Such a great number. What will be their fate now.

Moyinoluwa35:
Hmm

Good evening ma. I have been messaging you but you didn't reply. Please I want you to help me with the air force job, I will appreciate it ma. I sent you a DM, please reply this time.

Vicson2021:
Don't even wait for them to attack you this time,go and attack let the war start.
Una na chicken?
You wait for government,una go finish o

I dey even wonder when this will ever end in this nation.

Cold dey catch bandits too. Lol.

OYEDIPE:

The naira appreciated today. This is not a good news to push to the front page. We know your agenda.

I was surprised after seeing this thread too. I thought naira appreciated after the CBN's order!

That is the country we found ourselves. Getting worst day by day.

Lol. Some people wake up to it early morning. They are already addicted to it.

Jeez... This is bad.

Evestar200:
The NDA corpers lodge is for Corpers posted to NDA.

There are two Corpers Lodge inside NDA, one for Corpers posted to Command Secondary School while the other one is for NDA corpers.

Okay thanks.
So there's no general corpers lodge in KD town?

Evestar200:
Not in Asaba right now. So I don't know if is true or not

Hello. Good evening. Please is there any other corpers lodge aside the NCCF at Barnawa? And sorry is the NDA corpers lodge at kurmin mashi only for those posted to NDA? Thanks

Evestar200:
They do. My friends Serve in NDA and all of them live inside the Ribadu Cantonment.

I guess you're a corps member too?

Rinoxy:

Well, the last Corper we took, she wasn't paid.

Okay sir

Rinoxy:

I'm not sure about it.

Ok sir. Thanks. But I'll be happy if you can help me ask around to be sure.
Like you're based in Kaduna too?

Rinoxy:

Congratulations.

Hello sir. Good afternoon sir. Please do TIC pay corps members serving with them? Thanks

Things will sup

Evestar200:
If you go to NYSC secretariat at Angwan Rimi, they will change it for you.

Okay

Evestar200:
If you are a Christian go to NCCF at Barnawa.

Okay

Nice..

Nice..

Nice..

saintbillion:

Platoon 4.

I've emailed you to get ur WhatsApp contact

saintbillion:

Which platoon u dey boss?

Six boss and you? Pls drop ur WhatsApp no

saintbillion:

Yea boss

Make we link up na

saintbillion:

Yea boss

Awfr boss
I dey Kaduna camp like this

To be sure, some successful coups do usher in more democratic regimes. In recent years, some observers have gone so far as to suggest that coups may be the most practical way to force long-entrenched dictators from power. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of so-called “good coups”—defined as those that are followed by competitive elections—has been on the rise. But more often than not, coups in authoritarian regimes still simply replace one dictator with another. Those coups that are followed by elections, moreover, typically revert to authoritarianism within a few years. In part, this is because many coup leaders receive support and protection from autocratic sponsors abroad. More generally, military intervention in politics undermines norms of civilian control that are a prerequisite for stable, democratic rule.

About half of coup attempts succeed overall, and those staged against democratic regimes are more likely to succeed than those against dictatorships. In the past decade alone, newly elected rulers in Egypt, Honduras, and Thailand have fallen to coups. The 2013 coup in Egypt ousted Mohamed Morsi, the country’s first democratically elected leader, from power. In its aftermath, human rights organizations documented mass, arbitrary arrests; the detention of protestors and human rights workers; new restrictions on nongovernmental organizations; and a crackdown on political opposition.

Between 2000 and 2019, soldiers in thirty-one different states attempted to seize power, staging more than fifty different coup attempts altogether. While coups are no longer as common as they once were, the threat of a coup thus remains a pressing one. Coups are the most common way dictatorships begin and end. They also remain common in many democracies. Newly democratizing regimes, which have not yet developed norms of civilian and democratic governance, are particularly vulnerable. Knowing what works, and what does not, in stopping coups is important because their outcomes can have alarming consequences.

Understanding how counterbalancing works can thus help us predict where coup attempts will occur, whether they will succeed, and how violent they are likely to be. Taken together, the arguments and evidence in this book suggest that while counterbalancing may prevent successful coups, it is a risky strategy to pursue—and one that may weaken regimes in the long term.

My message to African leaders:


CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
How to Prevent Coups d’État
Return to Home
In April 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s military collapsed within weeks. While the mismatch between the adversaries’ capabilities left little doubt about the eventual outcome of the war, the conflict was notable for the speed with which conventional military resistance fell apart. There was a reason for this. For most of his time in office, Saddam had divided the country’s coercive power into multiple, overlapping security and intelligence organizations— efforts to insulate his regime from coups d’état that also sapped morale within the armed forces and undermined military effectiveness. A decade later, following a multiyear, $20 billion effort to rebuild military capacity, it became clear that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had hobbled the reconstituted Iraqi army in similar ways. As a result, in the spring of 2014, when the Islamic State began capturing territory across northern Iraq, Maliki took much of the blame.

The dilemma Iraqi rulers have faced is hardly unique. How to build a military strong enough to defend the state against the threat of war and rebellion—but not so powerful as to undermine civilian rule—is a fundamental challenge for democratic and authoritarian rulers alike. For individual leaders, the decision to prioritize coup prevention is a rational one. The threat of a coup is more immediate and unpredictable than the threat posed by civil war or international conflict. The overwhelming majority of rulers removed from power via a coup face death, exile, or jail. In their efforts to prevent coups, rulers adopt a range of coup-proofing strategies that can hinder military effectiveness, reinforce ethnic and political divides, and drain financial resources. Some rulers artificially inflate defense budgets and salaries, while others take the opposite approach—keeping the size of the military small, restricting soldiers’ access to arms, or rotating officers frequently to prevent them from developing their own bases of power. Elsewhere, leaders manipulate recruitment and promotion within the military to surround themselves with loyal troops.

The threat of a coup is more immediate and unpredictable than the threat posed by civil war or international conflict.

The choices that Saddam and Maliki made are particularly common ones: counterbalancing the military with republican guards, militarized police, and other paramilitary forces is often a central feature of rulers’ coup-prevention strategies. From the praetorian guard in ancient Rome to the secret police in Soviet Russia and national militia in contemporary Venezuela, coercive institutions outside the regular military have long been used as a bulwark against coups. Yet despite the frequency with which counterbalancing is employed—and the ways in which it can weaken military capacity—we know little about whether and how it works. Is counterbalancing an effective way to prevent coups d’état?

This book demonstrates that the way rulers structure their coercive institutions can indeed have profound effects on the survival of their regimes. Drawing upon an original dataset of security forces in 110 countries, combined with careful process tracing in cases of individual coup attempts, it shows that counterbalancing the military with coercive institutions outside the regular military chain of command increases the risk that coup attempts will fail. The presence of additional security forces can make it more difficult for coup plotters to recruit among key units in advance. While a coup attempt is under way, counterbalancing creates incentives to resist the coup. Because the consequences for being on the losing side of a coup attempt can be dire, most officers remain on the sidelines until it is clear what the outcome of the coup will be. When rulers organize security forces outside of military command, however, it changes the calculus, increasing the costs of inaction and creating incentives for officers in such forces to defend the incumbent regime. Counterbalancing also complicates coup plotters’ efforts to monopolize information during a coup, increasing uncertainty about the outcome of the coup—and thus also the odds that at least some officers will resist. However, counterbalancing is not without risk for the leaders who adopt it. Where counterweights compete with the military for resources and recruits, resentment and fear about a decline in status among military officers can provoke new coup attempts, even as counterbalancing creates obstacles to their execution. Furthermore, the way in which counterbalancing works—by creating incentives for armed resistance—increases the risk that coup attempts will escalate to civil war.

Anatomy of a coup: Social and governance red flags common in vulnerable countries
Political Risk Outlook 2022
by Eric Humphery-Smith and Maja Bovcon, 1 June 2022

Six successful coups in the space of 11 months is highly unusual, but that is just what we saw between February 2021 and January 2022. This worrying trend elicits key questions. First and foremost is where might be next?

Our predictive State Instability Index provides a good starting point. Virtually every country that has experienced a successful putsch in the last five years featured in the top 40 of the index, which assesses the risk of a major destabilising event over the next 12 months, including a coup, a civil war, or genocide. The latest edition reveals that Africa currently accounts for 50% of the highest risk countries, followed by Asia with 30%.

However, to distinguish between destabilising events and to narrow the focus down to coups specifically, we’ve combined the State Instability Index with insight gathered from a selected range of our Social and Governance risk indices, together with qualitative analysis from our experts. In doing so, we’ve isolated a group of countries that share a set of characteristics that are predominantly present where military takeovers occur. Coups are, in general, rare events, so it’s important to stress that we’re not saying one will happen. But based on the structural factors we’ve identified, Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe are among the most vulnerable, although mitigating factors will likely prevent a coup in some of them.

Aside from the ‘where next’, there are two crucial aspects of military takeovers that are also worth exploring. Why do they happen? And importantly for investors, what happens once they occur? Perhaps unsurprisingly, our data shows that the investment landscape rarely, if ever, improves after a coup. In fact, it often gets worse: almost half of all coups since 2000 were repeats – one coup .

African region three times as likely to host the next coup
Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau are just the latest in a growing list of African countries that have witnessed a coup attempt in the last five years. Since the turn of the century, there has been on average a 1% probability that a coup will occur in any given country in a year. In Africa, however, this rate triples to over 3% (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Africa has become the world’s coup hotspot

Our Social and Governance risk indices reveal how high levels of poverty and unemployment, weak institutions, insecurity and strained public finances make governments more prone to experiencing a coup and less able to counter the instigators. Figure 2 shows that coup-affected countries face greater social and governance risks. In a set of indices that includes Government Stability, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Democratic Governance and Corruption, the difference in average score between countries that have experienced a coup and those that haven’t is highly significant. On our 0.00–10.00 risk scale, coup countries perform worse than their non-coup counterparts on each index. This gap in performance indicates the far higher average coup risk of countries in Africa and Asia, which also generally inhabit the worst-performing end of our State Instability Index.

Figure 2: Countries that experience a coup fair significantly worse on key indices

The countries most vulnerable to a coup in 2022
Based on both our State Instability Index and our social and governance indices, a number of countries share similar structural vulnerabilities to those that have experienced a coup. This includes Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe (see Figure 3), each a nation with a rich history of coup attempts, or where an ageing autocrat allows factionalism to flourish.

Gabon, which saw a failed coup in January 2019, is a prime example. The Bongo family dynasty is clinging to power amid opposition from within the ruling party against President Ali Bongo’s heir apparent, Noureddin Bongo Valentin. In Zimbabwe, factionalism within the ruling ZANU-PF remains rife and poses a permanent threat to government stability. President Emmerson Mnangagwa de facto recognised this when he gave a prominent role to the military in his government to mitigate the risk of an overthrow.

Figure 3: Africa and Asia most vulnerable to coups

The dynamics behind a successful coup are never simple though. Mitigating factors, including geopolitics, can play a role in offsetting the chances of a military takeover for some jurisdictions. For instance, despite a high-risk environment in Kyrgyzstan, the chance of a successful coup decreases due to significant security and economic support from its regional superpower Russia. We saw something similar in neighbouring Kazakhstan, where the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the Russian-led regional security bloc – was quick to intervene when it looked as though President Tokayev’s regime was ripe to be overrun in early 2022. French military presence also reduces the likelihood of a coup in Côte d’Ivoire, even though the country would otherwise provide fertile ground for a takeover, due to its rich history of coup attempts and the fact that President Ouattara is serving a contentious third term.

Coups worsen operating and investment landscapes
Increasingly stringent ESG targets mean that countries that experience a coup face restricted access to international finance and are more likely than their peers to fall into a vicious cycle of instability and depressed economic development. Coup leaders often justify their seizure of power by pointing to the poor governance record of the overthrown regime. They also pledge to uphold democracy, but the hierarchical nature of the military – which does not tolerate dissent – makes this impossible. Indeed, performance on our social and governance indices more often than not deteriorates after a coup.

In Guinea, Mamady Doumbouya, the head of the special forces that deposed President Alpha Condé on 5 September 2021, denounced the Condé administration’s bad governance, corruption, and disregard for democratic principles. But in the months that followed, Doumbouya failed to live up to his promises, making no serious attempts to reform government or investigate allegations of corruption, much less commit to elections and a civilian transition within a quick timeframe. Indeed, we have seen virtually no improvement on our corresponding indices in the months following the coup.

In Sudan, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s military regime has stepped up the crackdown on pro-democracy movements, antagonising protestors. This chain reaction is reflected in the country’s scores on our Civil Unrest and Freedom of Opinion and Expression indices, both of which deteriorated following the coup.

Operational disruption and sanctions following a coup depress state revenues. We see this deterioration on our Public Debt and Fiscal Debt indices, prolonging sovereign default risks. In coup-affected countries, political and regulatory uncertainty also increase.

One silver lining for investors is that coup leaders do not generally have an increased appetite for resource nationalism. Scores on our Resource Nationalism Index one quarter before and after the coup remain on average unchanged, showing that coup leaders are aware of the need to reassure operators so that revenues continue to flow into state coffers.

Paying attention to the signals
Our data show that there are usually red flags well before coups occur. Treating these events as scenarios that can be anticipated and planned for is the best means to reduce the element of surprise. Savvy corporates and portfolio managers can employ predictive models and monitor the exposure of portfolios to S and G risks to develop robust mitigation strategies. However, as shown by our analysis, the complex and fast-moving signals that precede a coup still require detailed examination to find trigger points and connect the dots.

As the confluence of the global economic slowdown, inflationary pressures, and food shortages ignites popular dissatisfaction across the globe, it also increases the risk of governments succumbing to overzealous military leaders over the next year. Reading the signs now is more important than ever.

Six successful coups in the space of 11 months is highly unusual, but that is just what we saw between February 2021 and January 2022. This worrying trend elicits key questions. First and foremost is where might be next?

Our predictive State Instability Index provides a good starting point. Virtually every country that has experienced a successful putsch in the last five years featured in the top 40 of the index, which assesses the risk of a major destabilising event over the next 12 months, including a coup, a civil war, or genocide. The latest edition reveals that Africa currently accounts for 50% of the highest risk countries, followed by Asia with 30%.

However, to distinguish between destabilising events and to narrow the focus down to coups specifically, we’ve combined the State Instability Index with insight gathered from a selected range of our Social and Governance risk indices, together with qualitative analysis from our experts. In doing so, we’ve isolated a group of countries that share a set of characteristics that are predominantly present where military takeovers occur. Coups are, in general, rare events, so it’s important to stress that we’re not saying one will happen. But based on the structural factors we’ve identified, Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe are among the most vulnerable, although mitigating factors will likely prevent a coup in some of them.

Aside from the ‘where next’, there are two crucial aspects of military takeovers that are also worth exploring. Why do they happen? And importantly for investors, what happens once they occur? Perhaps unsurprisingly, our data shows that the investment landscape rarely, if ever, improves after a coup. In fact, it often gets worse: almost half of all coups since 2000 were repeats – one coup .

African region three times as likely to host the next coup
Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau are just the latest in a growing list of African countries that have witnessed a coup attempt in the last five years. Since the turn of the century, there has been on average a 1% probability that a coup will occur in any given country in a year. In Africa, however, this rate triples to over 3%

The countries most vulnerable to a coup in 2022

Based on both our State Instability Index and our social and governance indices, a number of countries share similar structural vulnerabilities to those that have experienced a coup. This includes Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe, each a nation with a rich history of coup attempts, or where an ageing autocrat allows factionalism to flourish.

Gabon, which saw a failed coup in January 2019, is a prime example. The Bongo family dynasty is clinging to power amid opposition from within the ruling party against President Ali Bongo’s heir apparent, Noureddin Bongo Valentin. In Zimbabwe, factionalism within the ruling ZANU-PF remains rife and poses a permanent threat to government stability. President Emmerson Mnangagwa de facto recognised this when he gave a prominent role to the military in his government to mitigate the risk of an overthrow.

Anatomy of a coup: Social and governance red flags common in vulnerable countries
Political Risk Outlook 2022
by Eric Humphery-Smith and Maja Bovcon, 1 June 2022

Six successful coups in the space of 11 months is highly unusual, but that is just what we saw between February 2021 and January 2022. This worrying trend elicits key questions. First and foremost is where might be next?

Our predictive State Instability Index provides a good starting point. Virtually every country that has experienced a successful putsch in the last five years featured in the top 40 of the index, which assesses the risk of a major destabilising event over the next 12 months, including a coup, a civil war, or genocide. The latest edition reveals that Africa currently accounts for 50% of the highest risk countries, followed by Asia with 30%.

However, to distinguish between destabilising events and to narrow the focus down to coups specifically, we’ve combined the State Instability Index with insight gathered from a selected range of our Social and Governance risk indices, together with qualitative analysis from our experts. In doing so, we’ve isolated a group of countries that share a set of characteristics that are predominantly present where military takeovers occur. Coups are, in general, rare events, so it’s important to stress that we’re not saying one will happen. But based on the structural factors we’ve identified, Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe are among the most vulnerable, although mitigating factors will likely prevent a coup in some of them.

Aside from the ‘where next’, there are two crucial aspects of military takeovers that are also worth exploring. Why do they happen? And importantly for investors, what happens once they occur? Perhaps unsurprisingly, our data shows that the investment landscape rarely, if ever, improves after a coup. In fact, it often gets worse: almost half of all coups since 2000 were repeats – one coup .

African region three times as likely to host the next coup
Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau are just the latest in a growing list of African countries that have witnessed a coup attempt in the last five years. Since the turn of the century, there has been on average a 1% probability that a coup will occur in any given country in a year. In Africa, however, this rate triples to over 3% (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Africa has become the world’s coup hotspot

Our Social and Governance risk indices reveal how high levels of poverty and unemployment, weak institutions, insecurity and strained public finances make governments more prone to experiencing a coup and less able to counter the instigators. Figure 2 shows that coup-affected countries face greater social and governance risks. In a set of indices that includes Government Stability, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Democratic Governance and Corruption, the difference in average score between countries that have experienced a coup and those that haven’t is highly significant. On our 0.00–10.00 risk scale, coup countries perform worse than their non-coup counterparts on each index. This gap in performance indicates the far higher average coup risk of countries in Africa and Asia, which also generally inhabit the worst-performing end of our State Instability Index.

Figure 2: Countries that experience a coup fair significantly worse on key indices

The countries most vulnerable to a coup in 2022
Based on both our State Instability Index and our social and governance indices, a number of countries share similar structural vulnerabilities to those that have experienced a coup. This includes Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe (see Figure 3), each a nation with a rich history of coup attempts, or where an ageing autocrat allows factionalism to flourish.

Gabon, which saw a failed coup in January 2019, is a prime example. The Bongo family dynasty is clinging to power amid opposition from within the ruling party against President Ali Bongo’s heir apparent, Noureddin Bongo Valentin. In Zimbabwe, factionalism within the ruling ZANU-PF remains rife and poses a permanent threat to government stability. President Emmerson Mnangagwa de facto recognised this when he gave a prominent role to the military in his government to mitigate the risk of an overthrow.

Africa and Asia most vulnerable to coups

The dynamics behind a successful coup are never simple though. Mitigating factors, including geopolitics, can play a role in offsetting the chances of a military takeover for some jurisdictions. For instance, despite a high-risk environment in Kyrgyzstan, the chance of a successful coup decreases due to significant security and economic support from its regional superpower Russia. We saw something similar in neighbouring Kazakhstan, where the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the Russian-led regional security bloc – was quick to intervene when it looked as though President Tokayev’s regime was ripe to be overrun in early 2022. French military presence also reduces the likelihood of a coup in Côte d’Ivoire, even though the country would otherwise provide fertile ground for a takeover, due to its rich history of coup attempts and the fact that President Ouattara is serving a contentious third term.

Coup Lords

The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have viewed African coups as a means of enhancing their regional ambitions. They have been actively sponsoring the Sudanese military’s bid to hold onto power. They have also been busy behind the scenes in emboldening and providing cover to Kais Saied’s auto-golpe in Tunisia. Preventing an Arab democracy from taking root also blunts any reformist momentum these Gulf states might face to open their own highly restrictive governance structures.

Russia has also been actively supporting coups in Africa. Often working through the Wagner mercenary group, Moscow has maintained a close relationship with the military throughout Sudan’s democratic transition and reportedly agitated for it to seize power. In exchange for its support, the Sudanese junta is likely to grant Russia naval port access to Port Sudan, giving Moscow a military foothold in the important Red Sea corridor. Wagner interests will also continue to operate in western Sudan in support of gold and other illicit trafficking through the Central African Republic.

In Mali, pro-Russian disinformation campaigns had disparaged the authority of democratically elected President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in the year preceding the August 2020 coup. This messaging contributed to the opposition protests against Keita that were used as a justification for the coup. Several members of the junta had previously studied in Russia.

To compensate for their lack of domestic legitimacy, coup makers crave international validation. This gives external authoritarian actors more leverage to compromise a state’s sovereignty. The coup in Mali, for example, has led the junta to consider inviting in Russian mercenaries, an action that would dramatically reshape Malian security and foreign policy. The effect of such a decision, taken by unelected military officers operating outside a constitutional framework and absent public accountability, wouldn’t be in the interests of Malian citizens, but it would enhance Russian leverage.

Ways International Democratic Actors Can Mitigate Coups
The most significant action the international democratic community can take to reverse the trend of coups in Africa is to incentivize democracy. African governments that commit to and uphold democratic practices should merit significantly greater diplomatic support, development and security assistance, and promotion of private investment. While Africa’s democratization wave of the 1990’s and 2000’s was led by domestic reformers, there were clear international incentives for adapting democratic norms. International democratic actors need to recommit themselves to these norms by building a more unified posture in sustaining opposition to coups
This diplomatic effort needs to actively engage the African Union and Regional Economic Communities, each of which have their own democracy charters, to affirm these norms. Much of the public reaction and coordination of international responses to a coup occurs through these regional bodies. If African regional institutions are clear in condemning a coup, it is far easier for the international democratic community to rally behind that position.

International democratic actors may rationalize that, once a coup has occurred, the best that can be done is to maintain engagement in the hope of encouraging gradual reform over time. The problem with this approach is that leaders who have come to power by breaking the rules—be it through coups or by evading term limits—tend not to moderate but to act with escalating impunity.

The flip side of providing incentives for Africa’s democratizers is the need to consistently impose real costs on coup makers. Those who seize power extralegally should not be recognized. Financial assistance and debt relief should be suspended. Coup leaders should have their assets frozen and denied access to the international financial system. Coup-installed governments should be denied access to sovereign accounts. The posture should be to first walk back the coup, then negotiate, not vice-versa.

By ensuring there are stringent costs on coup leaders, international democratic actors can also help balance the scales domestically. Protests and widespread civil disobedience from citizens who reject the unconstitutional seizure of power can escalate pressure on coup leaders. International democratic actors, therefore, must be careful they do not inadvertently undercut this domestic resistance by recognizing a coup, effectively providing legitimacy where it is otherwise absent.

External powers that are financially or politically propping up coup leaders must also face costs. In addition to blocking the democratic aspirations of millions of Africans, these actors are effectively undermining a rules-based international system while reaping the benefits from it. These costs should be reputational and financial. Naming and shaming can deepen antipathy towards these external spoilers and limit their regional influence. This should be accompanied by curtailed security cooperation, constrained access to Western markets and financial networks, and sanctions under the European or Global Magnitsky Acts and Global Fragility Act.

This is not just a moral stance but one that contributes to a more stable and prosperous Africa that can yield more reliable security and economic partners. Africa’s autocracies are responsible for over 75 percent of the continent’s conflicts, forced migration, and food crises. If the West wants to help stem the flow of these destabilizing forces, then it needs to be a steadfast champion of democracy in Africa.

There was a reason the international community broadly worked to eliminate coups in the post-Cold War period. The same rationale persists today. The question is whether international actors remember the script.