source identified two of the Nigerians he alleges to
be behind the Boko Haram militants.
One of them: former military Chief of Army Staff, Lt-
General Azubuike Ihejirika. The other: a former
state governor Modu Sheriff.

The disclosure was made in Australia by Stephen
Davis, a hostage negotiator reportedly hired by the
Nigerian government to interface with Boko Haram,
from whom he got the two names. General Ihejirika
swiftly denied any involvement.

The news was broken in Nigeria on Thursday by
Nasir El-Rufai, a former Minister.
Ihejirika, who was fired from his plum job last
January, immediately picked up his weapons and
aimed them in the direction of El-Rufai, calling him a
Boko Haram “commander.”
“The likes of El-Rufai have been supporting Boko
Haram,” he said in his rebuttal. “In fact, El-Rufai
and his likes are the same group of people that
ensured the army did not get the requested
equipment to deal with this menace once and for all,
as they used their cohorts to tell the government
that procuring modern equipment were not
necessary.”
He did not forget to throw in the ethnic card, either.
“When the Boko Haram operation started,
supporters of the sect like El-Rufai said that there
was nothing like Boko Haram and that the army
was just killing innocent youths. El-Rufai said that I
was re-inventing the killing of the Ibos during the
Biafra war following government’s determination to
rid the country of terrorism.”
For some reason, Ihejirika seemed to concentrate
his bullets on the emissary, rather than the
message, which was Davis. He did not say what he
did about “the El-Rufais” when he was in office.
That describes Nigeria rather well, in terms of our
persistent refusal to face the issues that confront
us. For a government which claims it really wants
to treat the Boko Haram infection, the Davis
intervention is a vital opening.
To begin with, the government, which knew—or
ought to have known—about the Davis allegations
before El-Rufai rang the bell, ought to have
commenced immediate investigations into the
allegations right away.
Ihejirika and Sheriff ought to have been arrested the
same day, and left with no chance to influence the
narrative.
The problem is the government of doubt in Abuja:
doubting itself, doubting its responsibilities, doubting
yesterday, doubting the questions, questioning the
doubts.
But for Abuja’s self-esteem crisis, we might
actually have reached the Davis level two and a half
years ago when President Goodluck Jonathan
himself first announced that he had Boko Haram
sympathizers in his government.
“Some of them are in the executive arm of
government, some of them are in the
parliamentary/legislative arm of government, while
some of them are even in the judiciary. Some are
also in the armed forces, the police and other
security agencies.”
How in the world does a leader identify the enemy
in the same room as he, but do nothing about it
even as that enemy inflicts increasing carnage in
the country?
But for Abuja’s self-esteem issues, we might
actually have reached the Davis level in April 2012
when National Security Adviser, Owoeye Azazi,
speaking a few months after Mr. Jonathan’s
remarks, said Nigeria needed to investigate the root
of the level of violence in Northeastern Nigeria [to
establish] whether it had escalated because the
group out of the blue became better trained, better
equipped and better funded.
He attributed the growing insecurity to what he
called “undemocratic practices” by the political
parties, and specifically indicting the ruling People’s
Democratic Party (PDP).
“The issue of violence did not increase in Nigeria
until when there was a declaration by the current
president that he was going to contest. PDP got it
wrong from the beginning. The party started by
saying Mr. A can rule, and Mr. B cannot rule,
according to PDP conventions, rules and regulations
and not according to the constitution. That created
the climate for what is happening or manifesting
itself in the country…”
The PDP, which is defined by power, not
responsibility, hated that kind of talk from an official
it considered to be its property rather than a servant
of the country. Two months later, Azazi was fired.
Seven months later, he died in a helicopter accident.
Azazi’s death ended any hopes of any more
uncomfortable questions from within the upper
echelons of power, but the disclosure by Dr. Davis
means that the old file ought to be re-opened. Will
the government of doubt do that? Better still, what
will the government do?
Judging solely from the track record of the
Jonathan government, we are to expect nothing.
Even if he did set up an investigation, such a
process will be abandoned once public focus is no
longer as harsh. His government, lacking interest in
accountability, characteristically and routinely
ignores such reports.
The truth is that this is how the Boko Haram
insurgency grew out of control. In the past couple
of years, not only has it unveiled itself as the most
destructive and divisive force since independence,
it has exposed the Jonathan government as divided
and incompetent, and the security agencies as
overblown and overrated.
While the presidential fleet of jets continues to grow,
Nigeria’s military has been exposed as being of
limited training and equipment; while the Nigerian
government continues to spend money recklessly
on its privileged inner circle, Nigeria’s infrastructure
decays; while Nigeria’s rulers make speeches, the
poverty and disenchantment are growing.
What next? The future is already here: Nigerian
soldiers refusing to fight, preferring the humiliation
of being court-martialed to execution by better-
armed, and perhaps better-trained militants.
The future is already here: a country where a small
group of violent militants armed itself, as well as
trained and mastered the terrain better than all of
the security agencies put together.
It is a sad, shameful day when Nigeria’s rulers
declare a state of emergency in the worst-affected
states, only for the militants to prove to be even
more diabolical in those states. It is an even more
shameful day to consider that a man of Ihejirika was
in charge of the army during a significant part of
this period, only to start pointing fingers after he has
been called out.
This is the tragedy of the Jonathan era: self-
doubting governance where fear is nurtured rather
than combatted; where the hard treatment is
avoided and the patient dies; where the criminals
are pardoned, not prosecuted. Our prize is that
million and millions of young citizens are left on the
streets to fend for themselves.
Hopefully, Boko Haram is as deep as we will ever
sink. It need not be this way. A responsible
government must find the courage to isolate the
enemy to defeat it. This can only be done if it first
establishes a capacity for social justice and the rule
of law. That is what #BringBackOurGirls is really
about, and why it defines the Jonathan government
so well.
Who are the sponsors of Boko Haram? Now Nigeria
has a good opportunity to find out. Can her
government of doubt find the heart?

By; SonalaOlumhense

http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/sunday/index.php/sonala-olumhense-syndicated/17973-under-the-hood-of-boko-haram