Procedural Posture

Plaintiff, a former employee of an automobile painting business, brought claims for overtime wages against defendants, several individuals who were officers, directors, or shareholders of the corporation that owned the business. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer, and the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, upheld that decision. The employee sought further review.

Overview

The former employee contended that the officers, directors, and shareholders were employers within the meaning of Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11090(2)(F) because they exercised control over the employee's wages. Brown Act . The court rejected that argument, observing that the plain language of § 11090, defining “employer,” did not expressly impose liability under Cal. Lab. Code § 1194 on individual corporate agents. Because § 1194 did not define “employer,” it was appropriate to apply the common law test of employment. Under the common law, corporate agents acting within the scope of their agency were not personally liable for the corporate employer's failure to pay its employees' wages. Therefore, the former employee could not state a § 1194 claim against the officers, directors, and shareholders. Nonpayment of overtime wages was not tortious conduct such as could result in personal liability of corporate directors. Allegations of conspiracy lacked merit because agents and employees of a corporation could not conspire with the corporation. Failure to request further leave to amend in the trial court or to argue that issue properly in the court of appeal waived the issue.

Outcome

The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal.


Procedural Posture

The State Bar Court recommended disbarment of petitioner. He sought review of that recommendation, contending the Supreme Court of California must issue a writ of review, hear oral argument, and render a written opinion before ordering the discipline as recommended.

Overview

Petitioner, admitted to practice law in 1971, committed numerous acts of misconduct, was ordered suspended with probation. Shortly thereafter he was again disciplined for similar misconduct, and ordered an additional period of suspension and probation. Subsequently, the State Bar charged him with willful disobedience of a court order constituting cause for disbarment or suspension. The State Bar Court found willful violations with aggravating circumstances, recommending disbarment. The State Bar Court Review Department agreed, also recommending disbarment. Petitioner moved for review of that decision. The Supreme Court of California denied the petition for review, imposing the discipline recommended by the State Bar Court. Despite an attorney's raising an important question of law or presenting a prima facie claim of legal or factual error, it could properly deny review where its independent examination of the record and evaluation of factual and legal assertions established the recommended discipline should be imposed.

Outcome

The Supreme Court of California is not required to issue a writ of review, hear oral argument, or render a written opinion before ordering an attorney's discipline as recommended by the State Bar Court; it independently assesses questions of law, questions of law and fact, and disputed questions of fact.