pilgrim.1:

@huxley,

I know what you actually said; but while not dragging you back, I think your reaction to the closed mindset answers well to the fact that you had misunderstood him. I have consequently discussed how that is so; and if you did not initially give me grounds to believe that you were adopting such a mindset, you would not have initially been too hasty to dismiss him as a retard, would you?

Take heart, I don't mean to. One thing you will find consistent about me is that when a discussion begins to get unreasonable, I simply fold myself away from the thread until such occasion as invites my inputs consequently. However, when that would not solve the problem for my fellow discussants, I take umbrage at their incessant malignant attitude - which is why I wonder that you would be complaining about this if indeed you didn't mind being malignant after I left one such discussion peacefully.

Grateful for your explanations, but you didn't quite bring about anything substantial in the views already shared in mine. First, Barbara agrees with Kurtz that modern naturalism is reliant upon science, not the other way round - she didn't argue for what you again are emphasizing as highlighted in your quoted.

Second, no matter how one may slice it, the basic premise of MN (Methodological Naturalism) simply remains as I have defined earlier:

● naturalism ((philosophy) the doctrine that the world can be understood
in scientific terms without recourse to spiritual or supernatural explanations)

● Naturalism is a worldview that assumes that the universe is
a closed system in which matter and energy are the only realities.

Now, if MN differs from this simply definitions, please kindly show - and help to outline also how it differs substantially from the fact that it is a philosophical worldview seeking to interprete the realities of the world without recourse to supernatural explanations. Whether it is held simply as Naturalism, I don't see what essentially you have said that changes one shade of the meanings and pointers already offered in mine - not even when one looks at "strong" or "weak" naturalism, they both still carry the same thing.

What is essentially different from Francis Collins as a scientist who is not an MN - even when he does his job as a scientist? Even when the equation of favouring ID is left out, does that essentially change anything in the fact that he does not adhere to the MN position? The basic thing you are missing here is that you're too keen to force science to bend to MN ("Basically, science relies on MN as it guiding principle" when we know that is not true and just quite the opposite.

Dear huxley, Methodological Naturalism is a worldview based on the philosophical doctrine that assumes and presumes to interprete the world in naturalistic terms. It is not science, but appeals to science; therefore, it is wrong and indeed a huge fallacy to presume that science relies on MN.

That is why, no matter how many such scientists I refer to, I presume that your first premise is to look out for what worldview they hold, and not what science they do! I said it is a presumption; and if you keep holding the false view of "science relying on MN", your case cannot then be helped. As soon as you sort this issue ouut and point me to unbiased reference where the definition of MN in mine differs scholarly from what unbiased scientists understand in this scheme, then I shall give you a good list of some scientists who do not adhere to the worldview of MN when conducting their researches.

Good to know.

Cheers.

In fact, I think I start this discussion by stating that MN "is one of the guiding philosophies of science". To use the use "rely" is a bit misleading and I should never have in my later post. Although I know some defended of MN use the word relies, I think it is a bit too loose and may trip the unwary.


If you look at the line diagram I made;

Naturalism
|
|
MN < ----------- Scientific method <----------- PN

MN < ----------- Scientific Method <-------- strong----------- (ON)


I had Naturalism at the top (I should really have put a line linking it to the scientific method). When Barbara Forrest user the term "modern naturalist" as in the below;

Methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism are distinguished by the fact that methodological naturalism is an epistemology as well as a procedural protocol, while philosophical naturalism is a metaphysical position. Although there is variation in the views of modern naturalists, Kurtz's definition captures these two most important aspects of modern naturalism: (1) the reliance on scientific method, grounded in empiricism, as the only reliable method of acquiring knowledge about the natural world, and (2) the inadmissibility of the supernatural or transcendent into its metaphysical scheme.[5] Kurtz's current definition is consistent with Sidney Hook's earlier one:

She id refering to the Naturalism at the top of my diagram. However MN is an "epistemological and procedural protocol". Basically, it defines and specifies a way of thinking and doing.


Now, check out this review that I found online, I think from a Christian scholar. I think he sets out the distinction quite well:

Contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of science invoke the term naturalism frequently enough that it is worth pausing to take inventory of the various kinds of views to which this label is applied. Mine is by no means the first effort of this sort. In fact, I take Kitcher*s *The Naturalists Return* as a starting point for my analysis. The naturalists have indeed returned, but often enough the welcoming party has been less than cordial. My task is to sort through the central arguments for and against naturalism in order to determine which, if any, forms of naturalism are viable.

Although naturalisms abound, the most significant distinction, which naturalists themselves do not always acknowledge, is between epistemological and metaphysical naturalism. We might also refer to this same distinction in terms of methodological and ontological naturalism. Epistemological or methodological naturalism is a claim about how we ought to investigate the world. Briefly, it is the belief that how we should engage in epistemic and scientific pursuits depends on how we actually can and do reason given our perceptual and cognitive faculties. In contrast, metaphysical or ontological naturalism is focused less on the human condition and more on the world itself. It is not merely a claim about how we know but also a claim about what there is to know. According to this version of naturalism, the world is comprised of, and only of, empirically knowable physical phenomena.

The best arguments against naturalism attack the metaphysical or ontological thesis and do little to undermine epistemological or methodological naturalism. However, both naturalists and their critics occasionally overlook this distinction. Since the relationship between epistemological and metaphysical naturalism is neither obvious nor necessary, a good argument against either version does not refute the other. I therefore argue that we should abandon the dogmatic assumption to which both naturalists and their critics silently adhere. I then argue in favor epistemological or methodological naturalism and explain why I am agnostic regarding metaphysical or ontological naturalism.


If Francis Collins is not a MNlist while he is doing his scientific work, what else is he then? Do you suppose in his job is makes allowance for supernatural explanations?

I found this as well on this site;

Methodological naturalism combined with supernaturalism is perhaps the most popular metaphysical position in the United States today. All theistic scientists adopt such methodological naturalism, as well as the 40-50% of the U.S. population who accept science and evolution but believe in God, the view known as "theistic evolution" (all of these individuals would be metaphysical supernaturalists as well as methodological naturalists). Of the others in the population, 40% believe in supernatural creationism and God (all are both metaphysical and methodological supernaturalists), and the remaining 10-15%, including probably most scientists and philosophers, are nontheist believers in science and evolution (so are all metaphysical naturalists). Therefore, no more than 15% of Americans sincerely believe in ontological naturalism; 85-90% are ontological supernaturalists with about half of these being methodological naturalists when it suits them.

@huxley,

huxley:

I found this as well on this site;

Methodological naturalism combined with supernaturalism is perhaps the most popular metaphysical position in the United States today. All theistic scientists adopt such methodological naturalism, as well as the 40-50% of the US. population who accept science and evolution but believe in God, the view known as "theistic evolution" (all of these individuals would be metaphysical supernaturalists as well as methodological naturalists). Of the others in the population, 40% believe in supernatural creationism and God (all are both metaphysical and methodological supernaturalists), and the remaining 10-15%, including probably most scientists and philosophers, are nontheist believers in science and evolution (so are all metaphysical naturalists). Therefore, no more than 15% of Americans sincerely believe in ontological naturalism; 85-90% are ontological supernaturalists with about half of these being methodological naturalists when it suits them.

Lol, let me draw your attention to something you probably missed in the opening quote there:

"Methodological naturalism combined with supernaturalism
is perhaps the most popular metaphysical position in
the United States today."

Please understand something here - we are being treated to the view as is in the USA; and one should note well that "methodological naturalism" on its own is a worldview that rejects any involvement of supernatural interpretations of world realities. MN (methodological naturalism) does not outrightly deny the existence of the supernatural per se, but it assumes that for purposes of its enquiries, the supernatural just does not exist and should not be appealed to in scientific enquiries.

This should not create any confusion for us - because I already noted that Stephen J. Gould in his Non-Overlapping Magisteria sees "a form of methodological naturalism mixed with supernatural beliefs".

Again, this does not mean that such a combination or mixing automatically translates to "science" - that would seriously defeat the purpose of your efforts so far, in as much as MN (methodological naturalism) does not seek to involve supernatural explanations in its enquries at any level. That the combination is held by many in the United States today should not make us confuse the fact that they are only worldviews and not "science".

huxley:

If Francis Collins is not a MNlist while he is doing his scientific work, what else is he then? Do you suppose in his job is makes allowance for supernatural explanations?

Francis Collins is not an MNlist in as much as MN (methodological naturalism) is not science but rather a worldview. I shall try to share more about this soon enough so you get a more appreciable grasp of this point. In his work, he employs the scientific method - but that does not mean that he employs methodological naturalism as a worldview in his work. Let's not confuse the "scientific method" for "methodological naturalism" - in as much as "methodological naturalism" is not the same as "the method of science".

huxley:

Now, check out this review that I found online, I think from a Christian scholar. I think he sets out the distinction quite well:

Thanks. Actually, there are a few other places where I had seen Mimi Marinucci’s ’Another Dogma: Metaphysical and Epistemological Naturalism’ – here and here. Also, I found some of the other papers of various contributors (including Marinucci) on the Methods of Science very refreshing (never put off by the homepage attributed to ‘Theistic Satanism’).

huxley:

In fact, I think I start this discussion by stating that MN "is one of the guiding philosophies of science". To use the use "rely" is a bit misleading and I should never have in my later post. Although I know some defended of MN use the word relies, I think it is a bit too loose and may trip the unwary.

First, a short outline of  a few of the types of naturalisms and where they fit in.

Basically, depending on who is using the term, naturalism is divided into methodological and ontological naturalism. However, there are other types of naturalism, viz:

●   Religious Naturalism, RN – see (Wikipedia and Religious Naturalism)
>> RN with God-language
>> RN without God-language
>> RN with God-language used philosophically
>> RN with shades of physicalism, humanism, pantheism
      [url=http://natural theology]natural theology[/url], Teleology,
      Theistic Realism, etc.


●   Philosophical Naturalism, RN – see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy)

Methodological Naturalism, MN
        ●   epistemology
        ●   scientific naturalism
                  ●    reductionism

>> Ontological Naturalism
       ●   physicalism
       ●   metaphysical naturalism


Now why try to delineate these issues? For the simple reason that Naturalism – whatever its slice or adjectival qualifiers – is simply a worldview and not science in itself. Whether it is methodological naturalism (MN), ontological naturalism (ON), or even religious naturalism (RN), they are all worldviews and not “science” in themselves – and almost all philosophers of science inclined to these forms of naturalism appeal to science as a tool for interpreting world realities.

Surprised? You shouldn’t be. If you take the example of RN (religious naturalism), you find the debate or arguments in its defence in such works as those of [url=http://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/ontological.html]Anselm[/url] of Canterbury (1033-1109) whose ontological argument purports to be an a priori proof of God's existence. Another helpful source where one may gain an understanding of his “philosophical theology” is at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A detailed reading of the various shades of Ontological argument with particular reference to religious naturalism can be found here.

But Anselm is not alone in Ontological argument; and many philosophers regard Descartes another ontologist whose arguments are not easily dismissed, even though largely misunderstood. A reviewer examined his a prior ontological argument at the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – noting particularly Descartes’ arguments in his Principles of Philosophy.

However, among those who were inclined to ontological naturalism (ON) from a philosophical naturalist’s view, they aimed “to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the ‘human spirit’” [Krikorian 1944, Kim 2003]].

From all these, it is clear that Naturalism is a worldview and not science; for which reason one cannot argue to make methodological naturalism (MN) a dominant philosophy over other naturalisms. I wasn’t teasing in earlier mentioning repeatedly that naturalism is a worldview, as this example shows:

Naturalism is a worldview, a philosophy -- a general
understanding of reality and humanity's place within reality.
Naturalism is usually defined most briefly as the philosophical
conclusion that the only reality is nature, as gradually discovered
by our intelligence using the tools of experience, reason,
and science.

Source: Naturalism.Org

That is one reason directly that should help us understand indeed that naturalism is not a tool as is science; therefore one could not propose that science “relies on” MN. The idea that “many scientists” adhere to MN is arguably untenable and can only pass on the basis that whoever was arguing such was pretending to have forgotten that MN is a worldview and not science.

huxley:

If you look at the line diagram I made;

Naturalism
|
|
MN < ----------- Scientific method <----------- PN

MN < ----------- Scientific Method <-------- strong----------- (ON)


I had Naturalism at the top (I should really have put a line linking it to the scientific method).

@huxley,

I appreciate your attempt to delineate Naturalism in its relation to the scientific method; however, it’s my understanding that the diagram is quite misleading – especially because it depicts the science method as pointing to Methodological Naturalism (MN) instead of the other way round. What you have done once again is try to give the premise that science ‘relies upon’ MN instead of the other way round; yet we know that no philosopher of science worth his onions would be able to defend that notion.

If I should go through your penultimate riposte, it would turn out precisely as I have been trying for several pages to show you these salient and incontestible points:

●   Naturalism relies on the scientific method, never the other way round
●   As a worldview, not all scientists are MNs
●   Methodological and Ontological Naturalisms hold the same premise –
     the philosophical doctrine that the world is best understood without
     recourse to supernatural explanations
●   Many reknowned philosophers of science reject naturalism (whatever
     shade of naturalism) because in many respects its logic is critically
     flawed.
●   Methodological Naturalism is only one philosophical worldview
     among several others; and as such is not to be held as the most
     precise logical of all explanations for understanding world realities.

Again, let me reiterate that Naturalism in all its slices and adjectival qualifiers actually appeals to science, and not the other way round. It is crucial that a student of the philosophy of science grabs this, because to hold it in reverse is to miss essentially what science is all about – for science is a tool of enquiry, never an end in itself: and as such, Naturalism is never a tool of enquiry. Rather, naturalism employs the scientific method as a tool for its philosophical arguments, be that as it may in any field of enquiry – for which cause, one cannot divorce naturalism from philosophy. This is why I have take the time to produce a flow chart below to help your reflections on the relationships between the various naturalisms and science.

Also worthy of particular note is the fact that there is a relationship shared between some of these types of naturalism, as the ‘viz a viz’ arrow between methodological and ontological – that is because they are many times not exclusive and other times not inclusive as well: they often have to be in consultation with each other and share concepts between themselves. For Religious Naturalism, not many modern scholars hold that it shares anything with either MN or ON – but that is very well debatable, and for that reason I didn’t indicate a ‘viz a viz’ connecting it to the others.

As for the 5 points outlined above, I could return to develop them analytically and clinically should you require me to do so.

Regards.

Thanks for the latest post, but you have not shown why MN is not the guiding principle for science.  Almost all philosopher of science and practicing scientist (theistic and nontheistic)  adopt that approach when practising science.   This is the position of a theistic philosopher of science (Mimi Marinucci) :

Although naturalisms abound, the most significant distinction, which naturalists themselves do not always acknowledge, is between epistemological and metaphysical naturalism. We might also refer to this same distinction in terms of methodological and ontological naturalism. Epistemological or methodological naturalism is a claim about how we ought to investigate the world. Briefly, it is the belief that how we should engage in epistemic and scientific pursuits depends on how we actually can and do reason given our perceptual and cognitive faculties. In contrast, metaphysical or ontological naturalism is focused less on the human condition and more on the world itself. It is not merely a claim about how we know but also a claim about what there is to know. According to this version of naturalism, the world is comprised of, and only of, empirically knowable physical phenomena

huxley:

Thanks for the latest post, but you have not shown why MN is not the guiding principle for science. Almost all philosopher of science and practicing scientist (theistic and nontheistic) adopt that approach when practising science. This is the position of a theistic philosopher of science (Mimi Marinucci) :

Although naturalisms abound, the most significant distinction, which naturalists themselves do not always acknowledge, is between epistemological and metaphysical naturalism. We might also refer to this same distinction in terms of methodological and ontological naturalism. Epistemological or methodological naturalism is a claim about how we ought to investigate the world. Briefly, it is the belief that how we should engage in epistemic and scientific pursuits depends on how we actually can and do reason given our perceptual and cognitive faculties. In contrast, metaphysical or ontological naturalism is focused less on the human condition and more on the world itself. It is not merely a claim about how we know but also a claim about what there is to know. According to this version of naturalism, the world is comprised of, and only of, empirically knowable physical phenomena

Dear huxley,

don't you see what I have been saying all along? Naturalism is a worldview - slice it anyhow one wishes with all its adjectives, it is not science and only appeals to the natural sciences. Even when you look at Mimi Marinucci's quote above, what does he say? Here again:

[list]Epistemological or methodological naturalism is a claim about how we ought to investigate the world. Briefly, it is the belief that how we should engage in epistemic and scientific pursuits depends on how we actually can and do reason given our perceptual and cognitive faculties.[/list]

MN does not make a preserve on science - at best, it is a claim among many other claims. It is because many people do not see this distinctives that make a lot of philosophers of science to reject naturalistic logic. An example? Karl Popper -

[list](1) Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science. He rejected it based on his general critique of induction (see problem of induction), yet acknowledged its utility as means for inventing conjectures.

source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy) [/list]

pilgrim.1:

Dear huxley,

don't you see what I have been saying all along? Naturalism is a worldview - slice it anyhow one wishes with all its adjectives, it is not science and only appeals to the natural sciences. Even when you look at Mimi Marinucci's quote above, what does he say? Here again:[list]Epistemological or methodological naturalism is a claim about how we ought to investigate the world. Briefly, it is the belief that how we should engage in epistemic and scientific pursuits depends on how we actually can and do reason given our perceptual and cognitive faculties.[/list]

MN does not make a preserve on science - at best, it is a claim among many other claims. It is because many people do not see this distinctives that make a lot of philosophers of science to reject naturalistic logic. An example? Karl Popper -

[list](1) Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science. He rejected it based on his general critique of induction (see problem of induction), yet acknowledged its utility as means for inventing conjectures.

source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy) [/list]

Who is saying naturalism is science? Is this what you think I am saying? MN is a framework and protocol that informs science. Basically, it defined a way of proceeding, thinking and approaching scientific investigations. IT IS NOT SCIENCE. And I have never said it is science.

This is how I envisage the relationship:

@huxley,

huxley:

Who is saying naturalism is science? Is this what you think I am saying? MN is a framework and protocol that informs science. Basically, it defined a way of proceeding, thinking and approaching scientific investigations. IT IS NOT SCIENCE. And I have never said it is science.

This is how I envisage the relationship:

Oh no, huxley. . . look again at that diagram and see where the arrow points between the scientific method and methodological naturalism - it is wrong, because it projects the idea that science relies on or appeals to MN instead of the other way round. This flaw is the reason why you have been postulating the idea that MN informs science - this is not a healthy claim, because ALL OTHER branches of naturalism inform the scientific method as well!

I think, in a kind of round-about way,  you are right because the arrows in my diagram  define a complete loop.  Naturalism, is a relatively newish philosophy, as it did not exist before the 19th century.  It developed by draw from the scientific method (SM) and through the successes of the SM it was possible to define a set of protocol and framework by which science might be conducted.  Such a protocol is MN.  Should it become necessary to add supernaturalism into the loop, I am sure the protocol would be revised.

I don't deny that Naturalism is a worldview. It is a worldview informed by science.  It is NOT science by itself.

@huxley,

Okay, at last we're getting somewhere. I couldn't have said it any better: "It is a worldview informed by science". That said, I should not be tedious on the subject any further, other than a comment that it does not appear that Naturalism is of recent date - I think it predates the 19th century (depending on how one interpretest its early philosophical developments) - but there again, I may be equally wrong.

Do have a great evening.

pilgrim.1:

@huxley,

Oh no, huxley. . . look again at that diagram and see where the arrow points between the scientific method and methodological naturalism - it is wrong, because it projects the idea that science relies on or appeals to MN instead of the other way round. This flaw is the reason why you have been postulating the idea that MN informs science - this is not a healthy claim, because ALL OTHER branches of naturalism inform the scientific method as well!

No according to my diagram, only MN informs the Scientific Method (SM).  The others are essentially metaphysical positions.

I am tired of asking, but I shall try again.  Can you show me philosophers of science and scientist who deny that science is guided by MN principles?  I would really like to know what their views are.

pilgrim.1:

@huxley,

Okay, at last we're getting somewhere. I couldn't have said it any better: "It is a worldview informed by science". That said, I should not be tedious on the subject any further, other than a comment that it does not appear that Naturalism is of recent date - I think it predates the 19th century (depending on how one interpretest its early philosophical developments) - but there again, I may be equally wrong.

Do have a great evening.

I have never denied that Natural was a worldview informed by science. What I was saying was that MN, in its present capacity is the guiding principle behind science. And those were my exact comments that sparked off this discussion.

You are right about its very early beginnings. But most naturalists today would only defend the type of naturalist that follows on from the successful track record of the Scientific Method. That is the type I also defend.

@poster

The key word here is Christian

According to the Bible a Christian cannot be possessed by a demon.  the Holy Spirit who dwells in a Christian is greater than the demons and Satan - so the answer to your question is NO

Read Luke 11.  In this passage, Satan is the strong man. But Jesus is the stronger man who overcomes him.  if you are truly born again Christian you are indwelt by the holy spirit, no demon can live with the holy spirit

@huxley,

huxley:

No according to my diagram, only MN informs the Scientific Method (SM).  The others are essentially metaphysical positions.

Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear!!   You have it all wrong and sound like you're trying to defend a worldview rather than appealing to the scientific method. You see, huxley, the scientific method has come a long way and has received inputs from various disciplines rather than from just the worldview known as 'methodological naturalism'. That is why you keep getting the wrong projection of thinking that science relies upon MN (ala Michael Martin in quoting Pennock), rather than MN relying on the scientific method (ala Barbara Forrest in quoting Kurtz).

Basically, you cannot use a worldview to defend science, because science is not a worldview that needs defending: it is a tool of investigating the realities of our world and it has its limitations and cannot be used to explain everything. If on the other hand you keep making the mistake of assuming that methodological naturalism is the only legitimate worldview there is and therefore is the only legitimate worldview that shapes the scientific method, you truly have it wrong, huxley.

It is this type of reasoning you're advancing that probably led other thinkers to reject the dogmatic logic of MN - it is not only Dr. Craig and Alvin Plantiga that have critiqued MN, but other philosophers of science have done so and continue to do so: Karl Popper being another. Notice that these people were not critiquing the scientific method - rather, they were critiquing methodological naturalism; and that is why they ask questions such as -

●   Is it (methodological naturalism) science?

●   Is it (methodological naturalism) logic?

These thinkers are not critiquing the scientific method at all, huxley - because they know that the scientific method is quite a well-developed body of methodology in the quest for truth in explaining world realities.

It is remarkable that there are philosophers of science, like Karl Popper, who have categorically rejected methodological naturalism on the basis of its rigid and circular logic. Yet, like some other notable philosophers, Popper is "generally credited with providing a context for major improvements in scientific method in the mid-to-late 20th century." (Wikipedia). Others who were recognized as important figures through the history of the scientific method include Descartes, Aristotle (which some have argued as being the father of modern scientific method), and Galileo (others also argue that he indeed should be recognized as the father of the scientific method).

Others (like Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos) have also made very important contributions to the development of the scientific method. But the notable contrast is that scholars like Kuhn critiqued Popper on a very important element: he "rejected the idea that there exists a single method that applies to all science and could account for its progress".

That critique of Kuhn is very important here, huxley - and should help you see the fallacy of your statement: [list]

huxley:
No according to my diagram, only MN informs the Scientific Method (SM).

[/list]

Lol, please try and study more about this subject and especially the works of those who have made very important contributions to the development of the scientific method - they have never critiqued the scientific method itself; but rather, they have both critiqued and rejected the dogmatic logic of methodological naturalism (MN). This is why it is a serious fallacy to assert that all "good" scientists follow the MN - no they don't. The MN is a worldview that continues to be critiqued and rejected by reknowned philosphers of science.

huxley:

I am tired of asking, but I shall try again.  Can you show me philosophers of science and scientist who deny that science is guided by MN principles?  I would really like to know what their views are.

I just gave you a basis why the above is the case. Reminder:

●   Karl Popper (1902- 1994)
     - generally credited with providing a context for major improvements
     in scientific method in the mid-to-late 20th century (note)

     - Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science.
     He rejected it based on his general critique of induction,
     yet acknowledged its utility as means for inventing conjectures. (note)

    -  Karl Popper famously stated "Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory,
     but a metaphysical research program." In the same paper, he continued,
     "And yet, the theory is invaluable. . ." (note)

●   Thomas Kuhn, (1922 - 1966)
     rejected the idea that there exists a single method that applies
     to all science and could account for its progress. In 1962 Kuhn
     published the influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
     which suggested that scientists worked in a series of paradigms,
     and argued that there was little evidence of scientists actually
     following a falsificationist methodology. ([url=http://]note[/url])

It would help to understand what science is, how it developed through history, its relation to philosophy, and the fact that it is not a worldview as is Methodological Naturalism, MN. Because science is not a worldview, it stands as a body of tools developed for investigating and understanding world realities; and it should not be confused for MN - that is the reason why philosophers of science who have made very important contributions have critiqued and rejected its dogmatic logic.

pilgrim.1:

I just gave you a basis why the above is the case. Reminder:

●   Karl Popper (1902- 1994)
     - generally credited with providing a context for major improvements
     in scientific method in the mid-to-late 20th century (note)

     - Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science.
     He rejected it based on his general critique of induction,
     yet acknowledged its utility as means for inventing conjectures. (note)

    -  Karl Popper famously stated "Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory,
     but a metaphysical research program." In the same paper, he continued,
     "And yet, the theory is invaluable. . ." (note)

●   Thomas Kuhn, (1922 - 1966)
     rejected the idea that there exists a single method that applies
     to all science and could account for its progress. In 1962 Kuhn
     published the influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
     which suggested that scientists worked in a series of paradigms,
     and argued that there was little evidence of scientists actually
     following a falsificationist methodology. ([url=http://]note[/url])

It would help to understand what science is, how it developed through history, its relation to philosophy, and the fact that it is not a worldview as is Methodological Naturalism, MN. Because science is not a worldview, it stands as a body of tools developed for investigating and understanding world realities; and it should not be confused for MN - that is the reason why philosophers of science who have made very important contributions have critiqued and rejected its dogmatic logic.

Thanks for your post.

MN is a pragmatic philosophy whose aims is to establish a framework and guideline by which good science may be conducted.  Does it answer have all the shortcomings of science?  I submit, YES.

Does it have its own shortcomings and critics?  Absolutely YES.

Now, are there any schools of philosophies that are universally accepted by all philosophers?  Absolutely NO.

Even in the philosophy of science, there are no less that 5 different schools of thought. And advocates of these fields debate fiercely over what and how science should be conducted.

Have the debates and controversies stop science from progressing and producing great results?  I doubt it.

Karl Popper formalised the concept of falsification which has been widely accepted by the scientific community.  But do all philosopher of science agree on the concept of falsification?  No,  I see your are familiar with names like Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerbend, etc.

The fact that falsification has its critic impede the progress of science?  I doubt it.  Falsification is a pragmatic philosophy that guides the conduct of science and almost all science adhere to this philosophy.

Popper my have been a good and influential philosopher but this does not mean he was infallible.  He notoriously described Darwinian Evolution as not been science because he thought it could not be falsified.  For a man of his statue, in the 20th century, to not realised just how easy it is to falsify Darwinian Evolution, just shows that some great men too can be in error.  Of course, once it was pointed out to him how evolution could he falsified, he withdrew his criticism.

Interesting how Popper criticised MN in one tone, but "acknowledged its utility as means for inventing conjectures":

Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science. He rejected it based on his general critique of induction (see problem of induction), yet acknowledged its utility as means for inventing conjectures.

Did he suggest a better approach?  Well, not that I am aware of.  If you are aware of a better approach, I would like to know.

Is it possible to develop a better philosophical approach to conducting science?  Absolutely YES.

Is there such an approach at the moment with a track record of success as MN?  NO.

I asked you for any "scientific" work that is currently conducted under non-MN principles and you rightly said Intellegent Design work, sometimes under the theme of Theistic Evolution.  Supports of ID have had their day in court in 2005 to defend their views and the were rightly kicked out of court as peddling pseudo-science.  In fact, you may want to watch transcripts of the trial.  Fascinating.  The Catholic scientist, Kenneth Miller, who defends MN, testified against ID'ers.

I am not aware of any real serious practising scientist who would conduct science under non-MN principles.  If you do, I would like to know who they are and what they do.

@huxley,

I sense that no matter how many times I point you to the real essence of MN, you still don't get it.

MN is a worldview and a philosophy - and there are so many worldviews and philosophies of science. But your problem is that you hold the assumption that MN supercedes all other philosophies - and that is where you are wrong. It won't hurt to see this fact, because you have not been able to show indeed that science relies on MN instead of the other way round. Other than trying to take the position of thinkers like Martin and Pennock, you should realise that even among naturalists there are others who see it the other way round!

huxley:

I asked you for any "scientific" work that is currently conducted under non-MN principles and you rightly said Intellegent Design work, sometimes under the theme of Theistic Evolution. Supports of ID have had their day in court in 2005 to defend their views and the were rightly kicked out of court as peddling pseudo-science. In fact, you may want to watch transcripts of the trial. Fascinating. The Catholic scientist, Kenneth Miller, who defends MN, testified against ID'ers.

Lol, Theistic Evolution (IMHO) is not Intelligent Design, dear huxley. They are often closely link, in just the same way that MN and ON are linked. Unfortunately, not many people see the difference and that is why it has been wrongly appended by people who are too uncomfy with the ID. It is because of such disaffection for ID that many uninformed minds misinterprete the positions of scientists as Francis Collins. In my suggesting Theistic Evolution earlier, I noted that there are many other worldviews that appeal to science just as MN does; and that is why MN is not science but merely a philosophical doctrine that appeals to science. When you do not grasp this distinction, you will continue to blur the lines that naturalists have argued either way for the definition of MN. An example:

       On Methdological Naturalism,

       * Michael Martin & Pennock see the case as that science relies on MN

       * Barbara Forrest & Kurtz see the case as that MN relies on science

These are not the same thing, and yet they are all naturalists. Question now is that who is saying what? And if you assert that your take on it is just the best possible of all the others, that is just as dogmatic as the logic that has been critiqued and rejected already!

You argue as if science was a sick and wobbly tool before the emergence of MN. . . as if science did not have a proper foundation before the emergence of MN. I'm sorry to observe that this has been the recurrent decimal in all your rejoinders, and I do not see what case really you have made for it. We both agree that MN is not science, as well that it does not address all the queries of scientific research in the quest for truth and interpretations of world realities. But you still have a hard time seeing MN for what it is - and I think that so many naturalists are hooked on this problem so much so that they are still arguing among themselves on what basically is MN. Of course, people like Barbara Forrest may acknowledge the distinction (ala Kurtz); but that again is contradicted by other naturalists like Martin (after Pennock). It is this dogmatic and circular logic in MN that has led many philosophers of science to critique and reject it without arguing against the scientific method itself.

pilgrim.1:

@huxley,

I sense that no matter how many times I point you to the real essence of MN, you still don't get it.

MN is a worldview and a philosophy - and there are so many worldviews and philosophies of science. But your problem is that you hold the assumption that MN supercedes all other philosophies - and that is where you are wrong. It won't hurt to see this fact, because you have not been able to show indeed that science relies on MN instead of the other way round. Other than trying to take the position of thinkers like Martin and Pennock, you should realise that even among naturalists there are others who see it the other way round!

Where have I said anything like what you have accused be off? Where? Have I even implied that? Show me where I have denied that MN is NOT a wordview and philosophy?

Have I denied that there are many worldviews and philosophies? Have I? Where? Have I even implied that?

Have I argued that MN supercede all other philosophies? Have I implied that? Where?

@huxley,

huxley:

pilgrim.1 link=topic=181454.msg3028537#msg3028537 date=1225650836:

@huxley,

I sense that no matter how many times I point you to the real essence of MN, you still don't get it.

MN is a worldview and a philosophy - and there are so many worldviews and philosophies of science. But your problem is that you hold the assumption that MN supercedes all other philosophies - and that is where you are wrong. It won't hurt to see this fact, because you have not been able to show indeed that science relies on MN instead of the other way round. Other than trying to take the position of thinkers like Martin and Pennock, you should realise that even among naturalists there are others who see it the other way round!

Where have I said anything like what you have accused be off? Where? Have I even implied that? Show me where I have denied that MN is NOT a wordview and philosophy?

Have I denied that there are many worldviews and philosophies? Have I? Where? Have I even implied that?

Have I argued that MN supercede all other philosophies? Have I implied that? Where?

I hope everything is alright? My apologies if you misread me; but let me point you to what in yours led me to that inference as highlighted in red:

(1)

huxley:
No according to my diagram, only MN informs the Scientific Method (SM).  The others are essentially metaphysical positions.

(2)

huxley:
MN is a pragmatic philosophy whose aims is to establish a framework and guideline by which good science may be conducted. Does it answer all the shortcomings of science? I submit, YES.

Is there such an approach at the moment with a track record of success as MN? NO.

Again, those are the sort of statements in yours that led me to the thought as highlighted in my quote in your reply.

Let me state my position again:

1)  Is Methodological Naturalism a worldview/philosophy?   YES

2)  Is MN science?   NO

3)  Is MN the only philosophy and worldview?   NO

4)  Does MN supercede all other philosophies?  NO

5)  Has MN got flaws?  YES

6)  Is MN the guiding philosophy (principle, framework) behind science?  ABSOLUTELY YES

7)  Has science got flaws and shortcomings?  YES

8-)  Has science got a great and successful track record of uncovering the "truth" about the nature of reality?  YES

9)  Are there any other reliable epistemic methods besides science for revealing the truth? NO

10)  Could there be any other ways of knowing besides that provided by science?  ABSOLUTELY YES


If you are going to critique my position, I would appreciate it if you critique it vis-a-vis these 10 points above.  Unless I deviate from these 10 points (in which case I would advise you),  any criticisms outside of this would be a misrepresentation of my position.

pilgrim.1:

Lol, Theistic Evolution (IMHO) is not Intelligent Design, dear huxley. They are often closely link, in just the same way that MN and ON are linked. Unfortunately, not many people see the difference and that is why it has been wrongly appended by people who are too uncomfy with the ID. It is because of such disaffection for ID that many uninformed minds misinterprete the positions of scientists as Francis Collins. In my suggesting Theistic Evolution earlier, I noted that there are many other worldviews that appeal to science just as MN does; and that is why MN is not science but merely a philosophical doctrine that appeals to science. When you do not grasp this distinction, you will continue to blur the lines that naturalists have argued either way for the definition of MN. An example:

      On Methdological Naturalism,

      * Michael Martin & Pennock see the case as that science relies on MN

      * Barbara Forrest & Kurtz see the case as that MN relies on science

These are not the same thing, and yet they are all naturalists. Question now is that who is saying what? And if you assert that your take on it is just the best possible of all the others, that is just as dogmatic as the logic that has been critiqued and rejected already!

You argue as if science was a sick and wobbly tool before the emergence of MN. . . as if science did not have a proper foundation before the emergence of MN. I'm sorry to observe that this has been the recurrent decimal in all your rejoinders, and I do not see what case really you have made for it. We both agree that MN is not science, as well that it does not address all the queries of scientific research in the quest for truth and interpretations of world realities. But you still have a hard time seeing MN for what it is - and I think that so many naturalists are hooked on this problem so much so that they are still arguing among themselves on what basically is MN. Of course, people like Barbara Forrest may acknowledge the distinction (ala Kurtz); but that again is contradicted by other naturalists like Martin (after Pennock). It is this dogmatic and circular logic in MN that has led many philosophers of science to critique and reject it without arguing against the scientific method itself.

I agree ID is not theistic evolution (TE).  My state was badly worded.  In fact, I hesitated for several minutes thinking for a better way to express the relationship, but could not think of one.

The real relationship is amorphose.  There some ID'ers who also hold onto TE.  Michael Behe actually strandles both camps.  Francis Collins, Ken Miller,  Francisco Ayalla, Simon Conway Morris, Daniel Fairbanks etc are TE and they have nothing but contempt for ID "theory".

Sorry,  I have just re-read what may have mislead you.  It was a typo on my part.

MN is a pragmatic philosophy whose aims is to establish a framework and guideline by which good science may be conducted.  Does it answer all the shortcomings of science?  I submit, YES.

Does it have its own shortcomings and critics?  Absolutely YES.

I meant to say,  "Does it have all the shortcomings of science?  I submit, YES."

I wonder what you understood by this statement?

No according to my diagram, only MN informs the Scientific Method (SM). The others are essentially metaphysical positions.

What I meant is this - of all the various flavours or shades of Naturalism, none but MN informs the Scientific Method. Humanistic Naturalism does not inform SM, Political Naturalism does not SM.

By metaphysical position, I mean a mental disposition arrived at as a result of the consideration of some other foundational data, particularly if the questions being address are questions of existence, being, morals, ethic, etc. For instance HN derives all its foundational data from the scientific method and then formulates a philosophy about how humans ought to live?

I have found this very good [url=http://www.metanexus.net/Magazine/Default.aspx?TabId=68&id=10028&SkinSrc=%5BG%5DSkins%2F_default%2FNo+Skin&ContainerSrc=%5BG%5DContainers%2F_default%2FNo+Container] article critiquing MN [/url] (or here by, I think a Christian philosopher (Robert A. Delfino).  See how he formulates MN.

Unfortunately, one problem that complicates our task is that there is some division within both the scientific and philosophical communities on the topic of methodological naturalism. There are differences both in the terminology used and in the definitions put forth. There are also differences with respect to the role the principle plays in science and in the arguments that have been used to justify its use in science.

For example, with respect to terminology, Eugenie Scott, an anthropologist who works for the National Center for Science Education, calls the principle ‘methodological materialism.’15 In contrast, Nancy Murphy, a professor of Christian Philosophy, calls the principle ‘methodological atheism.’16 However, both of these terminological choices have disadvantages. In the case of Scott, the word ‘materialism’ might be misinterpreted by some as excluding electro-magnetic fields, space-time, and other things scientists discuss. In the case of Murphy, scientists would need to have a clear understanding of God in order to understand what ‘atheism’ meant. Unfortunately, there are many different philosophical and theological conceptions of God. Which one would scientists pick and why? To avoid all of these problems, I use the phrase ‘methodological naturalism’ exclusively throughout the paper.

Despite these terminological differences, Scott and Murphy agree on the general meaning of the principle. Scott explains it this way: “[S]cience acts as if the supernatural did not exist.”17 Murphy understands it to mean that “scientific explanations are to be in terms of natural (not supernatural) entities and processes.”18 They also agree that the use of the principle in science is legitimate despite being members of different disciplines (science and philosophy) and different religious persuasions (Scott is an atheist and Murphy is a Christian). To determine if they are correct we need to examine the role that the principle plays in science.

When we examine Scott’s view of methodological naturalism more closely we see that the prohibition against the supernatural is both a priori and necessary. It is a priori because she defines science this way: “By definition, science cannot consider supernatural explanations.”19 And it is necessary because any discipline that rejects the principle is not scientific as the following passage makes clear: “Defining science as an attempt to explain the natural world using natural processes and mechanisms allows us to say to creationists like Henry Morris that ‘God did it’ is not science.”20 I will demonstrate later on that her understanding of the principle is incompatible with a realist conception of science.

Not all scientists, however, agree with Scott. For example, Massimo Pigliucci, a professor of ecology and evolution who is not sympathetic to intelligent design, holds that methodological naturalism is provisional and a posteriori. It is a posteriori because it is arrived at due to lack evidence: “Since there is no evidence of any [G]od or supernatural design in the universe, the scientifically-informed conclusion has to be that there is none.”21 It is provisional because he claims “falsification of the naturalist paradigm is indeed possible.”22 In other words, if the naturalist paradigm were ever falsified science as a discipline would continue but without the principle of methodological naturalism. I will argue later on that we do not have to wait until the naturalist paradigm is falsified in order for scientists to abandon methodological naturalism. I will also argue that the correct scientific stance on the supernatural should be neutrality, not denial of existence—even if it is a provisional denial—as Pigliucci claims.23

There have also been related disagreements within the scientific community about God and the supernatural. For example, some scientists such as the late Stephen Jay Gould, a paleontologist and evolutionary biologist, have argued that science and religion are completely separate. “Non-overlapping magisteria” (NOMA) was the phrase he used.24 His point was that scientists, speaking as scientists, cannot comment on God and supernatural. In opposition to Gould, Dawkins, an evolutionary biologist and an ardent atheist, has declared that “[T]he existence of God is a scientific hypothesis like any other.”25

Clearly, the scientific community is not speaking with one voice to the public and this is not helpful to the ongoing cultural and legal battles concerning science and religion. Indeed, in Kitzmiller v. Dover, Judge John E. Jones III ruled that Intelligent Design was “a religious view … and not a scientific theory” because, among other reasons, Intelligent Design failed “to meet the essential ground rules that limit science to testable, natural explanations.”26 The requirement that science only use natural explanations is precisely the injunction of methodological naturalism. What we must determine is if the use of methodological naturalism in science is justified. Let us turn, then, to the task of evaluating the arguments that have been put forth for prohibiting the supernatural in science.


I think his formulation is consistent with the position I have taken.

@huxley,

huxley:

If you are going to critique my position, I would appreciate it if you critique it vis-a-vis these 10 points above. Unless I deviate from these 10 points (in which case I would advise you), any criticisms outside of this would be a misrepresentation of my position.

To be fair, I think it shows in my rejoinders that I have tried to follow your positions as given previously in your arguments. Where you complained about anything, I consequently pointed them out to you - as in the last one. If I had misread you at any point, the same was highlighted and dealt with. If you were not clear, would that have been any fault of mine?

huxley:

I agree ID is not theistic evolution (TE). My state was badly worded. In fact, I hesitated for several minutes thinking for a better way to express the relationship, but could not think of one.

The real relationship is amorphose. There some ID'ers who also hold onto TE. Michael Behe actually strandles both camps. Francis Collins, Ken Miller, Francisco Ayalla, Simon Conway Morris, Daniel Fairbanks etc are TE and they have nothing but contempt for ID "theory".

Good to observe you see the distinction.

huxley:

Sorry,  I have just re-read what may have mislead you.  It was a typo on my part.

I meant to say,  "Does it have all the shortcomings of science?  I submit, YES."

No worries - we all make mistakes, and I have them aplenty.

huxley:

I wonder what you understood by this statement?
What I meant is this - of all the various flavours or shades of Naturalism, none but MN informs the Scientific Method. Humanistic Naturalism does not inform SM, Political Naturalism does not SM.

By metaphysical position, I mean a mental disposition arrived at as a result of the consideration of some other foundational data, particularly if the questions being address are questions of existence, being, morals, ethic, etc. For instance HN derives all its foundational data from the scientific method and then formulates a philosophy about how humans ought to live?

It seems to me you're still dwelling on Naturalism as such and only contrasting the contributions or otherwise of various forms of naturalism to science. That said, the one thing to note is that MN relies on (or appeals to) science, and not the other way round. If there be need to further expound on this, it would be my pleasure.

huxley:


2)  Is MN science?   NO

. . .

8-)  Has science got a great and successful track record of uncovering the "truth" about the nature of reality?  YES

9)  Are there any other reliable epistemic methods besides science for revealing the truth? NO

Perhaps, this is better stated now - which in contrast to your previous assertions may be held to be directly different from the above. How? Let me show a few:


(1) Earlier, you argued this: [list]

huxley:
Is there such an approach at the moment with a track record of success as MN? NO.

[/list]

(2) Second, your argued: [list]

huxley:
9)  Are there any other reliable epistemic methods besides science for revealing the truth? NO

[/list]

Between (1) and (2) arguments above quoted, I have the impression that (2) now replaces (1), because it stood as that:

●   is there an approach with a track record of success as MN? (argument #1)

●   is there an approach with a track record of success as science? (argument #2)

Which was it - MN or SCIENCE?

You see, these are the things in yours that I am careful to observe in yours that lead me to the inference that something is just not sticking it in your premise in these arguments. Although you had asked that your recent 10 points be observed as stating your position, it was just one example in yours that needed to be highlighted here so that we know just where the peg is.

Anyhow, in what follows, I shall like to draw this discussion to a warm close, if you may. I appreciate what positions you hold - a preferred worldview and philosophy, no doubt; and one that could be critiqued even by those who do not adhere to them. The only thing so far of substance is that some people (even scientists) make the huge mistake of misconstruing MN for science - and where they say they do not say so, their arguments seem to be seeking to defend their worldview rather than appreciating that science is nobody's prerogative.

Cheers.

huxley:

Despite these terminological differences, Scott and Murphy agree on the general meaning of the principle. Scott explains it this way: “[S]cience acts as if the supernatural did not exist.”17 Murphy understands it to mean that “scientific explanations are to be in terms of natural (not supernatural) entities and processes.”18 They also agree that the use of the principle in science is legitimate despite being members of different disciplines (science and philosophy) and different religious persuasions (Scott is an atheist and Murphy is a Christian). To determine if they are correct we need to examine the role that the principle plays in science.

Lol, here is a very fundamental point that often escapes the notice of many reviewers: natural, nature and naturalism are not the same things. Thanks for offering that citation - in due course I shall offer something that highlights how some scientists make this fundamental mistake and then argue that scientists are MNlists.

Cheers.

@huxley,

Lol, I actually wish indeed that this very interesting discussion had been taken from the very onset to its own thread, so that the important question of this thread (viz: Can A Christian Be Demon-Possessed?) would not have suffered these intrigues.

However, let me try and help this discussion on naturalism smile to a cozy close – if you may. First, because Naturalism is a worldview and people hold their worldviews passionately, I don’t think that anything that may be said further may change your mind. But perhaps it may warm your heart to know that people see things different on the same subject, even among naturalists. And that paradigm or dichotomy is what struck me early enough in trying to speed you on it.

Okay, here we go.

To be quite honest with you, naturalists (IMHO) should be allowed to define and hold their worldviews and doctrines for themselves. In this instance, not all naturalists hold the same shade of that worldview, and they argue broadly between the two basic divides of that worldview. In any case, mine was supposed to have been simply observing your thoughts without attempting to sculpt out what you should or should not hold. It is when this worldview gravitates into publicly affecting issues (such as affecting the practice of science) that it becomes necessary to weigh in and share some pointers.

While observing that Michael Martin (ala Pennock) and Barbara Forrest (after Kurtz) make seeming contradictory opposite statements on MN’s relationship to the scientific method and science, what I failed to consider was that this mishap is not perculiar to naturalists alone. Indeed, some theists (particularly Christian apologists) hold the same reference to the point that they “assume” that all scientists adhere to methodological naturalism (MN) without question. This has been described as a compromise between strange bedfellows – such as the situation in the USA today where many people have combined naturalism and supernaturalism (which I had observed is a worldview, nonetheless).

In fact, the article REPLACING METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM is a very interesting read.  And the title is also quite interest.

Why would Robert A. Delfino be arguing for replacing MN?  In fact, why is he interested in MN at all?  Replacing MN from where?

Let us look at the first few paragraphs of the article:

Richard Dawkins, during a recent interview about his new book, The God Delusion, proclaimed “[T]he big war is not between evolution and creationism, but between naturalism and supernaturalism.”1 I agree with Dawkins to the extent that naturalism, whether we are talking about metaphysical naturalism or methodological naturalism, is one of the primary barriers to fruitful dialogue between science and religion and to the interdisciplinary synthesis of knowledge in general. This is because naturalism seems to prevent scientific discussion of many important topics, including: human freedom, morality, purpose in nature, and God.

Although this problem is not new, Alvin Plantinga discussed it in some detail ten years ago in an article titled Methodological Naturalism?, it has not been resolved and it has not gone away.2 The recent battles over supernatural causation and the definition of science, as seen in the case of the Kansas Board of Education and in the District Court case in Pennsylvania, Kitzmiller v. Dover, are evidence of this.3 In addition, as if to add fuel to the fire, some scientists are now openly calling for attacks on religion and the supernatural. For example, at a recent conference on science and religion called Beyond Belief: Science, Religion, Reason and Survival, which was held at the Salk Institute in California, Steven Weinberg, a Nobel laureate in physics, said “Anything that we scientists can do to weaken the hold of religion should be done and may in the end be our greatest contribution to civilization.”4 In The God Delusion, Dawkins is clear that anything supernatural is the object of his attack: “I am attacking God, all gods, anything and everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or will be invented.”5

The time is ripe, then, to revisit the issue of naturalism. In this paper I focus on methodological naturalism with the goal of demonstrating why the scientific community should abandon it and replace it with a new methodological principle. I accomplish this by performing four tasks. First, I analyze different formulations and justifications of methodological naturalism that have been put forth by scientists and philosophers of science. Second, I show how all of these formulations and justifications have serious problems and therefore the principle of methodological naturalism should be abandoned. Third, I argue that a new methodological principle needs to take its place. I propose and defend such a principle, which I call the principle of methodological neutralism, with two goals in mind. The first goal is that it will be acceptable to the scientific, religious, and philosophical communities. The second goal is that it will allow for greater dialogue (or at least the possibility of greater dialogue) between science and religion and for greater interdisciplinary synthesis in general. Fourth, and finally, I reply to some objections that might be raised against my view.

Before we can move to our first task, we must clarify briefly what naturalism is. Naturalism is a metaphysical view that denies the existence of supernatural entities. Usually this view amounts to a kind of materialism and therefore it denies the existence of non-material beings such as God. Some scientists hold that naturalism is a necessary condition of science. For example, Arthur Strahler, a geologist, said: “The naturalistic view is that the particular universe we observe came into existence and has operated through all time and in all its parts without the impetus or guidance of any supernatural agency. The naturalistic view is espoused by science as its fundamental assumption.”


What does this write-up suggest?   Look at the highted statement.  I shall reproduce this here again:

The time is ripe, then, to revisit the issue of naturalism. In this paper I focus on methodological naturalism with the goal of demonstrating why the scientific community should abandon it and replace it with a new methodological principle.

What do you make of the relationship between the two from the above write-up?

My view is this.  Many opponents of naturalism have argue that by adopting MN, the scientific community have grossly restrict the practice and flexibility of science, a view with which I agree.  That MN, being a core philosophy of science constrict science and cause some of the conflict between science and religion.  That if MN were replace by a better philosophy these conflicts and tension might reduce,  which I also agree with.  But have humans found a better philosophy to replace MN.

If MN "depended" on science (or independent of science), why would he be calling for its replacement?  It makes no sense.

It only makes sense if science is guided by (or relied on ) MN.  

I would like to see you opinion on this article.  It is a very good article, writen by someone who understands the field and million miles better than the work of Craig Rusbult.  Although I do not agree with some of his conclusion, I think he has laid out the facts on the subject very well indeed.

But here is the deal - a citation where someone has highlighted this very important distinction which I’ve been trying to bring to your attention. Admittedly, it is quote a lengthy citation (apologies), but I shall try and summarise or highlight some of its salient points afterwards.


[list]What Science is Based On

Source: http://www.talkdesign.org/faqs/naturalism.html

Many people, including some scientists, misunderstand the foundations of science, believing that science assumes naturalism in some form. As noted above, though, science is based on nature, not on naturalism. To explain this more fully, we must say something about what science is and what it is based on. There is disagreement among philosophers over the exact definition of science, but for our purposes, we needn't go into such depth. We will cover only the basic philosophical assumptions that science makes and qualities of science that are generally agreed upon.

Some people think that science makes additional assumptions, but it really doesn't. It has been suggested, for example, that science assumes that the laws of nature have been constant throughout time (e.g., Morris, 1994). However, that is not an assumption but a conclusion. Uniformity of natural laws is something that scientists actively test. To date, their tests show that there has been little if any change in the last six billion years, but there is some evidence (still relatively weak) that the fine structure constant has changed slightly before that (Webb et al, 1999).

The assumption of naturalism is another assumption that science gets falsely accused of. Science does not make this assumption. Science does not assume that gods are necessary, but it does not assume they are absent, either. Science does not assume that miracles occurred, but neither does it assume a priori that they never have. (Miracles and science are discussed more below). Science is in the business of testing assumptions, not adding new ones. Individual scientists may believe one way or the other, but their beliefs are not a basis for science.

●  All science is based on observations of nature, which leads some scientists to say that science must assume methodological naturalism (e.g. Singham, 2002). But a little investigation shows that even this is an overstatement. The observations that science is based on are natural, but that is simply because the things we call supernatural are not observable, at least not directly.

Supernatural forces can, in theory, have effects that are observable. Science allows for this possibility. In fact, several scientific studies have been done to investigate phenomena that most people would consider supernatural, including the power of prayer (Benor, 1990; Byrd, 1988; Harris et al, 1999; Cha et al, 2001), divination (Randi, 1982; Enright, 1999), prophecy (Witztum et al., 1994; McKay et al., 1999; Perakh, 2000), life after death (Schwartz et al., 2001), ESP (Wiseman et al., 1996), and more. Some organizations actively encourage scientific investigation of the supernatural (JREF, 2002). Science can hardly be called naturalistic when it actively delves into the supernatural.

If a supernatural phenomenon is found to give repeatable, verifiable results, science will study it. For example, if fairies appear where they can be repeatedly observed, measured, and tested, then they will be valid objects of scientific study. Under such circumstances, though, most people would start calling the phenomenon "natural." The fairies that come to be part of normal shared experience will get labelled "natural" even if we don't yet understand how they fly, make the little sparkling lights, and turn some of the researchers into frogs. As I mentioned earlier, delimiting the supernatural is not easy.
But what about individual miracles? What about so-called supernatural events that can't be studied? Suppose, for example, an apparition of a dead relative appears and speaks to one person on one occasion, and nothing like it ever happens again. Science has a place for such phenomena as well: that place is outside science. But they are outside science because the observations cannot be verified, not because they are supernatural. Unverifiable natural events are also outside of science. When President Harrison signed the statehood proclamations admitting North Dakota and South Dakota to the United States, he purposely did not let anyone see which he signed first. The question of which state was admitted earlier is, in practice, outside of science, because no verifiable observations can be made to answer it. (However, simply being a one-time event does not place something outside of science. The observations must be repeatable, not necessarily the event being studied. Most events have observable consequences that persist long after the event. The origin of the moon, for example, can be studied scientifically because different mechanisms for its origin imply different modern-day properties such as the chemical composition of moon rocks.) To the extent that a reputed supernatural event leaves lasting evidence, the event can be studied scientifically. And again, we find science actively engages in studying such events. However, where verifiable evidence is lacking, science does not apply.

Scientists and philosophers can disagree over other defining features of science, but at least one requirement is clear. For something to qualify as science, the observations must be independently verifiable by others. Perhaps the greatest strength of science is that all its findings are subject to testing, and verifiability of the raw data is foundational to such testing. The effect of this requirement is to remove from scientific consideration subjective impressions and unevidenced phenomena. This does not imply that subjective and unevidenced phenomena aren't important, merely that they cannot be used as the basis for scientific research.

Science has never claimed to be all-encompassing. The few people who say otherwise are usually people who want the good reputation of science to apply to their own ideas outside science. Intelligent design proponents fit in this group (Dembski, 1998b). What these people want is more akin to scientism than to science. They want the reputation of science without having earned it.
The status of Intelligent Design as science has nothing whatsoever to do with its being natural or supernatural. As we have seen, simply being supernatural doesn't disqualify something from scientific study. Intelligent Design is rejected from science simply because there is no verifiable evidence to support it.

Most of Intelligent Design theory is purely subjective, saying little more than "it sure looks designed to me." Only two lines of argument have even a pretense of being scientific. The first, irreducible complexity, is a God-of-the-gaps argument. Certain biological systems, it is claimed, could not have evolved, leaving design as the alternative (Behe, 1996). This argument fails first because a lack of evolution does not imply design, and second because the arguments fail to allow for several biological processes that make the evolution of irreducible complexity not only possible but expected (Muller, 1939). The second supposedly scientific argument for design is specified complexity (Dembski, 1998c). But specified complexity is also a god-of-the-gaps argument. In fact, Dembski's "explanatory filter" for detecting design is really just the god-of-the-gaps expressed as a formal flow-chart; plus, it relies on irreducible complexity for its conclusions.[/list]

If nothing comes across to the reader at all, at least one thing is clear - even among scientists who make the mistake of thinking that nature equates to naturalism, it is at best an assertion from a worldview. Second, many scientists do not rule out the scientific study of the supernatural - some only rule its possibility absolutely out because they "want the good reputation of science to apply to their own ideas outside science". The arguments come to a headway when we note that even among naturalists, they do not hold a concensus on its relationship to science.

Cheers.

huxley:

In fact, the article REPLACING METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM is a very interesting read. And the title is also quite interest.

Why would Robert A. Delfino be arguing for replacing MN? In fact, why is he interested in MN at all? Replacing MN from where?

I also considered that article in seeking a balance between ideas - and that was why I offered the citation above on "What Science is Based On". If one does not first get a good picture of that basic question, how could we then proceed with the worldviews that appeal to science?

Anyway, like I said, I just wanted to bring this discussion to a warm close - because nothing has changed a shade from what I have been saying from the onset: from defining Naturalism and its position as a philosophy and a worldview which in no way is to be confused for science.

Regards.