Ghm's Posts
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megawealth01:True talk. I am holding my OandO shares because the upside potential is enourmous. Oando is the only indigenous upstream oil company not being run by an industry professional at the moment—and Wale needs to do something about it ASAP. He can remain Group CEO or become Chairman, but he should bring in a CEO who is an oil and gas expert. Seplat and Aradel are run by well-known industry leaders. Oando is not. Seplat is led by Effiong Okon, who spent 35+ years at Shell and served as Operations Director and ANOH Gas MD before becoming CEO in August 2026 . He is an engineer by training with deep operational credibility. Aradel is led by Gbite Falade, who runs a technically driven leadership team and grew the company from 67 to 273 employees . The Group Chief Technical Officer sits in the executive structure. Oando is led by Wale Tinubu—a lawyer, financier, and dealmaker. He built the company through acquisitions (ConocoPhillips, NAOC) and capital markets. That is a financier-dealmaker model, not an operator model. Does Oando have technical people? Yes. Ainojie "Alex" Irune serves as MD of Oando Energy Resources (the upstream subsidiary) and Group Executive Director . But the Group CEO role at Oando is not structured as a technical leadership position. That is the problem. The issue is simple: Oando has shifted from acquiring assets to operating them. The NAOC acquisition brought 24 producing fields, 1,255 km of pipelines, and 14 flow stations . Acquisition is a finance game. Production is an operations game. The skill set required at the top has changed. What Wale could do: Become Group Chairman – focus on capital allocation, M&A, and strategic partnerships (his strength) Hire a technical CEO – an upstream operator with deep reservoir, drilling, and production experience to run day-to-day operations This mirrors Seplat's transition model, where Roger Brown (finance background) handed over to Effiong Okon (technical background) . The H1 2026 production increase of 16% to 42,789 boepd suggests operations are functioning . But the pre-tax loss of N32 billion due to finance costs suggests the balance sheet, not operations, is the immediate constraint . Fixing the balance sheet requires capital markets expertise. Fixing operations requires technical leadership. Oando needs both at the top. |
ghm:As seen on the internet: Explanation Of Tinubu's 1993 $460,000 Forfeiture To The US Govt (Video)
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megawealth01:Who is Okonkwo, and why is he carrying this matter on his head? He says the President is hiding from "The Venezuela Option." Who says the President must attend UNGA in person? Over 50 presidents are not there this year—and he sent the Vice President to represent him. Nigerians and their wahala. Always focusing on the wrong thing. |
Let's be clear about deregulation. Once subsidies are removed, government has no say on price. That is determined by market forces—crude costs, FX, logistics. The labour unions should leave fuel prices alone and focus on the minimum wage. That's between them and their employer—government. And they should be ready to justify wage increases through productivity. Employers will pay more when staff add value to the bottom line. |
SonofElElyonRet:Your analysis is correct. Let them also know: the United States does not rely on third-party or external reports, whistleblowing, instigations, or petitions to make decisions. They have their own exclusive, intensive covert and overt intelligence agencies—and infinitely heavy, verified loads of information. They cannot be co-opted or constrained to arrest anyone based on political and lazy opposition tactics. Opponents who cannot compete but seek disqualification of their opponents as their winning strategy will not find traction there. |
megawealth01:Thanks for sharing, more perspectives in terms of raw appreciation and annualised appreciation.
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megawealth01:Warren Buffett Age: 96 Birthday: August 30, 1930 (this makes him 96 as of September 2026). Elon Musk Age: 55 Birthday: June 28, 1971 (this makes him 55 as of September 2026) if you don't gerrit, forget about it. |
The most troubling thing I see in Nigeria—something you don't see in any developed country—is the overwhelming focus on the Presidency and the Federal Government. In the UK, Canada, or the US, the central government focuses on macro matters: defence, tariffs, exchange rates, foreign reserves, foreign affairs etc. Meanwhile, sub-national governments handle the welfare of the people—hospitals, education, cleanliness, street cleaning, refuse collection, town planning, permits, policing, local roads, inner roads etc. Residents enjoy a good life because sub-national governments work. But in Nigeria, everything is blamed on the FG. This administration has somehow restructured the country—FG, States, LGAs, Regional Commissions. If what is meant for each of these four tiers gets to them and is well utilised and monitored at all four levels—not just at the FG/Presidency level—development will be rapid. That is our way out of poverty. I do not see any government, run by any other person, focusing on anything else except what this administration is doing already. Hence my personal opinion that PBAT should continue. Also, whenever we ask the popular opposition what they would do differently, they mumble. Nothing tangible—just empty rhetoric. We have powerful technological tools. Information on resources, ideas, strategies, current state before and after—it's all available everywhere via tech. We can talk and communicate via social media. Let citizens, NGOs and development focus groups spring up in all four tiers of government and demand accountability from elected officers, career civil servants, and spending officers—demand what belongs to the citizens in form of - the good and confortable life. |
Ovamboland:Abi o, or Open University |
megawealth01:There's an issue here. A handover involves two parties: the outgoing and the incoming. It isn't a proper handover until both agree and sign – confirming that what was handed over is exactly what was received. Geregu bond funds come to mind. |
megawealth01:You don't have to hold all your shares but you must not have less than the minimum 10 at any time in the 2 years to qualify. Please check page 22 and page 65 and get back to us. From page 22: "A Retail Investor shall cease to satisfy the Continuous Shareholding requirement if, at any time during the applicable qualification period, its holding of Offer Shares falls below the Minimum Subscription." And from page 65: "Entitlement under the Retail Investor Incentive Programme shall be limited to one (1) Incentive Share per eligible Retail Investor in respect of each qualification period... regardless of the number of Offer Shares or other Ordinary Shares held by such Retail Investor." |
awesomeJ:You are a fast finger. It is Yes. I have updated it. |
WhizdomXX:Yes. If you sell and your holding falls below 10 shares, you lose eligibility for the bonus share. You must hold at least 10 shares continuously for the period. If you buy 10 or 100 or 10,000 or 1 million, you still only get one bonus share after year one and one after year two – capped at two shares total. The incentive is not impressive. It only makes sense for people buying the minimum 10 shares. If you're buying more than 20, just ignore it completely and run your own portfolio – buy, sell, or hold on your terms. IMO |
deathwing:Why? |
I have subscribed to the Dangote Refinery (DR) IPO – so that I can remove myself from the pros and cons noise as quickly as possible. Now: Are there opportunities (outside DR) in the market currently? Any catalysts on the horizon? Any specific strategy to prepare for FTSE Frontier inclusion on the 21st? |
emmanuelewumi:Yeah, fair enough. I do IPO with one leg so that I can monitor and average down or level up. |
emmanuelewumi:No founder/Enterpreneur/business man/woman will do. |
Richtaiwo:My brother, the thing tire me. This is what I call the "Olodo Uprising"—and I am more afraid of it in Nigeria than government corruption. Shallow thinking. Trash spouting. They didn't get anything from the strategic regional commissions that will coordinate FG's projects across Nigeria, in addition to what state governments will be doing. The only thing they picked is the "white elephant project"—and they don't even know the meaning, or are too lazy to Google it. They quickly tag it to Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway and Sokoto-Badagry Roads. A white elephant project is a project, building, or investment that is expensive to build and maintain, but provides little or no practical benefit to its owners or the public. It is a burden—it costs a lot of money but doesn't generate enough value to justify its cost. But no road or means of transportation is a useless project. It opens up places in the countryside—corridors once neglected and unoccupied. It facilitates cross-country transit. It provides direct and indirect jobs during construction. It enhances security. It reduces seemingly ungoverned and uninhabited expanse of land. It increases productivity, GDP, and more. That is not a white elephant. That is nation-building. It is part of the international West Africa Coastal Highway—the same type they praise in the Western world. It takes an audacious leader to dare such projects. This man dared Lagos(Lekki)-Epe Free Trade Zone when he was governor. Now Dangote Refinery, airports, sea ports, several industries and estates are there—and the whole axis is bubbling. |
Streetinvestor2:People's experiences don't remove the fact that ₦1.4 trillion came in from different places in a few hours—and that money is from some people's surpluses. It's not money they need for survival. Please be gentle with me. Let's put the energy in my last line of the post. How do we as a nation solve the problem I identified in that line? So how do we solve it? How do we, as a nation—public and private sector practitioners, Christians, Muslims, other religions, wealthy and poor—ensure that the wealth in Nigeria is well distributed? That's the conversation I want to have. |
ogawisdom:Apart from the security issues—which are obvious and undeniable—this is why I question the "Ebi n pawa" talk. It feels like political noise. Look at the facts: an ordinary fake CBX took ₦178B from the public. Massive capital-intensive projects are going on in every part of the country—by churches, companies, organisations. The FG is disbursing trillions to states. The First Lady is giving out billions from time to time. All that money is going into circulation. Money leaves traces and rubs off on people. But circulation is not distribution. That's the real issue. |
ogawisdom:Really! Should I buy today? I already planned to buy 1st October. |
ogawisdom:Aliko Dangote is our own Elon Musk. I give it to him. He's going into power (20,000MW target), shipping (vessels from China for his refinery's 1,800 annual calls post-expansion), and another refinery in East Africa ($17bn at Lamu, Kenya). But those are just the bricks. The building is a $45 billion expansion programme across Africa—Kenya refinery, Ethiopia fertiliser, Ondo free trade zone, and a 2,000km pipeline from Namibia. Target: $100 billion revenue by 2030. That's not an ecosystem. That's an empire in motion. |
KarlTom:Na so o. I asked that direct question to clear the noise. |
Odunharry:Does the IPO subscription cashinflow go directly to the NGX? Also, does it make any difference if I subscribe today or on 13th October? |
essentialone1:Just tell Iya Kunle that 10 units will not make her a millionaire—talk less of a billionaire like Aliko. It is too small. But if she keeps it, and adds to it from time to time, the dividend will be enough to buy school sandals for Kunle. And if she keeps it long enough, it will grow—big enough to pay Kunle's university fees at best, that is if Kunle is still a baby. That way, she will manage her expectations and also stay interested in investing. Iya Kunle will still do MMM or Bet Naija anyway. So encourage her to buy the IPO. |
Streetinvestor2:I read all your posts now because I like your interesting views. One reason I read them: in consulting, sometimes two teams are asked to debate pros and cons on an investing decision, so all sides are considered. The bottom line for me is that there are no alternatives as such. I also think people are better off buying than not buying, given that we are spending people and keeping something aside should be encouraged, we also need a larger investing community in Nigeria. 600K is so small compared to our population. Small investors need to be protected more than HNIs, and it is the regulators who should do it. Western countries mandate promoters to state risks categorically. For CFDs, it's mandatory to state:"Spread bets and CFDs are complex instruments and come with a high risk of losing money rapidly due to leverage. 69% of retail investor accounts lose money. You should consider whether you understand how they work, and whether you can afford to take the high risk." For stocks, something similar should be stated:prices can go up or down, and you can lose money. Nigeria has risk disclosure requirements—the NGX mandates a Risk Disclosure Document . But we lack the standardised, blunt, quantified warnings that Western regulators require. That gap is dangerous for ordinary citizens who don't understand how markets work. This matters especially when promoters—including reputable people—make statements that blur the line between enthusiasm and misleading claims. The SEC's own cease-and-desist on Dangote Refinery pre-IPO solicitations shows the regulator knows this problem exists . What's needed is not just reactive enforcement, but mandatory, standardised warning labels on all promotions. |
Streetinvestor2:Sir, just read your post that you were referring to and the article I responded to and see the difference. I read and responded to your post because you touched on many issues I have been thinking about and working on. You tried to raise important points, but they were jumbled together – no build-up, no explanation, no data, and difficult to follow. I wanted to ask you to elaborate, but decided to elaborate myself instead of asking you. Besides, posts here are supposed to be discourse and discussion, not dismissal, attack or confrontation. Everyone can present different sides, and that does not mean someone's position is the only right one. Let me add that: this your post is great, honestly, I mean no harm, it has improved. It's longer, it is not confrontational, better articulated. You cited the specific issues you were referring to and easy for me to relate. Well done. One of the things I do, knowing that I didn't attend a grammar school is to type my post or dictate it, then use a tool to correct the grammar and structure before posting. |
megawealth01:Thanks for sharing. The article raises valid points. Let me separate fact from misleading. What's accurate: The currency depreciation concern is real. Dangote Cement listed at ₦135 in 2010, and the Naira has lost significant value since. The low free float is factual. Only ~3.3% is being offered publicly. The "inner caucus" observation has merit. The private placement wasn't available to retail. What's misleading: 1. The Bitcoin comparison is not analysis. Bitcoin in October 2010 was a $0.05 experimental asset with no track record, no regulation, no adoption. Comparing a blue-chip IPO to buying Bitcoin at $0.05 is a lottery ticket retrospective. Hindsight is not strategy. 2. The article ignores dividends. Dangote Cement has paid consistently since listing. The total return calculation omits this. 3. The exchange rate argument is not about Dangote Refinery. It's about everything Nigeria. The Naira depreciation that eroded Dangote Cement's dollar returns affects every Naira asset—Seplat, GTCO, Aradel, bonds, your savings. Using it to single out this IPO is intellectually dishonest. The real argument is "Nigeria has a macroeconomic problem," not "Dangote Cement/Refinery is a bad investment." 4. "Overhyped" ignores the structural shift. The refinery will be ~25-40% of NGX market cap. That's not hype—that's a fundamental reshaping of the exchange. Bottom line: The currency warning is valid—but it applies to everything Nigerian, including real estate, not just this IPO. The float concerns are noted. But the Bitcoin comparison is not serious, and the dividend omission weakens the Dangote Cement argument. Let's debate the real risks—execution, valuation, float—honestly. Not with hindsight lottery comparisons. I'm still learning too. Let's keep it grounded. |
essentialone1:Thank you for this. You introduced me to someone or pattern I have been trying to figure out ever since PIA was passed and visible turnaround was seen in the upstream and downstream sectors of the oil industry. Here are the learning point your post led me to: The Common Thread: Indigenous Ownership The Dossou-Aworet story and the Dangote Refinery story are two sides of the same coin: the indigenization of Nigeria's oil sector. Here's how they connect. Both stories are about the same wave—the transfer of Nigeria's oil assets from international oil companies (IOCs) to indigenous operators. Dossou-Aworet's vehicle: His Petrolin group holds stakes in Seplat Energy and Aradel Holdings, two of the biggest indigenous independents that acquired assets from IOCs . Dangote's vehicle: The refinery is the downstream counterpart—a private African-owned refinery that replaced decades of state failure and import dependence . The Renaissance Consortium Link The most direct connection is the Renaissance Africa Energy consortium, which bought Shell's onshore Nigerian business for $2.4 billion . Aradel Holdings is a consortium member. Petrolin (Dossou-Aworet's vehicle) agreed in January 2026 to sell its 40% holding in ND Western to Aradel, consolidating Aradel's position in the consortium. So Dossou-Aworet's interests and the companies acquiring IOC assets are directly intertwined. The Downstream-Upstream Nexus Here's where the Dangote Refinery fits into the same ecosystem: Player Role Connection Dangote Refinery Downstream (refining) Needs crude feedstock from upstream producers Seplat/Aradel Upstream (production) Produce crude that feeds domestic refineries Petrolin/Dossou-Aworet Shareholder Holds stakes in both Seplat and Aradel The refinery needs domestic crude supply to operate sustainably. Dangote has complained that producers offer crude at uncompetitive prices, forcing it to import feedstock . Meanwhile, producers like Seplat and Aradel are the ones who supply—or fail to supply—that crude. The Policy Backdrop The Presidency has explicitly linked these two stories. It credited Tinubu's reforms with: Facilitating the Renaissance consortium's acquisition of SPDC assets Approving Seplat's takeover of Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited The naira-for-crude policy, which supports local refining and helped Dangote become a net exporter of PMS and aviation fuel These are not separate policies—they're one integrated strategy to move Nigeria's oil value chain onshore. The Tension Between Them There's also a tension: Dangote wants cheap, reliable domestic crude. Producers like Seplat and Aradel want market prices for their crude. Dangote has rejected 15.5 million barrels offered domestically because the terms weren't competitive . Nigeria is now considering reforms to allow refiners to lift crude directly from production facilities at a discount . This is the same value chain—just different players fighting over the terms of trade. Portfolio Lesson The Dossou-Aworet story reinforces what the Dangote story teaches: the alpha in Nigerian oil is in the ownership transition. Indigenous operators are acquiring assets, and the value is flowing to those who own the upstream (Seplat, Aradel) and the downstream (Dangote). If you're tracking this, you're watching a single ecosystem: IOC divestment → indigenous operators → domestic crude supply → local refining → reduced imports. The players are different, but the thesis is the same. Portfolio Lessons You Can Apply Immediately 1. The IOC Divestment Thesis Is Still Live International oil companies are not done exiting Nigeria's onshore sector. TotalEnergies' $860 million divestment to Chappal Energies collapsed due to financing issues , and more assets will come to market. The companies acquiring these assets—Seplat, Aradel, Oando, Renaissance consortium—are the vehicles through which this value transfer happens. Action: Consider whether your portfolio has exposure to the indigenous operators acquiring these assets. Seplat and Aradel are both NGX-listed and accessible. 2. Track the "Quiet Accumulators" Dossou-Aworet increased his Seplat stake to 16.6% in Tullow Oil during its 2019-2020 collapse . He then increased his Aradel stake by 173.79 million shares in September 2025 at N555 per share . These are not passive holdings—they are strategic accumulations during weakness. Action: When quality assets sell off, watch for institutional or high-net-worth accumulation. Insider buying during declines often signals conviction. 3. The Renaissance Consortium Is a Signal Petrolin was part of the consortium that paid $2.4 billion for Shell's onshore business, partnering with Waltersmith, ND Western, First E&P, and Aradel . This is the template: consortiums of indigenous operators pooling resources to acquire assets the majors no longer want. Action: Understand who is buying divested assets. The winners in this transition will be the ones with financing, operational capacity, and community relationships. 4. The "Operator Edge" Is Real Dossou-Aworet's advantage wasn't just capital—it was 40+ years of relationships, technical knowledge, and regulatory experience. When he blocked Petronas' takeover of Energy Africa in 2003, he demonstrated the kind of boardroom and political influence that comes from being an insider . Action: When evaluating energy stocks, look beyond the balance sheet. Who is running the company? What is their operational track record? Do they understand the regulatory environment? 5. The Nigerian Oil Sector Is Being Reshaped The ownership transition from IOCs to indigenous operators is not just about who owns the assets—it's about how they are managed. Community relations, security, environmental remediation, and financing capacity are all variables that will determine success or failure . Action: Monitor production levels, community relations, and debt levels of the indigenous operators in your portfolio. The transition creates opportunity but also risk. |
francesfrances:Thanks for the remark. You actually brought another dimension of concern. I had that before, and my response is below. I initially thought I would go in heavily, but decided to do due diligence instead. Please note that despite my response, I am still learning, and I like the discourse. On the "$47 billion for just a refinery" point: You're right that standalone refiners rarely command such valuations. Turkey's Tupras – with comparable combined capacity across four refineries – is valued at about $12 billion . US-listed HF Sinclair, with roughly 678,000 bpd capacity, sits around $16 billion . So why is Dangote different? Because it's not being priced as a standalone refiner. 1. Capacity is doubling, not static The refinery currently operates at 700,000 bpd – surpassing its 650,000 bpd nameplate capacity after a 72-hour performance test with UOP in February 2026 . A second 700,000 bpd train is already under construction, targeting mechanical completion by end-2028 and bringing total capacity to 1.4 million bpd. DR is also more efficient than other refineries in that it converts approximately 92% of every barrel into clean transport fuels, with cash operating costs below $3 per barrel – among the lowest-cost refiners globally At that scale, it would surpass India's Jamnagar as the world's largest single-site refinery. The IPO proceeds are earmarked for this expansion, which is estimated at $12.4 billion – about 38% below what Phase 1 cost, because it replicates existing configuration on the same site . 2. The financials already support the valuation In H1 2026 alone, the refinery posted: Revenue: N19.47 trillion ($13.91 billion) Profit after tax: N2.55 trillion ($1.82 billion) EBITDA: $2.60 billion – nearly five times its full-year 2025 figure Gross refining margin rose to $24.50 per barrel, up from $13.70 in 2025 and $10.70 in 2024 . Average utilisation hit 83.6% . 3. Analysts have independently validated the valuation Two equity research reports published on September 7, 2026: Chapel Hill Denham valued the refinery at approximately $62.5 billion Renaissance Capital valued it at $53.89–$62.09 billion Both modelled the Phase 2 expansion. Chapel Hill Denham described it as "relatively de-risked" because the second train replicates existing infrastructure with engineering and licensing already in place . 4. On the "100% return requires $100bn valuation" concern You're right that doubling the share price from N525 would require a valuation approaching $100 billion. But capital appreciation is not the only return path. The refinery's cash generation supports dividends, and the expansion case provides a pathway to higher earnings. At N525, the implied P/E ratio is roughly 30 based on estimated earnings of N14 per share . That compares favourably with Aradel (above 20) and Seplat (above 15) on the NGX . 5. What's the risk? Renaissance Capital flagged that each year of delay in Phase 2 could "materially reduce the refinery's value" . The base case assumes commissioning by 2030, versus management's 2028 target . Other risks: refining-cycle volatility, crude supply constraints, FX movements, and operational disruptions . Bottom line: The valuation isn't crazy for a standalone refinery – because it's not being priced as one. It's being priced as a platform that will double capacity, integrate petrochemicals, and reshape Atlantic basin product flows . Whether that justifies $49 billion today depends on execution. The analysts covering it seem to think the expansion is achievable. But they're pricing in execution, not certainty. I hope this adds to the discourse. |