
The Federal Government has repeated this clearly: beneficiaries are not required to submit applications, pay fees or register through agents to receive the support. And: eligible Nigerians need not apply, pay fees or register through agents.
Any person, website, or WhatsApp broadcast asking you to pay N1,000 to N5,000 to 'activate your NERSI' is a fraudster.
Has NERSI Started Working? Yes, But In Batches
Yes. The Federal Government has commenced monthly cash payments. The commencement was announced today.

But 'started' does not mean everyone gets alert today. Like all social protection programmes, disbursement is phased.
How payment works:1. Beneficiaries are identified from the National Social Register.2. You receive an SMS from one of three approved wallet operators: ALAT, MoMo and NairaGram.3. You must reply YES to give consent before payment can be made.4. After consent, their mobile wallets will be opened and linked to their phone numbers and National Identification Numbers (NIN).5. N50,000 is credited to the wallet.6. You access it via USSD: - ALAT: *945*23# - MoMo: *671*0# You can withdraw through a bank or POS agent or spend directly.
This wallet-first model is deliberate. It solves the biggest problem of previous transfers: many poor Nigerians don't have bank accounts, but almost all have phones.
Where Did They Get Your Number? Inside the National Social Register (NSR)
This is the part most Nigerians don't understand.

The NSR is not from your bank, not from MTN, not from NIMC automatically. It is a repository of poor and vulnerable households, aggregated from the states' Social Registers, maintained by the National Social Safety-Nets Coordinating Office (NASSCO) and anchored by the State Operation Coordinating Unit (SOCU) in each state.

How was it built?According to the World Bank and NASSCO documentation:

Stage 1 - Geographical Selection: LGAs, wards, communities were prioritised based on levels of poverty and vulnerability. Two approaches were employed: using poverty headcount and using high-resolution poverty maps based on satellite imagery.

Stage 2 - Community-Based Targeting: Community leaders and multi-sectoral teams at LGA level helped rank households.

Stage 3 - Enumeration and Proxy Means Test: Trained enumerators visited homes with tablets. Fields that were captured included size of household, gender components, age, levels of education, livelihoods, living conditions and assets. The information was captured on a technology device that consisted of a proxy means test formula which automatically provided a ranking for the poverty levels of each household.

Today, the NSR has about 30 million Nigerians from seven million poor and vulnerable households across 36 states and FCT.
The register is compiled through community enumeration, validation, and data aggregation rather than an open 'apply online' portal for everyone.

COVID-19: The Registration Many Ignored
During COVID-19 lockdown (2020-2021), the Federal Government launched two registers:

1. The existing NSR for rural poor.2. The Rapid Response Register (RRR) for urban poor who lost income due to lockdown. For RRR, government did SMS and USSD campaigns asking Nigerians to dial codes and send their details.

What happened?- Group A engaged: They answered enumerators, they dialed the USSD, they linked NIN to SIM, they gave correct household data. They received alerts directly in their accounts. In Warri, in Port Harcourt, in Delta and Rivers, many market women, keke drivers, and artisans got N5,000 to N20,000.- Group B ignored or mocked: 'Government money no dey reach common man', 'They will use our NIN for ritual', 'Na scam'. They chased enumerators away.

Fast forward to 2026: That same data is what is being used for NERSI. Those who were in Group A are getting the first N50,000 SMS today without lifting a finger. Group B are now running around looking for 'NERSI portal link'.
This is not spiritual. It is database logic. If you are not in the database, you cannot be paid.
The COVID payment you received in your account then is the reason you don't need to open a new wallet now - they will open it for you and link it to that same phone number + NIN.

The Bigger Problem: How Nigerians Treat Innovation
Nigeria does not lack programmes. Nigeria lacks early adopters.
Every major innovation follows the same cycle in Nigeria:

1. Announcement Phase: Government announces NIN, BVN, NSR, RRR, Cash Transfer. Most Nigerians ignore.2. Mockery Phase: 'Another audio promise', 'Na for their family'.3. Enforcement/Payment Phase: Suddenly, you cannot do SIM registration without NIN, you cannot get loan without BVN, and your neighbour is getting N50,000 because he did NIN-SIM linkage early.4. Rush Phase: Everyone rushes, servers crash, agents collect N5,000 to help.

NERSI is teaching us again: When government announces data capture, it is not entertainment. It is future money.
If you ignored NSR enumeration in 2019-2022, you ignored NERSI in 2026 without knowing.
Innovation engagement must become a culture: When you hear 'Federal Government wants to enumerate', go and be enumerated. When you hear 'Link your NIN', link it. The cost of ignoring is higher than the 10 minutes it takes.

How To Check If You Are Selected and What To Do If You Are Not
There is no public website where you can type your phone number to check. The only official channels are:

1. SMS from ALAT, MoMo, NairaGram. Wait for it. Don't delete messages from those names.
2. Official helpline: 0700-022-2222. If you are unsure about any message, or anyone asks you for money, call the official NERSI helpline.
3. Official website: https://www.fmhapr.gov.ng/nersi/
4. Physical verification: Visit your LGA Secretariat - Port Harcourt City LGA, Obio/Akpor LGA, or Warri South LGA. Ask for SOCU office or Community Development Officer. Request that your household be enumerated for NSR. They will schedule a visit to your house to capture your data.
Keep your SIM active and linked to NIN. Don't change the SIM you used during COVID without updating SOCU.

And never share your PIN or BVN with anyone claiming to be NERSI agent.
What Government and Communities Should Do Better
Government should:- Make SOCU offices more visible at LGA level, not just in Abuja.- Publish state-by-state disbursement data transparently.- Keep the wallet system but add bank account linking option for those who prefer.

Communities should:- Stop chasing enumerators away.- Traditional rulers and youth leaders should sensitize people when enumeration teams come.- Market associations and unions (NUPENG, PTD, drivers) should help members keep NIN-SIM active.

Citizens should:- Treat every data capture exercise as potential future benefit.- Keep one phone number consistently linked to NIN for 5-10 years.- Help elderly parents and neighbours who cannot read SMS to understand consent (reply YES).
Conclusion: Your Old Data Is Your New Money
NERSI is not magic. It is the reward for being in the system.

The N50,000 you are waiting for today was decided by whether you gave your information during COVID-19, whether you linked your NIN, and whether you allowed your household to be counted as poor and vulnerable.
For those who did, congratulations - your wallet will ring.

For those who didn't, this article is your second chance. Go to your LGA SOCU, get enumerated, keep your SIM active, and engage next time government announces any innovation.

In Nigeria today, ignoring innovation is more expensive than embracing it.
---Sources: Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Reduction (30 Oct 2026), Punch NG, Channels TV, Nairametrics, NASSCO/World Bank NSR documentation, NairaGram/ALAT/MoMo disbursement guidelines.

About The Author
Osesua M Kelvin is a Nigerian citizen based in Port Harcourt with roots in EDO/DELTA State. He writes on social protection, community development and digital inclusion.

Nigeria is in the middle of its biggest power-sector reset since privatisation in 2013 — and 2026 is the year the government is trying to turn plans into delivery.
What's actually progressed
1. Decentralisation — states can now run their own power markets
The Electricity Act 2023 ended the federal monopoly. As of 2026, 16 state electricity markets have been activated, including Lagos, Enugu, Ekiti, Ondo, Oyo, Edo, Delta and others.
In theory this should bring regulation closer to consumers and allow states to attract their own investors. In practice, coordination between federal and state regulators is still messy — PwC flagged in April 2026 that clearer frameworks are needed for it to work.
2. Debt cleanup — the biggest bottleneck
The government owes generation companies (GenCos) around N6 trillion from unpaid subsidies and tariffs. To fix it, it launched a N4 trillion Presidential Power Sector Debt Reduction Programme.
• Series 1 bond: N501 billion issued in Q4 2025, oversubscribed
• Series 2 bond: N728.9 billion signed in September 2026 — N402bn cash + N326.9bn non-cash bonds to GenCos
• By Q2 2026, GenCos had signed full settlement agreements worth ~N2.28 trillion
• Minister Joseph Tegbe said in October that N1.23 trillion out of N3.3 trillion in verified legacy liabilities has been paid
The goal is to restore liquidity so GenCos and gas suppliers can actually invest again, instead of just surviving.
3. Metering — slow but real movement
• Nigeria crossed 7 million installed meters in January 2026, up from ∼6.9 million at end-2025
• Over 1 million meters delivered since 2025 under the Presidential Metering Initiative
• PMI-Install launched to train 5,000 installers nationwide
That still leaves a huge gap — millions are still on estimated billing, which is why this matters so much for trust.
4. Tariffs and subsidies
About 45% of the market had moved to cost-reflective tariffs by Q2 2026, linked to service quality. The government says this has cut the 2026 subsidy burden by more than N1 trillion.
5. Grid and transmission — recent uptick
Minister Tegbe, speaking this week at Nigeria Energy 2026 in Lagos (Oct 27-29), unveiled a 3-phase roadmap:
• Stabilise through Feb 2027
• Scale Mar 2027 - 2028
• Transform from 2028
He claims generation/transmission has been above 5,000MW in recent weeks, vs 3,700-4,700MW before June, with a peak of 5,330MW in Aug-Sept.
Specific fixes cited: restoration of the 375MW Alaoji plant after 3 years offline, new transformers in Apapa, Ijora, Alausa, Lekki (unlocking 672MW) and Katampe, Abuja (240MW).
Target now is 6,500MW wheeling by end-2026 and 8,000MW by end-2027, from ∼5,000MW currently.
Focus corridors: Lagos– Ogun, Benin– Enugu–Port Harcourt, and Abuja– Kaduna– Kano
Why many Nigerians aren't feeling it yet
This is the other side, from NERC data analysed in October 2026:
• DisCo revenue rose 450% in 8 years — from N218bn in H1 2018 to N1.2 trillion in H1 2026 — while total supply grew only 4.8%
• Average available generation capacity fell 41% over that same period, from 7,565MW to 4,456MW
• In H1 2026 alone, DisCos failed to collect N700.5bn — they received N1.9tn worth of energy but collected N1.2tn
• ∼85 million Nigerians still have no access to electricity at all
• Annual supply actually fell 15.7% in 2025 vs 2024, even as revenue jumped
Critics sum it up bluntly: "Nigerians have been paying for darkness." Consumers still report estimated billing, being asked to pay for transformers/poles, and poor enforcement.
The Presidential Adviser on Power, Dr Lanre Babalola, admits the transition is unfinished: Nigeria unbundled and privatised, but never completed the move to a truly competitive market. The single-buyer model (NBET) was meant to be temporary, but became structural.
Bottom line
Progress: Debt is being cleared, metering is expanding, states are entering the market, and generation has ticked up in the last 2-3 months.
Not yet progress: Reliable, affordable, 24-hour supply for most households and businesses, especially outside Band A / major corridors. The sector is still losing money, still heavily subsidised, and still struggling to convert available capacity into dependable delivery.
If the debt programme and state markets hold, 2027 is the test year — that's when the government says scaling should show up as fewer outages, not just higher peaks on paper.


15 states have fully started — as in, they have taken over regulation of their own electricity market from NERC.
That’s the official NERC count as of February 2026, when Bayelsa became the 15th.
There’s a bit of confusion because government statements in March said 16, and even more states have passed a state electricity law but haven’t yet completed the transfer. Passing the law ≠ running the market yet.
The 15 that have fully taken over:
1. Enugu — Oct 22, 2024 (first)
2. Ekiti
3. Ondo
4. Imo
5. Oyo
6. Edo
7. Kogi
8. Lagos
9. Ogun
10. Niger
11. Plateau — Sept 2025
12. Abia — Dec 24, 2025
13. Anambra — Jan 1, 2026
14. Nasarawa — Feb 3, 2026
15. Bayelsa — Feb 20, 2026
The other 21 + FCT have NOT yet taken over:
That includes Rivers, Delta, Kano, Kaduna, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Borno, Bauchi, Benue, etc.
So for you in Port Harcourt — Rivers State has NOT started yet. It’s still under federal NERC regulation, even though Delta and Bayelsa next door have moved.
Some of those 21, like Delta, Ebonyi, Jigawa, Taraba, have enacted their own state electricity laws as of mid-2026, but they haven’t finished the transfer process with NERC, so they’re not counted in the 15 yet.

Let's break the big promises from the last 3 messages into 3 groups:
1. ACHIEVABLE — Already happening, just needs to continue
a) Clearing the debt
The N4 trillion bond programme is actually working. Series 1 (N501bn) + Series 2 (N728.9bn) have been issued, GenCos have signed N2.28 trillion in settlement agreements.
This one is achievable because it's just about paying verified debts with bonds. It doesn't require building anything.
b) Metering
Crossing 7 million meters is real. Getting to maybe 10-12 million in the next 2-3 years is achievable — if the Presidential Metering Initiative keeps funding local assembly and the 5,000 installers are actually deployed.
It won't end estimated billing overnight, but it's the most practical reform.
c) States taking over regulation
17 states have done the legal transfer already. Getting to all 36 states in the next 3-5 years is legally achievable.
But — and this is important — only about 8 of those 17 are fully operational. Having a law and a commission on paper is not the same as being able to regulate PHED or Ikeja Electric properly.
2. POSSIBLE BUT HARD — Needs everything to go right
a) 6,500MW by December 2026 (in 2 months)
This is the current minister's target.
Right now Nigeria is struggling to wheel ∼5,000MW, even though installed capacity is over 13,000MW and available capacity was only 4,457MW in Q1 2026.
To jump to 6,500MW sustained by December, you need gas supply + transmission + DisCos to actually take the power, all at the same time. Past ministers promised the same 6,500MW in March 2024 "in 3 to 6 months" — it didn't happen.
Verdict: A peak of 6,500MW for a few hours is possible. 6,500MW every day for ordinary Nigerians by December is very unlikely.
b) 8,000MW by end of 2027
Same logic. The minister himself admitted: "We are struggling to wheel 5,000MW today."
Transmission capacity is said to be 8,500MW on paper, but DisCos often don't take the power because of low collection, losses, and customers who can't pay. So generation gets stranded — 3,500MW was left idle in 2025 because DisCos didn't demand it.
Verdict: Achievable as wheeling capacity if transmission upgrades continue. NOT achievable as 24-hour light for everyone by 2027.
3. NOT ACHIEVABLE ON THAT TIMELINE
a) 30GW (30,000MW) by 2030 — the 30-30-30 Roadmap
This is the government's own roadmap: 30GW by 2030, 30% from renewables.
Nigeria has averaged ∼4,500MW for 13 years despite over N10 trillion invested. To go from 4,500MW to 30,000MW in 4 years would mean adding ∼6,000MW of reliable power every year. No country has done that at Nigeria's funding and gas-supply level.
Verdict: Not achievable by 2030. Maybe 10,000-12,000MW peak is a stretch target.
b) 270GW by 2060
That's a planning number for industrial + tech demand. It's not a real target, it's a vision document.
c) Ending the "paying for darkness" problem
DisCos collected N1.2 trillion in H1 2026 but still left N700bn uncollected, with losses still high. Until DisCos fix collection, reduce theft/vandalism, and invest in transformers/feeders, more generation alone won't fix your socket.
So what would make it achievable?
All the reforms are connected. One alone fails:
1. Gas must flow — most plants are gas-fired, and gas suppliers won't supply if GenCos don't pay.
2. Debt must be cleared — that's happening, slowly.
3. DisCos must collect and invest — this is the weakest link right now.
4. Transmission must be stable — grid collapses still happen because the grid is old and overstretched.
5. States must actually build capacity — not just collect transfer orders.
If 1-4 happen, then 6,500MW → 8,000MW becomes realistic over 2-3 years, not 2 months.
If they don't, we'll keep hearing the same target from the next minister in 2028.
My straight take: Believe the process — debt bonds, metering, state laws. Don't believe the dates — 6,500MW by December, 30GW by 2030.


DIAGRAM KEY:
How to read it:
• Green (left): Already happening — debt bonds, metering past 7 million, 17 states have taken over.
• Yellow (middle): Hard but possible — we are at ∼5,000MW now, trying to get to 6,500MW by Dec 2026 and 8,000MW by 2027. Needs gas + grid + DisCo performance all at once.
• Red (right): Not on this timeline — 30,000MW by 2030 is crossed out, 270GW by 2060 is just a long-term vision.
And the bottom bar is the key problem: 13,000MW installed, but only 4,457MW available, and ∼5,000MW actually delivered at peak.
That gap is why you can have big installed capacity and still have no light.
Want me to make a second one just for Rivers / Port Harcourt — what PHED's situation looks like vs Lagos/Enugu?

Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited (ASCL) - the one people call Ajakuta - is Nigeria's biggest industrial white elephant.
Quick facts
• Location: Ajaokuta, Kogi State, on the bank of River Niger, about 200km south of Abuja
• Conceived: 1979 as Nigeria's flagship industrial project, meant to cut steel imports, drive industrialisation and support diversification
• Built by: Soviet-era engineers
• Capacity: 1.3 million metric tonnes per annum, designed to feed construction, automotive, rail and manufacturing
• Completion: By 1994, it was 98% complete in equipment, 40 of 43 planned units built
Why it never produced steel
It was commissioned in 1984 but went cold after the overthrow of the Shagari administration in 1983. Since then it has swallowed over $8 billion without ever rolling a single coil of commercial steel.
Nigeria has spent N46.62 billion on it just in the last decade, even as it failed to produce a single tonne commercially.
Reasons that keep coming up:
1. No coking coal and iron ore supply chain sorted
2. Policy inconsistency - every government starts a new "revival plan"
3. Legal tussles with concessionaires
4. No gas for its power plant until very recently
Where it is today - 2026
It is still idle, but still heavily funded:
• 2026 Budget: N6.5bn highest allocation in steel sector despite inactivity, with N6.04bn just for personnel costs for about 3,000 workers, even though nothing is projected in revenue. A review showed N7.21bn spent on running Ajaokuta across 501 transactions between 2020-2025.
• New gas deal: On July 6, 2026, the Ministry of Steel Development said it broke a 46-year jinx - ASCL signed a 20-year gas supply agreement with NNPC Ltd, Gas Aggregation Company and NNPC E&P for up to 50 million standard cubic feet per day to feed its power plant.
• New revival talks: There's also talk of a $2bn China-backed revival and earlier Russia-Afreximbank plan from 2019.
For now, as analysts put it, it functions largely as a salary-paying institution, not a producing steel mill. The claim is if fully commissioned, it could directly engage 10,000 staff and 500,000 jobs in upstream/downstream industries.
So if you're asking as a business person - no steel is coming out of Ajaokuta yet to buy. If you're asking as a citizen - that's why people are angry about the budget every year.

Yes - plenty. Debt and arbitration is actually the main reason Ajaokuta has been stuck for 20 years.
Here are the big controversies:
1. The Global Steel Holdings disaster
This is the biggest one.
• 2004: President Obasanjo government gave Ajaokuta and the National Iron Ore Mining Company (NIOMCO) Itakpe to an Indian company, Global Steel Holdings Limited (GSHL), on a 10-year concession.
• 2008: President Yar'Adua revoked it, accusing Global Steel of asset stripping.
• Global Steel went to arbitration: They filed a $5.23bn claim against Nigeria at the ICC in Paris .
Then it became messy:
• In 2013, it was said the Jonathan administration recovered Ajaokuta without any financial obligation.
• But in 2016, Buhari government did a modified deal - Global kept Itakpe, Nigeria took back Ajaokuta.
• In 2022, then Attorney-General Abubakar Malami announced Nigeria agreed to pay $496 million to settle the dispute.
That settlement is now under probe. The allegation is Malami agreed to pay $496m compensation despite the company having withdrawn claims for compensation in 2013. Malami is currently facing probe over five suspicious mega deals including that one.
2. Endless failed contracts - 1981 contract
Even older contracts are still in court. The civil works contract from 1981 awarded to Fougerolle Nigeria Ltd was still in arbitration until recently.
Good news: In November 2025, Nigeria actually WON an arbitration - a tribunal dismissed a claim of N4bn + €185.7m against Nigeria over that 1981 Ajaokuta contract.
3. The money pit controversy
• $8 billion+ sunk with zero commercial steel.
• Over N46.62bn spent in the last 10 years alone on salaries and running costs for an idle plant. Punch found N7.21bn spent across 501 transactions between 2020-2025.
That's why in the 2026 budget, people reacted - N6.04bn just for personnel costs for 3,000 staff in a plant that produces nothing.
So yes, the controversy is not just debt - it's concession failures, international arbitration claims, asset stripping allegations, and now investigation into whether Nigeria paid money it didn't need to pay to get its own steel plant back.

Under Tinubu, Ajaokuta has gotten more attention than in the last 10 years - because he made it a standalone ministry again.
Here's what his administration has actually done:
1. Created a Ministry just for it
In August 2023, Tinubu created the Federal Ministry of Steel Development and appointed Prince Shuaibu Audu as Minister. Before that, steel was under Mines & Steel.
His mandate is to revive Ajaokuta as central to Tinubu's Renewed Hope industrialisation agenda.
2. Solved the 46-year gas problem
This is the biggest practical step. Ajaokuta has its own power plant but never had gas.
On July 6, 2026, the Ministry said it broke a 46-year jinx - ASCL signed a 20-year gas supply agreement with NNPC Ltd, Gas Aggregation Company and NNPC Exploration & Production for up to 50 million standard cubic feet per day. Minister Audu said reviving Ajaokuta remains central and it will boost local steel production and cut import dependence.
Without gas, no furnace can run.
3. Chasing serious private money
Minister Audu said: "For Ajaokuta Steel Company, as you know, it was established in 1979. It hasn't produced any sheet of liquid steel since its inception. So what we did in this administration over the last three years is we took a number of measures. The first thing we did was we have now engaged with serious partners to revive and bring in funding."
Current plan: FG nears $2bn Ajaokuta Steel revival deal with Chinese investor, and they are in very advanced discussions with a Chinese company in particular and confident of signing before end of 2026. Government says it will cost $2bn to $5bn to revamp the entire complex.
4. Military/Industrial use MoU
The ministry signed an MoU between Ajaokuta and Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) aimed at producing raw materials for military equipment - rifles, bulletproof vests, helmets and ammunition.
5. What has NOT changed yet
It still hasn't produced steel. Nigeria still spends about $4 billion yearly on steel imports. And the budget allocation has even increased - N5.18bn to N6.5bn for Ajaokuta in 2026 despite inactivity, which opposition points to.
So Tinubu's approach is different from past "government will run it" - it's: get gas first, then bring a Chinese technical/financial partner to build-operate, and tie output to defence and local industry to justify the cost.
Whether it works by end of 2026 as promised is what everyone is watching now.

Explanation: This is why it's called a sprawling city, not a factory. You can see:
• Bottom: Coal/coke yards with cranes and railway lines - raw materials come in by rail from Itakpe
• Center: The heart - blast furnaces with the tall red-white chimney, yellow coke ovens, and long sinter halls
• Back: 4 huge cooling towers and power plant area
• Right: River Niger - it was built there for water and to export steel via barges
• Left: Workers estate. The whole site is 24,000 hectares - bigger than many Nigerian towns. 40 of 43 plants were already built by 1994.
PICTURE 2: How it's supposed to work
Simple explanation of the diagram:
1. Raw Materials: Iron ore from Itakpe (Kogi), coking coal (to make coke), limestone as flux.
2. Material Prep: Ore is sintered (roasted into lumps), coal is baked in coke ovens at 1000°C to make hard coke.
3. Iron Making - Blast Furnace: Sintered ore + coke + limestone go into blast furnace at ∼2000°C. What comes out is liquid iron at 1500°C + slag (for cement).
4. Steel Making: Liquid iron goes to Basic Oxygen Furnace where pure oxygen is blown to remove carbon - becomes liquid steel.
5. Rolling Mills: Liquid steel is cast into blooms/billets/slabs, then rolled into 4 products:
• Sheet/plate mill - for roofing, cars, appliances
• Light section mill - for building
• Medium section - for bridges, heavy structures
• Wire rod mill - for nails, cables, mesh
6. Final Products: Sheets, rebars, wire, structural beams - everything Nigeria currently imports for $4bn a year.
COMPANY OVERVIEW
Name: Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited (ASCL)
Established: 1979 by Shagari administration
Ownership: 100% Federal Government of Nigeria, under Ministry of Steel Development
Location: Ajaokuta, Kogi State
Capacity: 1.3M tonnes per year liquid steel (design)
Status: 98% mechanically complete but 0 tonnes commercially produced ever
Staff: ∼3,000 currently on payroll, 10,000 planned at full operation
Investment so far: Over $8 billion public money
Current focus: 20-year NNPC gas deal signed July 2026 + $2bn Chinese investor concession expected before Dec 2026
Think of it as Nigeria built the engine of industrialization in 1979, parked it, and has been paying drivers to sit in it for 47 years without turning it on. That's what Tinubu's team is now trying to start.

ADAPALM: INSIDE IMO STATE'S 4,310-HECTARE BLACK GOLD
The Return of Nigeria's Forgotten Agro-Industrial Giant
When Nigerians talk about oil, they think of crude. But before crude took over in the 1970s, there was another oil that funded the Eastern Region — palm oil. At the heart of that story is ADAPALM.
What is Adapalm?
Adapalm Nigeria Limited is one of Nigeria's largest oil palm plantations, located in Ohaji-Egbema Local Government Area of Imo State. Covering an expansive 4,310 hectares, it was once a critical source of foreign exchange for Nigeria.
It began in 1953 as the Ohaji Palm Settlement under Dr. Michael Okpara's government of Eastern Nigeria, designed to turn wild palm groves into a modern, industrial estate.
How Big is It Really?
To understand the scale:
• 4,310 hectares = 43,100,000 sqm = 10,650 acres
• That's over 71,000 standard plots (600sqm) of palm trees
• In oil terms, the refinery now produces 150 tons of palm oil daily
In the 2022/2023 season, Nigeria produced 1.4 million tons of palm oil, and Adapalm was a key contributor to that figure.
How They Operate: From Seed to Oil
Adapalm is not just a farm. It is a complete agro-industrial complex. This is how it works:
1. Nursery and Breeding
High-yield Tenera seedlings are raised in the central nursery for 12-14 months. Only the strongest are transplanted to the field. One hectare takes about 143 seedlings.
2. Plantation Management
The 4,310 hectares are divided into blocks separated by estate roads. Each block has a 25-30 year cycle. Teams handle:
• Ring weeding and slashing
• Fertilizer application
• Pruning and pest control
• Harvesting every 10-14 days
3. Harvesting
Bunches are cut using hooked knives and transported by trucks and tractors to the mill. A good bunch weighs 15-25kg.
4. Milling and Processing
This is the heart of Adapalm. At the Adapalm Mill:
• Sterilization: Bunches are cooked with steam to stop oil breakdown
• Threshing: Fruits are separated from bunches
• Digestion & Pressing: The fruits are pressed to extract crude palm oil
• Clarification: Oil is purified, dried and stored in large white storage tanks
• By-products: Palm kernel, fibre, and empty bunches are used for kernel oil, animal feed, and fuel
5. Storage and Marketing
The oil is stored and sold in bulk to industrial buyers, distributors, and retailers across Imo, Rivers, and beyond.
The Fall and Revival
Like many government-owned estates, Adapalm suffered decades of neglect, underfunding, and management crises. Bush took over, production dropped, and reptiles took over parts of the compound.
The turning point came when the Imo State government began discussions with the Central Bank of Nigeria for a N52 billion loan to revamp the estate, aligning with CBN's 2019 policy to restrict forex for palm oil importation to boost local production.
Today, under its General Manager Dr. Goddy Esom Obodo, the refinery is back, producing 150 tons daily and creating direct and indirect jobs for youths in Ohaji-Egbema.
Governor Hope Uzodimma has described it as central to reviving Nigeria's palm oil industry.
Why It Matters
Nigeria spends over $500 million annually importing palm oil. If Adapalm operates at full capacity:
• It retains foreign exchange
• It creates over 5,000 jobs
• It powers related industries: soap, cosmetics, vegetable oil, biodiesel
• It puts Imo back on the global palm oil map
Adapalm is more than a plantation. It is proof that Nigeria can feed itself and industrialize from agriculture again.
From Port Harcourt to Ohaji is less than 90 minutes. The black gold is flowing again.

Sources: Imo State Govt / CBN discussions, Sun Newspaper revival reports, Oriental News NG production data.

Presidential Metering Initiative (PMI) — N700bn
• Approved in November 2023 to close Nigeria's metering gap and end estimated billing
• Funds were disbursed by FAAC from May to November 2024 in tranches of N80bn - N120bn, totaling N700bn
• Original plan was 1.1 million meters by Dec 2025, then 2 million annually for 5 years
New date:
According to a NERC metering factsheet issued 14 October, the PMI "starts in 2027 with 750,000 meters to help close the metering gap". The Presidency confirmed the plan.
Why the shift:
Daily Trust reports it's now 2 years after FAAC disbursed the funds, and distribution has been moved to 2027.
Where we are now:
• NERC August 2026 figures: 12.75m active customers, 8.05m metered (63.1%), leaving ∼4.7m unmetered
• Between Q1 2025 - Q2 2026, DisCos issued 1,645,004 meters through other schemes — MAP (892,859), DISREP (404,993), MAF (236,045), vendor and DisCo-financed
• Under those schemes, customers on MAP still pay upfront (avg N150k per meter) and get refunded via tokens
Other programmes running alongside PMI:
• MAP — customers pay upfront, refunded through energy credits
• MAF — meters at no cost to customers, funded from tariff surcharge
• DISREP — $500m World Bank loan for 3.2m smart meters
The government says PMI will also include training of 5,000 meter installers by NAPTIN, supervised by NEMSA.

Here is why the N700bn was disbursed in 2024 but meters will only start in 2027:
1. Money was sent to a new company, not to DisCos
The fund went to PMI-Smart Grid Development Limited (PMI-SGDL), a federation-owned entity, not directly to the 11 DisCos. FAAC records show it was lodged as "State House: Smart Grid Development Limited e-collection account" in tranches from May 13 to Nov 10, 2024 — N120bn, then N100bn x5, then N80bn.
That company had to be set up:
• Board Chairman — Governor of Kwara and Chairman of Nigeria Governors Forum, AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq
• Executive Secretary — Special Adviser on Energy to the President, Olu Verheijen
• CEO/Project Director — Obafemi Solebo
2. It was designed to be more than just buying meters
According to the Presidency, the project includes:
• Training over 5,000 Nigerians as installers (called Power Force) — training only started July 2026 in batches by NAPTIN, with certification by NEMSA
• Strengthening local manufacturers under the Nigerian First Policy
3. Manufacturer dispute + court case
Power Minister disclosed that there was a dispute with the Association of Meter Manufacturers of Nigeria (AMMON) that led to a court injunction which halted procurement and installation for several months. It was only recently resolved.
4. Meanwhile other meter schemes kept running
Since PMI didn't deploy, DisCos relied on:
• MAP — you pay yourself (892,859 meters from Q1 2025 - Q2 2026)
• MAF and DISREP (World Bank $500m for 3.2m meters) — supposed to be free but prioritised Band A
That's why NERC says 8.05m are now metered out of 12.75m active customers, but Nigerians still paid an estimated N133.9bn for meters in 18 months at ~N150k average.
In short: FAAC can disburse quickly, but building the institution, training people, settling with manufacturers, and procuring at scale takes years. The Oct 14 NERC factsheet is the first official confirmation that rollout will now be 750,000 in 2027 instead of the 1.1m by Dec 2025 originally promised.

Total debt: FG owes GenCos about N4 trillion in legacy debts.
What has been paid:
• Feb 2026 — First phase: N501bn deployed — N300bn cash + N201bn in bond instruments
○ Out of that, N333bn has been paid to 8 GenCos covering 17 power plants
○ First coupon of N63.5bn on the 7-year bond was paid in full on July 14, 2026
• Sept 2026 — Second phase: FG raised N728.9bn / N729bn in Series 2 bonds to offset the legacy debt
• Oct 13, 2026 — Update: Minister of Power Joseph Tegbe said FG has now paid N1.23 trillion of legacy debts through bonds, with outstanding balance expected to be cleared next year
So:
• Paid: ~N1.23trn (about 30% of N4trn)
• Left: ~N2.77trn, target to clear in 2027
Verheijen (Special Adviser on Energy) said the payments have helped GenCos pay gas suppliers, lenders and maintenance contractors.
In short — FG has not cleared GenCos, but has moved from promises to actual bond payments, and says full settlement is next year.

In Nigeria, the electricity structure has changed 3 times — and we are now in the 3rd phase:
1. Before — NEPA Era (1972 - 2005)
• One government company did everything: National Electric Power Authority (NEPA)
• Generation + Transmission + Distribution = all NEPA
• Vertical monopoly, chronic outages, no regulator, no private investors
2. Previous — After 2005 Reform / Privatization (2005 - 2023)
EPSRA 2005 broke NEPA into PHCN as a bridge, then unbundled into 18 successor companies:
• 6 GenCos — generate power (e.g., Egbin, Kainji, Shiroro)
• 1 TransCo — TCN — still 100% FG-owned, carries power from GenCos to DisCos
• 11 DisCos — distribute to you (e.g., Ikeja, Eko, AEDC, IBEDC etc)
Plus new institutions:
• NERC — central regulator for all Nigeria
• NBET — bulk trader, buys from GenCos and sells to DisCos
• NEMSA, NAPTIN, REA — safety, training, rural electrification
Problem: It moved from government monopoly (NEPA) to private monopoly of 18 companies — still centralized, still FG-controlled, states could not make their own power laws.
3. Current — Electricity Act 2023 (from 2024 till now)
This Act repealed the 2005 Act and changed everything:
• States can now have their own electricity markets. States can license their own generation, transmission and distribution inside their state. Since 2025, many states (Lagos, Ekiti, Enugu, etc) have set up their own State Electricity Regulatory Commissions.
• NERC is no longer the only regulator — now it's federal + state regulators.
• More private players allowed — anyone can generate (solar, gas, hydro), including off-grid, mini-grid, without FG permission if it's within a state.
• Bands introduced: Customers now grouped into Bands A-E based on hours of supply. Band A (20hrs+) now pays cost-reflective tariff (~N209/kWh), lower bands still subsidized.
• New programmes to close gaps: Presidential Metering Initiative (N700bn for 3.8m meters), DISREP (World Bank $500m for 3.2m meters), MAF (free meters for Band A), MAP (you pay and get refund)
So:
Before = NEPA does everything
Previous = 6 GenCos + TCN + 11 DisCos, all regulated by NERC in Abuja
Now = Same 6+1+11 still exist on national grid, BUT any state can now create its own GenCos, DisCos, and regulator — moving from single national grid monopoly to decentralized, competitive markets.
That's why you hear about Lagos State electricity market and others now.


1. For your bill — no more estimated billing
That is the whole point of the meter programme we just discussed.
Before: Most Nigerians were unmetered, DisCo guesses your bill.
Now: PMI + DISREP + MAF are meant to give everyone a meter. With a meter, you pay for what you actually use. NERC rule: DisCo can only estimate your bill when they cannot read your meter, and even then there is capping.
If you are in Lagos (Ikeja/Eko DisCo), that N700bn PMI starting with 750k meters in 2027 is supposed to reach Band B-E customers — not just Band A who already get free meters now.
2. For supply — GenCos can generate more
When FG owed GenCos N4trn, they couldn't pay gas suppliers, so many turbines sat idle. Now FG has paid N1.23trn (N333bn cash to 8 GenCos + N729bn bond), GenCos can:
• Buy gas
• Pay maintenance
• Keep plants running
Result: More megawatts available to transmit, less blackouts caused by generation shortfall.
3. For choice — States can now fix their own light
This is the biggest change from Electricity Act 2023.
Before: Even if Lagos wanted to generate its own power, it had to wait for FG/TCN.
Now: Lagos can license its own companies to generate, distribute and regulate power inside Lagos, same for Delta where your home is. That means:
• States can allow embedded generation, solar mini-grids, industrial clusters
• Investors don't need to go through Abuja for a state project
• Competition — if national grid fails, state grid can still work
Several states have already started their own markets since 2025.
4. For trust and investment
The new structure says:
• Private Meter Asset Providers close the gap — you pay, you get refunded via tokens
• Training of 5,000 installers (Power Force by NAPTIN)
• Government pays its debts with bonds, not promises — markets trust that
When investors see FG actually paying GenCos and building meters locally, they are more likely to build new power plants.
Where it is NOT yet helpful:
• TCN (transmission) is still 100% FG-owned and is the bottleneck — if TCN collapses, no power reaches you even if GenCos generate
• DisCos still have to be efficient — many still prioritize Band A because Band A pays full cost
• Gas supply and vandalism still cause outages
So in short: The old system was "NEPA gives you whatever it has." The new system is trying to be "You have a meter, you pay what you use, your state can make its own power, and the companies that make power are actually paid."
If you are on estimated billing now, the most direct help for you is to apply for a meter under MAP or wait for MAF/DISREP in your Band — once metered, your bill should drop if you manage consumption.


Here is how electricity structure has changed from Obasanjo till now — itemized:
1. Obasanjo Administration (1999-2007) — Started the Reform
• Met NEPA — one government company doing everything: generation, transmission, distribution. NEPA was known for poor supply and no investment.
• Started building National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP) — new gas power plants to add generation.
• Passed Electric Power Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) 2005 — the foundation of all reforms till 2023.
• What that law did:
○ Broke NEPA into PHCN as a temporary holding company
○ Then unbundled PHCN into 18 successor companies: 6 GenCos, 11 DisCos, 1 TransCo (TCN)
○ Created NERC as independent regulator, REA for rural electrification, NBET concept
• Goal: Move from government monopoly to private market. But he left before privatization happened.
2. Yar'Adua / Jonathan Administration (2007-2015) — Privatized It
• Completed privatization in November 2013: Sold the 6 GenCos and 11 DisCos to private investors. TCN remained 100% FG-owned.
• Introduced MYTO — Multi Year Tariff Order — tried to make tariff move towards cost gradually.
• NIPP plants completed and added to grid, but gas supply and transmission were weak, so many plants sat idle.
• Result: Government no longer generated or distributed power directly — private companies did. But FG still regulated everything from Abuja via NERC.
3. Buhari Administration (2015-2023) — Managed the Private Market
• Inherited privatized market that was struggling — DisCos not collecting enough, GenCos not paid.
• Kept EPSRA 2005 law. No new electricity law.
• Tried to fix metering: Launched National Mass Metering Programme (NMMP) funded by CBN — about 1m meters, plus MAP where customers pay.
• Signed $2.3bn Siemens deal (Presidential Power Initiative) in 2019 to fix TCN and DisCo lines — but stayed inactive for 4 years.
• On subsidy: Kept uniform subsidy for all Bands. Reduced tariff shortfall from N580bn (2019) to N140bn (2022) by tightening collection, not by raising price much.
• On debt: Legacy debt to GenCos grew to about N4trn because government didn't pay the difference between cost and what DisCos collected.
• Constitutional amendment in 2023 — moved electricity from Exclusive to Concurrent List, so states could now make laws on electricity. National Assembly passed new Electricity Bill in July 2022.
4. Tinubu Administration (2023 till now) — Decentralized It
• Signed Electricity Act 2023 in June 2023 — repealed EPSRA 2005.
• What changed:
○ States can now license their own generation, transmission, distribution inside their state. NERC is no longer sole regulator — now federal + state regulators.
○ Since 2025, states like Lagos, Enugu, Ekiti started their own markets.
• Revived Siemens deal and created new structures like GAMCO and Power Force.
• For metering: Launched PMI — N700bn FAAC-funded for 3.8m meters (first 750k now moved to 2027), plus DISREP — $500m World Bank for 3.2m meters, plus MAF for free Band A meters.
• For tariff: Removed subsidy for Band A in April 2024 — Band A (20hrs) now pays cost-reflective ~tN209-225/kWh, Bands B-E still subsidized. Total subsidy bill after naira float jumped to ~N1.93trn.
• For debt: Started clearing GenCo debt with bonds — Feb 2026 N501bn (N300bn cash + N201bn bonds), N333bn paid to 8 GenCos (17 plants), Sept 2026 N728.9bn Series 2 bond, Oct 2026 total N1.23trn paid, target full clearance next year.
• Training: 5,000 installers via NAPTIN under Power Force.
Summary of structure:
• Obasanjo: NEPA = government does everything
• Jonathan: 6 GenCos + TCN + 11 DisCos = private does everything, FG regulates from Abuja
• Buhari: Same 6+1+11, but FG funds meters via CBN and keeps price low for all
• Tinubu: Same 6+1+11 on national grid, PLUS any state can now create its own GenCos/DisCos/regulator, Band A pays full price, FG pays GenCos with bonds, meters come from FAAC from 2027.[font=Lucida Sans Unicode][/font][img][/img]

Writing
🚨🎉 LUSESC FAMILY, IT'S TIME TO RECONNECT! 🎓💙💛

Get ready for an unforgettable celebration of unity, friendship, and excellence! Join us for the LUSESC Alumni AGM, End-of-Year Party & Inauguration of the New Executive Council 2026 — a day of exciting activities, awards, dancing, networking, and beautiful memories! 🔥🥳

🎤 HOST: Sir Gabriel E. Ukuli

🌟 KEYNOTE SPEAKER: Eniwake Orogun PhD.

📅 Date: 26th December 2026

⏰ Time: 12:00 PM

📍 Venue: Green Pepper Lounge, Royal Nibo Hotel, along NPA Expressway, Ekpan Junction, Delta State.

💛 Theme: OUR ALUMNI, OUR BOND!

Don't just hear the stories — come and be part of the memories! Invite your old classmates, reconnect with your people, and let's make history together! 🎉

✨ May Our Light Continue to Shine! ✨

Ghkkkgfssfghjkkkjjhh

Fuel subsidy economics in Nigeria is a simple tradeoff: the government was paying over N4 trillion a year to keep petrol cheap, now it saves that money but you pay the real price at the pump.
That is the trillion-naira tradeoff everyone argues about. Here's how it breaks down:
What the subsidy actually was?
It wasn't government buying fuel for you. It was NNPC importing petrol at global market price + FX cost, then selling at a fixed low price (N195 before May 2023). Government covered the difference.
Why it grew from less than N1 trillion in 2012 to over N2 trillion under Buhari to unmanageable in 2023:
• Nigeria consumes ∼50 million litres per day
• Crude above $80-100/bbl means higher import cost
• Naira devaluation means more naira to buy each dollar of fuel
• Smuggling: cheap Nigerian fuel was trucked to Benin, Niger, Cameroon
The math that forced removal
On May 29, 2023, President Tinubu removed it.
What was saved: Between June 2023 and December 2025, the federation mobilised N15.8 trillion that would have gone to subsidy.
Analysts estimate it saves N4 trillion to N6 trillion annually in direct fiscal costs.
What it would cost to bring back:
Finance Minister Taiwo Oyedele says returning to old prices would cost over N20 trillion yearly. Even selling at N500/litre would still require more than N16 trillion a year.
The NRS executive chairman warned that at higher crude prices, maintaining the old regime in 2026 could cost N52 trillion - about 76% of the N68 trillion federal budget.
Oyedele also argued it would require subsidizing FX, encourage smuggling, and ultimately weaken the naira.
Where did the N15.8 trillion go?
It didn't sit in one account. It flowed into FAAC and was shared:
• Federal Government: N5.4 trillion (34%)
• States: N6.5 trillion (41%)
• Local Governments: N3.9 trillion (24%)
That is why FAAC allocations exploded. In March 2023, FAAC shared N629 billion. In March 2026, it shared N2.036 trillion.
In theory: more money for roads, schools, Lagos airport rebuild ($500m from subsidy removal savings according to Aviation Minister), and state projects.
In practice: The World Bank Country Partnership Framework 2026-2032 notes that while fiscal space improved, many Nigerians became worse off since removal because inflation and transport costs spiked.
The Tradeoff, clearly

The Tradeoff in Clear Format (No Table)
1. WHAT WE WERE DOING BEFORE:
We were using oil money to hide the real price. Government was paying importers to sell fuel at N195 when real cost was N600-N800+. The money came from federation account that should have gone to Delta, Rivers, Lagos, and LGs for roads, schools, hospitals. It also encouraged smuggling — why sell in Warri for N195 when you can smuggle to Cameroon for N900? And it blocked private refineries — Dangote could not compete with subsidized imports.
2. WHAT WE ARE DOING NOW:
You now pay the real cost. Fuel is N850-N1000+. Transport from Enerhen Junction to Effurun jumps. Keke and boat operators in Warri increase fares. Every sachet water, garri price carries fuel cost.
In exchange, FAAC doubled. Delta now gets 2-3x what it got in 2022. No more trillions paid to NNPC as subsidy claims. Private refineries can now sell at market price and survive. Foreign exchange pressure reduced because we are not subsidizing dollars for fuel imports.
3. THE REAL QUESTION IS NOT SAVINGS, IT'S SPENDING:
The government saved N15.8 trillion on paper. The federal share was N5.4tn, states N6.5tn, LGs N3.9tn. Two-thirds went to states and LGs.
If you in Warri don't see that N369bn reflected in Warri-Sapele road, DSC area, schools, or jobs — then the tradeoff feels like loss only. Subsidy was visible: cheap fuel today. The gain is invisible: FAAC that must be managed.
4. WHY THEY SAY THEY CAN'T RETURN:
To return to N500/litre would still cost over N16 trillion a year, and full return to N195 would cost over N20 trillion a year before accounting for higher consumption and smuggling. Executive Chairman of NRS said maintaining it in 2026 could have cost N52 trillion, 76% of the federal budget.
That's why they are doing retail discount (NNPC forgoes profit) instead of subsidy — they call it margin sacrifice, not budget spending.
Bottom line: The trillion-naira tradeoff moved the pain from government balance sheet to your pocket, and moved the cash from NNPC to Delta State Government House. Whether you benefit depends on whether Delta spends that Q2 N188bn better than cheap fuel did for you.

Why the new "discount" is not subsidy - according to FG
In October 2026, FG announced NNPC will forgo its retail profit margin and sell at cost for 30 days. Presidency insists this is not a return to subsidy.
Difference: A subsidy is government paying from budget to cover import loss. A discount is retailer sacrificing profit margin. IMF estimates even this discount could cost 1.5% of GDP.
Bottom line for you in Port Harcourt / Warri:
The trillion-naira question is not whether subsidy is good or bad. It's about efficiency of transfer.
N5 trillion spent to make fuel N195 for everyone is an untargeted consumption subsidy. N5 trillion spent as direct cash transfers, CNG buses, or fixing East-West Road is targeted. The government chose the second path, but citizens only feel the gain if states actually spend their N10.4 trillion share visibly.

Delta is actually winning the FAAC lottery since subsidy removal, but you pay for it at the pump.
How much Delta got
That N15.8 trillion savings between June 2023 - Dec 2025 was shared to all states. Delta, because it is oil-producing with 13% derivation, now tops the country.
• Q2 2026 alone: Delta received N188.01 billion (N53.77bn April + N67.81bn May + N66.44bn June), overtaking Lagos as the largest FAAC recipient
• First half 2026 (Jan-June): Delta got N369.87 billion, the highest of all 36 states, ahead of Lagos N368.79bn
• June 2026: Delta led again with about N86 billion gross allocation
• Before removal: March 2023 total FAAC for all 3 tiers was only N629 billion. March 2026 total was N2.23 trillion with Delta alone taking N50.82bn
So for Warri, that money goes to Delta State Government, not directly to you. That's the core of the tradeoff.

Delta's spending tells the real tradeoff story.
With FAAC at record highs, Delta State went from a sub-N1 trillion budget to big spending. Here is what Government House says it did with your money:
What Delta says it is spending it on
2026 Budget: N1.664 trillion — tagged "Budget of Accelerating the MORE Agenda" — up 70% from N979.2bn in 2025. For the first time, 70% goes to capital projects (over N1.165 trillion).
For Warri/Uvwie specifically:
• N20 billion to Warri, Uvwie and Environs Development Agency for massive road and flyover projects reshaping the oil city
• N20 billion to Delta Capital Territory Development Agency for Asaba
• N450 billion for urban highways, rural roads and riverine roads — includes drainage, bridges
• Flyovers in Effurun, Warri, Ughelli, Agbor — one report puts the flyover package at N177bn. These are the projects reshaping Effurun Roundabout, PTI Junction, DSC Roundabout you know well
• N20 billion invested in a floating gas project to be sited in Warri, meant to restore Warri economy as commercial hub — financed from FAAC deductions
• N16bn for Power/Energy, N10bn Agriculture, N20bn Social Protection
• N100bn for local government intervention — N4bn per each of the 25 LGAs including Warri South, Uvwie, Warri North
May 2025, Ministry of Economic Planning said 42 projects earmarked for inauguration: sections of 46km Ughelli-Asaba dualisation, Kwale-Beneku Bridge, roads in Sapele.
The Tradeoff - In Clear Format (No Table)
Think of it like this:
Before: Everybody got small cheap fuel.
Government took N4-N6 trillion yearly and spread it thin — every litre you bought had N300-N400 hidden subsidy. You felt it immediately at Ogunu or Deco filling station. But Delta FAAC was small, about N143bn per quarter in Q1 2026. Roads like Warri-Sapele, Warri-Uvwie drainage stayed bad because no money.
Now: Fuel is expensive, but Delta Government is rich.
You pay N900 at pump, transport from Warri to Port Harcourt doubles. But Delta now collects N188bn in ONE quarter Q2 2026, beating Lagos. And N369.87bn in six months Jan-June 2026, highest in Nigeria.
So government swapped direct subsidy to you for indirect spending through Oborevwori's budget.
If that N20bn Warri-Uvwie agency actually fixes flooding in Enerhen, Jakpa Road, and flyovers cut your travel time, and the Warri gas project creates jobs — then the tradeoff may work long-term.
If that money disappears into contracts you never see — then you paid double: expensive fuel AND no development.
That is why critics say: "N177 billion for flyovers in Warri, Effurun, Ughelli and Agbor — yet Primary Health Centres lack drugs, schools are understaffed" — questioning if the projects meet real needs.
For a Warri man, the question to ask is simple: Has your cost of living increase since May 2023 been matched by visible improvement in Warri roads, drainage, light, and jobs?
The FAAC numbers say Delta has the cash to do it. The pump price says you have already paid your part.


Here is the Warri vs Asaba breakdown from Delta's own budget books — this answers your tradeoff:
Warri, Uvwie & Environs vs Asaba - Who gets what?
From Delta State Citizen's Budget documents:
2025 Citizen's Budget:
• Ministry of Works Rural & Riverine Roads: N125.97bn
• Ministry of Works Highways and Urban Roads: N123.03bn
• Warri, Uvwie & Environs Development Agency: N9.50bn
• Delta State Capital Territory Development Agency (Asaba): N9.50bn
Exact same amount. Plus specific Warri-coded projects:
• Construction of New Roads in Warri, Uvwie and Environs: N5.3bn
• Construction of Roads at Havens Home Estate, Ugboroke, Uvwie (Phase 11): N10bn
• Construction of Storm Water Discharge Channels and Erosion Control for Warri and Uvwie: N2bn
• Rehabilitation of Warri Township Stadium
• Trans Warri - Ode-Itsekiri road, Erosion Control for Warri and Uvwie: N3bn
2026 Budget (N1.664tn):
• Warri, Uvwie & Environs Development Agency: N20bn — doubled
• Delta Capital Territory Development Agency: N20bn — also doubled
• Road Infrastructure overall: N450bn
• Education N105.086bn, Health N50.067bn
So on paper, Warri is not sidelined. The government says N450bn roads + N20bn Warri agency + N20bn Warri floating gas project + flyovers at Effurun, PTI Junction, DSC Roundabout.
So does the tradeoff make sense for you in Warri?
Before removal: You saved maybe N20k-N30k per month on cheap fuel. Delta State got N75bn per quarter, little money for Warri roads.
Now: You spend extra N50k-N80k per month on fuel + transport from Enerhen to Port Harcourt. Delta State gets N188bn per quarter.
The test is simple:
If that N20bn Warri-Uvwie agency + N450bn roads actually:
• Fixes flooding in Jakpa, Enerhen, Airport Road
• Completes Effurun and Enerhen flyovers so you don't spend 1 hour in traffic
• Makes Warri-Sapele road motorable
• The N20bn gas project brings back companies to Warri
Then the subsidy removal money is working — painful but productive.
If you still buy fuel at N950 in Warri and still drive through flooded, pothole roads — then you are paying the subsidy removal cost without getting the FAAC benefit.
FAAC data shows Delta is now the richest state monthly from federation account. Citizen's budget shows it budgeted N9.5bn equally for Warri and Asaba in 2025, then N20bn each in 2026.

Warri, Uvwie, Warri South-West, Warri North - Verifiable Project List
These are from Delta Exco approvals and Ministry of Works inspections, not just budget figures:
The Big One - N78 Billion Julius Berger Contract (Signed Oct 2023, Duration 30 months, Completion target March 2026):
• Flyover at DSC Roundabout along Effurun/Patani (East-West Highway), Uvwie LGA
• Flyover at PTI Junction along Effurun/Patani Highway, Uvwie LGA
• Flyover from Enerhen Junction, Effurun to Marine Gate, Warri South LGA
• Road expansion DSC/NPA Expressway from Effurun Roundabout to DSC Roundabout, plus Cloverleaf Interchange at Effurun Roundabout and 2 pedestrian bridges
Uvwie & Warri South Town Roads (Inspected by Commissioner Izeze):
• Reconstruction of Uti Road Effurun, Uvwie
• Edo Guest House Road Ekpan, Uvwie
• Upper and Lower Erejuwa Road, Warri South
Warri South, Warri North, Warri South-West Approvals (2024-2025):
• Rehabilitation/asphalt overlay of Olu Palace Road / Ugbori / Ekurede-Itsekiri Road, Warri South
• Construction of Orugboh Roads, Warri South
• Reconstruction of Uba Egbelemeji–Ugbenikoko Road, Warri North
• Kolokolo to Tisun Road, Warri North
• Oporoza township roads, Warri South-West
• Ogbe-Ijoh Palace Road with spur to King's Jetty, Warri South-West
• Internal roads in Isaba, Warri South-West
• Deghele–Bateren Road, Warri South-West
• Old Koko Road Koko Garage to Lagos Expressway Phase I, Warri North
• Warri-Uvwie Storm Drainage expansion to 76 sites including Ugbuwangue community, Warri South
How to check if tradeoff is real:
1. Drive DSC Roundabout to Enerhen Junction — are Julius Berger flyovers completed?
2. Check Uti Road and Erejuwa Road — were they reconstructed?
3. During rain, does Jakpa Road / Enerhen still flood despite storm drainage expansion?
Delta got N369.87bn in 6 months — highest in Nigeria — because subsidy removal freed FAAC. The state budgeted N9.5bn for Warri-Uvwie agency in 2025 and doubled to N20bn in 2026.
If those flyovers and roads above are done, your extra fuel money converted to infrastructure. If not, it's the worst tradeoff: you pay more at pump and still pay with bad roads.

It's not the whole highway - but a big chunk of the Ondo State coastline is being bypassed, and that's what triggered the news you heard.
Here's what is happening as of October 2026:
1. The original plan was coastal all the way
The Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway is meant to be ∼700-750km from Victoria Island, Lagos to Calabar, passing through 9 states: Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River.
2. The Ondo section is being realigned inland
Reports say the highway will no longer follow the coast through Ilaje LGA in Ondo after passing Lagos and Ogun. The planned adjustment would move inland from around Oke-Upare in Ondo, through Ovia North-East and Ovia South-West in Edo State before reaching Gelegele and connecting towards Warri in Delta State.
That diversion affects Sections 4A and 4B - about 67km total: ∼27km in Ogun and 40km in Ondo, terminating around the Ondo-Edo axis. President Tinubu has reportedly directed that from Ondo into Edo it should follow the existing East-West Road rather than a new coastal alignment.
Ilaje communities like Ugbonla, Ilowo, Awoye, Abereke, Orioke are the ones saying they have been cut out.
3. Why FG says it changed it
Minister of Works David Umahi defends it on engineering grounds:
• Deep peat deposits 40-50m deep in the original coastal alignment - weak, compressible soil that needs massive excavation and special foundations
• Need for many bridges over waterways, high cost and long-term maintenance
He has also dismissed the wider claim that the project "won't go beyond Epe/Lagos" - saying construction is already advancing in Ogun, Ondo, Akwa Ibom and Cross River.
4. So is it true it will no longer pass through the coast?
• No for the whole highway - the project is still called a coastal highway and still runs along the coast in Lagos, Ogun, and other states.
• Yes for a substantial part of Ondo State - community groups, lawyers and even Ilaje and Itsekiri leaders meeting on Sept 19, 2026, say the route is being moved away from the coastal corridor to inland communities and are asking FG/National Assembly to probe it.
As of now, FG has not reversed it - reports say the inland alignment remains the government's preferred option while stakeholders continue to seek a review.

it will still pass through Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River. But not strictly on the beach everywhere.
Minister of Works David Umahi said this clearly at the Phase 2 stakeholders meeting in Lagos:
The redesign, particularly in sections passing through Ondo, Delta, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Bayelsa, aims to eliminate nearly 90% of potential bridges
“For the sections of Ondo, the section of Delta, the section of Port Harcourt, the continuous section in Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa, we are confronted with a lot of bridges, some as long as three kilometres... So, we are redesigning, going to the uplands of the corridor, and so that is going to eliminate about 90% of the bridges”
So the plan is:
• Keep the coastal corridor - Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River are all still on the alignment. FG even added 100km for Edo to make sure Edo was included.
• Move it inland/upland within that corridor in the Niger Delta where you have swamps, creeks and rivers. That is why former Gov Donald Duke and others said “you can't even go through Bayelsa... you'll probably have to build about 100 or 200 bridges” - FG now agrees and is avoiding those 3km-long bridges to cut cost.
What was controversial in Ondo is different: people said the road left the coastal communities entirely and went 20-30km inland through Edo to Warri. In Delta/Bayelsa/Rivers, the shift is described as from the direct shoreline/beach to the uplands of the same coastal corridor, not a full bypass of the state.
So for you in Delta - Warri axis is still very much in the plan. The alignment from Gelegele in Edo to Warri, then onward to Bayelsa and Port Harcourt, is kept, just not hugging the waterline with endless bridges.

Based on what FG has published and what Ilaje/Edo stakeholders are protesting, this is the clearest comparison available as of now — FG has not released a full community-by-community gazette for Delta/Bayelsa yet, but the Ondo-Edo diversion is well documented:
The Change That Sparked It
Original coastal alignment in Ondo: Was supposed to hug the Ilaje coastline from Ogun border through the fishing/oil settlements down to Delta.
New alignment being implemented: From around Oke-Upare in Ondo it turns inland through Ovia North-East and Ovia South-West LGA in Edo State to Gelegele area, then connects to Warri in Delta State. Sections 4A & 4B (67km) are affected.
President Tinubu also directed that from Ondo into Edo it should follow the existing East-West Road corridor instead of a brand new beach road, with elevation works to fix flooding.

For Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River
FG says they will still be passed, but the road will be shifted to uplands to avoid building bridges up to 3km long over swamps/creeks.
That means:
• WILL PASS: The states and their upland corridors - Delta (Warri), Bayelsa, Port Harcourt/Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River are all confirmed still in the project. Section 3A (Cross River) and 3B (Akwa Ibom) - 65km combined - have even been awarded.
• WON'T PASS in the strict sense: The direct beachline / mangrove / creek-edge villages that would have required those 90% of bridges. FG says it will eliminate about 90% of bridges by moving inland within the same corridor.
The protest groups' point is: Why keep it coastal in Lagos, Ogun, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Cross River but make it an inland highway only when it reaches Ondo State?

Here is the itemized list based on the official corridor + what communities and stakeholders have reported. Note: FG has not released the final village-by-village gazette for Bayelsa/Rivers/Akwa Ibom, so some are projected/likely stops under the original plan.
1. LAGOS STATE - WILL PASS (Section 1, already under construction)
• Ahmadu Bello Way, Victoria Island - start point
• Oniru
• Lekki
• Ibeju-Lekki - near Lekki Deep Sea Port
• Free Trade Zone
• La Campagne Tropicana
• Eleko Junction
2. OGUN STATE - WILL PASS (coastal edge)
• Makun-Omi
• Agbede Waterside
• Lenuwa Beach axis
• Ijebu-Ode (link point)
3. ONDO STATE - SPLIT
Original plan WILL PASS (now being BYPASSED - the controversy):
• Araromi Seaside
• Ode-Erinje
• Ilaje LGA core: Ugbonla, Ilowo, Ilepete, Obe-Enikanoselu, Obe-Rewoye, Ikorigho, Jinrinwo, Awoye, Awoye Odofado, Abereke, Orioke, Magbehinwa, Idiogba, Mese, Ayetoro
• Igbokoda - main town in Ilaje
New alignment WILL PASS (inland diversion):
• Oke-Upare - where it turns inland
4. EDO STATE - WILL PASS (newly added by President Tinubu - 100km)
• Ovia North-East
• Ovia South-West / Ovia West
• Gelegele - connection to Delta
• Benin City (link via existing road)
5. DELTA STATE - WILL PASS (but upland, not beach)
• Warri - main connection hub
• Escravos
• Okerenkoko
• Warri South-West LGA
• Burutu
6. BAYELSA STATE - WILL PASS (upland redesign to avoid 3km bridges)
• Agge
• Anyama-Ogbia
• Twon-Brass
• Yenagoa axis (via upland corridor)
7. RIVERS STATE - WILL PASS (upland)
• Bonny Island
• Finima - NLNG Plant area
• Opobo/Nkoro
• Port Harcourt
8. AKWA IBOM STATE - WILL PASS (Section 3B awarded)
• Ibeno - Mobil area, longest beach
• Esit Eket
• Oron
• Mbo LGA
• Uyo (link)
9. CROSS RIVER STATE - WILL PASS (Section 3A awarded, final destination)
• Bakassi
• Calabar South - where highway ends
• Ikang - border town
• Calabar
Summary:
• Won't pass again: The 80-100km stretch of direct beach villages in Ilaje, Ondo (Ugbonla to Awoye etc).
• Will pass: Lagos to Ogun stays coastal, then it goes inland through Edo to Warri, then continues through the uplands of Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom to Calabar to avoid building nearly 90% of the long bridges.

This is the OLD alignment - the original coastal concept before Umahi's redesign to uplands. This is what was presented at the March 2024 flag-off as a beach-hugging road:
OLD ALIGNMENT - Full Coast-to-Coast (700km)
The idea: Follow the Atlantic shoreline as close as possible from Lagos to Calabar, with bridges over every creek, river and swamp.
1. LAGOS
• Ahmadu Bello Way, Victoria Island
• Oniru
• Lekki
• Sangotedo
• Eleko
• Ibeju-Lekki / Free Trade Zone
• La Campagne Tropicana
• Lekki Deep Sea Port / Dangote Refinery axis
2. OGUN
• Makun-Omi
• Agbede Waterside / Iwopin Waterside
• Lenuwa Beach
• Epe - Ogun border
3. ONDO - The main coastal stretch (this is the part now changed)
• Araromi Seaside
• Ode-Erinje
• Ilaje LGA full coastline:
○ Ugbonla
○ Ilowo
○ Ilepete
○ Obe-Enikanoselu
○ Obe-Rewoye
○ Ikorigho
○ Jinrinwo
○ Awoye / Awoye Odofado
○ Abereke
○ Orioke / Orioke-Iwamimo
○ Magbehinwa
○ Idiogba
○ Mese
○ Ayetoro
• Igbokoda - Ilaje headquarters
• Atijere / Aiyetoro axis
Old plan went straight from here into Delta by sea/bridges.
4. DELTA - Old coastal
• Escravos
• Okerenkoko
• Warri South-West riverine
• Burutu
• Forcados
• Direct creek crossings to Bayelsa
5. BAYELSA - Old coastal (most difficult)
• Agge
• Ezetu
• Anyama-Ogbia
• Twon-Brass
• Brass Island
• Direct swamp crossings - this is where Donald Duke said "you can't even go through Bayelsa, Bayelsa is swamp... you'll need 100 or 200 bridges"
6. RIVERS - Old coastal
• Bonny Island
• Finima
• Opobo/Nkoro
• Andoni
• Bodo-Bonny axis (with bridges across Opobo Channel)
• Port Harcourt waterfront
7. AKWA IBOM - Old coastal
• Ibeno - Ibeno Beach
• Esit Eket
• Eket
• Oron
• Mbo LGA
• Ibaka / James Town
8. CROSS RIVER - Old coastal
• Bakassi
• Ikang
• Calabar South
• Calabar - end point
Why it changed:
Old alignment = almost continuous bridges. Some bridges up to 3km long. FG said:
• Deep peat 40-50m in Ondo
• Swamps in Bayelsa / Delta / Rivers / Akwa Ibom
• Would eliminate 90% of bridges by moving to uplands
So old = beach-by-beach, new = coastal corridor but upland - and in Ondo it completely left the beach for Edo inland route through Oke-Upare > Ovia > Gelegele > Warri.

Inland / Upland means:
• NOT on the river banks / beach / creek edge where you need to build 3km bridges over water, fight erosion, and build on 40-50m deep peat/mud.
• BUT inside the main towns/villages on solid ground - the dry land where people actually live, farm, and where the East-West Road already exists.
Example:
• Old plan: Ugbonla beach > Ilowo beach > Awoye beach > directly over the ocean/creeks on bridges to Escravos beach > Brass beach > Bonny beach. Pure waterfront.
• New plan: Ibeju-Lekki town > Ogun Waterside town > Oke-Upare (inland Ondo) > Ovia (inland Edo town) > Gelegele (inland) > Warri town (not Escravos creek) > Yenagoa town (not Twon-Brass waterfront) > Port Harcourt town (not Bonny Island waterfront) > Eket town / Oron town (not directly on Ibeno Beach sand) > Calabar town.
Inland / Upland means:
• NOT on the river banks / beach / creek edge where you need to build 3km bridges over water, fight erosion, and build on 40-50m deep peat/mud.
• BUT inside the main towns/villages on solid ground - the dry land where people actually live, farm, and where the East-West Road already exists.
Example:
• Old plan: Ugbonla beach > Ilowo beach > Awoye beach > directly over the ocean/creeks on bridges to Escravos beach > Brass beach > Bonny beach. Pure waterfront.
• New plan: Ibeju-Lekki town > Ogun Waterside town > Oke-Upare (inland Ondo) > Ovia (inland Edo town) > Gelegele (inland) > Warri town (not Escravos creek) > Yenagoa town (not Twon-Brass waterfront) > Port Harcourt town (not Bonny Island waterfront) > Eket town / Oron town (not directly on Ibeno Beach sand) > Calabar town.
[b][/b]

Nigeria's foreign reserve is at a historic high right now.
As of late September 2026, gross external reserves hit $55.25 billion - the highest in 18 years according to the CBN Governor Olayemi Cardoso.
Key points:
• Start of 2026: around $45.56 billion
• Mid-September 2026: $54.61bn on Sept 14, up 30.5% from $41.84bn a year earlier on Sept 15, 2025
• Sept 18, 2026: $55.25bn
• Early October 2026: still around $54.95bn as of Oct 2
That $55.25bn level is enough to finance about 11.3 months of imports and is already above the CBN's full-year projection of ∼$51.04bn for 2026.
The CBN attributes the build-up to stronger FX inflows - improved oil earnings, sovereign borrowing, and especially diaspora remittances - plus tight monetary policy to stabilize the naira. The current account surplus also jumped from $4.49bn in Q1 2026 to $7.54bn in Q2.

Yes, here's how that $55.25bn reserve directly affects you in Nigeria right now:
1. Naira Exchange Rate - Why it's more stable now
Think of foreign reserves as CBN's dollar savings account.
• CBN can defend the Naira: When demand for dollars is too high (for imports, school fees abroad, PTD fuel importers etc), CBN can sell dollars from reserves to the market. With $55bn+, they have more firepower than they had in 2023/2024 when reserves were under $35bn. That's why pressure in the FX market has "receded significantly" and Naira has been strengthening around September/October.
• Investor confidence: Foreign portfolio investors bring in dollars when they see we have enough reserves to let them take their money out later. More dollars coming in = less scarcity in Lagos black market and in Port Harcourt.
• Import cover: 11.3 months of import cover means Nigeria can pay for 11 months of imports even if oil sales stop tomorrow. That removes panic buying of dollars.
2. Inflation and cost of living
• Import prices: Nigeria still imports fuel, chemicals, machinery, rice, etc. When Naira is stable, the landing cost in Naira doesn't jump every week. That is why your diesel/PMS price and food import prices don't spike as fast.
• CBN's tight policy: To build reserves, CBN kept interest rate very high - MPR was at 26.5% before being recalibrated to 23% in September. High rate makes borrowing expensive for businesses, which is painful short term, but it helps to bring inflation down and attract dollars that keep reserves high.
• In Warri / Port Harcourt reality: You will feel it more through:
○ More stable BDC rate vs official rate (the gap is narrower now)
○ CBN better able to clear FX backlogs for manufacturers, so goods availability improves
○ But loans remain expensive because of that 23% MPR
3. Risk to watch
Reserves built from portfolio flows (hot money) can leave quickly if US interest rates rise. Sustainable build-up needs to come from crude production, non-oil exports, and remittances - which Cardoso said is now a big part.
At $54-55bn, Nigeria is in its strongest external position since 2008, which gives the government more room to pay foreign debts and support the Naira without burning through everything.


In Nigeria, foreign reserve and fuel subsidy are two sides of the same dollar.
Before 2023, this was the cycle:
1. How subsidy used to drain reserves
Nigeria imports almost all its refined fuel. NNPC would buy fuel in dollars, sell in Naira at a lower subsidized price.
• To get those dollars, CBN would dip into foreign reserves.
• When oil price was high, reserves would drop anyway because we were burning dollars to keep pump price at N185.
• That's why reserves fell from $47bn in 2013 to under $33bn in 2023 despite high oil sales - subsidy consumed trillions.
2. What changed since subsidy removal
President Tinubu removed subsidy in May 2023. As of October 1st 2026, FG has said again: "No going back on fuel subsidy removal" and "fuel subsidy will not return". Tinubu called the old regime "ruinous".
Because of that:
• NNPC/Dangote Refinery now sells PMS at market price (~N1,500/litre in some places this month), not at a loss
• Government no longer needs to find $500m+ every month from reserves to pay importers
• That is one major reason reserves could grow from ∼$45.56bn in January to $55.25bn now - the leakage stopped
3. How reserves still affect your pump price today, even without subsidy
Even without subsidy, reserves matter:
• Naira value: If reserves are high, CBN can keep Naira stable. If Naira crashes to N1,800/$, Dangote's crude (priced in dollars) will still cost more in Naira, so your fuel price goes up.
• Import of other petroleum products: Dangote now supplies over 92% of PMS in early 2026, but we still import diesel, aviation fuel, spare parts for refineries - all need dollars from reserves.
• CNG alternative: FG says instead of bringing back subsidy, they are pushing cheaper CNG transit programme. That programme also needs dollars for CNG kits - which again comes from reserve buffer.
So in simple Warri/Port Harcourt terms:
• Low reserves = weak Naira = higher fuel price even without subsidy
• High reserves = stable Naira = fuel price doesn't jump every week, and FG is less tempted to secretly pay subsidy again
That's why CBN is protecting the $55bn - it's the shield that makes "no subsidy" sustainable. If reserves crash again, pressure to bring back subsidy will return.

This is where the numbers are crazy. Let's put them side by side:
How much subsidy used to cost Nigeria
• 2021: N1.16 trillion
• 2022: N4.39 trillion
• 2023: Govt was spending about N18.4bn PER DAY on subsidy when Tinubu took over - that's N6.7 trillion per year at that time. N3.36 trillion was budgeted for just the first 6 months of 2023.
• If we brought it back TODAY in 2026:
○ CPPE estimates it would cost N19.16 trillion to N20 trillion per year - based on 50m litres/day consumption and N1,050 subsidy per litre
○ Nigeria Revenue Service (NRS) Chairman Zacch Adedeji says it would have cost N52 trillion in 2026 - which is 76% of the entire N68 trillion 2026 budget, about $36.2 billion.
How much reserves have gained since removal
• End of Dec 2023: $33.22bn (just after subsidy removal)
• Sept 14, 2026: $54.61bn
• Sept 18, 2026: $55.25bn - highest in 18 years
Gain = +$21bn in less than 3 years. About $20.8bn higher than Dec 2023.
Just from January 2026 to September 2026, reserves grew by about $7-9bn.
The comparison for you
If subsidy had stayed in 2026:
• Nigeria would have spent $36.2bn (N52trn) on subsidy alone
• Our entire reserves today are $55.25bn
• That means one year of subsidy would have wiped out 65% of ALL our foreign reserves
Instead, by removing subsidy:
• FG saved that $36bn
• Reserves grew by $21bn
• That $21bn is what CBN is now using to keep Naira stable, pay foreign debts, and import critical goods.
That's why FG keeps saying in October 1st broadcast: "Fuel subsidy will not return" - because at N20tn to N52tn per year, we would be broke and reserves would be back to $10bn level like 2016.
In Port Harcourt terms: subsidy was like you earning N500k but spending N380k just to keep generator fuel cheap for neighbours. You will never save. Now you stopped, painful at first (fuel N1,500), but your savings account (reserves) is finally growing.

From 1999 to 2023, Nigeria burnt a whole fortune on subsidy. Here's the breakdown from ex-EFCC Chairman Abdulrasheed Bawa's book The Shadow Of Loot and Losses - he audited the 25 years:
Total spent from 1999 to May 29, 2023: N16.5 TRILLION
That is the official amount paid out. Bawa said bulk was stolen via forged documents.


Buhari alone spent 66% of all subsidy money in 25 years of democracy.
The fraud peaked in 2011 - EFCC found N41.7bn fraud in that year alone.
If you go further back to 1973-2023 (50 years), Chapel Hill Denham estimates total is N25 trillion to N30 trillion.
What that N16.5trn means vs today's reserves
• N16.5trn at today's rate (~N1,500/$) = $11 billion
• But at the exchange rates when it was spent (N150- ), it was actually $40-50 billion in real dollar value - enough to build 3 Dangote refineries.
• In 2022 alone, subsidy was N4 trillion - that was 23% of the entire 2022 budget.
• In 2026, if it continued, it would cost N52 trillion (76% of budget) according to NRS.
Where the saved money is supposed to go now (FG's claim)
FG said reforms saved Nigeria from collapse. The savings from N16.5trn + the N52trn we avoided in 2026 are supposed to fund:
1. CNG Programme - Presidential CNG buses to cut transport fare in PH, Warri, Lagos
2. Dangote Refinery backing - No more dollar for fuel import, keep dollars in reserves
3. FAAC increase - States now get more allocation (your Delta and Rivers allocation doubled since 2023)
4. Student loan, infrastructure - Lagos-Calabar coastal road, Sokoto-Badagry
But the big win you see:
• Reserves moved from $33.22bn in Dec 2023 to $55.25bn now - a +$21bn gain in less than 3 years. That $21bn gain would have been impossible if we were still paying N20trn yearly for subsidy.
In short: From 1999-2023 we spent N16.5trn to keep fuel cheap but killed reserves. In 2023-2026 we stopped spending it, saved N15.8trn in 3 years alone according to reports, and reserves jumped to 18-year high.
b][/b]

In Delta State, the current flood is not one single cause - it's a combination, and this year is particularly bad:
1. River Niger overflow - the main driver
Several communities in Ndokwa East, Oshimili, Asaba-Asa and others have been submerged because the River Niger and its adjoining creeks overflowed their banks after persistent rise in water levels over recent days.
IDPs in Asaba holding camps themselves said the flood was caused by the overflow of River Niger and it was yet to recede.
2. Lagdo Dam release from Cameroon + heavy rainfall
The Delta State Government alerted that Lagdo Dam in Cameroon would be releasing modulated water into the River Benue and River Niger due to flooding caused by torrential rainfall. That water flows downstream and ends up in Delta.
3. Coastal and tidal surge
The FG's 2026 Annual Flood Outlook listed Delta among states to experience coastal and riverine flooding due to rise in sea level and tidal surge, which impacts river navigation and fishing areas.
4. Local drainage and human factors
• In many parts of Asaba/Okpanam, heavy rainfall caused flash flooding because drains are uncovered or undersized. One report noted a functional state drainage was blocked by a narrow culvert beneath the East-West Road, restricting natural flow to its discharge point.
• State government also warned against building on waterways - in Oghara, Ethiope West, days of heavy rainfall submerged homes after people built on natural water channels.
NIHSA had in fact warned 343 communities across 13 LGAs in Delta of high flood risk between July 21-27 due to rising upstream flows, and NiMet included Delta among 19 states at risk this season.
So short version: upstream water coming down the Niger/Benue (worsened by Lagdo Dam release) + very heavy local rain + high tide/sea level + blocked / built-over drainage = what you're seeing in Asaba, Ndokwa, Oshimili and Oghara right now.

or Agbarho specifically in Ughelli North, it's a different story from the River Niger overflow in Asaba.
Agbarho own na heavy, persistent rain + Agbarho River + bad drainage:
1. 3 to 10 days of non-stop rain - right now
The latest reports from today say three days of heavy rainfall caused severe flooding along Agbarho/Ughelli Road, cutting off one side near Agbarho Police Station. Another report says it followed 10 days of persistent rainfall that submerged large parts of Agbarho and Ughelli.
In July, it was also an overnight rain till morning that submerged the High Court and homes.
2. Agbarho River overflowed
Residents attributed the devastation to the community's proximity to the river, which has reportedly overflowed following the prolonged rainfall. That river is right beside the Effurun-Agbarho section of the East-West Road, but the flood still took over the road despite that closeness.
3. Drainage collapse at the Police Station culvert
The East-West Road collapsed at a culvert close to the Agbarho Police Station after rising floodwaters overwhelmed the drainage channel. Once one lane went, the water kept rising and cut off the second lane completely.
4. Virtually every part of town affected
Worst-hit sub-communities listed include Orhokpokpor, Ehwere, Ughwughelli, Oviri, Uvwiamuge, Oguname, Ohrerhe, Uvwiama, Oghara, Ophori, Ekrerhavwe, plus Orido Junction, Esiso and Oviri Junctions.
So for Agbarho, unlike Delta riverine areas, it's not Lagdo Dam - it's local torrential rain that has nowhere to go, river level rises, and the undersized/failed culverts on the East-West Road.
The state government listed Agbarho among priority areas for emergency drainage desilting this week - Sapele, Agbarho, Ekpan, Oghara

That's true. In fact, being loved by everyone can be a sign you're not leading.
Popularity is about approval. Leadership is about responsibility. They run on different incentives.
When you're trying to be loved, you avoid tension. When you're trying to lead, you have to create it sometimes.
1. Love rewards you for keeping things comfortable. Leadership often requires making things uncomfortable.
A good leader has to say no, reallocate resources, call out poor performance, kill a popular but failing idea, pick a direction when the group is split. Every one of those decisions will make someone not love you in that moment.
2. Being loved is about consensus. Leadership is about judgment.
If your compass is "what will everyone like?", you'll drift toward the safest, most agreeable option. That's not always the right option. People may love you for never challenging them, but they won't respect you for it later — and they won't grow because of you either.
3. The most trusted leaders aren't the most loved, they're the most consistent.
People don't need you to be likable every day. They need to know where you stand, that you'll tell the truth even when it's costly, and that you'll take the hit for the team when it matters. That earns trust, which lasts longer than affection.
There's a difference between being a people-pleaser and being a servant leader. A people-pleaser asks: "How do I keep everyone happy?" A servant leader asks: "How do I help everyone become better, even if it makes me less popular right now?"
The best leaders I've seen are not universally loved. They are universally clear, fair, and willing to be disliked for a principle. Paradoxically, that's often why people end up respecting — and eventually deeply valuing — them.

If everyone loves you as a leader, you should be worried. It usually means you are managing your image, not the mission.
Let's unpack it properly.
1. Love makes you avoid the work leadership actually is
There are 3 jobs only a leader can do, and all 3 will cost you some affection:
a) Define reality. Tell people the truth about where things really are — the finances are bad, the strategy is failing, the team is underperforming. A loved leader softens it so much that nobody feels urgency.
b) Make the trade-off. You can't fund everything, promote everyone, or pursue every opportunity. Good leadership is choosing what not to do. When you want to be loved, you say "yes" to everyone and you end up betraying everyone slowly.
c) Hold the standard. You enforce the same rule even when it's your best friend, your top earner, or yourself who breaks it. The moment you make exceptions to stay likable, you teach people that standards are negotiable.
A leader who is loved by everyone is often doing none of these.
2. There are two kinds of "love" — and only one helps you lead
Affection: "He's nice, he doesn't stress us, he lets us do what we want." This feels good but it creates weak teams. People feel comfortable but not safe, because they know you won't protect the mission from mediocrity.
Respect: "He's fair, he's consistent, he will tell me what I need to hear, not what I want to hear." This doesn't always feel good in the moment, but it creates psychological safety. People know you won't sacrifice the truth to stay popular.
Machiavelli said it 500 years ago — it's much safer to be feared than loved, if you have to choose. He didn't mean be cruel. He meant: if your leadership depends on everyone liking you, your power is in their hands. If it depends on respect for your principles, it's in yours.
3. What universally loved leaders secretly create
I've seen this pattern in companies, churches, unions, politics — especially here where community and respect matter so much:
• No feedback culture. Because nobody wants to offend the loved leader, bad news stops traveling up. You are loved and blind.
• Resentment in the shadows. The high performers get tired of carrying the low performers you won't confront because you want to be loved by the low performers too.
• Loyalty to you, not to the purpose. People follow you because you're nice, not because they believe in where you're going. The day you have to make a hard call, that loyalty collapses.
That's why some of the most loved leaders leave behind the weakest institutions. Everything was held together by their personality, not by systems, standards, or successors.
4. So what does a good leader do instead?
Not try to be hated. Try to be trusted.
A trusted leader does four things consistently:
1. Clarity over charisma. You know exactly what we are doing, why we are doing it, and what winning looks like. You don't need to love me to understand me.
2. Care and candor together. You know I care about you, so you can receive hard truth from me without thinking I'm attacking you. Care without candor is flattery. Candor without care is cruelty. You need both.
3. Consistency. You apply the same values when it's expensive as when it's cheap. People may not like your decision today, but they can predict it based on principle. That predictability is what makes people feel secure.
4. Courage to be disliked in the short term. You are willing to take a 20% dip in popularity for a 200% gain in progress.
In the end, people don't need a leader they can love like a friend. They need a leader they can rely on when things get hard, confused, and unpopular.
If you are leading anything right now — a team, a department, a family — ask yourself this uncomfortable question:

What difficult conversation am I avoiding right now because I want to remain loved?

The answer to that question is usually where your real leadership work begins.

This is one of the most debated parts of Peter Obi's record as Governor (2006 - March 17, 2014). There are two competing claims:
What Peter Obi has said:
• In 2015 he said "the state did not owe any local or foreign debt under his tenure from 2006 to 2014" and dismissed reports he left N17.6bn debt behind, saying it can be verified with the Debt Management Office (DMO).
• He has also said he cleared more than ₦35 billion in old gratuities and arrears before leaving and left office without owing salaries, pensions, gratuities or contractors for certified projects.
• He left money for projects, including money in First Bank account for erosion control.
What the Anambra State Government and DMO records say:
• In September 2024-2025, the Anambra Govt under Commissioner Law Mefor released a statement titled “Gov Peter Obi and Record of Public Debt in Anambra: Facts Beyond Propaganda and Lies” saying Obi left $123.77 million in external debt from eight different external borrowings for malaria, erosion control, education, healthcare.
• The same release said as of June 30, 2026, those 8 loans had an outstanding balance of $92.35 million / N127.4 billion at current exchange rate.
• Fact-checks of DMO data said DMO showed $41,459,335.44 in outstanding external debt as of 30 June 2014, shortly after Obi handed over.
• Verdict from multiple fact-checks: MISLEADING — while he may have cleared salary and contractor arrears, the state carried both domestic and external debt at the time of departure.
So the nuance:
• Obi defines "debt" as unpaid salaries / pensions / contractor arrears — which he says he cleared.
• DMO / State Govt defines "debt" as formal public debt (external loans from World Bank / AfDB etc) — which was on the books when he left, and continued to be serviced by successors including Soludo.
ere are the actual records the Anambra government released last week to back their claim — this is what they say are the 8 facilities:
The 8 external loans (original value $123.77m total)
According to Premium Times and Anambra Govt statement, the loans were taken between 2007-2013 for:
1. Malaria Control Booster Project
2. Additional Financing for Malaria Control Booster Project — original $48.33m, with $37.34m still outstanding as of June 30, 2026
3. Third National FADAMA Development Project / Fadama III
4. Health System Development Project II (Additional Financing)
5. State Education Programme Investment Project (SEPIP)
6. Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP)
7. Community and Social Development Project (CSDP)
8. Value Chain Development Project (VCDP)
All are World Bank / AfDB / IFAD-assisted concessional loans — the type every state takes for agriculture, health and erosion.
The state says outstanding balance as of June 30, 2026 = $92.35m = N127.37bn at current official rate, and that Soludo's government is still servicing them.
What does DMO show for 2014?
This is where the debate gets technical:
• Dec 31, 2013 (3 months BEFORE Obi left): DMO recorded Anambra external debt at $30.32m
• June 30, 2014 (3 months AFTER Obi left, Obiano had taken over): DMO recorded $41,459,335.44
So the DMO figure around handover was ∼$30-41m, not $123m. The $123m is the original signed amount — not all disbursed at once. Concessional loans disburse in tranches over years, so outstanding at any point is lower.
Fact-checkers concluded: Misleading to say Anambra was 100% debt-free — DMO shows external debt existed — but also misleading to say Obi left $127bn debt in 2014, because that N127bn is 2026 naira value using today's FX, not 2014 value.
Obi's camp still maintains:
He was not owing salaries, pensions, or contractors whose jobs were certified as at handover day, and that he left over N75bn savings / investments. Anambra Govt disputes that, saying Water Corporation workers were owed 42 months and primary school teachers' arrears from Mbadinuju era remained.

DMO: States External Debt Stock as at 30th June 2014
This is the PDF the DMO published — it lists all 36 states. The line you care about:
Anambra — $41,459,335.44
For context, some other states same date:
• Abia $35,500,952.41
• Adamawa $37,573,469.66
• Akwa Ibom $59,850,370.59
• Bauchi $111,607,175.28
• Cross River $120,212,331.65
That $41.46m figure is 3 months after Obi left office (he left March 17, 2014).
The DMO figure 3 months BEFORE he left:
• Dec 31, 2013: $30,323,574.40 / $30.32m
So DMO shows increase of $11.14m between Dec 2013 and June 2014, straddling the handover.
Why Anambra Govt says $123.77m then?
$123.77m is original signed value of 8 facilities, not outstanding as at handover.
According to Premium Times release of loan records:
loans were allegedly taken for eight projects, including Malaria Control Booster Project, Third FADAMA Development Project, Health System Development Project II (Add. Fin), State Education Programme Investment Project and Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project
Full list from govt + analysis:
1. Malaria Control Booster Project — ∼$9.46m
2. Additional Financing for Malaria Control Booster Project — $48.33m original, $37.34m outstanding as at June 30 2026
3. Third National FADAMA Development Project (Fadama III)
4. Health System Development Project II
5. State Education Programme Investment Project (SEPIP) — $48.33m associated
6. Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP) — ∼$37.89m
7. Community and Social Development Project (CSDP) — ∼$4.84m
8. Value Chain Development Programme (VCDP) — approved 2012, effective Oct 31 2013, but first disbursement Feb 2015 — 11 months AFTER Obi left
Outstanding as at June 30, 2026 claimed: $92,353,182.00 / N127.37bn
The key accounting point analysts make:
• Loan facility ≠ disbursed loan ≠ outstanding debt.
• Example: SEPIP and NEWMAP together = ∼$86.22m (70% of $123.77m) but World Bank records show cumulative disbursement was still very limited around end of 2013 and rose substantially during 2014.
• If money was disbursed after March 2014, it was drawn by Obiano administration, even if negotiated by Obi.
So both sides are partially correct:
• Obi inherited $16.87m external debt in Dec 2006, left with $30.32m in Dec 2013 → net increase ∼$13.45m during his tenure if you just compare closing stocks.
• He did not leave zero public debt — DMO proves external debt existed.
• But he also did not leave $123m cash debt in 2014 — that figure is 2026 valuation of facilities that were still disbursing years after he left.
[b][/b]

Think of it like this: not being corrupt is the floor, not the ceiling.
A lot of us, especially in places where corruption has done real damage, start to think "if we just get an honest person in charge, everything will be fixed." It's understandable. But honesty alone doesn't run anything.
A good leader needs at least four things, and honesty is only one:
1. Integrity
This is the not-corrupt part. It means you don't steal, you don't lie for gain, you don't bend rules for your friends. It builds trust. Without it, nothing else matters because people will assume your other qualities are just a cover. But trust alone doesn't get work done.
2. Competence
Can you actually understand the problem and make a workable plan?
A leader can be completely honest and still be clueless about economics, security, people management, or negotiation. An honest person who makes bad decisions out of ignorance can still wreck a company, a community, or a country — just without pocketing anything.
3. Vision and Courage
A non-corrupt caretaker will keep things from getting worse. A good leader has to make things get better. That requires a clear picture of where to go, and the courage to make unpopular decisions, fire underperforming loyalists, confront powerful interests, and take responsibility when it fails.
Many honest leaders fail here. They don't want to offend anyone, so they avoid hard choices. Nothing changes.
4. Care for People
This is the difference between a clean administrator and a leader people will follow. Do you listen? Can you bring different groups together? Can you inspire people to sacrifice for a common goal? Do you develop other leaders after you?
History is full of examples of leaders who were personally clean but were still poor leaders — rigid, indecisive, tribalistic, or simply unable to deliver results. And their honesty became irrelevant because people suffered anyway under their incompetence.
So the better question is:
Does being corrupt automatically make you a bad leader? Yes.
Does not being corrupt automatically make you a good leader? No.
It makes you eligible. What you do with that eligibility — whether you can lead with wisdom, skill, and genuine service — is what actually makes you good.

Because in reality we almost always get to choose between two disappointments:
1. The honest but ineffective leader.
He won't steal the money for the road project. But the road never gets built either, because he can't navigate the bureaucracy, can't stand up to contractors, can't make a plan. At the end of 4 years, the money is still there, but so is the pothole. People start saying, "At least the corrupt one was doing something."
2. The effective but corrupt leader.
She gets the road built, the lights on, the jobs moving. But she inflates the contract by 40%, gives it to her cousin, and makes sure everyone knows you have to pay to play. Things work, but the system rots from inside. And the next leader learns that this is how you have to play to get things done.
This is why just looking for "not corrupt" is a trap. It makes us lower the bar so much that we celebrate anyone who simply doesn't steal.
A truly good leader has to pass a harder test:
• If you leave him alone with money, does it stay safe? That's integrity.
• If you give him a difficult problem with no money, can he still find a way? That's competence.
• If you give him power over people who disagree with him, does he still treat them fairly? That's character.
Most of the frustration we feel isn't because honest people don't exist. It's because we are forced to choose between honesty without capacity, and capacity without honesty.

THE ISSUES, THE REALITY, THE FACT BEHIND REAL WARRI PIKIN CANCELLING HER SHOW.


THE ISSUES

The show was REAL WARRI PIKIN LIVE IN WARRI - In My Element scheduled for Sun. Sept 20th / 28th at The Monarchy Event Centre, Effurun Sapele Road.
Official reason she gave:
"Unfortunate divisions" in Delta State
In her own video statement, she said it was not just about this one show, but 8 years of bullying over her name. She explained it like this:
• The venue is in Effurun, which is in Uvwie LGA, not Warri South. Community stakeholders, lawyers, and local groups petitioned the venue and threatened to "scatter everything" on the show day if she didn't change everything.
• They demanded she pull down billboards, delete social media posts, remove radio jingles and banners that said "Live in Warri" and re-bill it as "Live in Effurun" or "Live in Delta".
• Some groups also told her to drop "Warri" from her stage name entirely, arguing Warri belongs to Itsekiri and Effurun/Uvwie is distinct.
• She said she had tried to compromise with "Live in Delta" but still got threats, and she was exhausted by the Urhobo / Ijaw / Itsekiri disunity, calling being an entertainer from Delta "tiring".
She ended her statement saying "y'all in that State don't deserve me" and that the cancellation wouldn't limit her brand because she represents Delta State, Nigeria, Africa, and women across tribes.
What the debate became:
On social media, it's turned into a huge Warri vs Uvwie identity debate:
• Many people are angry, saying tribalism is chasing investors out of Warri and that "Warri na Warri whether na Udu, Effurun".
• Others defend Uvwie, insisting "Effurun is not Warri.. she should have just change the address" and that correcting the name is about respecting local identity and bylaws.
There is also a counter-narrative from some Delta media aides claiming it wasn't really about the name but about low ticket sales and economic hardship — that people don't have time/money for shows right now — but Warri Pikin's own stated reason in her videos is the threats and division.


THE REALITY

Both sides are right, but the way it was done killed the win-win.
1. Why Uvwie/Effurun people felt they had to speak:
Uvwie has been fighting for years to not be called "Warri". Administratively, Effurun is headquarters of Uvwie LGA, not Warri South. For indigenes, being called Warri erases their identity and their own investment drive. If you want Effurun/Uvwie to grow as a brand for business, you have to say the name. That part is valid.
2. Why using "Warri" still makes marketing sense:
"Warri" is not just Warri South. Internationally, "Warri" is an umbrella economic city-cluster like "Lagos" - it includes Warri, Effurun, Udu, Osubi, Ekpan. That's what outsiders know. When says "Live in Lagos" and does it at Eko Atlantic in VI, nobody from Ikeja petitions him. Warri Pikin used "Warri" as a commercial catchment, not to deny Uvwie.

For community leaders:
Petition is okay, threat is not. A letter to correct address is advocacy. Threatening to "scatter the show" turns advocacy to economic sabotage. The show would have brought hotels, makeup artists, MCs, bouncers, vendors in Uvwie - all your own boys. Cancelling it didn't put Uvwie on the map, it took money off the map.
For government:
Delta needs to define "Greater Warri" officially, like Greater Accra or Greater Port Harcourt. If the state itself uses Greater Warri for Warri South, Warri South-West, Warri North, Uvwie, Udu, Okpe, Sapele corridor, then nobody feels stolen from. Then you can have Warri Pikin headline "Greater Warri" next time.
Bottom line: Putting your town on the map should be by hosting and owning the event, not by stopping it. If Uvwie wants to be known, the play should have been: "Welcome her, let her sell out, then mount your own Uvwie banners at the venue - This is Uvwie welcoming the world." That would have trended more positively than cancellation.
Warri built its name by being loud and inclusive. If every part of Warri now wants to be known, it should add to the noise, not silence the show.


FACT:

This is exactly why that poster became a bomb. It's not really about Warri Pikin, it's about what the word "Warri" means.
For over 100 years, "Who owns Warri?" has been an open wound. So when you write "LIVE IN WARRI" and put the venue in Effurun, people don't see an entertainment flyer, they see a political statement.
Here is the expansion:
1. Warri has 3 different meanings and that's the problem
a. Warri Kingdom: The traditional kingdom headed by the Olu of Warri, historically Itsekiri.
b. Warri Township: The old colonial town area - Warri South LGA.
c. Greater Warri / Warri Metropolis: The economic city that we all call Warri today - which includes Warri South, Uvwie (Effurun), Udu, Okpe, Warri South-West, parts of Warri North.
So when an entertainer says "Warri", she means C. But many locals hear A or B.
2. Why the tribes claim it differently
Itsekiri position: They say the Olu of Warri holds radical title over Warri lands. They point to early colonial court cases like Ometan v. Chief Dore Numa (1926) where the court ruled Itsekiri under the Olu held overlordship and Agbassa Urhobo were customary tenants, upheld up to Privy Council in 1933, and that Supreme Court rulings have affirmed Itsekiri possessory title.
Urhobo position - Agbarha, Agbassa, Okere-Urhobo, Uvwie: They say they are autochthonous to Warri. Agbarha-Ame (Agbassa), Okere-Urhobo are original owners of Warri Township. They point to post-independence cases like Idudu vs Okumagba where courts gave the Okumagba family possessory rights over 281.1 acres along Okumagba Avenue in central Warri. Their argument: "There's no ancestral root of any Itsekiri man or woman to Warri Township. Warri Township belongs to Urhobos and Ijaws" is what Urhobo leaders have argued.
Ijaw position - Ogbe-Ijoh, Gbaramatu: They point to the 1906 British land lease of 360 hectares of Ogbe-Ijoh land and the Warri Assessment Reports that said Warri originally belonged to Ogbe-Ijoh and Urhobo, and that Gbaramatu and Ogbe-Ijoh are customary tenants under that system.
So every time someone says "Warri" without specifying, each group feels if they keep quiet, they are conceding ownership in the larger court of public opinion.
3. Why Effurun, Agbarha are specifically angry now
Effurun (Uvwie): Effurun is headquarters of Uvwie LGA. It has its own king - Ovie of Uvwie. Since 2022 when the Olu title was reverted from "Olu of Itsekiri" back to "Olu of Warri" - a title first changed in 1936 to avoid conflict because Warri Province then included Urhobo land - Uvwie youth feel Itsekiri are expanding claim from Warri South to cover them. So a billboard saying "Live in Warri" inside Uvwie is seen as "they want to use our land to promote Warri ownership."
Agbarha (Warri): Agbarha is inside Warri South itself. They are Urhobo inside the core Warri city. They have been in legal battles for decades saying central Warri is Agbarha land, not Itsekiri. So they are the most sensitive to any event that projects Warri as one homogenous Itsekiri town.
In short: One tribe claiming ownership of Warri turns a simple venue address into an identity battle.
Warri Pikin is Urhobo from Agbarha herself, but because she used the commercial name "Warri Pikin" and put "Live in Warri" on an Effurun venue, Uvwie groups said: "You are using our Uvwie land to promote Warri, which Itsekiri people will now use to say they own us."
If she had written "Live in Effurun (Warri)" or "Live in Uvwie, Greater Warri", that small addition would have put Effurun on the map without appearing to take from it.

Note: about the flyer , it is not official, This is how I think future flyers could be written to avoid the Warri vs Uvwie confusion."

During the military regime of PMB as Head of State (1983–1985), Muhammadu Buhari primarily fought the Maitatsine sect, a violent extremist Islamic movement operating in Northern Nigeria.The details of this confrontation and other military-era operations include:1. The Maitatsine Sect (1984–1985)Who they were: The Maitatsine were an extremist, unorthodox Islamic group founded by Mohammed Marwa (nicknamed "Maitatsine". Similar to the modern-day Boko Haram, they vehemently opposed Western education, modern technology, and the authority of the Nigerian state, declaring anyone who did not follow their ideology as non-Muslims.The Military Response: Although the founder was killed in 1980 before Buhari took power, his fanatical followers resurfaced and launched violent insurrections during Buhari's military rule.The Yola and Jimeta Crises (1984): In early 1984, the sect launched a bloody uprising in Yola and Jimeta (Adamawa State). General Buhari flew directly to the region to personally supervise a ruthless military onslaught. The Nigerian Army cordoned off the areas and systematically dismantled the group.The Gombe Uprising (1985): The sect rose again in Gombe in April 1985. Buhari's regime deployed decisive military force once more, effectively crushing the remaining organized cells of the group before his government was overthrown in August 1985.2. Chadian Border Intruders (1983)Just months before he became Head of State, while serving as the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 3rd Infantry Division in Jos, Buhari fought Chadian military rebels along the northern border.Following border disputes and Chadian incursions into Nigerian islands on Lake Chad, Buhari defied direct orders from civilian President Shehu Shagari to seek a peaceful resolution.He ordered his troops to pursue the Chadian forces over 50 kilometers into Chadian territory, successfully securing the northern border but severely straining civil-military relations at the time.

To understand how Northern Nigeria's security crisis reached its current state, it helps to examine two closely linked developments: the transformation of local resource conflicts into multi-million naira criminal syndicates, and the ongoing military campaigns targeting their remote forest hideouts.

Phase 1: How Resource Clashes Evolved into Modern BanditryThe transition from localized disputes to full-scale banditry occurred over several distinct stages, fueled by environmental pressures and a breakdown in local governance.Land Deprivation and Climate Change: For decades, pastoralist Fulani herders and sedentary Hausa farmers coexisted through traditional land-sharing agreements. However, severe droughts, desertification in the far north, and a booming population forced herders southward. This migration encroached on designated farming areas, sparking intense competition over diminishing land and water resources.The Breakdown of Traditional Dispute Resolution: Historically, local chiefs and elders settled these disputes through mediation and compensation. As the state government stripped traditional rulers of their local authority, these informal legal channels collapsed. Farmers began forming local vigilante groups (Yan Voluntari or Yan Sakai) to protect their lands, while herders felt increasingly marginalized and unprotected by the formal legal system.Vigilante Overreach and Escalation: The crisis escalated dramatically when untrained vigilante groups began carrying out extrajudicial killings, burning Fulani settlements, and profiling ordinary herders as criminals. In response, herder groups formed armed defense units. Seeking revenge and survival, these groups quickly morphed into offensive militias.The Proliferation of Weapons: Porous borders with the unstable Sahel region allowed an influx of cheap automatic weapons, particularly AK-47s. Once armed, these herder-turned-militia groups realized that criminality was far more lucrative than livestock rearing. They abandoned cattle herding entirely to form heavily armed, mobile syndicates dedicated to mass kidnappings for ransom, highway robberies, and village raids.

Phase 2: How Current Security Forces Tackle Forest CampsModern bandits do not live in towns; they operate out of vast, contiguous forest reserves like the Rugu, Kamuku, and Sambisa forests, which stretch across Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, and Niger states. Confronting them requires specialized, jungle-warfare tactics.Joint Military Tasks Forces: The Nigerian Armed Forces lead coordinated operations, such as Operation Hadarin Daji in the North-West, combining the Army, Air Force, and police units to systematically locate and dismantle deep-forest camps.Air-Led Interdictions: Because the dense forest terrain makes ground navigation highly dangerous, the Nigerian Air Force uses fighter jets and armed drones for aerial surveillance and targeted strikes. These operations are designed to destroy bandit command structures and neutralise high-profile kingpins before ground troops move in.Clearing Operations and Special Forces: Army Special Forces units launch periodic ground assaults into the heart of the forests. Their objective is to flush bandits out of their fortified positions, rescue abducted civilians, and destroy makeshift logistics bases where bandits store food, fuel, and weapons.Telecommunications Blackouts: In moments of intense offensive operations, the government occasionally shuts down mobile network towers in targeted local government areas. This tactic successfully cuts off communication between bandits in the forest and their urban informants, preventing them from coordinating counter-attacks or negotiating ransoms.Involving Local Civilian Task Forces: Recognizing that formal troops cannot be everywhere, the military heavily relies on verified local vigilantes and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). These locals act as vital guides, utilizing their deep knowledge of the forest pathways to help state forces navigate the terrain.

Nothing Musa no go see for gate. So slippers ba issue now. Mehn u must be outta ur damn mind

idealogical:
Don't know if this is the standard wailing and joblessness or just stupidity and boredom.

Uduma Michael - Cares @DonSolution_ wrote:


https://mobile.twitter.com/DonSolution_/status/1249934379993960448

fancyhandsome:
Former Nigerian beauty queen Jennifer Okechukwu is set to tie the knot with her heartrobb in ibite Ogugu Awgu, Enugu state.

Jennifer was crowned Face of Culture Africa 2015 and was involved in numerous humanitarian projects during her reign including feeding/empowering over 500 widows in her local community in Enugu.

Here are stunning pre wedding shoot shared by the couple ahead of their traditional marriage on 6th,January 2020.

https://www.stelladimokokorkus.com/2020/01/ex-beauty-queen-jennifer-okechukwu.html?m=1

Queen Jennifer. Congratulations. The first time her. We went for an event @ owerri. Event organizers were behind schedule... Chairs and table not set. The queen took off her sarge even as an invited guest, she never mind she started arranging chairs and putting tables together. Was shocked at her humility. There and there I knew she was really an example. Happiness and fruitfulness in your home my queen.

fancyhandsome:
Former Nigerian beauty queen Jennifer Okechukwu is set to tie the knot with her heartrobb in ibite Ogugu Awgu, Enugu state.

Jennifer was crowned Face of Culture Africa 2015 and was involved in numerous humanitarian projects during her reign including feeding/empowering over 500 widows in her local community in Enugu.

Here are stunning pre wedding shoot shared by the couple ahead of their traditional marriage on 6th,January 2020.

https://www.stelladimokokorkus.com/2020/01/ex-beauty-queen-jennifer-okechukwu.html?m=1

Queen Jennifer. Congratulations. The first time her. We went for an event @ owerri. Event organizers were behind schedule... Chairs and table not set. The queen took off her sarge even as an invited guest, she never mind she started arranging chairs and putting tables together. Was shocked at her humility. There and there I knew she was really an example. Happiness and fruitfulness in your home my queen.

NwekeUG:
IgbereTV reports that the Senator and Congressman representing New Jersey, where Sowore resides in the U.S.A., wrote a letter to Nigerian Ambassador to the United States of America, on the detention of Sowore by the DSS.

See letter below

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515




November 25, 2019

Ambassador Sylvianus Adiewere Nsofor
Head of Mission
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
3519 International Court, N.W.
Washington DC. 20008

Dear Ambassador Nsofor,

We write to express strong concern about closing media and Civic space in Nigeria. There have been a number of troubling reports about Nigeria security services assaulting and detaining journalists using excessive force on non-violent protesters and taking other actions that inhibit freedom of expression, and otherwise prevent Nigerians from fully exercising their constitutional rights.

Journalists and activists such as Omoyele Sowore, Jones Abiri, Kofi Bartels, Samuel Ogundipe, and others investigating and speaking-out politically sensitive problems like corruption or insecurity have been harassed and detained, with reports that some have been tortured. In at least one instance, the Department of Security Services has ignored a court order to release a detained activist. Restrictions and deadly crackdowns on non-violent protesters since 2015 have similarly reflected a lack of apparent commitment to civic freedoms which is beginning to negatively impact the image of Nigeria's government, both home and abroad. Security forces used live ammunitions on Shiite protestors in Zaria, Kaduna State in 2015; on protestors in Onitsha, Anambra State in 2016, again on a Shiite procession in Abuja in 2018, raided the office of Daily Trust, and arrested the editor in January, 2019, and shot and killed Precious Owolabi, a journalist covering a July 2019 protest in Abuja. The crackdowns have collectively killed hundreds of Nigerian citizens and serve serve as troubling demonstration of the excessive force used by the military. The alleged perpetrators of these abuse have yet to be brought to justice.

Mr. Ambassador, Nigeria has a critical role to play in preserving peace and and stability in West Africa, and as the most popular democracy in the continent, it could serve as a shining example of how countries can best observe the rights enshrined in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. However, failure to failure to respect the rights in the Charter and those in Nigeria's own constitution undermine your nation's ability to lead in this area. We urge you to ensure that the rights and liberties contained in the constitution are observed for all citizens, and to take strong action against further closing space for journalists, political opposition, and those in civil society. The rights of all citizens must be respected without the threat of government reprisal. We look forward to seeing progress on this critically important issue. Thank you for your attention on this urgent matter.

Sincerely,


Signed

Robert Menendez
United States Senator

Josh Gottheimer
Member of Congress


http://igberetvnews.com/1167339/u-s-congress-writes-nigeria-detention-sowore-photo/

Nigeria is a free state. US Congress cannot tell us what to do.

SalamRushdie:
Campaigns for 3rd term have started in earnest

If he would continue. We would be happy

Hofbrauhaus:
People mumu sha...

How do you mean

Muhammadu Buhari GCFR (born 17 December 1942) is a Nigerian politician currently serving as the President of Nigeria, in office since 2015. He is a retired major general in the Nigerian Army and previously served as the nation's head of state from 31 December 1983 to 27 August 1985, after taking power in a military coup d'état.
 The term Buharismis ascribed to the Buhari military government.

He unsuccessfully ran for the office of president of Nigeria in the 2003, 2007, and 2011 general elections. In December 2014, he emerged as the presidential candidate of the All Progressives Congress for the March 2015 general elections. Buhari won the election, defeating the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan. This marked the first time in the history of Nigeria that an incumbent president lost to an opposition candidate in a general election. He was sworn in on 29 May 2015. In February 2019, Buhari was re-elected President, defeating his closest rival Atiku Abubakar by over 3 million votes.[8]

Buhari has stated that he takes responsibility for anything over which he presided during his military rule, and that he cannot change the past. He has described himself as a "converted democrat".[9]

Early life

Muhammadu Buhari was born to a Fulanifamily[10] on 17 December 1942, in Daura, Katsina State, to his father Hardo Adamu, a Fulani chief, and mother Zulaihat.[1][2] He is the twenty-third child of his father. Buhari was raised by his mother, after his father died when he was about four years old.[11]

Early military career

Buhari enrolled at age 19 in the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) in 1962.[12]In February 1964, the college was upgraded to an officer commissioning unit of the Nigerian Army and renamed the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) (prior to 1964, the Nigerian government sent cadets who had completed their NMTC preliminary training to mostly Commonwealth military academies[13][14][15]for officer cadet training). From 1962 to 1963, Buhari underwent officer cadet training at Mons Officer Cadet School in Aldershot in England.[16]

In January 1963, at age 20, Buhari was commissioned a second lieutenant and appointed Platoon Commander of the Second Infantry Battalion in Abeokuta, Nigeria. From November 1963 to January 1964, Buhari attended the Platoon Commanders' Course at the Nigerian Military Training College, Kaduna. In 1964, he facilitated his military training by attending the Mechanical Transport Officer's Course at the Army Mechanical Transport School in Borden, United Kingdom.

From 1965 to 1967, Buhari served as commander of the Second Infantry Battalion and appointed brigade major, Second Sector, First Infantry Division, April 1967 to July 1967.

Northern counter-coup of 28 July 1966

In July 1966 Lieutenant Muhammadu Buhari was one of the participants in the "July Rematch" or so called "Counter-Coup", led by Lt-Col Murtala Muhammed, that overthrew and assassinated Nigeria's first self-appointed military Head of State General Aguiyi Ironsi, who had assumed leadership of the Nigerian government after a failed coup attempt on 15 January 1966, which overthrew the elected parliamentary government of Nigeria (also known as first republic). Other participants in the coup on 28 July 1966 included 2nd Lieutenant Sani Abacha, Lieutenant Ibrahim Babangida, Major Theophilus Danjuma, Lieutenant Ibrahim Bako among others. The coup was a reaction to the January coupwhere a group of mostly Igbo officers led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwuoverthrew the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Many Northern soldiers were aggrieved by the murder of senior politicians, Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, northern regional premier, Ahmadu Bello, and four senior officers from northern Nigeria: Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari, Colonel Kur Mohammed, Lt-Cols Abogo Largema and James Pam.[17] The counter-coup was very bloody leading to the murder of mostly Igbo officers. Among the casualties were the first military head of state General Aguiyi Ironsiand Lt Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, the military governor of the Western Region.

Civil war

Buhari was assigned to the 1st Division under the command of Lt. Col Mohammed Shuwa,[18] the division had temporarily moved from Kaduna to Makurdi at the onset of the Nigerian Civil War. The 1st division was divided into sectors and then battalions [19]with Shuwa assisted by sector commanders Martin Adamu and Sule Apollo who was later replaced by Theophilus Danjuma. Buhari's initial assignment was as Adjutant and Company Commander 2 battalion unit, Second Sector Infantry of the 1st Division. The 2 battalion was one of the units that participated in the first actions of the war, they started from Gakem near Afikpo and moved towards Ogoja with support from Gado Nasko's artillery squad.[20] They reached and captured Ogoja within a week with the intention of advancing through the flanks to Enugu, the rebel capital.[21] Buhari was briefly the 2 battalion's Commander and led the battalion to Afikpo to link with the 3rd Marine Commando and advance towards Enugu through Nkalagu and Abakaliki. However, before the move to Enugu, he was posted to Nsukka as Brigade Major of the 3rd Infantry Brigade under Joshua Gin who would later become battle fatigued and replaced by Isa Bukar.[22] Buhari stayed with the infantry for a few months as the Nigerian army began to adjust tactics learnt from early battle experiences. Instead of swift advances, the new tactics involved securing and holding on to the lines of communications and using captured towns as training ground to train new recruits brought in from the army depots in Abeokuta and Zaria.[22] In 1968, he was posted to the 4 Sector also called the Awka sector which was charged to take over the capture of Onitsha from Division 2. The sector's operations was within the Awka-Abagana-Onitsha region which was important to Biafran forces because it was a major source of food supply. It was in the sector that Buhari's group suffered a lot of casualties trying to protect food supplies route of the rebels along Oji River and Abagana.[23]

After the war

From 1970 to 1971, Buhari was Brigade Major/Commandant, Thirty-first Infantry Brigade. He then served as the Assistant Adjutant-General, First Infantry Division Headquarters, from 1971 to 1972. He also attended the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India, in 1973.[24]

From 1974 to 1975 Buhari was Acting Director of Transport and Supply at the Nigerian Army Corps of Supply and Transport Headquarters.[25]

Participation in July 1975 coup

Then Lieutenant Colonel Buhari was among a group of officers[26] (led[27] by Colonels Ibrahim Taiwo, Joseph Garba, Abdulahi Mohammed, Anthony Ochefu, Lieutenant Colonels Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Ibrahim Babangida and Alfred Aduloju) who overthrew the Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon.

Governor of North Eastern State

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From 1 August 1975 to 3 February 1976, General Murtala Mohammed, appointed Buhari as Governor of the North-Eastern State, to oversee social, economic and political improvements in the state. Buhari also briefly served as Governor of Borno state from 3 February 1976 to 15 March 1976.

On 3 February 1976, the North Eastern state was divided by the Military Government into Bauchi, Borno and Gongola states. In August 1991, Yobe state was created from Borno state, while Gongola state was split into two states, Taraba and Adamawa. In October 1996, Gombe State was created from Bauchi State.

Federal Commissioner for Petroleum and Natural Resources

In March 1976, the Head of State, GeneralOlusegun Obasanjo, appointed Buhari as the Federal Commissioner (position now called Minister) for Petroleum and Natural Resources. When the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation was created in 1977,[28] Buhari was also appointed as its Chairman, a position he held until 1978. During his tenure as Commissioner, 2.8 billion dollars allegedly went missing from the accounts of the NNPC in Midlands Bank in the United Kingdom. Former President Ibrahim Babangida allegedly accused Buhari of being responsible for this fraud.[29][30][31]

However, in the conclusion of the Crude Oil Sales Tribunal of Inquiry headed by Justice Ayo Irikefe to investigate allegations of 2.8 billion Dollars misappropriation from the NNPC account, the tribunal found no truth in the allegations even though it noticed some lapses in the NNPC accounts.[32]

During Buhari's tenure as the Federal Commissioner for Petroleum and Natural Resources, the government invested in pipelines and petroleum storage infrastructures. The government built about 21 petroleum storage depots all over the country from Lagos to Maidugiuri and from Calabar to Gusau; the administration constructed a pipeline network that connected Bonny terminal and the Port Harcourt refinery to the depots. Also, the administration signed the contract for the construction of a refinery in Kaduna and an oil pipeline that will connect the Escravos oil terminal to Warri Refinery and the proposed Kaduna refinery.[33]

Back in military service

From 1978 to 1979, he was Military Secretary at the Army Headquarters and was a member of the Supreme Military Council from 1978 to 1979. From 1979 to 1980, at the rank of colonel, Buhari (class of 1980) attended the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in the United States, and gained a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies.[3][34][35]Upon completion of the on-campus full-time resident program lasting ten months and the two-year-long, distance learning program, the United States Army War College (USAWC) college awards its graduate officers a master's degree in Strategic Studies.

Other roles include:

General Officer Commanding, 4th Infantry Division, August 1980 – January 1981[36]

General Officer Commanding, 2nd Mechanised Infantry Division, January 1981 – October 1981[37]

General Officer Commanding, 3rd Armed Division Nigerian Army, October 1981 – December 1983

Chadian military affair

In 1983, when Chadian forces invaded Nigeria in the Borno State, Buhari used the forces under his command to chase them out of the country, crossing into Chadian territory in spite of an order given by President Shagari to withdraw.[38] This 1983 Chadian military affair led to more than 100 victims and "prisoners of war".[38]

December 1983 military coup

Main article: 1983 Nigerian coup d'état

Major-General Buhari was one of the leaders of the military coup of December 1983 that overthrew the democratically elected government of President Shehu Shagari. At the time of the coup plot, Buhari was the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Third Armored Division of Jos.[39] With the successful execution of the coup by General Buhari, Tunde Idiagbon was appointed Chief of General Staff (the de facto No. 2 in the administration). The coup ended Nigeria's short-lived Second Republic, a period of multi-party democracy started in 1979. According to The New York Times, the officers who took power argued that "a flawed democracy was worse than no democracy at all". Buhari justified the military's seizure of power by castigating the civilian government as hopelessly corrupt and promptly suspended Nigeria's 1979 Constitution. Another rationale for the coup was to correct economic decline in Nigeria. Sani Abacha in the military's first broadcast after the coup linked ' an inept and corrupt leadership'[40] with general economic decline. In Buhari's New Year day speech, he too mentioned the corrupt class of the second republic but also as the cause of a general decline in morality in the society.[40]

Head of state (1983–85)

The structure of the new military leadership which was also the fifth in Nigeria since independence resembled the last military regime, the Obasanjo/Yaradua administration. The new regime established a Supreme Military Council, a Federal Executive Council and a Council of States.[41] The number of ministries was trimmed to 18 while the administration carried out a retrenchment exercise among the senior ranks of the civil service and police. It retired 17 permanent secretaries and some senior police and naval officers. In addition, the new military administration promulgated new laws to achieve its aim. These laws included the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree for the prosecution of armed robbery cases, the State Security (Detention of Person) Decree which gave powers to the military to detain individuals suspected of jeopardizing state security or causing economic adversity.[42] Other decrees included the Civil Service Commission and Public Offenders Decree which constituted the legal and administrative basis to conduct a purge in the civil service.[42]

Policies and initiatives

Economic policy

In order to reform the economy, as Head of State, Buhari started to rebuild the nation's social-political and economic systems, along the realities of Nigeria's austere economic conditions.[43] The rebuilding included removing or cutting back the excesses in national expenditure, obliterating or removing completely, corruption from the nation's social ethics, shifting from mainly public sector employment to self-employment. Buhari also encouraged import substitution industrialisation based to a great extent on the use of local materials.[43] However, tightening of imports led to reduction in raw materials for industries causing many industries to operate below capacity,[44]reduction of workers and in some cases business closure.[45]

Buhari broke ties with the International Monetary Fund, when the fund asked the government to devalue the naira by 60%. However, the reforms that Buhari instigated on his own were as or more rigorous as those required by the IMF.[46][47]

On 7 May 1984, Buhari announced the country's 1984 National Budget. The budget came with a series of complementary measures:

A temporary ban on recruiting federal public sector workers

Raising of Interest rates

Halting Capital Projects

Prohibition of borrowing by State governments

15 percent cut from Shagari's 1983 Budget

Realignment of import duties

Reducing the balance of payment deficit by cutting imports

It also gave priority to the importation of raw materials and spare parts that were needed for agriculture and industry.

Other economic measures by Buhari took the form of counter trade, currency change, price reduction of goods and services.

Buhari's economic policies did not earn him the legitimacy of the masses due to the rise in inflation and the use of military might to continue to push many policies blamed for the rise in food prices.[48]


TO BE CONTINUE....

Shoodboi:
That's all.

Nice write up. Cool one.