agaugust:

explain to him how to use janes's defence, people complain it has too little information on all the weapons of every country in the world, jane's is not like the detail you find on wikipedia

agaugust: .
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the post on Ethiopia vs South Africa in military war has proved that south africans just need to s.hut up their mouths finally.
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Henry120: From bully boys to wimps: the decline of SA's military
04 MAY 2012 00:00 - PHILLIP DE WET

A comprehensive review of SA's military capabilities paints a grim picture of the country's defence capabilities. Let's hope Lesotho doesn't invade.

OUR COVERAGE

What warship? Zuma claim holds no water
MORE COVERAGE




It is a good thing that Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe do not seem to have any territorial ambitions, because if they chose to annex a few South African provinces, the defence force would be hard-pressed to stop them, especially if Lesotho decided to get into the action.

A large and long overdue review of South Africa’s defence capabilities and needs, now in the phase of public consultation, paints a grim picture.

The country has too few fighting men and women, often with old or useless equipment, often without the discipline required to constitute an effective fighting force, little ability to deploy them rapidly, little by way of heavy equipment to back them up and a severely limited ability to communicate with them once they are in the field.


Shortcomings stretch from basic training to intelligence capability, leaving the defence force if not defenceless as such, at least easily out-matched by a sufficiently large multi-front attack using chemical or biological weapons, heavily armoured units or any combination of these.

And that is the formal, written version. In private, analysts and military professionals across the board scoff at the idea that South Africa could defend itself from any serious, determined, concerted attack almost as much as they scoff at the idea that such an attack could take place in the foreseeable future.

“We are not going to fight a conventional war in the short-to-medium term,” said Len le Roux, a retired major general and consultant to the Institute for Security Studies on defence policy.

But if national defence remains the real job of the defence force, the defence review says, then somebody will have to pay for it.

“The persistent disconnect between the defence mandate, government expectation and resource allocation has eroded defence capabilities to the point where the defence force is unable to fully deliver its constitutional responsibility to defend and protect South Africa and its people and further cannot even support the current modest level of ambition,” the discussion draft reads.

Although it takes a high-level strategic view and specifically steers clear of enumerating crises and the cost of fixing them, the 423-page document makes it abundantly clear that maintenance of crumbling runways, for instance, will not wait. And there is wide consensus that almost every capability the defence force has is fast being eroded.

“We are at the point where we have two choices: either we spend a big chunk of money, or we do not intervene and we accept that we are going beyond the point of no return,” said Abel Esterhuyse, associate professor of strategy at Stellenbosch University’s faculty of military science and editor of the South African Journal of Military Studies.

That does not mean splurging on capital equipment arms-deal style. Both the review and analysts who were not involved in its drafting said operational funds were what was most desperately needed—money for the everyday running of the armed services rather than expensive equipment. What the existing forces need instead is to actually use their equipment, including what has already been bought at such expense and controversy.

“You have aircraft like the Gripen ... unless you have a certain number of flying hours a month you begin to lose the skills of the pilots and you can quite easily dig a large hole in the ground with a supersonic jet,” said David Chuter, a lecturer, a writer on defence and a former British defence official with a long history of project involvement in South Africa.

“The risk is that quite soon you have the pilot and you have the aircraft, but you don’t have a pilot capable of flying the aircraft effectively.”

Defence against the type of aggression that requires a Gripen fighter jet is not South Africa’s main area of concern at the moment, but the principle seems to hold true for the duties the military, air force and navy are carrying out.

Insufficient practice compounds problematic hardware and initial training and results in a force that has neither the credibility required to deter aggression nor the ability to fight poachers in the Kruger Park or pirates off the Mozambican coast. And there is a sense of near despair at the failure of politicians who order such tasks to fund them.

“Border protection was given back to the defence force from the South African Police Service [in 2010] without any substantial increase in budget to do that,” said Roelf Meyer, chairperson of the committee responsible for the defence review. “If the expectation is that we should take care of border protection and if it is a government priority, then we need more money.”

Although Meyer’s committee is independent of the military and tasked with reviewing it in terms of government priorities, he tends to slip into a parental “we” when speaking of the seemingly impossible demands being placed on the defence force. His committee’s draft document reads like an extended pitch for funding.

Still, his group well understands the political trouble a sudden and substantial increase in military spending would cause and seems to have learned from the work of the National Planning Commission. That body first published indicators—hard data with a touch of analysis that illustrated problems in an unarguable way. Once that was accepted, criticism of its subsequent hard-hitting recommendations was more difficult and critics found themselves called on to provide alternatives. The defence review could create the same type of baseline for the fully costed budget that will have to follow.

“I would like to see us build a consensus around the document as much as we can so that, when we put it to Parliament, we can say this is the view of South Africans,” said Meyer.

“I would hope we would be able to give this document to the minister [of defence] for her to put forward the argument, which I don’t think is any secret: the defence force is underfunded.”

In some respects, the argument for more money—and it will be an argument—will be easier than at any time in the past decade, the dragging bad karma of the arms deal notwithstanding. Better border protection also means preventing more smuggling of cigarettes and other goods that attract high levels of tax and are easily loaded on to a light aircraft, which should have a direct impact on taxes collected and thus be attractive to the more economically minded.

Combatting rhino poaching by way of the military tactics Chuter summarised, such as “scaring the shit” out of poachers through helicopter-landed special forces, touches on an issue particularly emotive for the middle class.

An improved peacekeeping capability would delight those with a pan-African bent. Commercial fishermen would approve of better patrolling of South Africa’s waters.

And, should the administration in charge in 2013 wish to reduce rather than magnify the perceived waste of money on the arms deal, a little bit of money could go a long way.

“For a relatively small amount of extra money, you can actually start making use of all this kit properly, in a way that would justify the initial expenditure and allow the defence force to carry out the missions it was bought for effectively,” said Chuter.

From defanged to refanged: How political change shaped the force
WHERE THINGS WENT WRONG
The disconnect between military requirements and military funding had its roots in the transition from apartheid, analysts said. It was a time when the overriding priority was to prevent a military coup, although there was a secondary nod to showing the rest of Southern Africa that South Africa would never again be a threat. That meant disempowering the military rather than supporting it and subsequent swift policy changes did not help.

“Mandela was trying to get the military out of the domestic environment. There was all this suspicion and doubt with white generals and black politicians, so the emphasis was on pulling them out of the domestic realm,” said Stellenbosch University’s Abel Esterhuyse. “Mbeki deployed the military into the foreign policy environment and made the key decision to disband the commando system, [leading to] the loss of that blanket domestic intelligence capability that we had across every small town in the country.

“Now, in the Zuma era, we are seeing that the police cannot cope with domestic challenges, so subtly the emphasis is starting to move towards a return to the domestic realm for the military. We do not want to be seen to be scaling down on our international commitments, but that is where it is going.”


Costly mission: The Gripen fighter jet. (Frans Dely)

In the middle of those shifts came the last formal defence review, conducted in 1998, which magnificently failed to predict anything like the actual future.

“There was a bit of a utopian view at the time, especially about Africa,” said Len le Roux, who was involved in that process. “The Cold War was over, apartheid was gone, so what could go wrong in Africa? The extent of South Africa’s commitment to peace missions was just not foreseen — and other stuff—I mean, who predicted the Arab Spring two years ago? Who predicted the way piracy would start up?”

But even as it became clear that South Africa would be a major participant in far-flung and complex missions for a long time to come, the requirement for more social spending and a big increase in public servant wages demanded reductions elsewhere. Then the global financial crisis struck state income.

DOMESTIC DEPLOYMENT
Deploying troops within South Africa’s borders in situations in which they could end up in conflict with civilians was long politically unpalatable. This, however, seems to be changing fast. The defence review makes no value judgment on domestic deployment, but coyly points out that the army requires urban warfare training anyway, which has value both in fighting insurgents north of Limpopo and in arresting violent service delivery protesters.

Effective border patrols would require a highly manoeuvrable component, such as motorbike squads, which likewise has a dual purpose. Non-lethal ammunition for the military is considered an important need, as is creating a faster process to authorise the deployment of defence units.

Analysts and military veterans also point out that the use of heavier weapons and explosives by crime syndicates requires an equal or greater response and that democracy may not be best served by militarising the police service to the point where it could handle such threats.

LABOUR ISSUES
The military has a labour problem. According to the defence review, it lacks a sufficient number of fighting soldiers while employing people variously described as uneconomical or ill-suited to their tasks. And it is costing too much. In the past financial year, 55% of the military budget went to personnel costs, whereas 40% is generally agreed to be a more acceptable level.

Outside analysts and former commanders, however, go much further. They said the application of general labour practices in the military meant an inability to discipline soldiers and prevented unsuitable recruits from being weeded out.

This, in a service such as the army that already has a clash of culture between the old defence force ways and the different norms brought in by the integration of forces from armed-struggle groups, has caused trouble. Add to the mix poorly conceived change to the formal discipline system and you have chaos.

“The current military discipline system [which entered into force in 1999] has not served its intended purpose and has conversely served to weaken military discipline and undermine the power of commanders,” said the defence review.

“The system has specifically disempowered commanders by removing summary discipline.”

After more than a decade under such a system and with the debate on unionisation within the defence force still unsettled, the results are starting to show and affect South Africa’s reputation.

“When you have troops on deployment in another country, they are representing you; they are flying your flag,” said one observer.

“When you have people misbehaving in shared United Nations camps and when you hear unflattering comparisons between South African officers and officers from other African countries, I wonder how much good we’re doing our strategy in Africa.”

THE MANY JOBS OF THE DEFENCE FORCE
On paper, the defence force has only one real objective: to seem scary enough to deter other countries or groups from looking for trouble and be ready enough to counter such trouble if it does develop. But as the review spells out in painstaking detail, it is being used in a wide range of other roles.

Peacekeeping operations
Troops have been deployed to a number of countries on the continent, where they have faced everything up to light artillery fire.

Border protection
After a hiatus of several years, the defence force was in 2010 ordered back to the borders. That is nearly 4 000km of coastline—excluding territorial waters—and a little less than 4 500km of land borders.

Piracy prevention
With pirates based in Somalia operating as far south as the Mozambique channel and with no other country on the east coast of Africa capable of patrolling waters far beyond its bases, the navy has by default become responsible for doing so.

Police support
Joint deployment has been few and far between, but the indications are that the army and air force will increasingly be called to battle gangs and help to quell service delivery protests.

Anti-poaching
Fighting rhino and abalone poaching requires skill and equipment found only in the military and its role in both is set to increase.

MARRYING DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENCE
The military has long resisted, with varying degrees of success, being seen as a potential creator of jobs, a developer of rural economies and, generally, a tool of the developmental agenda.


Among other non-core activities, the military is involved in anti-poaching and peacekeeping missions. (Gianluigi Guercia, AFP)

The defence review follows a similar line, pointing out that the military should “contribute to national development primarily by creating the security conditions necessary for development to take place”.

Land use and redistribution remains a particularly sticky issue. The military controls vast areas that often seem to be badly underutilised. But, the review says, some communication installations require quiet zones, some munition depots require safety zones and some types of training need wide open spaces.

The review concedes that although the defence force should not be structured around economic or social development, there are many things that can be done to help: identifying spare facilities in rural areas that communities can use for education, spreading bases more widely and making those bases procure more locally, opening base schools and hospitals to civilians and promoting local research, development and manufacture.


REVIEWING THE REVIEWERS
The defence review committee, which is due to deliver its final report in August, has at its political core a mixture of individuals with diverse experiences of the military and varying levels of political clout.

Chairperson Roelf Meyer was the minister of defence for a short period in late 1991 and early 1992, a time during which he apparently did not get along with hardline generals. He retired from politics in 2000, but still receives credit for his role as the chief government negotiator during the transition to democracy.

His deputy, Thandi Modise, received military training in Angola before being arrested as an Umkhonto we Sizwe operative. She is facing a possible revolt in North West, where she is premier.

Charles Nqakula became minister of defence after the toppling of Thabo Mbeki, apparently as a way to remove him from the safety and security portfolio, but did not survive the Zuma Cabinet reshuffle. And Tony Yengeni’s involvement in the arms deal indirectly resulted in him being jailed for a short time, but he remains a force within the ANC.—

andrewza:

I found the post full on inaccruses.

Firsty are they the best fighter pilots in africa. SA was able to get some impresve air to air kills in Angola useing out classed jets. And SU 24 is a attack aircraft or strike aircraft to be presise. And has was shown the Gripen can handek the SU27.

3000 AGMs missiels? Where you get that number from.

What guns are those. Nothing out ranges the G6 and G5.

We have solders deployed in the DRC, CAR, anti piracy and Sudan not to mention burindie, Angola, lestho. Many of whome came under fire. Just because our news dose not report out fights dose not mean they never happned. We deploy more solders per capter than even nigeria.

Ethyopia is at a defacto war and has a number of hostil nations and elments suronding it so has a need for a larg milltary. SA is at peace and in the most stabel region in Africa we spend less than 2% on deffense. If a threay was present we would increase our strengh. Out budget and potsiol budget in a time of need far supases in african country excluding egpty.

Henry120: From bully boys to wimps: the decline of SA's military
04 MAY 2012 00:00 - PHILLIP DE WET

A comprehensive review of SA's military capabilities paints a grim picture of the country's defence capabilities. Let's hope Lesotho doesn't invade.

OUR COVERAGE

What warship? Zuma claim holds no water
MORE COVERAGE




It is a good thing that Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe do not seem to have any territorial ambitions, because if they chose to annex a few South African provinces, the defence force would be hard-pressed to stop them, especially if Lesotho decided to get into the action.

A large and long overdue review of South Africa’s defence capabilities and needs, now in the phase of public consultation, paints a grim picture.

The country has too few fighting men and women, often with old or useless equipment, often without the discipline required to constitute an effective fighting force, little ability to deploy them rapidly, little by way of heavy equipment to back them up and a severely limited ability to communicate with them once they are in the field.


Shortcomings stretch from basic training to intelligence capability, leaving the defence force if not defenceless as such, at least easily out-matched by a sufficiently large multi-front attack using chemical or biological weapons, heavily armoured units or any combination of these.

And that is the formal, written version. In private, analysts and military professionals across the board scoff at the idea that South Africa could defend itself from any serious, determined, concerted attack almost as much as they scoff at the idea that such an attack could take place in the foreseeable future.

“We are not going to fight a conventional war in the short-to-medium term,” said Len le Roux, a retired major general and consultant to the Institute for Security Studies on defence policy.

But if national defence remains the real job of the defence force, the defence review says, then somebody will have to pay for it.

“The persistent disconnect between the defence mandate, government expectation and resource allocation has eroded defence capabilities to the point where the defence force is unable to fully deliver its constitutional responsibility to defend and protect South Africa and its people and further cannot even support the current modest level of ambition,” the discussion draft reads.

Although it takes a high-level strategic view and specifically steers clear of enumerating crises and the cost of fixing them, the 423-page document makes it abundantly clear that maintenance of crumbling runways, for instance, will not wait. And there is wide consensus that almost every capability the defence force has is fast being eroded.

“We are at the point where we have two choices: either we spend a big chunk of money, or we do not intervene and we accept that we are going beyond the point of no return,” said Abel Esterhuyse, associate professor of strategy at Stellenbosch University’s faculty of military science and editor of the South African Journal of Military Studies.

That does not mean splurging on capital equipment arms-deal style. Both the review and analysts who were not involved in its drafting said operational funds were what was most desperately needed—money for the everyday running of the armed services rather than expensive equipment. What the existing forces need instead is to actually use their equipment, including what has already been bought at such expense and controversy.

“You have aircraft like the Gripen ... unless you have a certain number of flying hours a month you begin to lose the skills of the pilots and you can quite easily dig a large hole in the ground with a supersonic jet,” said David Chuter, a lecturer, a writer on defence and a former British defence official with a long history of project involvement in South Africa.

“The risk is that quite soon you have the pilot and you have the aircraft, but you don’t have a pilot capable of flying the aircraft effectively.”

Defence against the type of aggression that requires a Gripen fighter jet is not South Africa’s main area of concern at the moment, but the principle seems to hold true for the duties the military, air force and navy are carrying out.

Insufficient practice compounds problematic hardware and initial training and results in a force that has neither the credibility required to deter aggression nor the ability to fight poachers in the Kruger Park or pirates off the Mozambican coast. And there is a sense of near despair at the failure of politicians who order such tasks to fund them.

“Border protection was given back to the defence force from the South African Police Service [in 2010] without any substantial increase in budget to do that,” said Roelf Meyer, chairperson of the committee responsible for the defence review. “If the expectation is that we should take care of border protection and if it is a government priority, then we need more money.”

Although Meyer’s committee is independent of the military and tasked with reviewing it in terms of government priorities, he tends to slip into a parental “we” when speaking of the seemingly impossible demands being placed on the defence force. His committee’s draft document reads like an extended pitch for funding.

Still, his group well understands the political trouble a sudden and substantial increase in military spending would cause and seems to have learned from the work of the National Planning Commission. That body first published indicators—hard data with a touch of analysis that illustrated problems in an unarguable way. Once that was accepted, criticism of its subsequent hard-hitting recommendations was more difficult and critics found themselves called on to provide alternatives. The defence review could create the same type of baseline for the fully costed budget that will have to follow.

“I would like to see us build a consensus around the document as much as we can so that, when we put it to Parliament, we can say this is the view of South Africans,” said Meyer.

“I would hope we would be able to give this document to the minister [of defence] for her to put forward the argument, which I don’t think is any secret: the defence force is underfunded.”

In some respects, the argument for more money—and it will be an argument—will be easier than at any time in the past decade, the dragging bad karma of the arms deal notwithstanding. Better border protection also means preventing more smuggling of cigarettes and other goods that attract high levels of tax and are easily loaded on to a light aircraft, which should have a direct impact on taxes collected and thus be attractive to the more economically minded.

Combatting rhino poaching by way of the military tactics Chuter summarised, such as “scaring the shit” out of poachers through helicopter-landed special forces, touches on an issue particularly emotive for the middle class.

An improved peacekeeping capability would delight those with a pan-African bent. Commercial fishermen would approve of better patrolling of South Africa’s waters.

And, should the administration in charge in 2013 wish to reduce rather than magnify the perceived waste of money on the arms deal, a little bit of money could go a long way.

“For a relatively small amount of extra money, you can actually start making use of all this kit properly, in a way that would justify the initial expenditure and allow the defence force to carry out the missions it was bought for effectively,” said Chuter.

From defanged to refanged: How political change shaped the force
WHERE THINGS WENT WRONG
The disconnect between military requirements and military funding had its roots in the transition from apartheid, analysts said. It was a time when the overriding priority was to prevent a military coup, although there was a secondary nod to showing the rest of Southern Africa that South Africa would never again be a threat. That meant disempowering the military rather than supporting it and subsequent swift policy changes did not help.

“Mandela was trying to get the military out of the domestic environment. There was all this suspicion and doubt with white generals and black politicians, so the emphasis was on pulling them out of the domestic realm,” said Stellenbosch University’s Abel Esterhuyse. “Mbeki deployed the military into the foreign policy environment and made the key decision to disband the commando system, [leading to] the loss of that blanket domestic intelligence capability that we had across every small town in the country.

“Now, in the Zuma era, we are seeing that the police cannot cope with domestic challenges, so subtly the emphasis is starting to move towards a return to the domestic realm for the military. We do not want to be seen to be scaling down on our international commitments, but that is where it is going.”


Costly mission: The Gripen fighter jet. (Frans Dely)

In the middle of those shifts came the last formal defence review, conducted in 1998, which magnificently failed to predict anything like the actual future.

“There was a bit of a utopian view at the time, especially about Africa,” said Len le Roux, who was involved in that process. “The Cold War was over, apartheid was gone, so what could go wrong in Africa? The extent of South Africa’s commitment to peace missions was just not foreseen — and other stuff—I mean, who predicted the Arab Spring two years ago? Who predicted the way piracy would start up?”

But even as it became clear that South Africa would be a major participant in far-flung and complex missions for a long time to come, the requirement for more social spending and a big increase in public servant wages demanded reductions elsewhere. Then the global financial crisis struck state income.

DOMESTIC DEPLOYMENT
Deploying troops within South Africa’s borders in situations in which they could end up in conflict with civilians was long politically unpalatable. This, however, seems to be changing fast. The defence review makes no value judgment on domestic deployment, but coyly points out that the army requires urban warfare training anyway, which has value both in fighting insurgents north of Limpopo and in arresting violent service delivery protesters.

Effective border patrols would require a highly manoeuvrable component, such as motorbike squads, which likewise has a dual purpose. Non-lethal ammunition for the military is considered an important need, as is creating a faster process to authorise the deployment of defence units.

Analysts and military veterans also point out that the use of heavier weapons and explosives by crime syndicates requires an equal or greater response and that democracy may not be best served by militarising the police service to the point where it could handle such threats.

LABOUR ISSUES
The military has a labour problem. According to the defence review, it lacks a sufficient number of fighting soldiers while employing people variously described as uneconomical or ill-suited to their tasks. And it is costing too much. In the past financial year, 55% of the military budget went to personnel costs, whereas 40% is generally agreed to be a more acceptable level.

Outside analysts and former commanders, however, go much further. They said the application of general labour practices in the military meant an inability to discipline soldiers and prevented unsuitable recruits from being weeded out.

This, in a service such as the army that already has a clash of culture between the old defence force ways and the different norms brought in by the integration of forces from armed-struggle groups, has caused trouble. Add to the mix poorly conceived change to the formal discipline system and you have chaos.

“The current military discipline system [which entered into force in 1999] has not served its intended purpose and has conversely served to weaken military discipline and undermine the power of commanders,” said the defence review.

“The system has specifically disempowered commanders by removing summary discipline.”

After more than a decade under such a system and with the debate on unionisation within the defence force still unsettled, the results are starting to show and affect South Africa’s reputation.

“When you have troops on deployment in another country, they are representing you; they are flying your flag,” said one observer.

“When you have people misbehaving in shared United Nations camps and when you hear unflattering comparisons between South African officers and officers from other African countries, I wonder how much good we’re doing our strategy in Africa.”

THE MANY JOBS OF THE DEFENCE FORCE
On paper, the defence force has only one real objective: to seem scary enough to deter other countries or groups from looking for trouble and be ready enough to counter such trouble if it does develop. But as the review spells out in painstaking detail, it is being used in a wide range of other roles.

Peacekeeping operations
Troops have been deployed to a number of countries on the continent, where they have faced everything up to light artillery fire.

Border protection
After a hiatus of several years, the defence force was in 2010 ordered back to the borders. That is nearly 4 000km of coastline—excluding territorial waters—and a little less than 4 500km of land borders.

Piracy prevention
With pirates based in Somalia operating as far south as the Mozambique channel and with no other country on the east coast of Africa capable of patrolling waters far beyond its bases, the navy has by default become responsible for doing so.

Police support
Joint deployment has been few and far between, but the indications are that the army and air force will increasingly be called to battle gangs and help to quell service delivery protests.

Anti-poaching
Fighting rhino and abalone poaching requires skill and equipment found only in the military and its role in both is set to increase.

MARRYING DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENCE
The military has long resisted, with varying degrees of success, being seen as a potential creator of jobs, a developer of rural economies and, generally, a tool of the developmental agenda.


Among other non-core activities, the military is involved in anti-poaching and peacekeeping missions. (Gianluigi Guercia, AFP)

The defence review follows a similar line, pointing out that the military should “contribute to national development primarily by creating the security conditions necessary for development to take place”.

Land use and redistribution remains a particularly sticky issue. The military controls vast areas that often seem to be badly underutilised. But, the review says, some communication installations require quiet zones, some munition depots require safety zones and some types of training need wide open spaces.

The review concedes that although the defence force should not be structured around economic or social development, there are many things that can be done to help: identifying spare facilities in rural areas that communities can use for education, spreading bases more widely and making those bases procure more locally, opening base schools and hospitals to civilians and promoting local research, development and manufacture.


REVIEWING THE REVIEWERS
The defence review committee, which is due to deliver its final report in August, has at its political core a mixture of individuals with diverse experiences of the military and varying levels of political clout.

Chairperson Roelf Meyer was the minister of defence for a short period in late 1991 and early 1992, a time during which he apparently did not get along with hardline generals. He retired from politics in 2000, but still receives credit for his role as the chief government negotiator during the transition to democracy.

His deputy, Thandi Modise, received military training in Angola before being arrested as an Umkhonto we Sizwe operative. She is facing a possible revolt in North West, where she is premier.

Charles Nqakula became minister of defence after the toppling of Thabo Mbeki, apparently as a way to remove him from the safety and security portfolio, but did not survive the Zuma Cabinet reshuffle. And Tony Yengeni’s involvement in the arms deal indirectly resulted in him being jailed for a short time, but he remains a force within the ANC.—

agaugust:

i am not surprised, i just found out all you south africans have problems with the truth if it does not favour south africa.

also andrewza has become very lazy in research or you just pretend not to know the truth by telling lies.

i posted my web source of the weapons and history of both ethiopia and south africa available free on internet websites. if you have different source for you faulty argument, please post your source for everyone to see here, we dont want you personal opinion that has no basis.

ethiopian army will almost d.estroy south african army anytime anyday, but i said both nations may end the war in a draw only because i dont jump to conclusion of which country will win a war until the war comes in real life, i am not a careless judge of military issues the way you south africans are.

really disappointed south african military men cannot think analytically in a complex situation, or maybe they just want to tell lies to avoid losing an argument

andrewza:

I found the post full on inaccruses.

Firsty are they the best fighter pilots in africa. SA was able to get some impresve air to air kills in Angola useing out classed jets. And SU 24 is a attack aircraft or strike aircraft to be presise. And has was shown the Gripen can handek the SU27.

3000 AGMs missiels? Where you get that number from.

What guns are those. Nothing out ranges the G6 and G5.

We have solders deployed in the DRC, CAR, anti piracy and Sudan not to mention burindie, Angola, lestho. Many of whome came under fire. Just because our news dose not report out fights dose not mean they never happned. We deploy more solders per capter than even nigeria.

Ethyopia is at a defacto war and has a number of hostil nations and elments suronding it so has a need for a larg milltary. SA is at peace and in the most stabel region in Africa we spend less than 2% on deffense. If a threay was present we would increase our strengh. Out budget and potsiol budget in a time of need far supases in african country excluding egpty.

agaugust:

andrewza try to rebuild your d.amaged credibility and honesty a little bit, all your past comments pages 82 to 84 carry no weblink to prove what you say, you just post what you think in your bedroom.

show us weblink or source of your claim that shows Grippen can handle SU-27 jet. i hope you know there are about 10 different versions of SU-27 in different countries. there has never been any combat between Grippen and SU-27 in this world as at today, so what is your source of information?

south african cannot use about 50 GV6 artillery to defeat ethiopian 1,200 artillery. range is not going eman any thing when ethiopia advances on you with artillery fire 10 times more than south african fire. the shells ethiopia fires in 6 minutes will take south africa a whole 1 hour to fire the same number of shells.

artillery war is a game of firepower and accuracy of it. andrewza your navy sea training makes you a bad judge of army land warefare. go back to school.

south african military modern weapons have NEVER k.lled any human being since you manufactured them. all ethiopian weapons have been used to k.ill in major big wars against eritrea, somalia, and a brief attack on sudan. almost all south african soldiers have NEVER fought any nation vs nation war since they joined the army. ethiopian soldiers were up to 350,000 men that fought in year 2000 against eritrea in a full scale war.

ethiopia has used her SU-27 to shoot down several MIG 29 of eritera. south african Grippen have never shoot down any enemy jet fighter since you purchased them.
most of the south african bush war pilots wouth have retired by now from a war of 25 years ago when they were already maybe over 15 years in service or would your pilots fly for 40 years in service?

also in the bush war, wikipedia history says the south african Mirage F-1 pilots always avoid the cuban MIG 23 jets in direct combat jet vs jet air to air. they only do close support to south african army.

ethiopian millitary will d.emolish south african military any time any day. the records of history and list of weapons favours ethiopia as likely winner in war against south africa

Henry120: From bully boys to wimps: the decline of SA's military
04 MAY 2012 00:00 - PHILLIP DE WET

A comprehensive review of SA's military capabilities paints a grim picture of the country's defence capabilities. Let's hope Lesotho doesn't invade.

OUR COVERAGE

What warship? Zuma claim holds no water
MORE COVERAGE





It is a good thing that Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe do not seem to have any territorial ambitions, because if they chose to annex a few South African provinces, the defence force would be hard-pressed to stop them, especially if Lesotho decided to get into the action.

A large and long overdue review of South Africa’s defence capabilities and needs, now in the phase of public consultation, paints a grim picture.

The country has too few fighting men and women, often with old or useless equipment, often without the discipline required to constitute an effective fighting force, little ability to deploy them rapidly, little by way of heavy equipment to back them up and a severely limited ability to communicate with them once they are in the field.


Shortcomings stretch from basic training to intelligence capability, leaving the defence force if not defenceless as such, at least easily out-matched by a sufficiently large multi-front attack using chemical or biological weapons, heavily armoured units or any combination of these.

And that is the formal, written version. In private, analysts and military professionals across the board scoff at the idea that South Africa could defend itself from any serious, determined, concerted attack almost as much as they scoff at the idea that such an attack could take place in the foreseeable future.

“We are not going to fight a conventional war in the short-to-medium term,” said Len le Roux, a retired major general and consultant to the Institute for Security Studies on defence policy.

But if national defence remains the real job of the defence force, the defence review says, then somebody will have to pay for it.

“The persistent disconnect between the defence mandate, government expectation and resource allocation has eroded defence capabilities to the point where the defence force is unable to fully deliver its constitutional responsibility to defend and protect South Africa and its people and further cannot even support the current modest level of ambition,” the discussion draft reads.

Although it takes a high-level strategic view and specifically steers clear of enumerating crises and the cost of fixing them, the 423-page document makes it abundantly clear that maintenance of crumbling runways, for instance, will not wait. And there is wide consensus that almost every capability the defence force has is fast being eroded.

“We are at the point where we have two choices: either we spend a big chunk of money, or we do not intervene and we accept that we are going beyond the point of no return,” said Abel Esterhuyse, associate professor of strategy at Stellenbosch University’s faculty of military science and editor of the South African Journal of Military Studies.

That does not mean splurging on capital equipment arms-deal style. Both the review and analysts who were not involved in its drafting said operational funds were what was most desperately needed—money for the everyday running of the armed services rather than expensive equipment. What the existing forces need instead is to actually use their equipment, including what has already been bought at such expense and controversy.

“You have aircraft like the Gripen ... unless you have a certain number of flying hours a month you begin to lose the skills of the pilots and you can quite easily dig a large hole in the ground with a supersonic jet,” said David Chuter, a lecturer, a writer on defence and a former British defence official with a long history of project involvement in South Africa.

“The risk is that quite soon you have the pilot and you have the aircraft, but you don’t have a pilot capable of flying the aircraft effectively.”

Defence against the type of aggression that requires a Gripen fighter jet is not South Africa’s main area of concern at the moment, but the principle seems to hold true for the duties the military, air force and navy are carrying out.

Insufficient practice compounds problematic hardware and initial training and results in a force that has neither the credibility required to deter aggression nor the ability to fight poachers in the Kruger Park or pirates off the Mozambican coast. And there is a sense of near despair at the failure of politicians who order such tasks to fund them.

“Border protection was given back to the defence force from the South African Police Service [in 2010] without any substantial increase in budget to do that,” said Roelf Meyer, chairperson of the committee responsible for the defence review. “If the expectation is that we should take care of border protection and if it is a government priority, then we need more money.”

Although Meyer’s committee is independent of the military and tasked with reviewing it in terms of government priorities, he tends to slip into a parental “we” when speaking of the seemingly impossible demands being placed on the defence force. His committee’s draft document reads like an extended pitch for funding.

Still, his group well understands the political trouble a sudden and substantial increase in military spending would cause and seems to have learned from the work of the National Planning Commission. That body first published indicators—hard data with a touch of analysis that illustrated problems in an unarguable way. Once that was accepted, criticism of its subsequent hard-hitting recommendations was more difficult and critics found themselves called on to provide alternatives. The defence review could create the same type of baseline for the fully costed budget that will have to follow.

“I would like to see us build a consensus around the document as much as we can so that, when we put it to Parliament, we can say this is the view of South Africans,” said Meyer.

“I would hope we would be able to give this document to the minister [of defence] for her to put forward the argument, which I don’t think is any secret: the defence force is underfunded.”

In some respects, the argument for more money—and it will be an argument—will be easier than at any time in the past decade, the dragging bad karma of the arms deal notwithstanding. Better border protection also means preventing more smuggling of cigarettes and other goods that attract high levels of tax and are easily loaded on to a light aircraft, which should have a direct impact on taxes collected and thus be attractive to the more economically minded.

Combatting rhino poaching by way of the military tactics Chuter summarised, such as “scaring the shit” out of poachers through helicopter-landed special forces, touches on an issue particularly emotive for the middle class.

An improved peacekeeping capability would delight those with a pan-African bent. Commercial fishermen would approve of better patrolling of South Africa’s waters.

And, should the administration in charge in 2013 wish to reduce rather than magnify the perceived waste of money on the arms deal, a little bit of money could go a long way.

“For a relatively small amount of extra money, you can actually start making use of all this kit properly, in a way that would justify the initial expenditure and allow the defence force to carry out the missions it was bought for effectively,” said Chuter.

From defanged to refanged: How political change shaped the force
WHERE THINGS WENT WRONG
The disconnect between military requirements and military funding had its roots in the transition from apartheid, analysts said. It was a time when the overriding priority was to prevent a military coup, although there was a secondary nod to showing the rest of Southern Africa that South Africa would never again be a threat. That meant disempowering the military rather than supporting it and subsequent swift policy changes did not help.

“Mandela was trying to get the military out of the domestic environment. There was all this suspicion and doubt with white generals and black politicians, so the emphasis was on pulling them out of the domestic realm,” said Stellenbosch University’s Abel Esterhuyse. “Mbeki deployed the military into the foreign policy environment and made the key decision to disband the commando system, [leading to] the loss of that blanket domestic intelligence capability that we had across every small town in the country.

“Now, in the Zuma era, we are seeing that the police cannot cope with domestic challenges, so subtly the emphasis is starting to move towards a return to the domestic realm for the military. We do not want to be seen to be scaling down on our international commitments, but that is where it is going.”


Costly mission: The Gripen fighter jet. (Frans Dely)

In the middle of those shifts came the last formal defence review, conducted in 1998, which magnificently failed to predict anything like the actual future.

“There was a bit of a utopian view at the time, especially about Africa,” said Len le Roux, who was involved in that process. “The Cold War was over, apartheid was gone, so what could go wrong in Africa? The extent of South Africa’s commitment to peace missions was just not foreseen — and other stuff—I mean, who predicted the Arab Spring two years ago? Who predicted the way piracy would start up?”

But even as it became clear that South Africa would be a major participant in far-flung and complex missions for a long time to come, the requirement for more social spending and a big increase in public servant wages demanded reductions elsewhere. Then the global financial crisis struck state income.

DOMESTIC DEPLOYMENT
Deploying troops within South Africa’s borders in situations in which they could end up in conflict with civilians was long politically unpalatable. This, however, seems to be changing fast. The defence review makes no value judgment on domestic deployment, but coyly points out that the army requires urban warfare training anyway, which has value both in fighting insurgents north of Limpopo and in arresting violent service delivery protesters.

Effective border patrols would require a highly manoeuvrable component, such as motorbike squads, which likewise has a dual purpose. Non-lethal ammunition for the military is considered an important need, as is creating a faster process to authorise the deployment of defence units.



Analysts and military veterans also point out that the use of heavier weapons and explosives by crime syndicates requires an equal or greater response and that democracy may not be best served by militarising the police service to the point where it could handle such threats.

LABOUR ISSUES
The military has a labour problem. According to the defence review, it lacks a sufficient number of fighting soldiers while employing people variously described as uneconomical or ill-suited to their tasks. And it is costing too much. In the past financial year, 55% of the military budget went to personnel costs, whereas 40% is generally agreed to be a more acceptable level.

Outside analysts and former commanders, however, go much further. They said the application of general labour practices in the military meant an inability to discipline soldiers and prevented unsuitable recruits from being weeded out.

This, in a service such as the army that already has a clash of culture between the old defence force ways and the different norms brought in by the integration of forces from armed-struggle groups, has caused trouble. Add to the mix poorly conceived change to the formal discipline system and you have chaos.

“The current military discipline system [which entered into force in 1999] has not served its intended purpose and has conversely served to weaken military discipline and undermine the power of commanders,” said the defence review.

“The system has specifically disempowered commanders by removing summary discipline.”

After more than a decade under such a system and with the debate on unionisation within the defence force still unsettled, the results are starting to show and affect South Africa’s reputation.

“When you have troops on deployment in another country, they are representing you; they are flying your flag,” said one observer.

“When you have people misbehaving in shared United Nations camps and when you hear unflattering comparisons between South African officers and officers from other African countries, I wonder how much good we’re doing our strategy in Africa.”

THE MANY JOBS OF THE DEFENCE FORCE
On paper, the defence force has only one real objective: to seem scary enough to deter other countries or groups from looking for trouble and be ready enough to counter such trouble if it does develop. But as the review spells out in painstaking detail, it is being used in a wide range of other roles.

Peacekeeping operations
Troops have been deployed to a number of countries on the continent, where they have faced everything up to light artillery fire.

Border protection
After a hiatus of several years, the defence force was in 2010 ordered back to the borders. That is nearly 4 000km of coastline—excluding territorial waters—and a little less than 4 500km of land borders.

Piracy prevention
With pirates based in Somalia operating as far south as the Mozambique channel and with no other country on the east coast of Africa capable of patrolling waters far beyond its bases, the navy has by default become responsible for doing so.

Police support
Joint deployment has been few and far between, but the indications are that the army and air force will increasingly be called to battle gangs and help to quell service delivery protests.

Anti-poaching
Fighting rhino and abalone poaching requires skill and equipment found only in the military and its role in both is set to increase.

MARRYING DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENCE
The military has long resisted, with varying degrees of success, being seen as a potential creator of jobs, a developer of rural economies and, generally, a tool of the developmental agenda.


Among other non-core activities, the military is involved in anti-poaching and peacekeeping missions. (Gianluigi Guercia, AFP)

The defence review follows a similar line, pointing out that the military should “contribute to national development primarily by creating the security conditions necessary for development to take place”.

Land use and redistribution remains a particularly sticky issue. The military controls vast areas that often seem to be badly underutilised. But, the review says, some communication installations require quiet zones, some munition depots require safety zones and some types of training need wide open spaces.

The review concedes that although the defence force should not be structured around economic or social development, there are many things that can be done to help: identifying spare facilities in rural areas that communities can use for education, spreading bases more widely and making those bases procure more locally, opening base schools and hospitals to civilians and promoting local research, development and manufacture.


REVIEWING THE REVIEWERS
The defence review committee, which is due to deliver its final report in August, has at its political core a mixture of individuals with diverse experiences of the military and varying levels of political clout.

Chairperson Roelf Meyer was the minister of defence for a short period in late 1991 and early 1992, a time during which he apparently did not get along with hardline generals. He retired from politics in 2000, but still receives credit for his role as the chief government negotiator during the transition to democracy.

His deputy, Thandi Modise, received military training in Angola before being arrested as an Umkhonto we Sizwe operative. She is facing a possible revolt in North West, where she is premier.

Charles Nqakula became minister of defence after the toppling of Thabo Mbeki, apparently as a way to remove him from the safety and security portfolio, but did not survive the Zuma Cabinet reshuffle. And Tony Yengeni’s involvement in the arms deal indirectly resulted in him being jailed for a short time, but he remains a force within the ANC.—

agaugust:

Great research job Henry. Not like south Africans on this forum who write personal opinion from their bedroom to deceive us. Thanks Henry

andrewza:

What reshearch. He qutoed a artical writen by the sme group of people that say our subs never sail while they at sea, our frigates never sail while they returning from south amrica, our helcoters never fly while they conducting recues.

agaugust:

andrewza try to rebuild your d.amaged credibility and honesty a little bit, all your past comments pages 82 to 84 carry no weblink to prove what you say, you just post what you think in your bedroom.

show us weblink or source of your claim that shows Grippen can handle SU-27 jet. i hope you know there are about 10 different versions of SU-27 in different countries. there has never been any combat between Grippen and SU-27 in this world as at today, so what is your source of information?

south african cannot use about 50 GV6 artillery to defeat ethiopian 1,200 artillery. range is not going eman any thing when ethiopia advances on you with artillery fire 10 times more than south african fire. the shells ethiopia fires in 6 minutes will take south africa a whole 1 hour to fire the same number of shells.

artillery war is a game of firepower and accuracy of it. andrewza your navy sea training makes you a bad judge of army land warefare. go back to school.

south african military modern weapons have NEVER k.lled any human being since you manufactured them. all ethiopian weapons have been used to k.ill in major big wars against eritrea, somalia, and a brief attack on sudan. almost all south african soldiers have NEVER fought any nation vs nation war since they joined the army. ethiopian soldiers were up to 350,000 men that fought in year 2000 against eritrea in a full scale war.

ethiopia has used her SU-27 to shoot down several MIG 29 of eritera. south african Grippen have never shoot down any enemy jet fighter since you purchased them.
most of the south african bush war pilots wouth have retired by now from a war of 25 years ago when they were already maybe over 15 years in service or would your pilots fly for 40 years in service?

also in the bush war, wikipedia history says the south african Mirage F-1 pilots always avoid the cuban MIG 23 jets in direct combat jet vs jet air to air. they only do close support to south african army.

ethiopian millitary will d.emolish south african military any time any day. the records of history and list of weapons favours ethiopia as likely winner in war against south africa

agaugust:

Henry quoted his own source we see it, so you need to quote your own source for us to see. Stop writing your biased personal opinions for us to read on this forum, we are not illiterates or 7 year old children.

andrewza you say you have no time to post web link sources for your unverified claims, but you still spend so much time to reply every new post from Nigerians almost immediately

I begin to see you andrewza losing your credibility and honesty like snydergp lost his own and msauza never had it at all.

andrewza:

What do you mean quoate a source. I gave the infomation. SANDF dose not publises there ops. I know the sub was at sea because I watched it sail, I know the ship was in south amrica because it was a large exersize.

I am on my cell phone. Do you know how hard it is to find sources.
I have not changed I am just getting frustaited.

snydergp:

95% of all acquisitions are logged by international arms companies and the information is freely available even on the NA, the only difference would be the cost associated would mostly be classified but your national budget expenditure would reflect these acquisitions due to oversite by democratic institutions like opposition party's( that is if democracy is in place)

If you don't have it you don't, if u placed orders with reputable arms companies the world would know simple as that unless its intelligence related.

agaugust:

if you cannot find source weblink to prove your comment its better you keep silent and wait till you have proof.

I am using me cellphone too, so not only you. I am at work and my boss is in meeting with some military officers so I secretly use my mobile phone to browse internet.

Maybe you are frustrated because south African army is almost defeated by ethiopian army as the public can now see and laugh.

Capnd143: [b]i stand to strongly disagree bro! The Shaldags Mk.2 which were delivered to our navy bt never documented was built by a prominent and recognise isreali company; known as the ISREAL SHIPYARDS LTD. The were awarded certificate of standard on 1st january 2010 by Isreali Standard organisations! So the idea of trying to potray inferiority of our patrol boats will be a dillusion as our suppliers are world class ship builders! In addition to that, to refute your other point: it is very clear that Nigerian Navy might have been seeking confidential status of some sort which made the isreali rarely mention the name of our navy whenever we are the customer, rather when the officials are asked of their customer the refer to NN AS "AN AFRICAN Nation". You can glance through isreali-nigerian warship deals to confirm that! Even here on it website i even found them using same phrase http://www.israel-shipyards.com/news.asp

snydergp:

[b]Now boy stop talking sh*t do u even know the capabilities of saaf.

Here is the specifications on of the SU-27 and Gripen JAS-39/C and remember SA has both C and D versions.
http://www.aviatia.net/versus/jas-39-gripen-vs-sukhoi-su-27/

Now can we settle this SU-27 once and all mr bullsh*t talker, do your research because we all know your a amateur boy,
Your own NAF can't even keep ur F-7's in good service they already crashed 3 F-7's in the last two years due to poor pilot training and maintenance.

NAF bought 15 1980's tech F-7 which is nolonger even on the production line in China and crashed 3 within Two years now that is the worst crash record of any military in peace time over the last 10 years your sh*ty NAF is far worse then Rwanda.

Nigerias air safety record is also in shambles with over 6 commercial passenger crashes in 4 years your country is so worse that even the EU air safety authorities banned flights a few years ago and don't even allow ur planes in there airspace without proper safety checks.

Now is this the same wurthless Nigeria who can't even guarantee the safety of its NAF pilots claiming there the best in Africa when the very same Ethiopia out classes you in all sectors of your ill disciplined army

Go dream over this sh*t this weekend amateur[/b]

agaugust:

if you cannot find source weblink to prove your comment its better you keep silent and wait till you have proof.

I am using me cellphone too, so not only you. I am at work and my boss is in meeting with some military officers so I secretly use my mobile phone to browse internet.

Maybe you are frustrated because south African army is almost defeated by ethiopian army as the public can now see and laugh.

Capnd143: truely speaking bro! This comment doesnt hold water! How does EU air restriction affect the topic at hand? And crashing of planes?

Please bro, with due respect always analyze certain points before posting bro! And you keep calling nigerian navy sh*t navy! Lol bro! If the were that sh*t as you claimed then why did SA withdraw it warship 4rm the gulf of guinea which is a Nigerian sphere of influnce and patrol by nigerian naval forces? The should have push forward rather than tender an apology! Then surely the would have felt the wrat of the Great nigerian Navy!

andrewza:

I can't let miss truths remian.

Is that against ops second


No I proofed that wrong. It 3 things

1 this thread gets derialed to easyly

2 people think to patroticly, with hatred, or straight miss infomation.

3 I keep posting reposnse that then get redirected.

Capnd143: truely speaking bro! This comment doesnt hold water! How does EU air restriction affect the topic at hand? And crashing of planes?

Please bro, with due respect always analyze certain points before posting bro! And you keep calling nigerian navy sh*t navy! Lol bro! If the were that sh*t as you claimed then why did SA withdraw it warship 4rm the gulf of guinea which is a Nigerian sphere of influnce and patrol by nigerian naval forces? The should have push forward rather than tender an apology! Then surely the would have felt the wrat of the Great nigerian Navy!

Henry120:

It gets derailed to easily because you and your compatriots are always hell bent on painting nigeria black. We as nigerians would not stand for that.

No hatred on the nigerian side, as it is usually syndergp and msuaza both of whom are your country men who have continued to show their xenophobic traits on this thread, and we nigerians would definitely not take that lying down. There is nothing wrong in been patriotic and we have not peddled any form of mis information as we always provide links and photos to prove you guys wrong.

snydergp:

Ivory Coast and its coastline were never under the control of Nigeria infact, Nigeria protested this at the AU summit and saying that souyh africa is backing up Bagbo and is not a neutral force. Even then the SAS Drakenberg is a naval supply vessel not a frigate but it packet enough power to stand its ground against any threat it faces.

Stop twisting issues because I've posted the link of this story last year already.

Capnd143: wrong! Even the west knows that those coastline are under nigerian influence! The security of the gulf of guinea is Nigerias obligation along side neigbouring nation! Check how the international dailies reported it;

yahoo: SA provocatively sends warship to gulf,NIGERIAS TRADITIONAL SPHERE OF INFLUENCE!
When the matter was brought up the SA claimed having informed nigerian C-in-C and ghanians!

And to further show how biased .co.za domain media are, the always critize,exagerate matters of less significance! Just take a look this:
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/sa-sends-warship-to-gulf-of-guinea-1.1027637http://m.mg.co.za/index.php?view=article&urlid=2008-05-20-nigeria-becomes-world-piracy-hot-spot&views=1&mobi=true&KEY=hqdhrjh73a9thp5bgrlk8kct41

Capnd143: wrong! Even the west knows that those coastline are under nigerian influence! The security of the gulf of guinea is Nigerias obligation along side neigbouring nation! Check how the international dailies reported it;

yahoo: SA provocatively sends warship to gulf,NIGERIAS TRADITIONAL SPHERE OF INFLUENCE!
When the matter was brought up the SA claimed having informed nigerian C-in-C and ghanians!

And to further show how biased .co.za domain media are, the always critize,exagerate matters of less significance! Just take a look this:
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/sa-sends-warship-to-gulf-of-guinea-1.1027637http://m.mg.co.za/index.php?view=article&urlid=2008-05-20-nigeria-becomes-world-piracy-hot-spot&views=1&mobi=true&KEY=hqdhrjh73a9thp5bgrlk8kct41

Henry120:

It gets derailed to easily because you and your compatriots are always hell bent on painting nigeria black. We as nigerians would not stand for that.

No hatred on the nigerian side, as it is usually syndergp and msuaza both of whom are your country men who have continued to show their xenophobic traits on this thread, and we nigerians would definitely not take that lying down. There is nothing wrong in been patriotic and we have not peddled any form of mis information as we always provide links and photos to prove you guys wrong.

Capnd143: Nigeria (Esco) - July 22, 2012 04:52 PM (GMT)
Nigeria 's Military Budget
Military Budget
QUOTE
Payment Plan
RU-2012-$96,000,000,2013-$511,600,000,2013-$288,000,000
USA-2012-$116,500,000 (Pending)
South African-2012-$80,000,000, 2013-$130,000,000 , 2013-$42,500,000
Ukraine-2012-$8,500,000
China-2012-$10,000,000, 2014-$945,000,000-2015-$931,472,000-2016-$931,472,000
UK-2013-$150,000,000
QUOTE
2012 Purchases
RU
(24) Dozor 600 UAV--$96,000,000 (Delivery scheduled for Q4 2013)
(15)-Mi-35M -$240,000,000 ( delivered by Q3 2013)
(6)-Ka-50N-$140,000,000 ( delivered by Q3 2013)
(100)-BTR-T APC-$40,000,000 (upgraded from Nigeria's T-55 stock) ( delivered by Q3 2013)
(300)-GAZ-2975 'Tigr' HMMMV:-$30,000,000 ( delivered by Q3 2013)
(77)-T-72BM-$61,600,000 (upgraded from Nigeria T-72 stock) ( upgrades will be completed by Q1 2013)
(2)-Mi-26T2-$36,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(4)-Ka-29TB-$48,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(3)-Ka-60/64-$36,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(1)-Il-76MF-$50,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(12)-Mi-17/Mi-8 (Variants: (10) Mi-17-1V and (2) Mi-17-1VA)-$108,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(100)-KAB-1500LG-Pr-E (Variants: (50) KAB-1500LG-F-E, (25) KAB-1500LG-OD-E, and (25) KAB-1500LG-Pr-E-$10,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
USA
(1) MQ-9 Reaper UCAV (4-unit system)
(100) EGBU-12 Paveway II 500-lb-$116,500,000 (Delivery scheduled for Pending)
South African
(30) G6-52ER 155mm SPH-$210,000,000 (Delivery scheduled for Q3 2013, with the final units delivered by Q12015)
(25)-Rooikat 76-$55,000,000 (delivery by Q1 2013, with final deliveries in Q3)
Ukraine
(-BTR-4 APC-$8,500,000 (delivered by Q2 2013)
China
(5)-ZBD-97-$10,000,000 (4Q2013)
(33) ZBD-97s-(free vehicles for the purpose of training and maintenance)
(95) ZBD-97s-$195 million (45 ZBD-97 delivered 1Q2013) ( 50 vehicles delivered 1Q 2014)
(10) L-15 Advanced Jet Trainers-$150 million (can I be provided with a delivery date)
(24) JH-7A-$600 million (24 JH7A aircraft will be delivered 1Q 2014)
UK
(300)-ILAV Badger -$150,000,000-(Badger ILAV (200) 6x6 configuration and (100) 4×4) (Deliveries complete by first quarter of 2014)

Capnd143: Nigeria (Esco) - July 22, 2012 04:52 PM (GMT)
Nigeria 's Military Budget
Military Budget
QUOTE
Payment Plan
RU-2012-$96,000,000,2013-$511,600,000,2013-$288,000,000
USA-2012-$116,500,000 (Pending)
South African-2012-$80,000,000, 2013-$130,000,000 , 2013-$42,500,000
Ukraine-2012-$8,500,000
China-2012-$10,000,000, 2014-$945,000,000-2015-$931,472,000-2016-$931,472,000
UK-2013-$150,000,000
QUOTE
2012 Purchases
RU
(24) Dozor 600 UAV--$96,000,000 (Delivery scheduled for Q4 2013)
(15)-Mi-35M -$240,000,000 ( delivered by Q3 2013)
(6)-Ka-50N-$140,000,000 ( delivered by Q3 2013)
(100)-BTR-T APC-$40,000,000 (upgraded from Nigeria's T-55 stock) ( delivered by Q3 2013)
(300)-GAZ-2975 'Tigr' HMMMV:-$30,000,000 ( delivered by Q3 2013)
(77)-T-72BM-$61,600,000 (upgraded from Nigeria T-72 stock) ( upgrades will be completed by Q1 2013)
(2)-Mi-26T2-$36,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(4)-Ka-29TB-$48,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(3)-Ka-60/64-$36,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(1)-Il-76MF-$50,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(12)-Mi-17/Mi-8 (Variants: (10) Mi-17-1V and (2) Mi-17-1VA)-$108,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
(100)-KAB-1500LG-Pr-E (Variants: (50) KAB-1500LG-F-E, (25) KAB-1500LG-OD-E, and (25) KAB-1500LG-Pr-E-$10,000,000 (delivered in Q4 2013)
USA
(1) MQ-9 Reaper UCAV (4-unit system)
(100) EGBU-12 Paveway II 500-lb-$116,500,000 (Delivery scheduled for Pending)
South African
(30) G6-52ER 155mm SPH-$210,000,000 (Delivery scheduled for Q3 2013, with the final units delivered by Q12015)
(25)-Rooikat 76-$55,000,000 (delivery by Q1 2013, with final deliveries in Q3)
Ukraine
(-BTR-4 APC-$8,500,000 (delivered by Q2 2013)
China
(5)-ZBD-97-$10,000,000 (4Q2013)
(33) ZBD-97s-(free vehicles for the purpose of training and maintenance)
(95) ZBD-97s-$195 million (45 ZBD-97 delivered 1Q2013) ( 50 vehicles delivered 1Q 2014)
(10) L-15 Advanced Jet Trainers-$150 million (can I be provided with a delivery date)
(24) JH-7A-$600 million (24 JH7A aircraft will be delivered 1Q 2014)
UK
(300)-ILAV Badger -$150,000,000-(Badger ILAV (200) 6x6 configuration and (100) 4×4) (Deliveries complete by first quarter of 2014)