The Dark World Of Jihadist Propaganda Channels On Telegram
Aliyu Dahiru June 24, 2023
Ansaru, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated terror group based in Nigeria, is able to share propaganda materials, radicalise members, and connect with similar organisations in other parts of the world through Telegram bot accounts and chat rooms.
Following the crackdown on Ansaru jihadist accounts on Facebook and WhatsApp in Feb. 2023, the group has shifted its operations to Telegram, a messaging app that has been a favoured platform for extremists due to the relative discreteness it comes with.
In Jan. 2023, a group was formed and named Mahanga TV after some Ansaru members reported losing their Facebook accounts. The group was initially made public and promoted up till early February. However, it was later converted into a private channel that requires an invitation for membership. The group deliberately adopted a pseudonym that could potentially mislead analysts and counter-terrorists into associating it with a distinct online media platform that shares a similar name.
A screenshot of Ansaru Telegram group promoting JNIM propaganda, dated June 12, 2023. (see picture 2 below)
Ansaru’s decision to transition to Telegram was a carefully considered move. The platform’s appeal to extremists lies in its array of features, including encrypted messaging and streamlined private group creation. These surpass the capabilities of similar platforms like Rocket Chat and Elements – which are also favoured by jihadists. Telegram’s most significant feature is the ability to create bots: automated chat partners that perform predetermined tasks around the clock.
Bots have become an important tool among extremists for their ability to efficiently spread propaganda, streamline communication, and maintain a constant online presence. Jihadists are utilising the innate capabilities of bots to their advantage, enabling them to operate 24/7 and disseminate a continuous flow of extremist material to their intended audience.
Telegram’s bot detection system can remove bots that are reported, but many bots are able to evade detection by avoiding certain words and images that could be flagged by moderators. This can include altering specific words or using a mix of different languages to avoid detection. HumAngle recently found that jihadists used emojis specifically to dodge detection efforts.
Ansaru members are stepping up their efforts to use social media platforms for radicalisation and to plan a resurgence. The jihadists use private Telegram channels to discuss propaganda and other jihadi-related topics, primarily in Hausa and Arabic languages. And from there, they carry out activities on open platforms such as TikTok.
A screenshot of an account on TikTok promoting Ansaru propaganda and gaining thousands of views. (see picture 3 below)
Despite social media companies’ attempts to curb extremism, the terror groups appear undeterred. The aim is to inspire new members and extremists to take action rather than simply promote their cause on social media.
Ansaru’s shift to Telegram indicates their ability to adjust to the evolving social media terrain. With Facebook and WhatsApp ramping up their efforts to eliminate extremist content, groups such as Ansaru have been compelled to consolidate on Telegram for communication.
The platform has provided an opportunity for individuals to share content that would typically be subject to removal by other platforms, including graphic videos, incendiary and hateful language, and depictions of child soldiers.
Through monitoring various bots and chat groups, HumAngle has gained valuable insight into the discussions, audio recordings, channel promotions, and propaganda videos being shared by the terrorists.
In just four months, the group’s membership surged from 10 to over 30. Four administrators shared materials, moderated the conversations, and coordinated the group’s activities.
Who is Ansaru?
Ansaru, a jihadist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda, broke away from Boko Haram in 2012. Also known as Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), the group operates primarily in the Northwest and North-central regions of Nigeria.
It was found to have conducted abductions and assaults on Nigerian security forces and Western targets, especially between 2012 and 2013. But it has been responsible for relatively less violence, compared to other local extremist groups such as Jama’atu Ahlussunnah Liddaawati Wal Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
The group’s main target is foreigners, particularly those from Western countries. They have taken responsibility for a number of high-profile abductions, such as the kidnapping of a French citizen in 2012 and multiple foreign labourers from a construction site in 2013.
Ansaru was subdued through a series of counterterrorism operations against its urban cells between 2013 and 2014. But it became active again in 2019 and has since conducted attacks on the Nigerian military. The group has also merged with JAS defectors who migrated from the Northeast after the 2015-2016 crackdown.
The group has carried out attacks in various locations across Niger in North-central Nigeria and Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara in the Northwest. In Jan. 2022, Ansaru announced a connection with Jama’atu Nusratul Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM), another Al-Qaeda-affiliated organisation based in Mali, for tactical operations and training.
In 2021, the governor of Niger state, Abubakar Bello, said the terrorists hoisted flags in Kaure, a village in the state’s Shiroro area, displacing large numbers of people and forcefully taking women as wives and slaves. They have also managed to gain acceptance from some locals of Birnin Gwari in Kaduna state.
The terror group exploits grievances, clashes, and the security situation in Northwest and North-central Nigeria. Its members portray themselves as protectors of the communities while imposing their own interpretation of Islamic law, and this forbids democratic participation.
Digital library
The Ansaru Telegram group has become a digital library of extremist literature, providing access to e-books and pamphlets authored by Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab ideologues. The detailed publications serve as a roadmap for radicalisation and act as ideological shock absorbers in a critical jihadi scenario.
Nigerian jihadists, specifically Ansaru, have been found to rely on literature and other radical materials obtained from Al-Qaeda and Islamic State leaders due to the absence of scholarly works from local ideologues. The books are occasionally translated into Hausa and shared through various lesson sessions on the Telegram group. E-books are often shared for personal reading or recommended to readers.
Ansaru aims to spread Al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology and enhance recruitment efforts by sharing these materials, thereby creating a sense of belonging within the jihadist movement. The Telegram group had a total of 14 e-books. Eleven were written in Arabic, two were in English, and one in French.
One of the ebooks, Sharh Mukhtasar Siyasatil Hurub (Explanation of the Summary on Politics of War), is 215 pages long and has a compilation of lessons offered by Sheikh Qasim al-Rimi, the late Al-Qaeda leader in the Arabian Peninsula. It explains the strategy a jihadist group can follow, the spiritual preparations, and everything a jihadist needs to know about the politics of war.
The cover of the “Sharh Kitab Mukhtasar Siyasatil Hurub” by the Al-Qaeda ideologue Sheikh Qasim al-Rimiy. (see picture 3 below)
The book provides a comprehensive analysis of the rules and conduct of war, presenting a distorted interpretation of Islamic teachings to justify violence in the name of jihad. It explores various aspects of warfare, including tactics and military strategy. It also highlights the spiritual elements crucial for a jihadist fighter. It delves into the crucial role of faith in offering comfort, inspiration, and direction amidst periods of strife.
The book has gained notoriety for its role in radicalising people within jihadist networks and attracting recruits.
Another notable document in the Ansaru collection is a five-page pamphlet titled “Killing Leader and How To Deal with Events,” which has been translated into both English and French. The pamphlet was authored by Abdullah Adam, a well-known Al-Qaeda ideologue. It offers step-by-step instructions to new recruits who may be struggling with the aftermath of losing their leaders.
The pamphlet has circulated among Al-Qaeda Jihadists in the wake of Ayman Alzawahiri’s death at the hands of the United States.
“The state in which a Mujahid can be after the loss of his leader or someone important and obedient is to adorn himself with patience, tranquillity and dignity,” the pamphlet said.
“And it’s not appropriate for him to show anguish and anger, nor [should] anything improper emanate from him, especially if he is among those who order and forbid, or those who are pointed at.”
Cross-promotion and bot networks
Ansaru members have been found to engage in a systematic cross-promotion of propaganda materials within private Telegram channels. This involves the sharing and endorsement of content from extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab to amplify the reach of their narratives.
The shared contents comprise messages sourced from Telegram bots and channels affiliated with Al-Qaeda. A variety of bots, primarily communicating in Arabic, have been identified. While some of these bots disseminate tactical messages, others spread propaganda.
One of the Al-Qaeda bots promoted by Ansaru sharing different propaganda videos and tactical messages. Screenshot dated June 12, 2023. (see picture 4 below)
While their own activities have waned, the promotion of other Al-Qaeda affiliates has served as a driving force behind their continued engagement. The promotion of other Al-Qaeda affiliates serves as a catalyst for Ansaru jihadists by providing a shared cause and a renewed sense of belonging. As they witness the activities and achievements of these groups, Ansaru members find validation for their own extremist ideologies and goals.
One of the Al-Qaeda channels promoted by Ansaru members criticising Islamic State jihadists. Screenshot dated May 10, 2023. (see picture 5 below)
From the Telegram group, Ansaru members have created a TikTok account where they share propaganda messages in Hausa. They also share speeches by Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf and other jihadist clerics in Nigeria.
Ansaru’s TikTok posts, which number over 30, have attracted thousands of views. Through them, the group continued to distance itself from the JAS faction of Boko Haram.
“Our name is Ansaru,” one Hausa post said. “We are distancing ourselves from any attack that was conducted on Muslims,” the voice added, speaking on the Kaduna train attack that was initially attributed to them.
Balancing security and privacy
Telegram has long been under fire for purportedly enabling jihadists and other extremist organisations to share propaganda. Jihadists predominantly use private channels and employ words that evade detection by moderators through a blend of alphanumeric characters or bilingualism.
In response to the issue, Telegram has implemented measures to combat the spread of extremist content, including the introduction of reporting mechanisms for users to flag such material.
The platform has also collaborated with various organisations to identify and eliminate terrorist propaganda. But critics argue that the measures are inadequate. They believe Telegram should take a more proactive approach to monitor and remove such content, rather than simply reacting to public outcry. They argue that the app’s lack of content moderation and its implementation of end-to-end encryption have provided jihadist groups with an ideal platform to propagate their ideologies with minimal hindrance.
Telegram’s encryption is a double-edged sword, as it is intended to safeguard user communications from unauthorised access, but it also poses a significant challenge in detecting and addressing malicious content.
As a result, jihadist groups like Ansaru use the messaging app to recruit, radicalise, and distribute propaganda materials. Extremists are known to establish channels and groups, sometimes comprising a large number of members, to disseminate radical content, such as videos, messages, and other forms of media.
The platforms created range from propaganda to recruitment, tutorial, security, and fan channels. The Ansaru group serves as a hub for members to access and join other groups across various channels.
The platform has recently taken action against bots found promoting terrorist propaganda. The propaganda bots have a lifespan of about one month, during which time they are able to operate undetected.
Telegram’s alleged role in aiding extremist activities has also raised concerns among governments and law enforcement agencies across several countries. Calls have been made for increased collaboration with Telegram in the monitoring and removal of extremist content.
The issue of Telegram’s stance on freedom of speech has also been a subject of debate. Pavel Durov, the founder, has emphasised his unwavering commitment to the principle of free speech and has expressed his reluctance to intervene in user communications.
At a TechCrunch event in 2015, he expressed his belief that the right to privacy outweighs the fear of potential threats such as terrorism.
But critics say as much as these ideals are important, they should not be prioritised over the pressing need for public safety.
This article was produced with mentorship from the African Academy for Open Source Investigations (AAOSI) to tackle disinformation that undermines our democracies as part of an initiative by the International Centre for Journalists (ICFJ) and Code for Africa (CfA). Visit https://disinfo.africa/ for more information.
It is important to note that Aug. 2021, when DOS accounts stopped expressing support for the Unknown Gunmen, was the same time the faction announced that it was suspending the Monday sit-at-home order, which it previously imposed to protest the detention of IPOB founder Nnamdi Kanu. Shortly afterwards, the same faction declared that anyone still enforcing the curfew was an enemy. Later, it would outrightly blame Autopilot for disturbing the peace in the region.
Let us also not forget that just the month before that, in July 2021, Simon Ekpa, leader of Autopilot, was sacked as a broadcaster on Radio Biafra. And then he went on to write on social media, “The Biafra struggle has entered the AUTOPILOT phase, a very dangerous phase that we have no control of what happens. To your tent oh Israel” — setting the ball rolling for the secession of Autopilot members.
(See picture 3 above)
An analysis of the emoji reactions to the various posts amplifying UGM attacks helps to gauge what general sentiments the pages’ followers harbour regarding the trend. The thumbs-up/like (👍) naturally constituted most of the reactions, followed by haha (😆), love (❤️), sad (😢), and wow (😲), care (🥰), and angry (😡) coming last.
A lot of variables affect how people react: the victims of attacks (civilians or perceived enemies), for example, the brutality of the attack, or whether some of the gunmen were also casualties. The level of support for gruesome attacks also seemed to dip towards 2022.
(See picture 4 above)
Coordinated amplification
There are many cases of coordinated campaigns and searches on CrowdTangle reveal that a lot of the posts published on the six pages monitored appeared simultaneously on dozens of other IPOB-affiliated platforms on Facebook.
On the morning of Oct. 6, 2021, Emeka Gift Official made a post claiming that after shooting an unknown gunman, a police officer discovered that he was a member of the Department of State Services (DSS), Nigeria’s domestic intelligence agency. “Nigeria media instead of reporting accurately they change it that ‘Police mistakenly killed Nigeria DSS,’” he wrote. Within one hour, the same post was published verbatim in 48 other places by over 40 distinct accounts. It was also shared 325 times into 206 groups.
Here’s another example that similarly tries to blame another group for the UGM crisis. On Nov. 6, 2021, a page called Spynigeria.NG claimed that the police in Imo state arrested two men, Danladu G and Bamaiyi G, who had been terrorising the people disguised as Unknown Gunmen. They “are from the North-Western part of the country”, the post added. The claim was copy-pasted by many IPOB platforms and appeared publicly a total of 108 times. It was shared by 14 pages and 47 times across 45 distinct groups.
Meanwhile, the news was not covered by any credible news platform. Sahara Reporters, which reported it in May 2021, cited the blog Igbere TV as its source. But a search for the report on the blog site returned no results and its Facebook page only has one relevant post that says: “Police Nab Two Gunmen With Army Uniform, AK-47 in Owerri. Names: 1. Godwin Danladi 2. Bamaiyi Gada. Both are not from the Southeast. Are these the 'Unknown Gunmen'?” The claim was copy-pasted by 11 pages and shared 20 times into different groups.
There are other cases of copy-paste coordination, too, like this post about an attack on a police station in Anambra that was shared 66 times (copy-pasted by 12 pages and shared in 21 groups), or this post about UGM warning residents of Asaba to observe Monday curfews that was shared 44 times, or this one about gunmen killing an Igbo Muslim cleric shared 40 times (copy-pasted by nine pages and shared 23 times by 22 accounts).
What this shows is that IPOB went to great lengths to promote violent attacks blamed on Unknown Gunmen. In at least two instances, it even took the trouble of designing graphics on the subject.
When we contacted the six Facebook pages studied for this report to ask why they published many posts amplifying UGM attacks, only two responded. “Your [an] unknown journalist thanks,” said Biafran Update, “and all our news are verified news.” It didn’t respond to a follow-up question.
The Admin 4 of Radio Biafra replied that Nnamdi Kanu’s IPOB “has nothing to do with the so-called Unknown Gunmen. We neither represent nor speak for them as we do not know who they are.” The administrator added that they do not amplify UGM’s activities but rather “report[s] such and similar incidents under our media outlets”. When we shared links to posts on the page from early 2021 that appeared to support Unknown Gunmen's activities, we received no response though Facebook indicated the messages were read.
Influence on news reporting
It is believed that the criminal gangs identify themselves as Unknown Gunmen to mock the press, which uses the label for unidentified assailants. The Nigerian media had used the phrase for many years, even before IPOB was founded, in reference to attacks across the country.
A study of over 26,800 news articles scraped using MediaCloud showed that there were very few mentions of “unknown gunmen” by local media organisations between 2013 and 2015. The numbers increased slowly between 2016 and 2020 owing to rising insecurity, especially in the northwestern and north-central parts of the country.
The following year, something remarkable happened. The number of times “unknown gunmen” appears in local news and blog sites increased by nearly 1,900 per cent. The upward progression started in Feb. 2021, coinciding with when IPOB’s Facebook pages started amplifying the UGM attacks.
The platforms with the highest number of news articles featuring the phrase are Latest Nigerian News, Nairaland, Naija News Today, Vanguard, Daily Post Entertainment, Daily Post, Tori Nigeria News, Ripples Nigeria, Punch Newspaper, and Independent Newspaper. Many of the more established media outlets are more careful to avoid using the word “unknown” in their headlines, especially when no one has accepted responsibility for an attack.
In any case, it is hard to say to what extent IPOB’s campaign influenced the language adopted for these reports or whether it encouraged blanket descriptions and prevented journalists from interrogating the true nature of the violent incidents.
(see picture 5 below)
Other curious events
To better understand IPOB’s stance on the Unknown Gunmen menace, it helps to take a look at tweets from Nnamdi Kanu. He only mentioned the name in nine of his tweets between March and June 2021, when he was re-arrested.
He did not dissociate the Unknown Gunmen from IPOB in any of the tweets. Instead, he praised the criminal group, calling its members “avengers of the innocent” and protectors. Sometimes, he simply added hashtag #UGM to a tweet that didn’t directly refer to them.
One of Kanu’s tweets provides a window into IPOB’s possible approach of “plausible deniability” to violent attacks. In the wee hours of April 5, 2021, gunmen invaded the police headquarters and prison in Imo state, setting free hundreds of inmates. IPOB claimed it was not involved. The police, however, said its preliminary investigations revealed the group was responsible. HumAngle contacted police spokesperson Olumuyiwa Adejobi multiple times to ask how many other UGM attacks the police connected to IPOB but received no response.
Meanwhile, in the middle of the back-and-forth, Kanu took to his Twitter account to argue that people should not be in prison to begin with because Nigeria was rehabilitating Boko Haram insurgents and “terror herdsmen”. “If you know you know! #UGM,” he added.
Again, it is noteworthy that IPOB does not want to come across as a terror organisation but as a “non-violent self-determination movement”. The group has shown a strong interest in courting the support of the international community. In 2022, after it established a liaison office in Catalonia, Emeka Gift, one of IPOB’s top propagandists, wrote that they only achieved the feat because of their non-violent approach. “If IPOB is a violent movement, Catalonia will never extend [a] hand of fellowship to us,” he argued.
Besides, in 2021, the separatist group paid an American lobby firm $750,000 to win over the support of the U.S. government and policymakers. This was after a similar one-year contract of over one million dollars expired.
Some of the other strange things we observed from the social media posts were: IPOB stepping in to defend Unknown Gunmen against allegations levelled against the latter, IPOB sharing press statements supposedly from Unknown Gunmen, registers such as “hunt” and “black beasts” (referring to police officers) appearing in both UGM press statements and previous Nnamdi Kanu broadcasts, instances where IPOB credits an attack to UGM though major newspapers only blamed “hoodlums”, or this video statement from Unknown Gunmen where they called southeast Nigeria “Biafra land”.
It was also strange that Unknown Gunmen enforced sit-at-home orders started by IPOB, called for the release of Nnamdi Kanu, stood against the conduct of elections, and attacked people and groups IPOB had identified as enemies.
At least 15 of the Facebook posts studied for this report had obvious elements of sarcasm that seemed intended to mock the security agents and other victims of Unknown Gunmen attacks.
In this post from May 2021, Radio Biafra said after the gunmen “mistakenly” set a police station ablaze, the officers “developed wings and flew away”. This one shared in the same month by Biafran Update said they “mistakenly” blew up a pipeline supplying oil to the north from Imo state. In this post from Feb. 2022, Dotland Media hailed the UGM for sending two security agents “to judgement”. The following month, the same page reported UGM as paying a “courtesy visit” to former Nigerian ambassador to the US, George Obiozor, and blessing his house with “holy and anointing fire”.
Some of the posts dissociating IPOB from the Unknown Gunmen also appeared tongue-in-cheek.
Finally, it helps to pay attention to past Radio Biafra broadcasts.
For example, on Oct. 27, 2020, Kanu went live briefly to encourage Nigerian soldiers to join what he called the People’s Revolutionary Army/Force — but, he added, he had not come up with a name yet and was open to suggestions. He emphasised that this force was not the same as the Biafran Army (which may have evolved to become the Eastern Security Network).
This revolutionary army will have Nigerians from all parts of the country, he said, not just Biafrans. “We are going to liberate everybody in this zoo called Nigeria … If they say we cannot protest on the streets, we are going to the bushes … We will be hanging you on street lights, all of you.”
This article was produced with mentorship from the African Academy for Open Source Investigations (AAOSI) to tackle disinformation that undermines our democracies as part of an initiative by the International Centre for Journalists (ICFJ) and Code for Africa (CfA). Visit https://disinfo.africa/ for more information.
Second picture below: A man points at a Biafran flag painted on a wall on Old Market Road in Onitsha, Nigeria, during a shutdown in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Nigerian Civil War on May 30, 2017. Photo: Stefan Heunis/AFP via Getty Images
The Curious Case Of The ‘Unknown Gunmen’ And IPOB’s Internet Propaganda
Kunle Adebajo June 23, 2023
What is the connection between the pro-Biafran separatist terror group and an infamously vague but violent militia? Here’s what we learnt from studying hundreds of social media posts by IPOB-affiliated accounts.
Key takeaways:
• IPOB accounts on Facebook and other social media platforms began amplifying unknown gunmen attacks in early 2021, coinciding with a huge spike in the mentions of ‘unknown gunmen’ in local news articles.
•Many of the posts regarding unknown gunmen, especially cases of amplification and disinformation, have signs of being part of a coordinated campaign.
•The different factions of IPOB have divergent views of unknown gunmen activities, with one opposing and the other expressing tacit support.
•IPOB has strategic reasons not to associate itself with the violence the UGM group has become notorious for.
•Returning to Radio Biafra broadcasts from 2020 can help to understand the possible origins of the Eastern Security Network (ESN) and the Unknown Gunmen (UGM) — as well as the links between them.
Ten years ago, the southeastern part of Nigeria was the country’s safest region. But that changed in 2021 as bubbling agitations for a breakaway state turned violent. At the centre of this crisis is an evasive group that’s come to be known as the ‘Unknown Gunmen’ — UGM for short. They have been blamed for deadly attacks on police stations, military checkpoints, and civilians. While no one would take responsibility for these acts of violence, one group, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), raises far more suspicion than others. A careful look through years of social media propaganda shows why.
Let’s start with some background information.
Nigeria went to war in 1967 after the Republic of Biafra declared independence under the leadership of Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, then military governor of the eastern region. The war ended three years later after hundreds of thousands of lives were lost, many of them to starvation, but calls for the secession of Biafra have not ceased. Kenny Nwannekaenyi Okwu-Kanu (popularly known as Nnamdi Kanu), a British-Nigerian national who gained prominence as director of London-based broadcaster Radio Biafra, joined forces with Alphonsus Uche Okafor-Mefor to establish IPOB. Their goal was to restore the sovereignty of Biafra with “renewed vigour”. While it is not clear exactly when IPOB emerged, some of the earliest records date back to 2013. Mefor and Kanu first registered the Indigenous People of Biafra with the UK government in Oct. 2013 and then again in July 2014.
The group started by organising peaceful protests, broadcasting its campaign online, and rallying a group of supporters locally and internationally within the diaspora community. Kanu became notorious for his unrestrained, often treasonous and hateful, language. At the World Igbo Conference in Los Angeles in Sept. 2015, he said, “We need guns and we need bullets to defend our land or else our people will perish at home.” About a month later, Nigerian intelligence officers arrested him in Lagos, leading to a wave of protests and grave police clampdown. Kanu jumped bail in 2017.
During the #EndSARS anti-police brutality demonstrations in Oct. 2020, Kanu released several statements on Radio Biafra where he urged his followers to kill security personnel and hunt politicians such as Abia state governor Okezie Ikpeazu, former Lagos governor Bola Tinubu, and Rivers governor Nyesom Wike. “Anybody wearing police or army uniform is an enemy of the people. Anywhere you see them, you take them down,” he announced in one broadcast. After a period of calling on security agents to resign and join the “Peoples Revolutionary Army/Force”, in Dec. 2020, IPOB launched the Eastern Security Network (ESN), touting it as a vigilante group set up to protect civilians in the region from foreign invaders. Instead, it marked the beginning of a dark episode in southeastern Nigeria.
Attacks on security personnel and structures increased. High-handed military offensives targeted at crushing the ESN inflamed passions, with IPOB declaring that it saw it as a declaration of war. “They shall be shamefully defeated. The war has begun! We shall defend Biafra and we shall triumph!” said spokesperson Emma Powerful. Kanu’s re-arrest in June 2021 and his continued detention led to the IPOB breaking up into at least two factions: the Directorate of State (DOS) and the more radical Autopilot.
Enters Unknown Gunmen.
According to data collected by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) using local press reports, the southeast was by far Nigeria’s safest region in 2012 — in terms of the number of violent incidents and deaths. It maintained this status every year since then until 2021, the year following the launch of IPOB’s militant wing. Violent events more than doubled, and death tolls shot up even higher. Fatalities increased from 194 in 2020 to 951 and 627, respectively, in the years that followed. Using these indices, the southeast is now third on the list of Nigeria’s most peaceful regions — displaced by the southwest and south-south.
The activities of the forest-camping Unknown Gunmen have led to killings, kidnappings, and mass displacements. “My uncle ran away from the village because these people asked him to give them money to buy guns and bullets. Our villages are empty because they are the law now,” one man from Imo state narrated to the BBC. “The law that people know is the one that has been imposed by the unknown gunmen, who say they are for Biafra, but we know they are not.”
Analysis of the CFR data shows that last year, there were more victims of abduction in the southeast than in the Boko Haram-ravaged states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. Nearly as many civilians were killed too, and far more security personnel lost their lives to violence in the southeastern region than in the BAY states. Many of these murders were chilling. After beheading a newly-wed couple, both officers of the Nigerian Army, in May 2022, the gunmen called to mock their relatives. Last December, another soldier was abducted and tortured by people who identified themselves as unknown gunmen. “What we are after is Biafra. We have nothing to do with IPOB. Say bye-bye to your fellow soldiers,” they said in a video statement. More recently, on April 21, gunmen killed five police officers in the Ngor Okpala area of Imo and then a couple who owned a shop where some of the officers sought refuge.
Fatalities recorded across Nigeria between May 2011 and April 2023
So, why has the region suddenly become more insecure? A cursory look at the facts strongly suggests that the answer has something to do with the ESN. But unlike other insurgent groups, IPOB would not directly take responsibility for attacks that carry its signature or promote its interests. Instead, while its propaganda may often come off as inciting, it distances itself from violent acts as much as possible — except in “self-defence” or in defence of civilians. But this may only be a strategy to maintain a brand that would not jeopardise efforts to secure diplomatic backing or the support of people in the affected areas.
Nevertheless, a closer study of the separatist group’s social media communication provides important insights that buttress this theory.
For or against?
HumAngle collated posts on Facebook by six pages affiliated with the two IPOB factions, totalling over 200. The posts are those that mention “Unknown Gunmen” or “UGM” and show a trend consistent with all the groups. Even though half of the pages were created before July 2017 — one, Radio Biafra, has been around since April 2013 — there were only two posts mentioning unknown gunmen before Oct. 2020. And then suddenly, there was a spike, picking up between Feb. and May 2021 and then at intervals afterwards.
(See picture 2 below)
We categorised the posts using various labels. Some simply amplified attacks by ‘Unknown Gunmen’ without a clear undertone of support. Some clearly supported the activities of the gunmen. Some deployed sarcasm in narrating the UGM attacks. Some blamed the government for the UGM attacks — or Fulani people or, in one case, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). Some condemned the UGM attacks. Some distanced IPOB from UGM attacks. And some seemed like neutral commentaries on the developments.
Whether a page’s posts support or condemn attacks by Unknown Gunmen roughly depends on which IPOB faction the administrator is loyal to — and what timeline is considered.
Pages allied with the Directorate of State (DOS) faction amplified UGM attacks in the early period between Oct. 2020 and May 2021 and then again — but less strongly — between Sept. 2021 and Feb. 2022. The same pages expressed support for Unknown Gunmen between March and Aug. 2021. In the later period, we start seeing a different trend. Between Sept. 2021 and March 2022 and then again in Feb. 2023, these pages condemned UGM attacks. Around the same period, they also distanced IPOB from the attacks. DOS accounts moved from calling Unknown Gunmen “avengers” to referring to them as “terrorists”.
For Autopilot-affiliated pages, on the other hand, the trend of amplification continued for much of 2022, with the highest number of posts sharing news of UGM attacks appearing in April of that year. There were significantly more sarcastic posts on these pages and significantly fewer posts blaming the government for instigating or coordinating the attacks. Also, there are no posts condemning the Unknown Gunmen and only two distanced IPOB from the criminal group.
naptu2: Someone wrote that he had once accompanied the chief of Naval Staff on his boat from Queen's Drive to Apapa in the 1970s. Then, sometime in the early 2000s, he was to go with the chief of Naval Staff from Queen's Drive to Apapa and to his surprise they were to go in a motorcade. He was disappointed. "Why should the chief of Naval Staff go to Apapa by road?" he asked.
Anyway, I'm happy to report that the boat is back. You can see it at the 1:11 minute mark in this video. It is marked NN 01. This is the pulling out ceremony for the former chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ibas.
naptu2: President Olusegun Obasanjo has always been close to the Americans. In fact, all the three visits to Nigeria by American presidents (Carter, Clinton and Bush) have occurred when he was head of state.
President Obasanjo asked the Americans to retrain the Nigerian Military when he became president in 1999. He also asked for a range of assistance from the Americans (it was that request that led the Americans to give Nigeria several warships including two Coast Guard cutters, NNS Thunder and NNS Okpabana).
As part of the process, the Americans asked the Nigerian Army for its order of battle. The Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Victor Malu refused. He was shocked at the request. How can you reveal your order of battle to a foreign country? He felt that it was unpatriotic and he warned President Obasanjo that the Americans were only after their own interests and not the interest of Nigeria. President Obasanjo immediately retired General Malu.
The military cooperation agreement was signed after General Malu was removed from office. Lieutenant General Alexander Ogomudia was appointed as his replacement.
This is General Malu's pulling out parade. They followed the usual route. The parade was held at Bonny Camp and then General Malu was "pulled" to Army Officers Mess at Marina for the reception.
You can see Lieutenant General Salihu Ibrahim among the guests (in white agbada). General Ibrahim is one of the most professional chiefs of army staff that we've ever had. He was chief of army staff from 1990 till 1993. It was during his tenure that Flag Staff House was moved to Marina.
Flag Staff House was initially at Marina, but it was moved to 1 Glover Road, Ikoyi just before Independence. Ironsi, Gowon, Akahan, Katsina, Ejoor, Danjuma, Akinrinade, Jalo, Wushishi, Babangida and Abacha all lived at 1 Glover Road. However, there was a problem.
A DMI operative had previously told me (sometime around 1989) that Abacha would never leave 1, Glover Road. He said that Abacha had contracted a Senegalese marabout and that they had buried a cow that was dressed in a general's uniform at 1 Glover Road. He said that the marabout had said that nobody would be able to remove Abacha as long as the cow was buried there. An SSS operative would later tell me the same story in 1993, after Abacha had become head of state (he continued to stay at Glover Road for some time after he became head of state).
Abacha was made the minister of defence and Salihu was made the chief of army staff, but Abacha refused to leave Flag Staff House. Salihu Ibrahim complained to President Babangida and Babangida converted that house beside Lagos House Marina into Flag Staff House and then converted 1, Glover Road into Defence House.
General Ogomudia led the pulling out pocession. This parade was held in 2001.
General Victor Malu had previously served as the force commander of Ecomog in Liberia.
naptu2: This is the pulling out parade of Lieutenant General Ishaya Bamaiyi.
President Olusegun Obasanjo retired all the service chiefs after the return to democracy in 1999. He appointed Lieutenant General Victor Malu as General Bamaiyi's successor.
General Ishaya Bamaiyi served as chief of army staff from 1996 till 1999. He first came to prominence when he was the commander of 9th Brigade at Ikeja Cantonment. He was able to gain control of the Armour Transit shed at the cantonment during the 1990 and he led the armoured column that came to Lagos Island and took back control of Dodan Barracks and Radio Nigeria. His action basically ended the coup. He was subsequently appointed as the new commander of the Brigade of Guards and he served in this position from 1990 till 1992.
They played all the usual songs during this parade. They played Nike Nike, Iya Ni Wura, that Hausa song whose name I can't remember, Auld Lang Syne, that English song whose name I cannot remember and God Be With You Till we meet again.
General Victor Malu led the pulling out procession from Bonny Camp to Army Officers Mess, Marina.
JuanDeDios: Oh, ok. I've seen the NIS people countless times. I guess this is one of their uniforms - or they've changed it. Prisons too must've changed theirs since the days I (as a kid) used to see them warders taking them "onighan" to farm from the low security prison in my home town.
Politics › The Dark World Of Jihadist Propaganda Channels On Telegram by naptu2(op): 5:39am On Jun 26, 2023
Everybody come and see oh! People are arguing with Musiwa again.
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