bidexiii:





For heaven sake I never said we should go for s300/400. Check out all my statements, how many times do I have to say these.

We can go for something close "medium range missile", that is what a standard army should have.

Alright Sir

abiodunalasa:
.

I have a Blog too bro. There's no SEO that will tell you to write mumble jumble English just to enjoy readability. But you can say whatever you want just to make yourself feel better. The point remains that, if you want your Blog to be taken seriously, you need a very adept content Editor.

You have narrow view about ADS.
You dont know about "doctrine of necessity" and you don't wanna ask so that you can know how armed drones come into ADS.
I guess ego problem for you

"stup*d" "buff00n" "Id1ot" seriously ? In a gentlemen's conversation ?
pls you need to sit down and reconsider your values in life..
At this point I leave you to it.

Surprise! Surprise!!

everybody now have a blog.

Why don't you show us your blog so we can enjoy your rich contents? And read grammatical bombshell-less articles?

About SEO.... i could school on a lot of things. And yes there is an AI SEO manager. If you want me to show you... Well i will do that for a small fee

I would know about an SEO AI manager because i'm a certified google advocate on digital skills in Africa.

African Military Blog is one of many online platforms I'm a member of.

How would you successfully run a blog or website without having prior knowledge on SEO AI Manager and expect to succeed? Do you think this is 1980.

___

Anyway talking about ADS... You failed woefully when you mentioned Nigcomsat and Gulma drone in the same sentence.

You should have stopped at Roland ADS. Funny enough you didn't even mention the shilka which is the only potent thing we have resembling air defense.

Anyways wallow in your ignorance.


In a time when Equatorial Guinea has Pantsyr-S1
RWANDA looking to purchase Russian ADS.
C. A. R about to receive some Chinese ADS systems.
Morocco just picked up Chinese Sky Dragon ADS.
Ivory coast is making enquiries on french Crotale
South African has starstreak and other potent systems
Sudan has Chinese systems
Egypt S300
Algeria multiple potent systems

Even fvccking Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has more air defense systems than the whole of west Africa.
(and they are not even a country yet)

With France riding roughshod over our neighborhood, some of you are questioning the importance of having a proper air defense system.


Okay.

lionel4power:


Surprise! Surprise!!

everybody now have a blog.

Why don't you show us your blog so we can enjoy your rich contents? And read grammatical bombshell-less articles?

About SEO.... i could school on a lot of things. And yes there is an AI SEO manager. If you want me to show you... Well i will do that for a small fee

I would know about an SEO AI manager because i'm a certified google advocate on digital skills in Africa.

African Military Blog is one of many online platforms I'm a member of.

How would you successfully run a blog or website without having prior knowledge on SEO AI Manager and expect to succeed? Do you think this is 1980.

___

Anyway talking about ADS... You failed woefully when you mentioned Nigcomsat and Gulma drone in the same sentence.

You should have stopped at Roland ADS. Funny enough you didn't even mention the shilka which is the only potent thing we have resembling air defense.

Anyways wallow in your ignorance.


In a time when Equatorial Guinea has Pantsyr-S1
RWANDA looking to purchase Russian ADS.
C. A. R about to receive some Chinese ADS systems.
Morocco just picked up Chinese Sky Dragon ADS.
Ivory coast is making enquiries on french Crotale
South African has starstreak and other potent systems
Sudan has Chinese systems
Egypt S300
Algeria multiple potent systems

Even fvccking Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has more air defense systems than the whole of west Africa.

With France riding roughshod over our neighborhood, some of you are questioning the importance of having a proper air defense system.


Okay.

Can’t agree with you more on this one
Nigeria doesn’t have any potent ADS, end of story.

This whole argument has been pointless and derailing,

when it’s time to derail the thread and argue blindly on matters they are ignorant on that’s when they know how to show themselves.

How can someone include radio jamming equipment, NIGCOM sat and CH3 UCAV in the same sentence as air defense? You best run away and hide your face when sensible people are arguing.

lionel4power:

.


In a time when Equatorial Guinea has Pantsyr-S1
RWANDA looking to purchase Russian ADS.
C. A. R about to receive some Chinese ADS systems.
Morocco just picked up Chinese Sky Dragon ADS.
Ivory coast is making enquiries on french Crotale
South African has starstreak and other potent systems
Sudan has Chinese systems
Egypt S300
Algeria multiple potent systems

Even fvccking Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has more air defense systems than the whole of west Africa.
(and they are not even a country yet)

With France riding roughshod over our neighborhood, some of you are questioning the importance of having a proper air defense system.


Okay.

This post is exactly why people "question" the rationale. Because this has that we should have those.

Be it as it may, we deserve/should be fielding potent ADS. The type & scope is best left for the bean counters

jakeporeshenko:

Can’t agree with you more on this one
Nigeria doesn’t have any potent ADS, end of story.

This whole argument has been pointless and derailing,

when it’s time to derail the thread and argue blindly on matters they are ignorant on that’s when they know how to show themselves.

How can someone include radio jamming equipment, NIGCOM sat and CH3 UCAV in the same sentence as air defense? You best run away and hide your face when sensible people are arguing.

I understand the need for patriotic comments. It keeps the forum interesting.

But you have to draw a line. Balance patriotism with common sense else you start believing your own propaganda.

When someone asked what Air Defense System does Nigeria have, you simply say X and Y and leave it at that.

Instead he went and start mentioning every random bullsh1t.

I was surprised he didn't mention the Shilka and our navy's 76mm Rapid fire naval gun. Those two things are sole our only air defense as at today.

Odunayaw:
This post is exactly why people "question" the rationale. Because this has that we should have those.

Be it as it may, we deserve/should be fielding potent ADS. The type & scope is best left for the bean counters

To be honest, air defense is quite important for Nigeria. when you put in consideration the critical oil infrastructure we need to protect which is the life's blood of this country.

Nobody is asking for THAAD or Patriot SAM but at least there have to be some coordinated defense posture as a form of deterrence.

It is not because we dont have an aerial threat doesn't mean we shouldn't be at alert. We have to have at least something.

Look at South Africa for instance, apart from Angola there isnt much threat they should worry about but they are still somewhat prepared.

Nigeria and South Africa acquired the British Seacat at the same period when both nations were still young. but look at the difference right now between the two countries.

According to a report i read some times ago, Nigeria wanted to buy 30 units of Roland ADS but lack of funds prevented that. That means that as of then our defense planers believed that what we needed to protect Nigeria was 30 units.

What has changed up till now? Are we more secure or less secure today?

Also remember that the Roland ADs is a short range system and it wouldn't completely provide defensive measures.

As a hindsight thought

When one is low on sanctioned squadron strength, the usual remedial is to increase the no of Sam systems.

Ie if compared on a cost by cost basis , however fighters r always the best form of protection compared to Sam.

Anyways on a different topic
S400 buy was necessitated due to falling squadron nos.
Plus the need to speed up the development of one own long range SAMs via TOT and in-house study of proven systems.

Sam's r like juju especially long range SAMs

Juju never works or do they ?

However the alleged omnipotent effectiveness of juju always works wonders don't they ?

nemesis8u:
As a hindsight thought

When one is low on sanctioned squadron strength, the usual remedial is to increase the no of Sam systems.

Ie if compared on a cost by cost basis , however fighters r always the best form of protection compared to Sam.

Anyways on a different topic
S400 buy was necessitated due to falling squadron nos.
Plus the need to speed up the development of one own long range SAMs via TOT and in-house study of proven systems.

Sam's r like juju especially long range SAMs

Juju never works or do they ?

However the alleged omnipotent effectiveness of juju works wonders don't they ?

Well we have the f7s air guard and Roland ADS.. So we're covered. Nothing to worry about.

lionel4power:

Well we have the f7s air guard and Roland ADS.. So we're covered. Nothing to worry about.

Something I forgot to mention

Short range and medium range sams r necessary though , otherwise the juju of long range SAMs will not work.

nemesis8u:


Something I forgot to mention

Short range and medium range r necessary though , otherwise the juju of long range SAMs will not work.

in order words, layered air defense.

Plus EW this days no Air Defense without that.

lionel4power:
in order words, layered air defense.

Plus EW this days no Air Defense without that.

I wrote about previously on how different Sams work together and how their role is complementary to each other.

Organic EW is most of the time available with SAMs, however u need dedicated EW to increase the capability.

Time to put u guys to sleep


INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

REQUIREMENTS :

1.an automated Air Defense command and control center for controlling and monitoring of Air Defense Operations.
In network centric warfare era, RASP(recognizable air situation picture) information is required to be made available at the appropriate level for taking tactical decision. These levels are

1.strategic level
2.Operational level
3.tactical level

The information sharing involves sharing of the information among navy, army and civil radar network. The system will receive data from different types of homogeneous/ heterogeneous radars, reports from mobile observation posts and data from various other Air Force Airbases or Civilian agencies viz Air Traffic Control, Air Force Movement Liaison Unit etc. to create real time comprehensive recognized air situation picture (RASP) at the Command & Control Center (C & C Center). The connectivity of sensors/agencies from/to the C&C Center will connected on a redundant high speed wide area network based on IP protocol.

the automated Air Defense command and control should have the following features
1.Adaptable to legacy systems
2.High availability rate
3.Open architecture and state of the art HMI
4.Upgrade ability and expand ability
5.Situational awareness and Analysis
6.Generation of Recognized, accurate, updated and complete real time Air Situation Picture (RASP) for local as well as centralized air space control and surveillance Threat Evaluation on the basis of Identification of track.
7.Integration of various types of radars and adaptable to user legacy systems.
8.System generated solution for Weapon assignment including Surface to Air Guided Weapons, AAA and aircraft (Fighter aircraft interception control)
9.Automation of tactical functionalities viz. Interception, Aircraft recovery, Threat evaluation, PAD (Passive Air Defense) warning etc.
10.Automatic track Identification based upon flight plan and IFF data with manual override
11.Interception solution & commands for defender aircraft against target.
12.Flight Plan ingestion & collision resolution.
13.Surveillance alert generation.
14.Simulation of exercise environment through multi identity tracks.
15.Dissemination of weapon control orders & other tactical commands to weapon units.
16.Record & Replay of operator actions as well as ASP situations.
17.Air Defense Resource Planning, management & deployment including radar coverage area analysis
18.Post mission analysis
19.Air tasking order processing
etc

at the minimum the idea is to provide an appropriate solution to identify the track information in the Air.
1.To produce a “Recognized Air Situation Picture” (RASP) by using the information received from different radars and other assets.
2.To provide a perfect WA solution for enemy aircraft/missiles using different interception tactics (for Combat Air Patrol), sam missiles and AAA.
3.To achieve automation in the Air-Defense hierarchy of the concerned air force.


WHAT IS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A MODERN GOOD sam

1.High Mobility
2.High Resistance to Jamming
3.Optimal Missile range and corresponding Radar Power
4.Lower Band Operating Frequencies
5.Advanced Digital Signal and Data Processing
6.Defensive Counter Measures and Emitting Decoys
7.Low Probability of Intercept Techniques
8.Digital Data links/Network Centric Setup
9.Dual Missile Seekers
10.Ability for Interception of PGMs
etc

sam missiles are not standalone much depends on the radars supporting it.

The limit of the interception range of a modern surface-to-air missile system can be easily estimated.
Given the radar performance parameter R0, which is the maximum range for initial detection of a target with a radar cross section of one square meter, the detection range for a target with a radar cross section σ, is:

R det (σ)=R0·σ1/4

After initial detection, there is a time delay or reaction time during which a firm track is established, the target is identified, and the missile is launched. The time dependence of the target range, as measured from the radar, is:

R target (t)=[[{R2 det (σ)-altitude2}½- V target .t]2 +altitude2]½

here
2 stands for square
½ stands for square root
altitude = target altitude
V target = target speed
R det(σ) = radar detection range for a target with a radar cross section σ

Again the time dependence of the range of the intercepting surface-to-air missile, as measured from the radar is

R sam (t)=V sam ·(t−τ delay )

here
V sam = surface-to-air missile average speed
t delay = time delay or reaction time

By setting these two equations equal, R sam (t) = R target (t), the maximum potential interception range, as limited by surface-to-air missile fly-out, can then be calculated as a function of several variables.

these kind of calculations and analysis are required to set up Weapon Engagement Zones WEZs which are a critical part of air defense planning because they represent the defense posture against the air and missile threats.

WEZ is an airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon system and can be sub divided into the following

(a) FEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft.
(b) HIMEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with high-altitude SAMs.
(c) LOMEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles.
(d) SHORADEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with SHORAD weapons. It may be established within a low- or high-altitude missile engagement zone.
(e) JEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which multiple AD systems (SAMs and aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats.

Again air defense includes includes various types of defensive coverage depending on operational requirements

(a) Area Defense. Area defense uses a combination of weapon systems (e.g. aircraft and SAMs) or various combinations of airborne and ground-based sensors and shooters to defend broad areas.

(b) Point Defense. Point defense protects limited areas, normally in defense of vital elements of forces or installations. For example, a sam or AAA unit positioned to protect an airfield is considered point defense.

(c) Self-Defense. Self-defense operations allow friendly units to defend themselves against direct attacks or threats of attack through the use of organic weapons and systems. The right of self-defense is inherent to all ROE and weapons control procedures.

which again in turn requires

(a) Determination Of Surveillance Coverage Areas. Defended airspace must be under continuous surveillance to facilitate early warning. The planner should use a combination of air-, surface-, and space-based detection assets to achieve this requirement. Adequate early warning of air and missile attacks provides the reaction time necessary for friendly forces to seek shelter or take appropriate action. Early warning of hostile air and missile attacks is vital for a layered defense.

(b) Development of the Active AMD(air and missile defense) Fire Plan. The objective is to provide the required level of protection specified in the critical asset list. Defense resources involve applying a mix of the following six employment guidelines, because not all may be required or possible to defend dependent upon the threat and defensive counter-air assets available:

1. Mutual Support. Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the adjacent weapon systems. For gun systems, this dead zone is usually small. For missile systems, the dead zone may be large and mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover non-operational units or units at lower states of readiness.

2. Overlapping Fires. Weapons are positioned so that their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes from which the enemy can attack or conduct surveillance operations, defense planners must apply mutual supporting and overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.

3. Balanced Fires. Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions. This is necessary for AD in an area where the terrain does not canalize the enemy or when the avenue of approach is unpredictable.

4. Weighted Coverage. Weapons are positioned to concentrate fires toward the most likely threat direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage in a more likely direction.

5. Early Engagement. Sensors and weapons are positioned to maximize early warning and to engage and destroy aircraft and missiles before they acquire and fire on or damage the defended asset.

6. Defense in Depth. AMD sensors and weapons are positioned to enable multiple engagement opportunities and deliver an increasing volume of fire as an enemy air or missile threat approaches the protected asset. Defense in depth reduces the probability that “leakers” will reach the defended asset or force.

again,

steps must be taken for reduction of Enemy targeting effectiveness of ur assets via

1.Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability by complicating enemy surveillance and reconnaissance efforts to pinpoint locations of targets. Mobility may be coupled with concealment to “hide” assets.

2.Deception. Deception misleads adversaries by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. Deception may be used to cause an enemy to waste munitions on false targets, deceive their combat assessment process, and falsely influence their decision makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information.Deception may deny the enemy the ability to gain correct tactical, operational, and strategic information when using their reconnaissance and surveillance systems.

3.Emission Control/Communications Security. Communications security and an emission control program for infrared, electromagnetic, and acoustic
signature reduction can deny the enemy sensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisition and ID of friendly target systems (eg C2 nodes).

4.Camouflage and Concealment. Practice visual signature reduction measures that can “hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets/target systems. These measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings. Timely intelligence concerning the overflight by enemy satellite and aircraft collection systems is important to the effort. Those measures also may be coupled with deception measures to
further complicate chances of effective enemy attacks.

5.Redundancy. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical nodes, capabilities, and systems that are particularly vulnerable to air and missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. Redundancy includes dual, contingency, or backup capabilities that can assume primary mission functions (in whole or in part) upon failure or degradation of the primary system. Of
primary concern are “soft” targets such as C2 nodes and sensors (antennae) and fixed sites such as airfields and ground stations for airborne sensors.

6.Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration and making a target system less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed.
etc


@lionel4power u can use this in Ur blog if u want , no need for credit.

To make sure u guys really r asleep

Another post of mine

the only guarantee of a foolproof air defense is your fighter elements.

ground based air defense is essentially a supporting and back up element.

SAMs are basically classified according to slant range and engagement altitude.

we have
1.MANPADS
2.SHORT range sam
3.ER-SHORADS
4.medium range sam
5.LONG range sam
6.VERY LONG range sam

against maneuvering and agile targets using terrain masking flight profile ,

1.MANPADS will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

2.SHORT range sam will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

3.ER-SHORADS will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

4.medium range sam

5.LONG range sam

6.VERY LONG range sam

MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM will be useless against the above targets.

MANPADS SRSAM ERSHORAD are best effective against maneuvering and agile targets flying at low altitudes in order to evade the radar , because of the low engagement range capability , very quick response time , very short kill chain , low escape zone , high maneuvering capability , seeker sensitivity, acquisition and lock on is optimal at low ranges.

my point being u have to select ur sam depending on ur requirements and conditions .
1.point defense / base defense / area defense
2.terrain to be protected , flat / mountainous / valleys
3.static defense / mobile defense
4.stand alone / networked
5.internal sensors / external sensors
6.integral protection / deterrence

etc etc

if MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM comes up against a maneuvering and agile targets flying at medium to high altitudes (a foolish decision in the first place) then the best case scenario for the MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM will be to force the fighter to dump its weapons and fuel and turn tail.
ie MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM achieved a MISSION KILL which is as good as a TARGET KILL.


the best scenario is when u have all of these networked , integrated and in overlapping mode

1.MANPADS protects against low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets

2.SHORT range sam protects against low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets , maneuvering targets on weapon delivery run , PGMs , cruise missiles

3.ER-SHORADS forces low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets to either abort mission or to fly up into the engagement envelope of MRSAM / LRSAM or get killed.

4.medium range sam kills target within their engagement envelop at medium or high altitudes , if the targets have been forced to the kill zone or if the target is unaware of the existence of the said SAMs. however kill probability is low especially against receding targets while high on head on mode.

5.LONG range sam good against bombers, awacs , tankers , and against a flight/group of fighter formations, also good if the fighter pilot falls asleep during flight
also tries to force targets to descend into lower altitudes to be caught up by MRSAM SRSAM ETC.

6.VERY LONG range sam same above with additional anti ballistic capability.

nemesis8u:


I wrote about previously on how different Sams work together and how their role is complementary to each other.

Organic EW is most of the time available with SAMs, however u need dedicated EW to increase the capability.

Time to put u guys to sleep


INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

REQUIREMENTS :

1.an automated Air Defense command and control center for controlling and monitoring of Air Defense Operations.
In network centric warfare era, RASP(recognizable air situation picture) information is required to be made available at the appropriate level for taking tactical decision. These levels are

1.strategic level
2.Operational level
3.tactical level

The information sharing involves sharing of the information among navy, army and civil radar network. The system will receive data from different types of homogeneous/ heterogeneous radars, reports from mobile observation posts and data from various other Air Force Airbases or Civilian agencies viz Air Traffic Control, Air Force Movement Liaison Unit etc. to create real time comprehensive recognized air situation picture (RASP) at the Command & Control Center (C & C Center). The connectivity of sensors/agencies from/to the C&C Center will connected on a redundant high speed wide area network based on IP protocol.

the automated Air Defense command and control should have the following features
1.Adaptable to legacy systems
2.High availability rate
3.Open architecture and state of the art HMI
4.Upgrade ability and expand ability
5.Situational awareness and Analysis
6.Generation of Recognized, accurate, updated and complete real time Air Situation Picture (RASP) for local as well as centralized air space control and surveillance Threat Evaluation on the basis of Identification of track.
7.Integration of various types of radars and adaptable to user legacy systems.
8.System generated solution for Weapon assignment including Surface to Air Guided Weapons, AAA and aircraft (Fighter aircraft interception control)
9.Automation of tactical functionalities viz. Interception, Aircraft recovery, Threat evaluation, PAD (Passive Air Defense) warning etc.
10.Automatic track Identification based upon flight plan and IFF data with manual override
11.Interception solution & commands for defender aircraft against target.
12.Flight Plan ingestion & collision resolution.
13.Surveillance alert generation.
14.Simulation of exercise environment through multi identity tracks.
15.Dissemination of weapon control orders & other tactical commands to weapon units.
16.Record & Replay of operator actions as well as ASP situations.
17.Air Defense Resource Planning, management & deployment including radar coverage area analysis
18.Post mission analysis
19.Air tasking order processing
etc

at the minimum the idea is to provide an appropriate solution to identify the track information in the Air.
1.To produce a “Recognized Air Situation Picture” (RASP) by using the information received from different radars and other assets.
2.To provide a perfect WA solution for enemy aircraft/missiles using different interception tactics (for Combat Air Patrol), sam missiles and AAA.
3.To achieve automation in the Air-Defense hierarchy of the concerned air force.


WHAT IS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A MODERN GOOD sam

1.High Mobility
2.High Resistance to Jamming
3.Optimal Missile range and corresponding Radar Power
4.Lower Band Operating Frequencies
5.Advanced Digital Signal and Data Processing
6.Defensive Counter Measures and Emitting Decoys
7.Low Probability of Intercept Techniques
8.Digital Data links/Network Centric Setup
9.Dual Missile Seekers
10.Ability for Interception of PGMs
etc

sam missiles are not standalone much depends on the radars supporting it.

The limit of the interception range of a modern surface-to-air missile system can be easily estimated.
Given the radar performance parameter R0, which is the maximum range for initial detection of a target with a radar cross section of one square meter, the detection range for a target with a radar cross section σ, is:

R det (σ)=R0·σ1/4

After initial detection, there is a time delay or reaction time during which a firm track is established, the target is identified, and the missile is launched. The time dependence of the target range, as measured from the radar, is:

R target (t)=[[{R2 det (σ)-altitude2}½- V target .t]2 +altitude2]½

here
2 stands for square
½ stands for square root
altitude = target altitude
V target = target speed
R det(σ) = radar detection range for a target with a radar cross section σ

Again the time dependence of the range of the intercepting surface-to-air missile, as measured from the radar is

R sam (t)=V sam ·(t−τ delay )

here
V sam = surface-to-air missile average speed
t delay = time delay or reaction time

By setting these two equations equal, R sam (t) = R target (t), the maximum potential interception range, as limited by surface-to-air missile fly-out, can then be calculated as a function of several variables.

these kind of calculations and analysis are required to set up Weapon Engagement Zones WEZs which are a critical part of air defense planning because they represent the defense posture against the air and missile threats.

WEZ is an airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon system and can be sub divided into the following

(a) FEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft.
(b) HIMEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with high-altitude SAMs.
(c) LOMEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles.
(d) SHORADEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with SHORAD weapons. It may be established within a low- or high-altitude missile engagement zone.
(e) JEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which multiple AD systems (SAMs and aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats.

Again air defense includes includes various types of defensive coverage depending on operational requirements

(a) Area Defense. Area defense uses a combination of weapon systems (e.g. aircraft and SAMs) or various combinations of airborne and ground-based sensors and shooters to defend broad areas.

(b) Point Defense. Point defense protects limited areas, normally in defense of vital elements of forces or installations. For example, a sam or AAA unit positioned to protect an airfield is considered point defense.

(c) Self-Defense. Self-defense operations allow friendly units to defend themselves against direct attacks or threats of attack through the use of organic weapons and systems. The right of self-defense is inherent to all ROE and weapons control procedures.

which again in turn requires

(a) Determination Of Surveillance Coverage Areas. Defended airspace must be under continuous surveillance to facilitate early warning. The planner should use a combination of air-, surface-, and space-based detection assets to achieve this requirement. Adequate early warning of air and missile attacks provides the reaction time necessary for friendly forces to seek shelter or take appropriate action. Early warning of hostile air and missile attacks is vital for a layered defense.

(b) Development of the Active AMD(air and missile defense) Fire Plan. The objective is to provide the required level of protection specified in the critical asset list. Defense resources involve applying a mix of the following six employment guidelines, because not all may be required or possible to defend dependent upon the threat and defensive counter-air assets available:

1. Mutual Support. Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the adjacent weapon systems. For gun systems, this dead zone is usually small. For missile systems, the dead zone may be large and mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover non-operational units or units at lower states of readiness.

2. Overlapping Fires. Weapons are positioned so that their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes from which the enemy can attack or conduct surveillance operations, defense planners must apply mutual supporting and overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.

3. Balanced Fires. Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions. This is necessary for AD in an area where the terrain does not canalize the enemy or when the avenue of approach is unpredictable.

4. Weighted Coverage. Weapons are positioned to concentrate fires toward the most likely threat direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage in a more likely direction.

5. Early Engagement. Sensors and weapons are positioned to maximize early warning and to engage and destroy aircraft and missiles before they acquire and fire on or damage the defended asset.

6. Defense in Depth. AMD sensors and weapons are positioned to enable multiple engagement opportunities and deliver an increasing volume of fire as an enemy air or missile threat approaches the protected asset. Defense in depth reduces the probability that “leakers” will reach the defended asset or force.

again,

steps must be taken for reduction of Enemy targeting effectiveness of ur assets via

1.Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability by complicating enemy surveillance and reconnaissance efforts to pinpoint locations of targets. Mobility may be coupled with concealment to “hide” assets.

2.Deception. Deception misleads adversaries by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. Deception may be used to cause an enemy to waste munitions on false targets, deceive their combat assessment process, and falsely influence their decision makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information.Deception may deny the enemy the ability to gain correct tactical, operational, and strategic information when using their reconnaissance and surveillance systems.

3.Emission Control/Communications Security. Communications security and an emission control program for infrared, electromagnetic, and acoustic
signature reduction can deny the enemy sensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisition and ID of friendly target systems (eg C2 nodes).

4.Camouflage and Concealment. Practice visual signature reduction measures that can “hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets/target systems. These measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings. Timely intelligence concerning the overflight by enemy satellite and aircraft collection systems is important to the effort. Those measures also may be coupled with deception measures to
further complicate chances of effective enemy attacks.

5.Redundancy. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical nodes, capabilities, and systems that are particularly vulnerable to air and missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. Redundancy includes dual, contingency, or backup capabilities that can assume primary mission functions (in whole or in part) upon failure or degradation of the primary system. Of
primary concern are “soft” targets such as C2 nodes and sensors (antennae) and fixed sites such as airfields and ground stations for airborne sensors.

6.Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration and making a target system less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed.
etc


@lionel4power u can use this in Ur blog if u want , no need for credit.

This is an insane amount of information

lionel4power:

Well we have the f7s air guard and Roland ADS.. So we're covered. Nothing to worry about.

Our Rowland are In a bad state and unserviceable. I have said it earlier on, only few are in a good state.

I'll rather depend on the SA-7 grail manual than the Rowland.

lionel4power:


To be honest, air defense is quite important for Nigeria. when you put in consideration the critical oil infrastructure we need to protect which is the life's blood of this country.

Nobody is asking for THAAD or Patriot SAM but at least there have to be some coordinated defense posture as a form of deterrence.

It is not because we dont have an aerial threat doesn't mean we shouldn't be at alert. We have to have at least something.

Look at South Africa for instance, apart from Angola there isnt much threat they should worry about but they are still somewhat prepared.

Nigeria and South Africa acquired the British Seacat at the same period when both nations were still young. but look at the difference right now between the two countries.

According to a report i read some times ago, Nigeria wanted to buy 30 units of Roland ADS but lack of funds prevented that. That means that as of then our defense planers believed that what we needed to protect Nigeria was 30 units.

What has changed up till now? Are we more secure or less secure today?

Also remember that the Roland ADs is a short range system and it wouldn't completely provide defensive measures.

We CRITICALLY need something potent


The Roland was bought to protect army armored columns only, I think the reasoning of old is that we detect an intruder and immediately scramble jets to intercept.

lionel4power:


This is an insane amount of information

Put it this way if ur on a lady u gonna go half way or the full way

Seriously though I wonder how many skipped the post after the first 2 lines

nemesis8u:
To make sure u guys really r asleep

Another post of mine

the only guarantee of a foolproof air defense is your fighter elements.

ground based air defense is essentially a supporting and back up element.

SAMs are basically classified according to slant range and engagement altitude.

we have
1.MANPADS
2.SHORT range sam
3.ER-SHORADS
4.medium range sam
5.LONG range sam
6.VERY LONG range sam

against maneuvering and agile targets using terrain masking flight profile ,

1.MANPADS will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

2.SHORT range sam will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

3.ER-SHORADS will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

4.medium range sam

5.LONG range sam

6.VERY LONG range sam

MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM will be useless against the above targets.

MANPADS SRSAM ERSHORAD are best effective against maneuvering and agile targets flying at low altitudes in order to evade the radar , because of the low engagement range capability , very quick response time , very short kill chain , low escape zone , high maneuvering capability , seeker sensitivity, acquisition and lock on is optimal at low ranges.

my point being u have to select ur sam depending on ur requirements and conditions .
1.point defense / base defense / area defense
2.terrain to be protected , flat / mountainous / valleys
3.static defense / mobile defense
4.stand alone / networked
5.internal sensors / external sensors
6.integral protection / deterrence

etc etc

if MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM comes up against a maneuvering and agile targets flying at medium to high altitudes (a foolish decision in the first place) then the best case scenario for the MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM will be to force the fighter to dump its weapons and fuel and turn tail.
ie MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM achieved a MISSION KILL which is as good as a TARGET KILL.


the best scenario is when u have all of these networked , integrated and in overlapping mode

1.MANPADS protects against low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets

2.SHORT range sam protects against low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets , maneuvering targets on weapon delivery run , PGMs , cruise missiles

3.ER-SHORADS forces low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets to either abort mission or to fly up into the engagement envelope of MRSAM / LRSAM or get killed.

4.medium range sam kills target within their engagement envelop at medium or high altitudes , if the targets have been forced to the kill zone or if the target is unaware of the existence of the said SAMs. however kill probability is low especially against receding targets while high on head on mode.

5.LONG range sam good against bombers, awacs , tankers , and against a flight/group of fighter formations, also good if the fighter pilot falls asleep during flight grin
also tries to force targets to descend into lower altitudes to be caught up by MRSAM SRSAM ETC.

6.VERY LONG range sam same above with additional anti ballistic capability.

thanks for reposting this. I've read this before on your thread

The Doctrine of necessity

The doctrine of necessity is a rarely used political concept or utilitarian idea and is used to define and validate extra-constitutional issues that fall outside the purview of the constitution but are necessary to preserve political stability. The fundamental objective of the doctrine is to satisfy the exigencies which have been created by certain situations outside the contemplation of the constitution or the rule of law; and its significant feature is the deliberate circumvention of the constitution or some aspects of the rule of law in order to get out of political quagmire.



The doctrine of necessity is the basis on which extra-legal actions by state actors, which are designed to restore order, are found to be constitutional. The maxim on which the doctrine is based originated in the writings of the medieval jurist Henry de Bracton.

In modern times, the doctrine was first used in a controversial 1954 judgment in which Pakistani Chief Justice Muhammad Munir validated the extra-constitutional use of emergency powers by
Governor General , Ghulam Mohammad.

______
As you all can see this is a purely political term which has no connection with the military discussions.

So @abiodunalasa please explain to us how this "doctrine of necessity" relates with Nigerian air defense?

Odunayaw:
We CRITICALLY need something potent


The Roland was bought to protect army armored columns only, I think the reasoning of old is that we detect an intruder and immediately scramble jets to intercept.

bidexiii:



Our Rowland are In a bad state and unserviceable. I have said it earlier on, only few are in a good state.

I'll rather depend on the SA-7 grail manpad than the Rowland.

I believe one day we'll get it right.

lionel4power:



I believe one day we'll get it right.

Buying the pantsir will take care of most of the ads concerns as of now. Or a equivalent western or African system.

Use it for airbase defence or use it for defence of mobile army columns etc. It is versatile.

Later when budget is available add in MRSAM etc etc.

jakeporeshenko:

Can’t agree with you more on this one
Nigeria doesn’t have any potent ADS, end of story.

This whole argument has been pointless and derailing,

when it’s time to derail the thread and argue blindly on matters they are ignorant on that’s when they know how to show themselves.

How can someone include radio jamming equipment, NIGCOM sat and CH3 UCAV in the same sentence as air defense? You best run away and hide your face when sensible people are arguing.

He posts for the "likes". It makes him happy even if his posts are nonsensical.

How can a country with a population of nearly 200m not have a real air defense system and some people are here defending the indefensible?

nemesis8u:


Buying the pantsir will take care of most of the ads concerns as of now. Or a equivalent western or African system.

Use it for airbase defence or use it for defence of mobile army columns etc. It is versatile.

Later when budget is available add in MRSAM etc etc.

The things I will love to see right now is Mig 35 for air force and 4 frigate, 4 submarines and 4 corvette for the navy. Most African countries use Chinese SR-ADS and I Dont trust the Chinese just as I don't trust the F-7.

Long range air defense system in any sub Saharan country is a complete waste of resources.

iblawi:


The things I will love to see right now is Mig 35 for air force and 4 frigate, 4 submarines and 4 corvette for the navy. Most African countries use Chinese SR-ADS and I Dont trust the Chinese just as I don't trust the F-7.

Long range air defense system in any sub Saharan country is a complete waste of resources.

If acquired progressively then all u listed is doable.

SRSAM and MRSAM combination is more than enough for a potent ADS.

LRSAM only if u have lots of dollars to burn or the threat assessment justifies it's need.

U will need twin engined jets to complement the single engined ones , however that requirement will be based on the need/assesment of air force to project air power in the neighborhood.

Submarines and frigates r necessary as most commerce is through sea etc and they need to be secured.

Xbee007:

He posts for the "likes". It makes him happy even if his posts are nonsensical.

How can a country with a population of nearly 200m not have a real air defense system and some people are here defending the indefensible?

Most annoying part is they are all bashing bidexiii, accusing him of advocating for a new air defense system, meanwhile he was just answering your initial question.

“Does Nigeria field any system with air defense capabilities”
Bidexiii answered: no they’re all obselete and everyone went balaistic, please where is the lie in that statement, when was the last time our Roland Missiles ( which haven’t received any upgrades since inception) were involved in any kind of life fire exercise ??

Throwing around “requirements, risks assesment and priorities” like they know anything...

In the early 2000’s the findings/results of a risk assesment carried out showed that the next biggest threat to our national stability was an insurgency, was anything done about it?

Xbee007:

He posts for the "likes". It makes him happy even if his posts are nonsensical.

How can a country with a population of nearly 200m not have a real air defense system and some people are here defending the indefensible?

Apart from pantsir S, what is the reliability of all the Chinese Air defense system lionel4power was writing. For me its better to know you Dont have than looking foolish at the time of need. I will never trust those ADS.

nemesis8u:


If acquired progressively then all u listed is doable.

SRSAM and MRSAM combination is more than enough for a potent ADS.

LRSAM only if u have lots of dollars to burn or the threat assessment justifies it's need.

U will need twin engined jets to complement the single engined ones , however that requirement will be based on the need/assesment of air force to project air power in the neighborhood.

Submarines and frigates r necessary as most commerce is through sea etc and they need to be secured.

Your head dey der my guy.

Nigerian navy Naval outpost, Baga, Lake Chad


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cWBMOCZnHc

jakeporeshenko:
Nigerian navy Naval outpost, Baga, Lake Chad


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cWBMOCZnHc

Wow am impressed by the numbers of Gun boats patrolling Baga - lake chad inland water-ways.

Before the outbreak of Boko haram crisis in 2009; Baga use to be a trade centre for fish. I'll buy all sorts of smoked fish for my mum when travelling back home.

bidexiii:



Wow am impressed by the numbers of Gun boats patrolling Baga - lake chad inland water-ways.

Before the outbreak of Boko haram crisis in 2009; Baga use to be a trade centre for fish. I'll buy all sorts of smoked fish for my mum when travelling back home.

Yeah it’s a substantial facility for now but everything looks so temporary. Lake chad is a very strategic body of water that has social, economic, environmental and strategic impact in the region.

The navy should get serious and hunker down, build a proper base that can accommodate at least 2000 men and several riverine boats. The army amphibious units should also have a larger presence in that region.

I guess it all depends on money made available and the directive from mr president.

At the end of the video I saw some construction work being done, I’m waiting for channels tv to release their video on the visit.

HQ DIVISION 8 NA

jakeporeshenko:

Most annoying part is they are all bashing bidexiii, accusing him of advocating for a new air defense system, meanwhile he was just answering your initial question.

“Does Nigeria field any system with air defense capabilities”
Bidexiii answered: no they’re all obselete and everyone went balaistic, please where is the lie in that statement, when was the last time our Roland Missiles ( which haven’t received any upgrades since inception) were involved in any kind of life fire exercise ??

Throwing around “requirements, risks assesment and priorities” like they know anything...

In the early 2000’s the findings/results of a risk assesment carried out showed that the next biggest threat to our national stability was an insurgency, was anything done about it?

Bidexiii's reply was succinct, exactly what I expected. I never expected that the argument would drag on for this long.

I knew we still have the Rowland, I have seen pictures of them before on this thread. In fact, I read about our obsolete (and therefore nonexistent) ADS before asking. I also came across a post on "Ourtimeiscome", where abiodunalasa copied what he posted.

The point I want everyone to understand is that Nigeria needs to be proactive.

If we genuinely purchase our defense equipment based on our perceive immediate need, I would say our real and immediate need is to improve our intelligence gathering and better policing. You hardly read report of NIA or DSS thwarting terrorists attacks or Nigerian police arresting a wanted terrorists. And most of Nigeria's problem can be solved with better policing alone.

But who says we can't have it all? ADS, better police, Modernised Military, potent Navy and great Airforce. We should dream big!

jakeporeshenko:
Nigerian navy Naval outpost, Baga, Lake Chad


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cWBMOCZnHc

trust Brenda to do a better job


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gw-BqLBgecU