₦airaland Forum

HELLO GUYS,I JUST HEARD IT ON RADIO. Beaf IS DEAD! HE DIED OF A HEART ATTACK WHILE READING ABATI'S RESPONSE.

FELLAS,CHECK OUT MY NEW SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE CALLED "IGBOBOOK". ITS For Serious Minded weed smokers who have something 'hiray' to express. you Can Also Connect With Other Weed smokers locally and internationally. for Guys Who Wish To Date weed smoking babes,this is the forum for you. i Had To Create This Site Since Its Fun Creating sites with the suffix "-book". Mtcheeew.... copycats siblings!

@IFEOMA,I HOPE THINGS ARE BEGINNING TO SHAPE UP?

ALL THESE WOMEN WHO CLAIM NOT TO BE BOTHERED ABOUT MARRIAGE AND HAVING KIDS... I Greatly Pity Your Old Age. when You Are Grey,wrinkled and senile, you would wish your child or grand child were around to give some support. you May Feel That The Money You Are Amassing now will fetch you a nanny at old age... i Dey laff. if e nor be panadol e nor fit be like panadol. and Make You Remember Say Nanny or maid go go christmas ooo. then You Will Be Left With Your Mastercard, visacard and your shit. no kids.

Kevin,if I catch u ehh! Lol. The graduate spelling was a typographical error. Besides,Oyibo man language no be our native tongue.I still dey find the lady oooo.

Still waiting for a Hit.

There's something our ibo sister is not telling us...I have never heard a man except a crack head abandon his marriage after 7 months, refuse to give his so-called wife money for ante-natal when its so much obvious both of them are expecting their first issue.
That babe isn't telling us everything we need to know to enable us make proper judgement. Do you know the distance from the nearest yoruba state to the East? And you guus want me to believe that the man forgot all the stress of that journey with his family after 7 months,abandon heavily pregnant wife and took off?
I sure say na Lagos marriage una do and dat man no even see your parents face,let alone ur siblings,or else him for get fear for at least one year before him run.

So stop painting this guy as unholy and crude. I believe you have your excesses. Either you cheated on him with an igbo guy, or you lashed at him because you earn more than him (something we guys won't ever forgive), or you just wanted to start a topic,a very controversial one here on NL.

This thread has been created for men who are really serious in getting to meet ladies and starting a relationship. If you are a nairalander and you don't fall into this category,just view and pass. Insulting and suggestive comments aren't necessary. Respect other people's Right to Associate. Please. I pray we get to find virtuous people from this thread.

Name:Thoniann
Sex: Male
Education: Graduatuate
Age:3.
Occupation: Business
Email:thoniann@yahoo.com
Phone:08035454219,08055153450
Desires: A lady,mature at heart...no tribal,religious bias. She must be serious minded and committed.

M,Graduate,Business Man,Based in Asaba,30c66b39...serious minded females only.

The North has refused to embrace peace. Fucking Islamabads!

My BB name is Lord Thoniann II

@Bisjosh,what's ur number or bb pin?

Angeleyez has continually held this thread hostage by not even posting what her desires are,what kind of man she seeks. She just continues to ask about everyone's location and sex. Don't tease men here with ur abroad antics. If you're pretty,the post your FB name so men can view and know if you meet up.

And Messi should move to Racing Satander and score 2 hat tricks there.

Those 2 fellows are not going to last in the sands of time. They cannot be "great" until the tow the line of other "great men" like Pele,Maradona,Ronaldo de Lima, Ronaldinho,Zinedine Zidane, Del Piero. These men have won trophies for their countries, continentally and world cup.
As far as I'm concerned they are both fooling themselves in Spain.

@Betty008
Dat scam method is so out-dated. Get a website where potential dealers can access your company's information, assess your trading terms and a proper contact address. Don't push this thing further or else I will report your post to the appropriate anti-graft agency.
Scammer.

Still no response for me. So so sad!

My desire for a true queen for my heart is still on. Interested ladies should hit me up on 08035454219.

Is Cardinal Arinze the only black Cardinal? Is Cardinal Anthony Okogie not there? Una no dey even read sef!

@Angeleyez,thanks for the interest. Well, I feel our correspondence should be private. If you want to know any thing more about me,then email me: thoniann@yahoo.com
I'm in Nigeria anyway.

The FALSE GOSPEL of ISLAM
By Ric Llewellyn
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR CENTURIES, Christians have recognized Islam as a false religion. Until recently Muslims (or Mohammadans as they have been known in the past) have been the focus of evangelistic outreaches. But today many people are considering Islam from a more ecumenical point of view. It is often said that Christians, Jews, and Muslims are worshipping the same God, but in different ways. Muslims have capitalized on this misconception and now urge Christians and Jews to worship the one God with them, and work together for solutions to the world's many social problems. It is important to know some of the history and false doctrines of Islam, and to reject the new approach of this fast growing religion.

Islam began about 600 A.D. in what is modern Saudi Arabia. Muhammad, the "prophet" of Islam, received what is purported to be a revelation from God. This revelation is known as the Qur'an, the holy book of Islam. From its dubious beginnings, Islam has grown to approximately a billion adherents worldwide. For centuries Islam has exerted a great deal of influence over the people of the Middle East and Africa, even dominating southern Europe for a time. Today Islam is endeavoring once again to have a significant influence upon the culture and society of the Western World.

The new image Islam is trying to present in the West is a far cry from the fanaticism and violence advocated by many Muslim leaders. Nevertheless, the devotion of Muslims in the West to Islamic principles is as uncompromising as any in the world. The presentation of Islam in Europe and North America is characterized by intellectualism rather than emotionalism. The irrational religious frenzy by which Islam has become recognized worldwide is covered by a facade of civility. Yet, Muslims around the world concur that Islamic laws and principles take precedence over the decency and morality of civilization.

No matter how intellectual, civilized, or scientific Islam is made to appear, it is still a religion which embodies "another gospel.- which is not another" (Gal. 1:6-7). The Lord declares it accursed (Gal. 1:. Christians must be prepared to present the one true Gospel of salvation to Muslims, desiring that they be delivered from their religious bondage.

The most important thing for Christians to know when confronted with the teachings of a false religion is the Truth. It cannot be too forcefully stated that Christians must know the Scriptures. In evangelism, therefore, we must know the Evangel.

Our message to Muslims is that they, like all men, are lost. All are naturally at enmity with God (Ps.14:2-3; Jn. 3:36b; Eph. 2:1-3). There is no good in us that can merit God's favor and there is no good we can do to endear ourselves to Him (Isa. 64:6; Rom. 3:12, 19-20; Titus 3:5). But, being lost and unable to effect our own salvation, God did all that is required to reconcile men to Himself. Christ bore our sin, died on the Cross shedding His Blood as a completely propitious sacrifice for sin, and He rose again bodily from the dead. Believing this testimony and wholly trusting Jesus Christ for salvation is all that is necessary to be saved (1 Cor. 15:1-41, Rom. 5: 1, 6-9; Col. 1:12-22; 2 Cor. 5:18-21).

The "gospel" of Islam is something quite different. Similar to many modern cults, Islam claims to revere the writings of all the prophets. Yet, Muslims unequivocally subjugate the Scriptures to the "prophecy" of Muhammad.

A leaflet prepared by the Institute of Islamic Information and Education titled "Introducing Islam to Non-Muslims" states, "Muhammad is the very last Prophet of God to mankind. He is the final Messenger of God. His message was and is still to the Christians, the Jews and the rest of mankind. He was sent to those religious people to inform them about the true mission of Jesus, Moses, David, Jacob, Isaac, and Abraham."

The leaflet continues, "Muhammad is considered to be the summation and the culmination of all the prophets and messengers that came before him. He purified the previous messages from adulteration and completed the Message of God for all humanity. He was entrusted with the power of explaining, interpreting and living the teachings of the Qur'an."

Believers must recognize that Joseph Smith (Mormonism), Charles T. Russell (Jehovah's Witnesses), Mary Baker Eddy (Christian Science), and Ellen G. White (Seventh Day Adventism) have all claimed that same transcendent authority. And along with these, Muhammad was the bearer of wicked doctrines that have plunged many into the outer darkness of eternal torment.

Among the insidious doctrines of Islam is the rejection of the doctrine of imputation. "Introducing Islam to Non-Muslims" explains, "Muslims believe that people are born free of sin. It is only after they reach the age of puberty, and it is only after they commit sins that they are to be charged for their mistakes. No one is responsible for or can take the responsibility for the sins of others."

First, this is a denial of the Biblical teaching that all mankind sinned in Adam, that is, Adam's sin has been imputed to the whole human race (Rom. 5.12-14). Second, this is a denial of the Biblical teaching that the sin of man is imputed to Christ, that is, Christ became sin for us on Calvary's Cross (2 Cor. 5:21). Third, this is a denial of the Biblical teaching that the righteousness of God is imputed to men upon believing, that is, believers possess the righteousness of God (2 Cor. 5:21;Rom. 5:15-19).By denying these truths which are fundamental to the Gospel of salvation by grace through faith alone, Islam has laid the groundwork for a "gospel" of self righteousness and salvation by works.

The Bible teaches that salvation is NOT a reward. Heaven is the eternal abode of those who have received Christ the Saviour. Islam teaches that salvation is indeed a reward for a life of relative piety and righteousness. The Qur'an states, "Then those whose scales are heavy, they are successful. And those whose scales are light are those who lose their souls…" In fact, Muslims are encouraged to "vie with one another to attain to your Sustainer's forgiveness and to a Paradise as vast as the heavens and the earth, which awaits the God-conscious, who spend for charity in time of plenty and in time of hardship, and restrain their anger, and pardon their fellow men, for God loves those who do good."

From these denials of fundamental Biblical teachings and the establishment of a religion of self righteousness follows the Islamic repudiation of the Saviour. The following is so important to Islam that it was printed in very bold type in the leaflet "Prophethood in Islam"--"The Quranic account of Jesus emphatically rejects the concept of his 'Divinity' and 'Divine Sonship…" The Institute of Islamic Information and education publishes a leaflet entitled "Is Jesus Really God?" In it they totally reject the Biblical teaching that Jesus is God manifest in the flesh.

Nevertheless, the Word is plain: "God was manifest in the flesh" (1 Tim. 3:16). Jesus is the self existent I AM (Jn. 8:58). The Creator dwelled as a man among men (Jn. 1:1-3, 14). Jesus Christ is the Forgiver of sin (Lk. 5.20-21). In short, the Son and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30). The Lord Jesus Christ said to the religious of His day who rejected His deity, :, if ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins" (Jn. 8:24).

Islam unashamedly rejects these truths which comprise the Gospel. While many people today say that Christians and Muslims worship the "Whosoever transgresseth, and abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, HATH NOT GOD" (2 Jn.9). An even greater condemnation is pronounced by God in verse seven. Denying the doctrine of Christ reveals Islam as a deception and an antichrist religion. The Qur'an has substituted false doctrines which present another gospel. Islam purports to be "the way of peace," but the end of Islam is the way of death. Bible-believers must not yield these eternally important points merely because Islam claims to esteem the patriarchs and the prophets. It is our responsibility to testify to the Truth, even as we cry out against the error of any false religion.

It is important for God's people to be aware of the fact that many so-called Christians are willing to compromise the Truth of God's Word in the interest of building bridges with various religions. Islam seems to be asserting itself in the area of religious dialogue, and men and women who claim to represent Christianity are quickly building the credibility of Islam as a true religion. Instead of witnessing, Christians are encouraged to discover common ground with Muslims. Rather than exposing its errors, Christians are told to search for the truth in Islam. Thus, Islam is gaining a respectability that is simply not deserved.

While "Christians" are manifesting their "open mindedness," Muslims are spreading their false religious propaganda under the cover of dialogue. Muslims believe that all mankind must be brought into subjection to the spurious teachings of the Qur'an in order to experience peace and blessing. They will not compromise that belief. Muslims believe that the doctrine of the Incarnation of God is blasphemy. They will not compromise that belief. Muslims believe that Muhammad is the prophet who fully revealed the final truth. They will not compromise that belief. Muslims are "devoted to their ideals,, and uncompromising with falsehood" ("Moral System of Islam". Only the glorious, liberating light of the one true Gospel will be able to break through such darkness.

Although those who practice Islam profess "to respect all those who are faithful and God conscious people," it is their contention that the one true religion is Islam. Muslims trace the "true religion" from Abraham through Ishmael, but the Bible absolutely contradicts this notion. Genesis 17:15-21 makes it clear that God rejected Ishmael, confirming the covenant blessings--including the fulfillment of the true religion to Isaac alone. In chapter 21 Hagar and Ishmael are cast out of Abraham's house with the sanction of God, "Let it not be grievous in thy sight" (v. 12).

Galatians chapter three deals with this subject of the true religion and directly references the events of Genesis 17 and 2 1. Galatians 3:8 says, "And the scripture, farseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed." The promise of salvation for Jew and Gentile was prophesied to come through the seed of Abraham. Verse 16 clearly relates the true religion, the only Gospel, to the promise made to Abraham in Genesis 17:15-21: "Now to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. [God] saith not, And to seeds, as of many, but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ." The Gospel preached to Abraham was the Gospel of Christ delivered through Isaac, not the gospel of Islam delivered through Ishmael.

Islam claims to be a religion of peace and tolerance. It is, in fact, characterized by instability and religious bigotry. It is our duty to stand for the Gospel and against all other gospels. Islam has rejected the essential teachings of the Word of God. The "prophet" Muhammad brought a message from a false spirit that totally opposes the Gospel of grace. The message of Islam is a curse, not a blessing.

Islam is being presented as a practical, modern religion though it holds its adherents in spiritual bondage. Christians must be diligent to witness to-not dialogue with Muslims. This is God's way of presenting the glorious light of the Gospel. There is only one true religion. It was prophesied in the Garden of Eden, typified in the days of Noah, confirmed to Abraham and Isaac, and realized in Jesus Christ.

Aside creating the hilarious Soap,James Iroha has to his list of achievements a First Class Honours Degree in Theatre Arts from the University of Ibadan, he was also a pioneer student of that department. God Rest his Soul.

Fagbemi said, “I am not a fake police officer. I joined the force in 2000 as a constable but I later went for cadet inspector course in 2006.

“When I was a constable, I served at both Ijagbo and Offa divisions. I was dismissed in 2011 when a suspected murderer in my custody escaped.”

Then, what are you?

What is wrong in what she said ? Oju-iku died since last year and only a senseless person like you will still think his body is still intact . Or are you intending to mummify his body?

Its saddening that Bluetooth has gone mad and does not know that he should not throw stones since he is living in a glass house. Have you forgotten how HID Awolowo (Awo's Widow) begged the Yoruba nation to come and inter her husband's corpse they kept in a mausoleum since 1987,that it wasn't maintained and was beginning to rot? We igbos aren't going to allow our hero undergo that shame of "eternal public display" because the Icon and Warlord had toiled and needs his rest in God's Earth.
Please ensure you know your history before you come out here on Nairaland to blab. Educated Men are here. Scumbag!

E be like say we go carry this debate go AIT oooo. I don tire to read. Wetin sef? Una no dey sleep?

I'm most baffled by menacing approach many comments on NL take. Ezeachi aired his views on an accord reached decades ago and we want to crucify him? He has told us that he feels the accord if practicalised will bring about the much desired peace and progress we all crave. My question is,when has it become criminal to air ones's views? If you all have better options to resolve these immense problems we are facing in Nigeria,why don't you air them so we can weigh them,not tear apart the poster;weigh them like mature minds and see how we can raise a voice to address them.I strongly feel that this pseudo-entity called Nigeria is failing terribly and cannot hold any longer. The best bet is for all of us to have a Referendum to decide if we want to continue living falsely or go our separate ways. We have seen this mode work in several countries,why not Nigeria? This is the only country with a severe problems in the world that has deliberately refused to address her problems by way of Referendum. Isn't this a nice choice?

@ACM10,thank you jare. I don tire for that Aribasola0 or wetin him call himself. I don hear you.

@aribisala0,you must understand at critical times such as an impending war like the meeting before the civil war,minutes of dialogues between factions are often presented to the populace with divergence to favour its course. if there were minutes by tha Ghanaian Govt,that would have proven most authentic because they were the host and as such had no stake in the outcome of our combat, I have only posted these varying versions for readers to deduce their facts. Ezeachi's post like I remember commenting was a commentary not minutes and I faulted his usage of the word "minutes". Even in the academia,commentaries are often viewed as either "pro" or "leftist". Please be adequately informed that I did these postings without bias. I posted them for persons who have asked for other versions. I didn't know before now that there was a Biafran version. Naija way tire me.

But I feel Nigeria is better off dis-integrated. We are not moving forward,Religion is one of our biggest problems after tribalism. Why can't we tow the line of Southern Sudan and Sudan and the former Soviet Union and see how it does pan out?

Hello, thoniann: New Topics | Unread Replies

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You Want A SNC?- Read This Full Minutes Of The Famous Aburi Conference.

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thoniann:
I Love Nairaland,

PRESS RELEASE ON THE ABURI ACCORD

BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF EASTERN NIGERIA

 

THE MEETING

OF THE

SUPREME MILITARY

COUNCIL

AT

ABURI ACCRA GHANA

4-5 JANUARY 1967

1967

PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER

ENUGU

CONTENTS

PAGE

I Introduction ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  1

II The Aburi Meeting ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  4

III Implementation of Aburi Agreements ,  8

IV  Bad Faith of Lt.-Col. Gowon ,  ,  ,  16

 

APPENDICES

 

I ,,Official Minutes of the Supreme Military Council

- held in Ghana on 4th and 5th January, 1967 ,  19

Annexure A: Agenda ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  28

Annexure B: Declaration on Use of Force .29

Annexure C: Statement on the Supreme Military

Council ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  30

Annexure D: Communique ,  ,  ,  31

Annexure E: Second and Final Communique ,  32

 

II Address by the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, His Excellency Lt.-Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu at a Press Conference held on Friday, 6th January,

1967 ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  33

 

III Report of the Meeting of the Law Officers of the

Federation held in the office of the Solicitor-

General, Mid-Western Nigeria, Benin City, on

Saturday and Sunday the 14th and 15th January,

1967 ,  , - ,  ,  ,  . 37

 

IV "Comments on the ‘Accra decisions’ of the Meeting of the Supreme Military Council" by the Permanent Secretaries of the Lagos Government ,



THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

AT ABURI, GHANA, JANUARY, 1967

 

INTRODUCTION

 

ON 17 JANUARY, 1966, the former civilian Federal Government of Nigeria handed over power to the Armed Forces. Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi as the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army assumed the headship of the Federal Military Government and established the Supreme Military Council. Subsequently, on 24 May, 1966, he promulgated the Decree No. 34 putting into effect the decisions of the Supreme Military Council to establish a centralized administration for the country. Six days later widespread violence and riots broke out in Northern Nigeria. Thousands of Easterners were massacred.

2. On 29 July, 1966, a group of Northern Nigerian Army personnel kidnapped and, as was later revealed, murdered Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government. At the same time they attempted to annihilate all Eastern Nigerian Army Officers and men at Ibadan, Abeokuta and Ikeja in Western Nigeria and at Kaduna, Zaria and Kano in Northern Nigeria. Nearly 200 officers and men of Eastern Nigeria origin were slaughtered. Those who escaped but later returned to their posts following assurances of safety were also murdered. The pogrom was soon extended to Eastern Nigerian civilians resident in Northern Nigeria, Lagos and the West; and by September, 1966, the killings and molestations carried out by the combined forces of Northern Nigerian soldiers and civilians had assumed such large proportions that Easterners everywhere outside the East sought protection within their home Region.

 

3. All these massacres, which claimed the lives of over 30,000 Easterners, jolted the conscience and excited the indignation of the world. They were also fraught with tragic consequences for the country. The bond of comradeship which had previously held the Nigerian Army together completely severed. Mutual fear, suspicion and hatred have prevailed to such an extent that Army Officers and men Eastern Nigeria origin cannot now co-exist with those of Northern Nigeria origin. The massive movement of population which has resulted from these tragic events has also posed serious economic and social problems.

 

4.The fleeing Easterners had abandoned their homes, businesses for and employments and swelled the population of Eastern Nigeria by den nearly two million. As they returned a potentially explosive situation arose in the East and in consequence the Government of Eastern Nigeria was obliged to ask non-Easterners residing in the East to leave to the Region in the interest of their own safety. The flight of Easterners has also radically altered the machinery and structure of the Federal Government, for Easterners have been forcibly excluded from participating in the Federal Government, Federal Statutory Corporations and the other Federal Organizations outside the Eastern Region.

 

5.The disintegration of the Army and the mass movement of population, coupled with the necessary measures taken to prevent further friction, conflict and killing, have intensified Regional loyalties and made it impossible today for any one person to command the loyalty of all sections of the country.


6. It has been the view of the Government and people of the East

that a solution can and must be found quickly to the country’s present problems and in doing so full cognizance must be taken of the stark realities of the present in order to avoid future conflict and bloodshed. The East has accordingly co-operated with the rest of the country in efforts to find a realistic solution. But progress in this direction has been frustrated by incessant exhibition of bad faith on the part of the Military Leaders in Lagos and the North. A few examples will serve to illustrate this.

 

7. The disappearance of the Supreme Commander on 29 July, 1966, demanded that the next senior Military Officer should temporarily assume command of the Army and the headship of the Federal Military Government until the Supreme Military Council should determine the leadership of the Army and the country. But on 1 August, 1966,
Lt.-Col.Yakubu Gowon, Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters, announced that he had assumed the Offices of Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government, although there were at least half-a- dozen Military Officers who were senior to him. The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria found it impossible to recognize this seizure of power; nevertheless it was prepared to co-operate with Lt.-Col. Gowon in order to prevent further bloodshed.

8. On 9 August, a meeting of representatives of the Military -Governors of the East, Mid-West, West, North and Lt.-Col. Gowon met and unanimously reached agreement on five issues which were vital for reducing the tension then existing in the country. The first demonstration of bad faith on the part of Lt.-Col. Gowon was his non-implementation of a number of these agreements which concerned him, particularly the one stipulating that soldiers should be repatriated to their Regions of origin and confined to barracks. Lt.-Col. Gowon had also agreed with the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria that soldiers returning to the North from the East and vice versa should carry their arms and some quantity of ammunition for self-defence but that these arms and ammunition should be returned to their original armoury immediately the soldiers had reached their destination. Eastern soldiers returning from the North were not even given arms and ammunition for self-protection as stipulated. Furthermore, when Northern soldiers arrived at their destination they failed to return the arms and ammunition given to them in the East.

9. Another agreement reached on 9 August, was that a conference of Regional delegations should be held to recommend in broad outline the future form of political association for Nigeria. The Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference duly met from 12 September to 3 October when it adjourned for three weeks. By the time it rose it had reached a measure of agreement on a number of issues. But while the Conference was still in session, Northern soldiers with the aid of civilians massacred thousands of Eastern Nigerians in the North and some even in Lagos, the venue of the Conference.

10. As the date of resumption of the Ad Hoc ConstitutionalConference approached the question of the safety of Eastern delegates came to the fore. The Eastern Nigeria Military Government insisted on the immediate implementation of the agreement of 9 August whereby all military personnel were to be posted to barracks within their respective Regions of origin. The Eastern position was unanimously supported by the Leaders of Thought Conference of Western Nigeria. But the proposal was not acceptable to Lt.-Col. Gowon, and without further consultations with all the Military Governors he dismissed the Constitutional Conference on 30 November, 1966.  At the same time he declared that he was appointing a "drafting committee" to draw up a constitution on lines which would be suitable to him, and threatened to mobilize enough forces to deal with anyone who opposed his will.

 

11. The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria thought that Gowon events were taking a dangerous turn and that it was essential for the Supreme Military Council, which had not been convoked since 29 July, to meet. Since the situation in the country made it impossible for the Military Governor of the East to attend a meeting in any area occupied by Northern troops, various suggestions of alternative venues were put forward by him. So anxious indeed was he to attend the meeting that he purchased an executive plane to facilitate his journey to any acceptable venue. For long, however, his suggestions were treated with levity by Lt.-Col. Gowon, but eventually it was unanimously agreed that the meeting should hold outside Nigeria.

 


THE ABURI MEETING

12. The Supreme Military Council subsequently met at Aburi, Ghana, on 4 and 5 January, 1967. It had been recognized by the Military leaders that the meeting would:

(a) resolve the question of leadership within the army, restore the chain of command which had become badly disrupted, and examine the crisis of confidence amongst the officers and soldiers which had rendered it impossible for them intermingle;

(b) evolve ways and means of carrying on the responsibility of administering the country until a new constitution had been determined; and

(c) tackle realistically the problems of displaced persons. These considerations were reflected in the agenda which was agreed upon by members of the Supreme Military Council (see Appendix I Annexure A).

13. 0n the first day of the meeting the Military Governor of the East put forward a resolution, which the meeting endorsed, calling -on the military leaders to renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis. It was this resolution which was embodied in a communique issued by the Council at the end of the first day of the meeting (see Appendix I Annexure B).

14. After deliberating anxiously and seriously on the reorganization, administration and control of the Army the meeting reached aft agreements on the following lines (see Appendix I for the Official Minutes of the Conference):

"(a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.

"(b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.

"(c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.

"(d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotions to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police, to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.

"(e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will have control over Area Commands for internal security.

"(f) Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks."

15. It was further agreed by the Supreme Military Council that a Military Committee comprising representatives of the Regions should meet within two weeks from the date of receiving instructions to prepare statistics which would show:

"(a) Present strength of Nigerian Army;

"(b) Deficiency in each sector of each unit;

"(c) The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;

"(d) Additional requirement for the country and each Area Command."

Pending the completion of the work of the Committee, it was agreed by the Council that further recruitment of soldiers throughout the country should cease.

 

16. On the implementation of the agreement reached by representatives of the Military Leaders on 9 August, 1966, the Council reaffirmed the principle that Army personnel of Northern origin should return to the North from the West. In order to meet the security needs of the West it was agreed that a crash programme of recruitment and training was necessary but that the details should be examined after the Military Committee had finished its work. -

17. It was in the course of discussing the reorganization of the Army that the crucial issue of the assumption by Lt.-Col. Cowon of the offices of Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government arose. The Governor of the East, in explaining why it was impossible for him to recognize Lt.-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander, pointed out that the fate of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the legitimate Supreme Commander, was yet unknown and so no one could succeed him; that in the absence of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi whoever was the next senior officer in rank should manage the affairs of the country; and that the East was never party to any decision to appoint Lt.-Col. Gowon Supreme Commander. Subsequently, Lt.-Col. Gowon volunteered information regarding the murder of the MajorGeneral and his host, Lt.-Col. Adekunle Fajuyi, on 29 July, 1966. The Supreme Military Council decided to accord the late military leaders the full honours due to them.

18. The Supreme Military Council recognized that with the demise of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi no other Military Leader could command the support of the entire Nigerian Army and that a new arrangement was necessary for an effective administration of the whole country. The Council also took cognizance of the fact that extreme centralization had been the bane of the Military Regime in the past and that it was essential to re-define the powers of the Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the Regional Military Governments in order to ensure public confidence and co-operation.

19. When the Supreme Military Council resumed its deliberations at Aburi on 5 January, after members had spent the night at their various posts with their advisers, it proceeded to discuss the powers of the Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the Regional Governments. -The upshot was that the Council re-affirmed its previous decisions on the reorganization of the Army and also took the following additional decisions: -

"(ii) On appointments to certain posts.

The following appointments must be approved by the Supreme Military Council:

(a) Diplomatic and Consular posts.

(b) Senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.

(c) Super-scale Federal Civil Service and Federal Corporation posts.


"(iii) On the functioning of the Supreme Military Council. Any decisions affecting the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military Council. Where a meeting is not possible such a matter must be referred to Military Governors for comment and concurrence.

"(iv) That all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on the 14 January and list all the Decrees and provisions of Decrees concerned so that they may be repealed not later than 21 January, if possible.

 

"(v) That for at least the next six months, there should be purely a Military Government, having nothing to do whatsoever with politicians."

20. The next item discussed was the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference which Lt.-Col. Gowon had unilaterally dissolved on 30 November, 1966. The Council agreed that the Conference should resume sitting as soon as practicable to continue from where it left off, and that the question of implementing the unanimous recommendations of the Conference in September, 1966 should be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Military Council.

21. Finally, on the problem of displaced persons, the relevant section of the Official Minutes of the Council reads as follows:

"(a) on rehabilitation, that Finance Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each Region should send three representatives to the meeting;

"(b) on employment and recovery of property, that civil servants and Corporation staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should continue to be paid their full salaries until 31 March, 1967 provided they have not got alternative employment, and that the Military Governors of the East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons."

22. On his return from the Aburi meeting the Military Governor of the East held a press conference to reassure Easterners who had considerable apprehension about the meeting and its outcome. (For the full text of the Military Governor’s press statement see Appendix 2.) He emphasized at this conference that the Aburi meeting had been worthwhile and gave the assurance that provided the agreements reached were ~implemented much progress would have been made towards relieving tension and banishing fear within the country.

 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ABURI AGREEMENTS


23. The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria was represented at the meeting of the Solicitors-General held in Benin on 14 and 15 January. (For the Report of the Law Officers see Appendix III). The Eastern delegation received full briefing in the light of the Aburi decisions to which its views strictly adhered. Since some other delegations had not been fully briefed it became necessary to refer a number of issues back to the Supreme Military Council. One of the most important was section 69 of the Nigerian Constitution in respect of which the Report of the Law Officers’ meeting reads—

"As regards the powers of the Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the Regional Government, all the Law Officers, excepting those from the East, are of the view that effect would be fully given to the Accra decision in this regard by repealing section 3 of Decree No. 1 and restoring the provisions of the suspended section 69 with necessary modifications whereby the Federal Military Government will now have power to make Decrees to the following extent:

(a) With respect to the Federal Territory of Lagos, on any matter whatever;

(b) With respect to the whole of Nigeria, or any part thereof (other than Lagos), on
matters included in the Exclusive Legislative List and the Concurrent Legislative List; provided that where there is an inconsistency between a Federal Decree on a Concurrent matter and a Regional Edict on the same matter, the Federal Decree will prevail.

"Under this arrangement the Military Governors will have no power to make Edicts on matters on the Exclusive Legislative List but will have powers to make Edicts on matters in the Concurrent Legislative List and on residual matters."

"The view of the Eastern Law Officers is that the introduction of the element of Regional consent in Federal legislation must necessarily modify the position as it was before 17 January in the sense that there will be a lacuna in the legislative activities of both the Supreme Military Council and the Regions where consent is not given. It appears, therefore, to be the intention of the Accra decision that such a lacuna should be filled by the Regions. With respect to matters on the Concurrent Legislative List, it is their view that the Regions can legislate in relation to Federal Law."

24. The views of the Eastern Nigerian Law Officers quoted above from the Solicitors-General Report clearly reflect the spirit and letter of the Aburi decision on this matter. One of the main areas of friction between the Regions and the Central Government during the last civilian regime concerns the exercise of powers over matters on the Concurrent List. The controversial issue was the provision whereby a law passed by the Federal Government superseded any other law passed by a Regional Government on the same subject. This problem was fully recognized by most delegations to the meeting of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference in Lagos in September, 1966. It was the objective of the Aburi meeting to eliminate such sources of friction, hence the decision that "the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should remain in the Supreme Military Council (not in one man) to which any decision affecting the whole country (whether on the Exclusive or Concurrent List) shall be referred for determination provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the matter requiring determination must be referred to Military Governors for their comment and concurrence." There can be no doubt that this modified the position before 17 January, 1966, when the Military Regime took over, and that it provides a new governmental arrangement needed for Nigeria "in view of what the country has experienced in the past year (1966)."

25. Since the receipt of the Report of the Law Officers by the members of the Supreme Military Council, the Military Governor of Western Nigeria has vindicated the stand of the Eastern Nigerian Law Officers as regards section 69. He commented—
"In the light of what has been stated at pages two to three of the Report, it is considered that only the Supreme Military Council should have power to make laws on matters on the Exclusive Legislative List. As regards matters on the Concurrent Legislative List, it is felt that the exercise of powers concurrently by the Supreme Military Council and the Military Governors of the Regions with respect to the same subjects could lead to conflict or friction of a type which ought to be avoided under the present Military Regime. It seems that one sure way to avoid such conflict or friction would be by making new provisions whereby the Supreme Military Council will have power to make laws on matters on the Concurrent Legislative List in respect of Lagos only whilst the Military Governors will have power to make laws by Edict on those matters in respect of their Regions."

26. The Law Officers held divergent views on such questions as the machinery for the meetings of the Supreme Military Council and the manner in which the concurrence of the Military Governors, as members of the Council, should be signified in the making of Decrees. On these questions the Military Governor, West, has again vindicated the stand of the East when he commented as follows:

"(a), a meeting of the Supreme Military Council will be properly constituted and can properly be held if any Military Governor isabsent, but as agreed at Accra, any Military Governor not present will be given the opportunity to express his comments on, and concurrence with, the decisions taken in his absencebefore they are implemented.

"(b) Where all the Military Governors are present at a meeting of the Supreme Military Council decisions should now be taken only with the concurrence or unanimity of all the Military Governors. Decisions by majority would have been the best thing in ordinary circumstances but in the present situation in the country, one has to admit that such a rule could lead to open disagreements and conflicts and so to the revival of tension which everything must be done now to reduce."

27.Again, the Eastern Military Government readily sent representatives to the meeting of the Committee of Army Officers at Benin which, as was agreed at Aburi, would discuss matters relating to the quantity of arms and ammunition available in each Unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated stores, as well as the sharing out of such arms equitably to the various Commands. The Committee - -could not progress with its work for lack of co-operation from the representatives of Lt.-Col.Gowon.

28. While the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria has been making a determined and sincere effort to act according to the spirit and decisions of Aburi, Lt.-Col. Gowon has deliberately set out to ignore both. Ten days after the Aburi meeting,  the Gowon Government issued a booklet, entitled Nigeria 1966, parts of which attacked and libelled
the Military Governor of the East. The booklet also contained tendentious statements the sole aim of which could only be to inflame passions and cause disaffection within the country. This booklet was launched in New York, London and other capitals of the world.


29. Worse still, three weeks after the meeting, at a press conference which he held on 26 January, 1967, Lt.-Col. Gowon reproduced a truncated and distorted version of the agreements reached at Aburi. The source of Lt.-Col. Gowon’s statement was not the official minutes of the meeting, which had been prepared by his own officials, but a hostile commentary on the Aburi decisions prepared afterwards by people with vested interests in Lagos—men who were neither members of the Supreme Military Council nor were present at the meeting. These people were in a position to advise Lt.-Col. Gowon before the meeting since the agenda for the Aburi meeting were agreed to well beforehand. Furthermore, most of the major decisoins at Aburi were taken on the second day of the meeting after members had spent the night at their respective stations, consulting with their advisers.

30. A few days after Aburi some Permanent Secretaries in Lagos met to criticize the decisions reached by the Supreme Military Council, the highest authority in the land. With regard to the reorganization of the Army they objected to the new title of "Commander-in-Chief" on the grounds that—

"(1) it would be a subtle way of either abolishing the post of Supreme Commander or declaring it vacant to be filled by unanimous decision of the Supreme
Military Council,  and

(2) The Accra decision transfers the Executive Authority of the Federal Military Government from the Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander (in accordance with Decree No. 1) to the Supreme Military Council. The implication of this is that the Commander-in-Chief would have no power of control or dismissal over the Regional Governors, "

On the establishment of Military Headquarters, the Permanent Secretaries stated that "the establishment of Military Headquarters with equal representatives from the Regions headed by a Chief of Staff amounts to confederation". They made no effort to define what they meant by a "confederation". As regards the creation of Area Commands the Permanent Secretaries took exception to what they considered to be "dividing up the Nigerian Army into Regional ones, without links with or effective unifying control over the Army by the ‘Supreme Commander’." This advice, which was clearly motivated by selfish interests, ignored the anxiety of the Nigerian public for a workable and effective settlement of the crisis and a quick return to normal conditions. In strict compliance with this advice, however, Lt.-Col. Gowon, true to his well-known characteristic of ignoring solemn agreements, made a volte-face at his press conference. On the issue of the reorganization of the Army he declared—

"We reviewed the situation in- the Nigerian Army and we all agreed that there should be one Nigerian Army under a unified command as at present. We recognized that in the context of the events of 1966, the most practical way of achieving this aim is to organize the Army into area commands. The preponderance of T the army personnel in each command will be drawn from the re indigenes of that area. Each area command will be under an P Area Commander who will take operational instructions from the Military Headquarters which will be directly under me as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Under the proposal, the Military Governors can use the area command for internal security purposes but this will normally be done with the express permission of the Head of the Federal Military Government. We definitely decided Bosom against Regional armies."

As could be seen from the Minutes of the Aburi Conference, no decision was taken that the Area Commands should be directly under Lt.-Col. Gowon "as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces" nor that the Military Governors should obtain his permission to use the Area Commands for internal security.


31. Again, instead of emphasizing that the Supreme Military Council, in recognition of the fact that no single government in the Federation has its writ running throughout the country, has introduced the element of Regional consent into the process of reaching its decisions, Lt.-Col. Gowon merely stated—


"We, however, agreed to return to the status quo ante 17 January, 1966, and this is in keeping with my earlier public pronouncements that Decrees or parts of Decrees which tended towards over- centralization should be repealed. We will continue to operate the existing Federal Constitution and the Federal system of government until a new Constitution is drawn up. A decree is now under preparation which will give effect to the decision to return to the Constitutional position before 17 January, 1966, "


32. Turning to the problem of displaced persons the Permanent Secretaries suggested:

"(a) when the meeting of Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of Finance resumes, the principle of revenue allocation should not be discussed as it was not mentioned in the minutes of the Accra meeting.

"(b) the decision to continue to pay salaries till the end of March, 1967, does not take into consideration economic factors which are linked with it . . . Secondly, it does not make sense to include daily paid workers among those whose salaries should continue to be paid. The decision should therefore be reconsidered."

The insistence of the Permanent Secretaries that "the principle of revenue allocation should not be discussed" at any future meetings of Permanent Secretaries, Finance, is clear evidence that they intend to strangle the East economically since they are well aware of the mass return of nearly two million Easterners to the Region, the loss of £20,000,000 in property by refugees from the North and the forcible exclusion of Easterners from the Federal Civil Service, the Federal Statutory Corporations, the Foreign Service and other Federal institutions. - Surely they cannot expect the East to survive economically in these circumstances under the existing system of revenue allocation. Moreover, whatever economic factors are linked with the Supreme Military Council’s- decisions on this matter it is patent that the displaced employees are in no way responsible for their present plight. And the inequitable treatment suggested by the Permanent Secretaries in respect of daily paid workers can only remind the country of the industrial strife which such an application of double standards caused in the days of the former civilian regime.

33. In spite of all these Lt.-Col. Gowon in his press conference defers to the recommendations of the Permanent Secretaries on this head. Although the decision at Aburi was that the salaries of all displaced persons who had not obtained alternative employment should, without qualification, be paid until 31 March, 1967, Lt.-Col. Gowon stated that "each case is to be considered on its merit" and that Federal Corporations would find it "very difficult" to continue to pay their displaced employees.

34. With respect to appointments to certain posts in the Federal Public Service, the Permanent Secretaries commented as follows:

"(a) whichever category of officer is meant, the effect of this decision will tend to paralyse the functions of the Federal Public and the Police Service Commissions;

"(b) if Regional Governors have power to appointments, the loyalty of Federal Officers would be to their regions of origin—meaning in effect that there will be no Federal Civil Service;

"(c) the acceptance of this decision would also require, as the law officers have reported, amendments to those sections in the Constitution dealing with appointment to Nigeria Police,Federal Public Service
Commission and sections of various acts dealing with appointment in Federal Statutory
Corporations;

(d) furthermore, it is observed that while Military Governors will have power to appoint, or approve appointments of
Federal Government Servants, there is no corresponding power of the Supreme Military Council to even influence
the appointments to senior posts in the Regional Public Services. This clearly makes the Federal Military Government."

Obviously the Permanent Secretaries are not concerned with the peace, stability and even the survival of Nigeria; their sole interest is to maintain the status quo because any attempt at a fair distribution of posts -in the Federal Civil Service, the Federal Corporations, the Foreign Service and other Federal institutions would mean a diminution of the powers they now enjoy. The East must remain permanently excluded from these services and institutions for the selfish ends of Federal Permanent Secretaries. The East must be relegated to obscure embassies abroad where they will- be ineffective and unheard. In his press statement Lt.-Col. Gowon, in his attempt to keep to the advice of the Permanent Secretaries, was caught up in contradictions. In one and the same breath he said that these appointments should be approved by the Supreme Military Council and that the Federal public Service and Police Commissions should retain their present functions. His exact words were-

"There have been some speculations about the effect of our decisions on senior appointments and - promotions in the Federal Public Service. It was agreed that top posts such as Permanent Secretaries and Ambassadors will have to be approved by the I ship Supreme Military Council. I would like to explain that the Armey Federal Public Service Commission as well as the Police Commission and i will continue to function as at present."

 

35. Finally, on the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference the Permanent Secretaries stated that it was rather advisable for Gowon stick to their previous recommendations and advice, namely:

"(a) that the Ad Hoc Constitutional
Conference should stand adjourned indefinitely;

"(b) that the immediate political programme announced to the nation on 30 November, 1966, by the ‘Supreme Commander’ should be implemented and the country must be so informed."

The Permanent Secretaries have here revealed that the origin of Lt.Col. Gowon’s
"political programme"
of 30 November, 1966, was "the recommendations and advice" given to him by these Permanent Secretaries. In accordance with this advice, however, Lt.-Col. Gowon, while not appearing to re-affirm "that the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference should stand adjourned indefinitely", said— "So far I have not set up the Drafting Committee and the Constituent Assembly promised in my broadcast (of 30 November, 1966) because it was the intention that normal conditions should be fully restored before they begin to function,  I am carrying,  on the necessary consultations with all sections of the Nigerian - community and when eventually the names we are screening are announced the general public will be satisfied."

In this context, the indications are that Lt.-Col. Gowon would rather take steps to implement his pet programme than facilitate the resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference as decided at Aburi. This is borne out by the draft Decree which he produced after Aburi.

36. This draft Decree, which has been circulated to the Regional Military Governors by Lt.-Col. Gowon, accordingly by-passes or ignores all the major decisions taken at Aburi. It seeks to return Nigeria to the constitutional position before 17 January, 1966, while in fact the decisions of the Supreme Military Council were on specific issues and were not limited by dates. In the draft Decree the title of "Supreme Commander" is still retained contrary to the decision at Aburi to alter it to "Commander-in-Chief". The draft Decree also retains the word "President" instead of "Chairman of the Supreme Military Council" as was agreed at Aburi. Again it enlarges the membership of the Supreme Military Council to include "Head of the Nigerian Army (a non-existent post), the "Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces" and the "Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army". No such decisions were taken at Aburi. It was merely agreed that there should be one Chief of Staff at Headquarters.

37. In addition, contrary to the Aburi accord, the draft Decree vests executive and legislative powers either in the Federal Military Government or in the Federal Executive Council. But the Aburi meeting clearly decided that the legislative and executive authority of the

Federal Military Government should devolve on the Supreme Military Council to which any matter affecting the whole country should be referred for determination.


38. The draft Decree also completely ignores the decision at Aburi that appointments and promotions within the upper hierarchy of the Army, Police, the Public Service and Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military Council.


39. Lastly, the draft Decree proceeds to restore sections 70, 71 and 86 of the old Constitution, which had been suspended, without also restoring the safeguards provided in that Constitution. By this action Lt.-Col. Gowon, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Aburi agreements, arrogates to himself the power to declare a state of emergency anywhere in Nigeria.

BAD FAITH OF LT.-COL. GOWON


40. The failure of Lt.-Col. Gowon to adhere to the decisions unanimously reached at Aburi is only the latest evidence of his bad faith, inconsistency and lack of realism.


41. On the first day of his seizure of power he had pleaded for co-operation from the East Military Government, and had promised to retain power only temporarily in order to normalise the extraordinary conditions created by himself and his fellow Northerners, military and civilian. Thereafter the Military leaders were to meet and decide on the leadership. Lt.-Col. Gowon has never fulfilled that promise. The breach of his promise to see to the return of arms and ammunition by Northern soldiers evacuated from the East has already been mentioned in paragraph 8 above. Lt.-Col. Gowon also assured the Military Government of the East in August, 1966 that he would stop the killings in the country, but these killings subsequently increased in organization and ferocity until they reached the proportions of a pogrom. He moreover promised that the inquiry set up by Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi into the May massacres of Easterners in Northern Nigeria would "certainly go on as scheduled". Nothing has been heard again about this inquiry ever since. So also most of the difficulties preventing the return to normal conditions in the country have stemmed from Lt.-Col. Gowon’s bad faith in not implementing the unanimous decisions reached by the representatives of the military leaders at their meeting in Lagos on 9 August.

42. Early in September 1966, armed soldiers of Northern origin from Ibadan raided Benin Prison and removed soldiers who had been detained as a result of their
alleged involvement in the attempted coup of 15 January. The Northerners among the detainees were set free and repatriated to the North; the remainder, mainly Easterners, were murdered under brutal circumstances. And although Lt.-Col. Gowon gave assurances that the murderers would be brought to justice, so far the perpetrators of the atrocities have gone unpunished.

43. It was exactly this same sort of bad faith that Lt.-Col. Gowon exhibited in September, 1966. In his opening address to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference, he had himself instructed the delegates to choose one of the following alternatives in formulating a new Constitution for Nigeria:

"(a) A Federal system with a strong Central Government;
"(b) A Federal system with a weak Central Government;
"(c) A Confederation ;or

"(d) An entirely new arrangement which may be peculiar to Nigeria."

At the same time Gowon disavowed any intention of dictating to the country a particular constitution. When, however, he saw that the delegations were veering towards the second or third alternative, he adjourned the conference indefinitely. He thereupon announced that "the idea of a temporary confederation is unworkable" and that he was appointing "a drafting committee" to prepare a constitution which "will reflect the generally expressed desire for a stable federation". it will be recalled, however, that the delegations to the Ad Hoc Conference went to Lagos in September, 1966, after extensive consultations among the people in each Region. Thus each delegation went with a mandate representing the "expressed desire" of its people. But, true to type, Lt.-Col. Gowon placed a dubious construction on the submissions
of the delegations to suit his purpose and that of his advisers.

44. Contrary to the decisions at Aburi recruitment into the Army has continued in different parts of the country except the East; contrary to these agreements, Lt.-Col. Gowon has proceeded to appoint Ambassadors without reference to the Supreme Military Council; contrary to the agreements, purchase and importation of arms have continued. Lt.-Col. Gowon unilaterally postponed the meeting of Military officers to discuss the reorganization of the Army as agreed at Aburi. The proposed meeting of Finance officials on the problem of rehabilitation of displaced persons has not even been held because Lt.-Col. Gowon’s Finance Permanent Secretary does not think that such a meeting will serve any useful purpose. -


45. In the light of the foregoing and since there is clearly no hope of a change of attitude on the part of Lt.-Col. Gowon, the East Military Government considers that the time has come when it must take a final stand against a regime which cannot abide by agreements voluntarily arrived at. The Military Government of the East is irrevocably committed to the task of ameliorating the suffering of its struggling people and providing them with the peace, order and good government which are their overriding needs. To this end the Government will publish shortly its future policy towards the implementation of the Aburi agreements.

aribisala0:
Guy you are misrepresenting things here Biafran version of what? of the minutes or Biafran REACTION to the meeting and its aftermath?

There was a comment about the initial Minutes of the Aburi conference and it was released by the Federal Govt of Nigeria. This other release is by the Eastern Govt or Biafran Govt. I posted it for you guys to compare.I'm not mis-representing facts please.

I Love Nairaland,

PRESS RELEASE ON THE ABURI ACCORD

BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF EASTERN NIGERIA

 

THE MEETING

OF THE

SUPREME MILITARY

COUNCIL

AT

ABURI ACCRA GHANA

4-5 JANUARY 1967

1967

PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER

ENUGU

CONTENTS

PAGE

I Introduction , , , , , , 1

II The Aburi Meeting , , , , , 4

III Implementation of Aburi Agreements , 8

IV  Bad Faith of Lt.-Col. Gowon , , , 16

 

APPENDICES

 

I ,,Official Minutes of the Supreme Military Council

- held in Ghana on 4th and 5th January, 1967 , 19

Annexure A: Agenda , , , , , 28

Annexure B: Declaration on Use of Force .29

Annexure C: Statement on the Supreme Military

Council , , , , , , 30

Annexure D: Communique , , , 31

Annexure E: Second and Final Communique , 32

 

II Address by the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, His Excellency Lt.-Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu at a Press Conference held on Friday, 6th January,

1967 , , , , , , 33

 

III Report of the Meeting of the Law Officers of the

Federation held in the office of the Solicitor-

General, Mid-Western Nigeria, Benin City, on

Saturday and Sunday the 14th and 15th January,

1967 , , - , , , . 37

 

IV "Comments on the ‘Accra decisions’ of the Meeting of the Supreme Military Council" by the Permanent Secretaries of the Lagos Government ,



THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

AT ABURI, GHANA, JANUARY, 1967

 

INTRODUCTION

 

ON 17 JANUARY, 1966, the former civilian Federal Government of Nigeria handed over power to the Armed Forces. Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi as the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army assumed the headship of the Federal Military Government and established the Supreme Military Council. Subsequently, on 24 May, 1966, he promulgated the Decree No. 34 putting into effect the decisions of the Supreme Military Council to establish a centralized administration for the country. Six days later widespread violence and riots broke out in Northern Nigeria. Thousands of Easterners were massacred.

2. On 29 July, 1966, a group of Northern Nigerian Army personnel kidnapped and, as was later revealed, murdered Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government. At the same time they attempted to annihilate all Eastern Nigerian Army Officers and men at Ibadan, Abeokuta and Ikeja in Western Nigeria and at Kaduna, Zaria and Kano in Northern Nigeria. Nearly 200 officers and men of Eastern Nigeria origin were slaughtered. Those who escaped but later returned to their posts following assurances of safety were also murdered. The pogrom was soon extended to Eastern Nigerian civilians resident in Northern Nigeria, Lagos and the West; and by September, 1966, the killings and molestations carried out by the combined forces of Northern Nigerian soldiers and civilians had assumed such large proportions that Easterners everywhere outside the East sought protection within their home Region.

 

3. All these massacres, which claimed the lives of over 30,000 Easterners, jolted the conscience and aroused the indignation of the world. They were also fraught with tragic consequences for the country. The bond of comradeship which had previously held the Nigerian Army together completely severed. Mutual fear, suspicion and hatred have prevailed to such an extent that Army Officers and men Eastern Nigeria origin cannot now co-exist with those of Northern Nigeria origin. The massive movement of population which has resulted from these tragic events has also posed serious economic and social problems.

 

4.The fleeing Easterners had abandoned their homes, businesses for and employments and swelled the population of Eastern Nigeria by den nearly two million. As they returned a potentially explosive situation arose in the East and in consequence the Government of Eastern Nigeria was obliged to ask non-Easterners residing in the East to leave to the Region in the interest of their own safety. The flight of Easterners has also radically altered the machinery and structure of the Federal Government, for Easterners have been forcibly excluded from participating in the Federal Government, Federal Statutory Corporations and the other Federal Organizations outside the Eastern Region.

 

5.The disintegration of the Army and the mass movement of population, coupled with the necessary measures taken to prevent further friction, conflict and killing, have intensified Regional loyalties and made it impossible today for any one person to command the loyalty of all sections of the country.


6. It has been the view of the Government and people of the East

that a solution can and must be found quickly to the country’s present problems and in doing so full cognizance must be taken of the stark realities of the present in order to avoid future conflict and bloodshed. The East has accordingly co-operated with the rest of the country in efforts to find a realistic solution. But progress in this direction has been frustrated by incessant exhibition of bad faith on the part of the Military Leaders in Lagos and the North. A few examples will serve to illustrate this.

 

7. The disappearance of the Supreme Commander on 29 July, 1966, demanded that the next senior Military Officer should temporarily assume command of the Army and the headship of the Federal Military Government until the Supreme Military Council should determine the leadership of the Army and the country. But on 1 August, 1966,
Lt.-Col.Yakubu Gowon, Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters, announced that he had assumed the Offices of Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government, although there were at least half-a- dozen Military Officers who were senior to him. The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria found it impossible to recognize this seizure of power; nevertheless it was prepared to co-operate with Lt.-Col. Gowon in order to prevent further bloodshed.

8. On 9 August, a meeting of representatives of the Military -Governors of the East, Mid-West, West, North and Lt.-Col. Gowon met and unanimously reached agreement on five issues which were vital for reducing the tension then existing in the country. The first demonstration of bad faith on the part of Lt.-Col. Gowon was his non-implementation of a number of these agreements which concerned him, particularly the one stipulating that soldiers should be repatriated to their Regions of origin and confined to barracks. Lt.-Col. Gowon had also agreed with the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria that soldiers returning to the North from the East and vice versa should carry their arms and some quantity of ammunition for self-defence but that these arms and ammunition should be returned to their original armoury immediately the soldiers had reached their destination. Eastern soldiers returning from the North were not even given arms and ammunition for self-protection as stipulated. Furthermore, when Northern soldiers arrived at their destination they failed to return the arms and ammunition given to them in the East.

9. Another agreement reached on 9 August, was that a conference of Regional delegations should be held to recommend in broad outline the future form of political association for Nigeria. The Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference duly met from 12 September to 3 October when it adjourned for three weeks. By the time it rose it had reached a measure of agreement on a number of issues. But while the Conference was still in session, Northern soldiers with the aid of civilians massacred thousands of Eastern Nigerians in the North and some even in Lagos, the venue of the Conference.

10. As the date of resumption of the Ad Hoc ConstitutionalConference approached the question of the safety of Eastern delegates came to the fore. The Eastern Nigeria Military Government insisted on the immediate implementation of the agreement of 9 August whereby all military personnel were to be posted to barracks within their respective Regions of origin. The Eastern position was unanimously supported by the Leaders of Thought Conference of Western Nigeria. But the proposal was not acceptable to Lt.-Col. Gowon, and without further consultations with all the Military Governors he dismissed the Constitutional Conference on 30 November, 1966.  At the same time he declared that he was appointing a "drafting committee" to draw up a constitution on lines which would be suitable to him, and threatened to mobilize enough forces to deal with anyone who opposed his will.

 

11. The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria thought that Gowon events were taking a dangerous turn and that it was essential for the Supreme Military Council, which had not been convoked since 29 July, to meet. Since the situation in the country made it impossible for the Military Governor of the East to attend a meeting in any area occupied by Northern troops, various suggestions of alternative venues were put forward by him. So anxious indeed was he to attend the meeting that he purchased an executive plane to facilitate his journey to any acceptable venue. For long, however, his suggestions were treated with levity by Lt.-Col. Gowon, but eventually it was unanimously agreed that the meeting should hold outside Nigeria.

 


THE ABURI MEETING

12. The Supreme Military Council subsequently met at Aburi, Ghana, on 4 and 5 January, 1967. It had been recognized by the Military leaders that the meeting would:

(a) resolve the question of leadership within the army, restore the chain of command which had become badly disrupted, and examine the crisis of confidence amongst the officers and soldiers which had rendered it impossible for them intermingle;

(b) evolve ways and means of carrying on the responsibility of administering the country until a new constitution had been determined; and

(c) tackle realistically the problems of displaced persons. These considerations were reflected in the agenda which was agreed upon by members of the Supreme Military Council (see Appendix I Annexure A).

13. 0n the first day of the meeting the Military Governor of the East put forward a resolution, which the meeting endorsed, calling -on the military leaders to renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis. It was this resolution which was embodied in a communique issued by the Council at the end of the first day of the meeting (see Appendix I Annexure B).

14. After deliberating anxiously and seriously on the reorganization, administration and control of the Army the meeting reached aft agreements on the following lines (see Appendix I for the Official Minutes of the Conference):

"(a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.

"(b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.

"(c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.

"(d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotions to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police, to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.

"(e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will have control over Area Commands for internal security.

"(f) Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks."

15. It was further agreed by the Supreme Military Council that a Military Committee comprising representatives of the Regions should meet within two weeks from the date of receiving instructions to prepare statistics which would show:

"(a) Present strength of Nigerian Army;

"(b) Deficiency in each sector of each unit;

"(c) The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;

"(d) Additional requirement for the country and each Area Command."

Pending the completion of the work of the Committee, it was agreed by the Council that further recruitment of soldiers throughout the country should cease.

 

16. On the implementation of the agreement reached by representatives of the Military Leaders on 9 August, 1966, the Council reaffirmed the principle that Army personnel of Northern origin should return to the North from the West. In order to meet the security needs of the West it was agreed that a crash programme of recruitment and training was necessary but that the details should be examined after the Military Committee had finished its work. -

17. It was in the course of discussing the reorganization of the Army that the crucial issue of the assumption by Lt.-Col. Cowon of the offices of Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government arose. The Governor of the East, in explaining why it was impossible for him to recognize Lt.-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander, pointed out that the fate of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the legitimate Supreme Commander, was yet unknown and so no one could succeed him; that in the absence of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi whoever was the next senior officer in rank should manage the affairs of the country; and that the East was never party to any decision to appoint Lt.-Col. Gowon Supreme Commander. Subsequently, Lt.-Col. Gowon volunteered information regarding the murder of the MajorGeneral and his host, Lt.-Col. Adekunle Fajuyi, on 29 July, 1966. The Supreme Military Council decided to accord the late military leaders the full honours due to them.

18. The Supreme Military Council recognized that with the demise of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi no other Military Leader could command the support of the entire Nigerian Army and that a new arrangement was necessary for an effective administration of the whole country. The Council also took cognizance of the fact that extreme centralization had been the bane of the Military Regime in the past and that it was essential to re-define the powers of the Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the Regional Military Governments in order to ensure public confidence and co-operation.

19. When the Supreme Military Council resumed its deliberations at Aburi on 5 January, after members had spent the night at their various posts with their advisers, it proceeded to discuss the powers of the Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the Regional Governments. -The upshot was that the Council re-affirmed its previous decisions on the reorganization of the Army and also took the following additional decisions: -

"(ii) On appointments to certain posts.

The following appointments must be approved by the Supreme Military Council:

(a) Diplomatic and Consular posts.

(b) Senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.

(c) Super-scale Federal Civil Service and Federal Corporation posts.


"(iii) On the functioning of the Supreme Military Council. Any decisions affecting the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military Council. Where a meeting is not possible such a matter must be referred to Military Governors for comment and concurrence.

"(iv) That all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on the 14 January and list all the Decrees and provisions of Decrees concerned so that they may be repealed not later than 21 January, if possible.

 

"(v) That for at least the next six months, there should be purely a Military Government, having nothing to do whatsoever with politicians."

20. The next item discussed was the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference which Lt.-Col. Gowon had unilaterally dissolved on 30 November, 1966. The Council agreed that the Conference should resume sitting as soon as practicable to continue from where it left off, and that the question of implementing the unanimous recommendations of the Conference in September, 1966 should be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Military Council.

21. Finally, on the problem of displaced persons, the relevant section of the Official Minutes of the Council reads as follows:

"(a) on rehabilitation, that Finance Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each Region should send three representatives to the meeting;

"(b) on employment and recovery of property, that civil servants and Corporation staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should continue to be paid their full salaries until 31 March, 1967 provided they have not got alternative employment, and that the Military Governors of the East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons."

22. On his return from the Aburi meeting the Military Governor of the East held a press conference to reassure Easterners who had considerable apprehension about the meeting and its outcome. (For the full text of the Military Governor’s press statement see Appendix 2.) He emphasized at this conference that the Aburi meeting had been worthwhile and gave the assurance that provided the agreements reached were ~implemented much progress would have been made towards relieving tension and banishing fear within the country.

 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ABURI AGREEMENTS


23. The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria was represented at the meeting of the Solicitors-General held in Benin on 14 and 15 January. (For the Report of the Law Officers see Appendix III). The Eastern delegation received full briefing in the light of the Aburi decisions to which its views strictly adhered. Since some other delegations had not been fully briefed it became necessary to refer a number of issues back to the Supreme Military Council. One of the most important was section 69 of the Nigerian Constitution in respect of which the Report of the Law Officers’ meeting reads—

"As regards the powers of the Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the Regional Government, all the Law Officers, excepting those from the East, are of the view that effect would be fully given to the Accra decision in this regard by repealing section 3 of Decree No. 1 and restoring the provisions of the suspended section 69 with necessary modifications whereby the Federal Military Government will now have power to make Decrees to the following extent:

(a) With respect to the Federal Territory of Lagos, on any matter whatever;

(b) With respect to the whole of Nigeria, or any part thereof (other than Lagos), on
matters included in the Exclusive Legislative List and the Concurrent Legislative List; provided that where there is an inconsistency between a Federal Decree on a Concurrent matter and a Regional Edict on the same matter, the Federal Decree will prevail.

"Under this arrangement the Military Governors will have no power to make Edicts on matters on the Exclusive Legislative List but will have powers to make Edicts on matters in the Concurrent Legislative List and on residual matters."

"The view of the Eastern Law Officers is that the introduction of the element of Regional consent in Federal legislation must necessarily modify the position as it was before 17 January in the sense that there will be a lacuna in the legislative activities of both the Supreme Military Council and the Regions where consent is not given. It appears, therefore, to be the intention of the Accra decision that such a lacuna should be filled by the Regions. With respect to matters on the Concurrent Legislative List, it is their view that the Regions can legislate in relation to Federal Law."

24. The views of the Eastern Nigerian Law Officers quoted above from the Solicitors-General Report clearly reflect the spirit and letter of the Aburi decision on this matter. One of the main areas of friction between the Regions and the Central Government during the last civilian regime concerns the exercise of powers over matters on the Concurrent List. The controversial issue was the provision whereby a law passed by the Federal Government superseded any other law passed by a Regional Government on the same subject. This problem was fully recognized by most delegations to the meeting of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference in Lagos in September, 1966. It was the objective of the Aburi meeting to eliminate such sources of friction, hence the decision that "the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should remain in the Supreme Military Council (not in one man) to which any decision affecting the whole country (whether on the Exclusive or Concurrent List) shall be referred for determination provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the matter requiring determination must be referred to Military Governors for their comment and concurrence." There can be no doubt that this modified the position before 17 January, 1966, when the Military Regime took over, and that it provides a new governmental arrangement needed for Nigeria "in view of what the country has experienced in the past year (1966)."

25. Since the receipt of the Report of the Law Officers by the members of the Supreme Military Council, the Military Governor of Western Nigeria has vindicated the stand of the Eastern Nigerian Law Officers as regards section 69. He commented—
"In the light of what has been stated at pages two to three of the Report, it is considered that only the Supreme Military Council should have power to make laws on matters on the Exclusive Legislative List. As regards matters on the Concurrent Legislative List, it is felt that the exercise of powers concurrently by the Supreme Military Council and the Military Governors of the Regions with respect to the same subjects could lead to conflict or friction of a type which ought to be avoided under the present Military Regime. It seems that one sure way to avoid such conflict or friction would be by making new provisions whereby the Supreme Military Council will have power to make laws on matters on the Concurrent Legislative List in respect of Lagos only whilst the Military Governors will have power to make laws by Edict on those matters in respect of their Regions."

26. The Law Officers held divergent views on such questions as the machinery for the meetings of the Supreme Military Council and the manner in which the concurrence of the Military Governors, as members of the Council, should be signified in the making of Decrees. On these questions the Military Governor, West, has again vindicated the stand of the East when he commented as follows:

"(a), a meeting of the Supreme Military Council will be properly constituted and can properly be held if any Military Governor isabsent, but as agreed at Accra, any Military Governor not present will be given the opportunity to express his comments on, and concurrence with, the decisions taken in his absencebefore they are implemented.

"(b) Where all the Military Governors are present at a meeting of the Supreme Military Council decisions should now be taken only with the concurrence or unanimity of all the Military Governors. Decisions by majority would have been the best thing in ordinary circumstances but in the present situation in the country, one has to admit that such a rule could lead to open disagreements and conflicts and so to the revival of tension which everything must be done now to reduce."

27.Again, the Eastern Military Government readily sent representatives to the meeting of the Committee of Army Officers at Benin which, as was agreed at Aburi, would discuss matters relating to the quantity of arms and ammunition available in each Unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated stores, as well as the sharing out of such arms equitably to the various Commands. The Committee - -could not progress with its work for lack of co-operation from the representatives of Lt.-Col.Gowon.

28. While the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria has been making a determined and sincere effort to act according to the spirit and decisions of Aburi, Lt.-Col. Gowon has deliberately set out to ignore both. Ten days after the Aburi meeting,  the Gowon Government issued a booklet, entitled Nigeria 1966, parts of which attacked and libelled
the Military Governor of the East. The booklet also contained tendentious statements the sole aim of which could only be to inflame passions and cause disaffection within the country. This booklet was launched in New York, London and other capitals of the world.


29. Worse still, three weeks after the meeting, at a press conference which he held on 26 January, 1967, Lt.-Col. Gowon reproduced a truncated and distorted version of the agreements reached at Aburi. The source of Lt.-Col. Gowon’s statement was not the official minutes of the meeting, which had been prepared by his own officials, but a hostile commentary on the Aburi decisions prepared afterwards by people with vested interests in Lagos—men who were neither members of the Supreme Military Council nor were present at the meeting. These people were in a position to advise Lt.-Col. Gowon before the meeting since the agenda for the Aburi meeting were agreed to well beforehand. Furthermore, most of the major decisoins at Aburi were taken on the second day of the meeting after members had spent the night at their respective stations, consulting with their advisers.

30. A few days after Aburi some Permanent Secretaries in Lagos met to criticize the decisions reached by the Supreme Military Council, the highest authority in the land. With regard to the reorganization of the Army they objected to the new title of "Commander-in-Chief" on the grounds that—

"(1) it would be a subtle way of either abolishing the post of Supreme Commander or declaring it vacant to be filled by unanimous decision of the Supreme
Military Council, and

(2) The Accra decision transfers the Executive Authority of the Federal Military Government from the Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander (in accordance with Decree No. 1) to the Supreme Military Council. The implication of this is that the Commander-in-Chief would have no power of control or dismissal over the Regional Governors, "

On the establishment of Military Headquarters, the Permanent Secretaries stated that "the establishment of Military Headquarters with equal representatives from the Regions headed by a Chief of Staff amounts to confederation". They made no effort to define what they meant by a "confederation". As regards the creation of Area Commands the Permanent Secretaries took exception to what they considered to be "dividing up the Nigerian Army into Regional ones, without links with or effective unifying control over the Army by the ‘Supreme Commander’." This advice, which was clearly motivated by selfish interests, ignored the anxiety of the Nigerian public for a workable and effective settlement of the crisis and a quick return to normal conditions. In strict compliance with this advice, however, Lt.-Col. Gowon, true to his well-known characteristic of ignoring solemn agreements, made a volte-face at his press conference. On the issue of the reorganization of the Army he declared—

"We reviewed the situation in- the Nigerian Army and we all agreed that there should be one Nigerian Army under a unified command as at present. We recognized that in the context of the events of 1966, the most practical way of achieving this aim is to organize the Army into area commands. The preponderance of T the army personnel in each command will be drawn from the re indigenes of that area. Each area command will be under an P Area Commander who will take operational instructions from the Military Headquarters which will be directly under me as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Under the proposal, the Military Governors can use the area command for internal security purposes but this will normally be done with the express permission of the Head of the Federal Military Government. We definitely decided tit against Regional armies."

As could be seen from the Minutes of the Aburi Conference, no decision was taken that the Area Commands should be directly under Lt.-Col. Gowon "as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces" nor that the Military Governors should obtain his permission to use the Area Commands for internal security.


31. Again, instead of emphasizing that the Supreme Military Council, in recognition of the fact that no single government in the Federation has its writ running throughout the country, has introduced the element of Regional consent into the process of reaching its decisions, Lt.-Col. Gowon merely stated—


"We, however, agreed to return to the status quo ante 17 January, 1966, and this is in keeping with my earlier public pronouncements that Decrees or parts of Decrees which tended towards over- centralization should be repealed. We will continue to operate the existing Federal Constitution and the Federal system of government until a new Constitution is drawn up. A decree is now under preparation which will give effect to the decision to return to the Constitutional position before 17 January, 1966, "


32. Turning to the problem of displaced persons the Permanent Secretaries suggested:

"(a) when the meeting of Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of Finance resumes, the principle of revenue allocation should not be discussed as it was not mentioned in the minutes of the Accra meeting.

"(b) the decision to continue to pay salaries till the end of March, 1967, does not take into consideration economic factors which are linked with it . . . Secondly, it does not make sense to include daily paid workers among those whose salaries should continue to be paid. The decision should therefore be reconsidered."

The insistence of the Permanent Secretaries that "the principle of revenue allocation should not be discussed" at any future meetings of Permanent Secretaries, Finance, is clear evidence that they intend to strangle the East economically since they are well aware of the mass return of nearly two million Easterners to the Region, the loss of £20,000,000 in property by refugees from the North and the forcible exclusion of Easterners from the Federal Civil Service, the Federal Statutory Corporations, the Foreign Service and other Federal institutions. - Surely they cannot expect the East to survive economically in these circumstances under the existing system of revenue allocation. Moreover, whatever economic factors are linked with the Supreme Military Council’s- decisions on this matter it is patent that the displaced employees are in no way responsible for their present plight. And the inequitable treatment suggested by the Permanent Secretaries in respect of daily paid workers can only remind the country of the industrial strife which such an application of double standards caused in the days of the former civilian regime.

33. In spite of all these Lt.-Col. Gowon in his press conference defers to the recommendations of the Permanent Secretaries on this head. Although the decision at Aburi was that the salaries of all displaced persons who had not obtained alternative employment should, without qualification, be paid until 31 March, 1967, Lt.-Col. Gowon stated that "each case is to be considered on its merit" and that Federal Corporations would find it "very difficult" to continue to pay their displaced employees.

34. With respect to appointments to certain posts in the Federal Public Service, the Permanent Secretaries commented as follows:

"(a) whichever category of officer is meant, the effect of this decision will tend to paralyse the functions of the Federal Public and the Police Service Commissions;

"(b) if Regional Governors have power to appointments, the loyalty of Federal Officers would be to their regions of origin—meaning in effect that there will be no Federal Civil Service;

"(c) the acceptance of this decision would also require, as the law officers have reported, amendments to those sections in the Constitution dealing with appointment to Nigeria Police,Federal Public Service
Commission and sections of various acts dealing with appointment in Federal Statutory
Corporations;

(d) furthermore, it is observed that while Military Governors will have power to appoint, or approve appointments of
Federal Government Servants, there is no corresponding power of the Supreme Military Council to even influence
the appointments to senior posts in the Regional Public Services. This clearly makes the Federal Military Government."

Obviously the Permanent Secretaries are not concerned with the peace, stability and even the survival of Nigeria; their sole interest is to maintain the status quo because any attempt at a fair distribution of posts -in the Federal Civil Service, the Federal Corporations, the Foreign Service and other Federal institutions would mean a diminution of the powers they now enjoy. The East must remain permanently excluded from these services and institutions for the selfish ends of Federal Permanent Secretaries. The East must be relegated to obscure embassies abroad where they will- be ineffective and unheard. In his press statement Lt.-Col. Gowon, in his attempt to keep to the advice of the Permanent Secretaries, was caught up in contradictions. In one and the same breath he said that these appointments should be approved by the Supreme Military Council and that the Federal public Service and Police Commissions should retain their present functions. His exact words were-

"There have been some speculations about the effect of our decisions on senior appointments and - promotions in the Federal Public Service. It was agreed that top posts such as Permanent Secretaries and Ambassadors will have to be approved by the I ship Supreme Military Council. I would like to explain that the Armey Federal Public Service Commission as well as the Police Commission and i will continue to function as at present."

 

35. Finally, on the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference the Permanent Secretaries stated that it was rather advisable for Gowon stick to their previous recommendations and advice, namely:

"(a) that the Ad Hoc Constitutional
Conference should stand adjourned indefinitely;

"(b) that the immediate political programme announced to the nation on 30 November, 1966, by the ‘Supreme Commander’ should be implemented and the country must be so informed."

The Permanent Secretaries have here revealed that the origin of Lt.Col. Gowon’s
"political programme"
of 30 November, 1966, was "the recommendations and advice" given to him by these Permanent Secretaries. In accordance with this advice, however, Lt.-Col. Gowon, while not appearing to re-affirm "that the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference should stand adjourned indefinitely", said— "So far I have not set up the Drafting Committee and the Constituent Assembly promised in my broadcast (of 30 November, 1966) because it was the intention that normal conditions should be fully restored before they begin to function, I am carrying, on the necessary consultations with all sections of the Nigerian - community and when eventually the names we are screening are announced the general public will be satisfied."

In this context, the indications are that Lt.-Col. Gowon would rather take steps to implement his pet programme than facilitate the resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference as decided at Aburi. This is borne out by the draft Decree which he produced after Aburi.

36. This draft Decree, which has been circulated to the Regional Military Governors by Lt.-Col. Gowon, accordingly by-passes or ignores all the major decisions taken at Aburi. It seeks to return Nigeria to the constitutional position before 17 January, 1966, while in fact the decisions of the Supreme Military Council were on specific issues and were not limited by dates. In the draft Decree the title of "Supreme Commander" is still retained contrary to the decision at Aburi to alter it to "Commander-in-Chief". The draft Decree also retains the word "President" instead of "Chairman of the Supreme Military Council" as was agreed at Aburi. Again it enlarges the membership of the Supreme Military Council to include "Head of the Nigerian Army (a non-existent post), the "Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces" and the "Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army". No such decisions were taken at Aburi. It was merely agreed that there should be one Chief of Staff at Headquarters.

37. In addition, contrary to the Aburi accord, the draft Decree vests executive and legislative powers either in the Federal Military Government or in the Federal Executive Council. But the Aburi meeting clearly decided that the legislative and executive authority of the

Federal Military Government should devolve on the Supreme Military Council to which any matter affecting the whole country should be referred for determination.


38. The draft Decree also completely ignores the decision at Aburi that appointments and promotions within the upper hierarchy of the Army, Police, the Public Service and Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military Council.


39. Lastly, the draft Decree proceeds to restore sections 70, 71 and 86 of the old Constitution, which had been suspended, without also restoring the safeguards provided in that Constitution. By this action Lt.-Col. Gowon, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Aburi agreements, arrogates to himself the power to declare a state of emergency anywhere in Nigeria.

BAD FAITH OF LT.-COL. GOWON


40. The failure of Lt.-Col. Gowon to adhere to the decisions unanimously reached at Aburi is only the latest evidence of his bad faith, inconsistency and lack of realism.


41. On the first day of his seizure of power he had pleaded for co-operation from the East Military Government, and had promised to retain power only temporarily in order to normalise the extraordinary conditions created by himself and his fellow Northerners, military and civilian. Thereafter the Military leaders were to meet and decide on the leadership. Lt.-Col. Gowon has never fulfilled that promise. The breach of his promise to see to the return of arms and ammunition by Northern soldiers evacuated from the East has already been mentioned in paragraph 8 above. Lt.-Col. Gowon also assured the Military Government of the East in August, 1966 that he would stop the killings in the country, but these killings subsequently increased in organization and ferocity until they reached the proportions of a pogrom. He moreover promised that the inquiry set up by Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi into the May massacres of Easterners in Northern Nigeria would "certainly go on as scheduled". Nothing has been heard again about this inquiry ever since. So also most of the difficulties preventing the return to normal conditions in the country have stemmed from Lt.-Col. Gowon’s bad faith in not implementing the unanimous decisions reached by the representatives of the military leaders at their meeting in Lagos on 9 August.

42. Early in September 1966, armed soldiers of Northern origin from Ibadan raided Benin Prison and removed soldiers who had been detained as a result of their
alleged involvement in the attempted coup of 15 January. The Northerners among the detainees were set free and repatriated to the North; the remainder, mainly Easterners, were murdered under brutal circumstances. And although Lt.-Col. Gowon gave assurances that the murderers would be brought to justice, so far the perpetrators of the atrocities have gone unpunished.

43. It was exactly this same sort of bad faith that Lt.-Col. Gowon exhibited in September, 1966. In his opening address to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference, he had himself instructed the delegates to choose one of the following alternatives in formulating a new Constitution for Nigeria:

"(a) A Federal system with a strong Central Government;
"(b) A Federal system with a weak Central Government;
"(c) A Confederation ;or

"(d) An entirely new arrangement which may be peculiar to Nigeria."

At the same time Gowon disavowed any intention of dictating to the country a particular constitution. When, however, he saw that the delegations were veering towards the second or third alternative, he adjourned the conference indefinitely. He thereupon announced that "the idea of a temporary confederation is unworkable" and that he was appointing "a drafting committee" to prepare a constitution which "will reflect the generally expressed desire for a stable federation". it will be recalled, however, that the delegations to the Ad Hoc Conference went to Lagos in September, 1966, after extensive consultations among the people in each Region. Thus each delegation went with a mandate representing the "expressed desire" of its people. But, true to type, Lt.-Col. Gowon placed a dubious construction on the submissions
of the delegations to suit his purpose and that of his advisers.

44. Contrary to the decisions at Aburi recruitment into the Army has continued in different parts of the country except the East; contrary to these agreements, Lt.-Col. Gowon has proceeded to appoint Ambassadors without reference to the Supreme Military Council; contrary to the agreements, purchase and importation of arms have continued. Lt.-Col. Gowon unilaterally postponed the meeting of Military officers to discuss the reorganization of the Army as agreed at Aburi. The proposed meeting of Finance officials on the problem of rehabilitation of displaced persons has not even been held because Lt.-Col. Gowon’s Finance Permanent Secretary does not think that such a meeting will serve any useful purpose. -


45. In the light of the foregoing and since there is clearly no hope of a change of attitude on the part of Lt.-Col. Gowon, the East Military Government considers that the time has come when it must take a final stand against a regime which cannot abide by agreements voluntarily arrived at. The Military Government of the East is irrevocably committed to the task of ameliorating the suffering of its struggling people and providing them with the peace, order and good government which are their overriding needs. To this end the Government will publish shortly its future policy towards the implementation of the Aburi agreements.