₦airaland Forum

newlander:
What some people are saying about biafra and Nnamdi Kanu

BininKingdom:
Even on wikipedia, I checked the population of Muslims in all the states in Nigeria, they just increase all to make it seem Muslim dominate Christians in Nigeria.

Imo state has 20% of muslims. imagine. the northern states are all islamic

RE: NigerianID | Re:Robert S. Goldstein (Biafra Public Relations Rep in the USA) - Letter of Resignation to Odumegwu Ojukwu (1968)


Dr. Aluko:

It is obfuscation at its most blatant to read Goldstein letter outside of the rationale for action taken by Ojukwu and the Biafran leadership.

I'll attempt to answer your earlier questions posed to me alonsgide this, because they are related.

- The first question was why Ojukwu did not, given that Biafra had shrunk dramatically, not surrender to save starving Biafrans.

- The second is, to link it to the substance of Goldstein's letter, why Ojukwu insisted on ceasefire and the airlift of relief to Biafrans as the only grounds or conditions for accepting relief.

First, Ojukwu knew that an internationally observed ceasefire was the only guarantee for the security and safety of the Biafran. Second, the atrocities recorded wherever the federal forces liberated lent credence to that demand. In fact, it made it imperative, particularly because the Lagos regime was not prepared to negotiate in true faith for the amicable end of the conflict.

The war strategy of the Gowon administration was hell-bent on Biafra's complete surrender without guarantees. No political and military leader will agree to that kind of suicide. I'll return to this point. But let me quote from Susan Cronje's quite illuminating book, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran war 1967-1970 ( I'd also recommend that you read the other, Biafra: Britain's Shame). Cronje writes this about the meeting in Niamey referenced by Goldstein:

"The Nigerian delegation was led by Chief Awolowo, but General Gowon arrived in Niamey on 16 July and addressed the meeting as an 'observer.' The main theme of his speech was a warning that if the 'rebels persist in their contemptuous attitude to the conference table the federal government will have no choice but to take over the remaining rebel-held areas...In military terms the rebellion is virtually suppressed already.' But the atmosphere had suibtly changed. Hamani Diori had altrady suggested that the committee's consultative role should be changed to a mediatory one, and after Gowon's address the committee went into closed session. Eventually it was announced that that Ojukwu had been asked to attend, and Gowon who had already returned to Lagos flew back to Niamey the following day, cancelling all engagements. His presence in Niamey was required not for a meeting with Ojukwu but to reply to a truce proposal put forward among others by General Ankrah. This called for a ten-mile wide demilitarized zone patrolled by neutral troops to allow relief supplies to pass to Biafran refugees. According to one account of the debate, Gowon is said to have turned to General Ankrah, saying, 'You are a military man: you know what it is with commanders.' The suggestion that he might be unable to restrain his army was reinforced when he warned the committee that if it did not see things his way they would have to have 'a Nigeria without me.' According to a Niamey radio report the following day, General Gowon rejected the resolution put to him by the O.A.U. committee; the main points of this resolution were the establishment of a demilitarized zone and 'an international force which would include neutral observers acceptable to both sides.' Ghana and Cameroun, the broadcast said, had offered shipping facilities for moving relief supplies.

Ojukwu arrived in Niamey on 19 July in President Houphet-Boigny's private jet. The Biafran delegation, when it was fully assembled, included Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former Nigerian president, Dr. Okpara, former Eastern Nigerian premier, Sir Louis Mbanefo, Dr. Eni Njoku and several other notables; Lagos was not far off in suggesting that the 'entire rebel leadership' had assembled in Niger. At the end of the meeting between Ojukwu and the consltative committee - Gowon had returned to Lagos two days previously - a communique was issued. Two versions appear to be in existence; the one broadcast by Niamey radio read: (1) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have agreed to meet immediately in Niamey under the chairmanship of President Diori Hamani in order to begin preliminary talks on a speedy resumption of Nigerian peace negotiations; (2) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have agreed to resume as soon as possible peace negotiations in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the O.A.U Consultative Committee on Nigeria.' The version as broadcast by Lagos - and which does not pretend to be a verbatim report - said that the committee had called on both parties to resume peace talks as soon as possible, '... with the objecvtive of preserving Nigeria's territiorial integrity and guaranteeing the security of all its inhabitants.' The committee said, according to this broadcast, that 'it will be in contact with the federal military government, and Ojukwu or his representativs may at any time contact any member government of the committee.' The Lagos version went on to cite two further point of which ther was no mention in the Niamey version, both dealing with relief, and appealing to the two sides to undertake various mesures to alleviate the suffering among war victims.

In view of the strong criticism that has been levelled at the Biafran leadership for its intrasigence, and the high praise heaped o General Gowon and his Government for humanitarian concern and magnanimity, it should be stressed that in Niamey Gowon rejected the O.A.U proposals for a partial truce and international policing of relief routes, while Ojukwu was prepared to accept both these proposals. When Ojukwu returned to Biafra, he gave a press conference at which he was asked whether his invitation to the OAU had meant any form of recognition of him. For once Ojukwu was cautious in his reply: 'Let's put it this way. My presence in Niamey for once represents the O.A.U's acceptance that there are two sides to a conflict.' He would not reveal any further details about the forthcoming Addis Ababa peace talk, but said, 'I find myself in a rather simillar situation as after Aburi.' He did not want to say anything in case Lagos started 'interpreting it, and go back to square one..." (302-303)

The foregoing provides the clear context of the situation, that it was not Ojukwu, but Gowon who rejected the proposals by which Ojukwu and the Biafran leadership was prepared to abide.The context is clearly established and makes nonsense of Golsdstein's ground for resignation.

While the Biafran government was prepared to act without precondition, the Nigerian authorities persistenly insisted on Biafran surrender. It was a deliberate and determined argument made to make certain that the only solution was by a military solution because Lagos knew that the basic grounds on which it made its offer of relief was conditional and unconscionable. It was to disavow the very basic reason why Biafra defended itself in the first place: its sovereignty as a means to the safety, security and dignity of its population. Now, were the Gowon administration acting in good faith, that would be a differet matter. What guaratees could Biafrans have, had Ojukwu surrendered as a condition for food? None.

Here is the evidence narrated by John Stremlau in his The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War how Gowon's cable upturned the agreements reached in May 1968 in kampala between Eni Njoku and Enahoro in which Eni Njoku had in fact "conceded the evntuality of one-Nigeria." As Stremalau notes, "Whereas Enahoro had left acceptance of the twelve-state structure implicit in his propsals, Gowon insisted that before any agreement was reached the rebels must explictly embrace the twelve states. In addition, Gowon stipulated that there would be no question of an interim commission for the rebel-held areas, there would be no recruitment and formation of Ibo units into the federal armed forces, and no elements of the rebel troops or police would be allowed to retain their arms. Gowon's instruction, which did not reach Kampala until shortly after Enahoro had made his presentation, clearly reflected the views of the more hawkish elements in the federal government" (172-173).

To put these in summary:

(a) Ojukwu did not reject relief, he wanted the security and guarantee of safety for Biafrans. He was in fact willing to accept the O.A.U's proposals

(b) Gowon and the Lagos administration manipulated international propaganda, as testified in the versions of the broadcasts of the Niamey agreement to further its own goals of the liquidation of Biafra

(c) The federal government was not, in spite of all the efforts made by the Biafrans willing to negotiate peace, they were hell-bent on "surrender" as the only condition for the survival of the Biafran population.

If anybody must bear responsbility, it must be those who kept using the talks to elongate the suffering of the civilian population, and clearly this are the 'hawks" who placed the only condition for peace on Biafra's surrender and liquidation. And there, you have it.

Obi Nwakanma


To: naijaintellects@googlegroups.com
CC: NaijaPolitics@yahoogroups.com; nigerianID@yahoogroups.com; OmoOdua@yahoogroups.com; USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com; Raayiriga@yahoogroups.com; nowa_o@...; ekitipanupo@yahoogroups.com
From: alukome@...
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 04:28:54 +0100

najoke:
https://17350-presscdn-0-16-pagely.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Ojukwu.jpg


of

halarho:
Open up your heart dull boy
Tell those your terrorist and self centred friends to provide a Quranic evidence for their claim

halarho:
Mr man u are becoming dumb and blind......hw can u claim to be a Muslim and at the same time a terrorist when Islam detests terrorism..... No portion of the Quran backs terrorism

halarho:
Please can u provide any Quranic or Biblical verse that supports terrorism........ U lack depth and concrete understanding of Scriptural verses........liar......biased and value laden individual

najoke:

LOL...now it is distortion of History, read Goldstein original book here

https://books.google.com.ng/books?id=ocWsAQAAQBAJ&pg=PT514&lpg=PT514&dq=morning+post+news+august+17+1968&source=bl&ots=00UN2sDkhq&sig=-KknF9QJQJJX1EKg3G3VjTqTjU4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjShqr67p7UAhWBVRoKHTelCjsQ6AEIMjAC#v=onepage&q=morning%20post%20news%20august%2017%201968&f=false

RE: NigerianID | Re:Robert S. Goldstein (Biafra Public Relations Rep in the USA) - Letter of Resignation to Odumegwu Ojukwu (1968)


Dr. Aluko:

It is obfuscation at its most blatant to read Goldstein letter outside of the rationale for action taken by Ojukwu and the Biafran leadership.

I'll attempt to answer your earlier questions posed to me alonsgide this, because they are related.

- The first question was why Ojukwu did not, given that Biafra had shrunk dramatically, not surrender to save starving Biafrans.

- The second is, to link it to the substance of Goldstein's letter, why Ojukwu insisted on ceasefire and the airlift of relief to Biafrans as the only grounds or conditions for accepting relief.

First, Ojukwu knew that an internationally observed ceasefire was the only guarantee for the security and safety of the Biafran. Second, the atrocities recorded wherever the federal forces liberated lent credence to that demand. In fact, it made it imperative, particularly because the Lagos regime was not prepared to negotiate in true faith for the amicable end of the conflict.

The war strategy of the Gowon administration was hell-bent on Biafra's complete surrender without guarantees. No political and military leader will agree to that kind of suicide. I'll return to this point. But let me quote from Susan Cronje's quite illuminating book, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran war 1967-1970 ( I'd also recommend that you read the other, Biafra: Britain's Shame). Cronje writes this about the meeting in Niamey referenced by Goldstein:

"The Nigerian delegation was led by Chief Awolowo, but General Gowon arrived in Niamey on 16 July and addressed the meeting as an 'observer.' The main theme of his speech was a warning that if the 'rebels persist in their contemptuous attitude to the conference table the federal government will have no choice but to take over the remaining rebel-held areas...In military terms the rebellion is virtually suppressed already.' But the atmosphere had suibtly changed. Hamani Diori had altrady suggested that the committee's consultative role should be changed to a mediatory one, and after Gowon's address the committee went into closed session. Eventually it was announced that that Ojukwu had been asked to attend, and Gowon who had already returned to Lagos flew back to Niamey the following day, cancelling all engagements. His presence in Niamey was required not for a meeting with Ojukwu but to reply to a truce proposal put forward among others by General Ankrah. This called for a ten-mile wide demilitarized zone patrolled by neutral troops to allow relief supplies to pass to Biafran refugees. According to one account of the debate, Gowon is said to have turned to General Ankrah, saying, 'You are a military man: you know what it is with commanders.' The suggestion that he might be unable to restrain his army was reinforced when he warned the committee that if it did not see things his way they would have to have 'a Nigeria without me.' According to a Niamey radio report the following day, General Gowon rejected the resolution put to him by the O.A.U. committee; the main points of this resolution were the establishment of a demilitarized zone and 'an international force which would include neutral observers acceptable to both sides.' Ghana and Cameroun, the broadcast said, had offered shipping facilities for moving relief supplies.

Ojukwu arrived in Niamey on 19 July in President Houphet-Boigny's private jet. The Biafran delegation, when it was fully assembled, included Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former Nigerian president, Dr. Okpara, former Eastern Nigerian premier, Sir Louis Mbanefo, Dr. Eni Njoku and several other notables; Lagos was not far off in suggesting that the 'entire rebel leadership' had assembled in Niger. At the end of the meeting between Ojukwu and the consltative committee - Gowon had returned to Lagos two days previously - a communique was issued. Two versions appear to be in existence; the one broadcast by Niamey radio read: (1) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have agreed to meet immediately in Niamey under the chairmanship of President Diori Hamani in order to begin preliminary talks on a speedy resumption of Nigerian peace negotiations; (2) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have agreed to resume as soon as possible peace negotiations in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the O.A.U Consultative Committee on Nigeria.' The version as broadcast by Lagos - and which does not pretend to be a verbatim report - said that the committee had called on both parties to resume peace talks as soon as possible, '... with the objecvtive of preserving Nigeria's territiorial integrity and guaranteeing the security of all its inhabitants.' The committee said, according to this broadcast, that 'it will be in contact with the federal military government, and Ojukwu or his representativs may at any time contact any member government of the committee.' The Lagos version went on to cite two further point of which ther was no mention in the Niamey version, both dealing with relief, and appealing to the two sides to undertake various mesures to alleviate the suffering among war victims.

In view of the strong criticism that has been levelled at the Biafran leadership for its intrasigence, and the high praise heaped o General Gowon and his Government for humanitarian concern and magnanimity, it should be stressed that in Niamey Gowon rejected the O.A.U proposals for a partial truce and international policing of relief routes, while Ojukwu was prepared to accept both these proposals. When Ojukwu returned to Biafra, he gave a press conference at which he was asked whether his invitation to the OAU had meant any form of recognition of him. For once Ojukwu was cautious in his reply: 'Let's put it this way. My presence in Niamey for once represents the O.A.U's acceptance that there are two sides to a conflict.' He would not reveal any further details about the forthcoming Addis Ababa peace talk, but said, 'I find myself in a rather simillar situation as after Aburi.' He did not want to say anything in case Lagos started 'interpreting it, and go back to square one..." (302-303)

The foregoing provides the clear context of the situation, that it was not Ojukwu, but Gowon who rejected the proposals by which Ojukwu and the Biafran leadership was prepared to abide.The context is clearly established and makes nonsense of Golsdstein's ground for resignation.

While the Biafran government was prepared to act without precondition, the Nigerian authorities persistenly insisted on Biafran surrender. It was a deliberate and determined argument made to make certain that the only solution was by a military solution because Lagos knew that the basic grounds on which it made its offer of relief was conditional and unconscionable. It was to disavow the very basic reason why Biafra defended itself in the first place: its sovereignty as a means to the safety, security and dignity of its population. Now, were the Gowon administration acting in good faith, that would be a differet matter. What guaratees could Biafrans have, had Ojukwu surrendered as a condition for food? None.

Here is the evidence narrated by John Stremlau in his The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War how Gowon's cable upturned the agreements reached in May 1968 in kampala between Eni Njoku and Enahoro in which Eni Njoku had in fact "conceded the evntuality of one-Nigeria." As Stremalau notes, "Whereas Enahoro had left acceptance of the twelve-state structure implicit in his propsals, Gowon insisted that before any agreement was reached the rebels must explictly embrace the twelve states. In addition, Gowon stipulated that there would be no question of an interim commission for the rebel-held areas, there would be no recruitment and formation of Ibo units into the federal armed forces, and no elements of the rebel troops or police would be allowed to retain their arms. Gowon's instruction, which did not reach Kampala until shortly after Enahoro had made his presentation, clearly reflected the views of the more hawkish elements in the federal government" (172-173).

To put these in summary:

(a) Ojukwu did not reject relief, he wanted the security and guarantee of safety for Biafrans. He was in fact willing to accept the O.A.U's proposals

(b) Gowon and the Lagos administration manipulated international propaganda, as testified in the versions of the broadcasts of the Niamey agreement to further its own goals of the liquidation of Biafra

(c) The federal government was not, in spite of all the efforts made by the Biafrans willing to negotiate peace, they were hell-bent on "surrender" as the only condition for the survival of the Biafran population.

If anybody must bear responsbility, it must be those who kept using the talks to elongate the suffering of the civilian population, and clearly this are the 'hawks" who placed the only condition for peace on Biafra's surrender and liquidation. And there, you have it.

Obi Nwakanma


To: naijaintellects@googlegroups.com
CC: NaijaPolitics@yahoogroups.com; nigerianID@yahoogroups.com; OmoOdua@yahoogroups.com; USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com; Raayiriga@yahoogroups.com; nowa_o@...; ekitipanupo@yahoogroups.com
From: alukome@...
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 04:28:54 +0100

najoke:
https://17350-presscdn-0-16-pagely.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Ojukwu.jpg


Mndd44
lalasticlala

Rossikk
vagabondMynd44
laudate
ProWalker
Rilwayne001
SilentHaulers
ISpiksDaTroof

RE: NigerianID | Re:Robert S. Goldstein (Biafra Public Relations Rep in the USA) - Letter of Resignation to Odumegwu Ojukwu (1968)


Dr. Aluko:

It is obfuscation at its most blatant to read Goldstein letter outside of the rationale for action taken by Ojukwu and the Biafran leadership.

I'll attempt to answer your earlier questions posed to me alonsgide this, because they are related.

- The first question was why Ojukwu did not, given that Biafra had shrunk dramatically, not surrender to save starving Biafrans.

- The second is, to link it to the substance of Goldstein's letter, why Ojukwu insisted on ceasefire and the airlift of relief to Biafrans as the only grounds or conditions for accepting relief.

First, Ojukwu knew that an internationally observed ceasefire was the only guarantee for the security and safety of the Biafran. Second, the atrocities recorded wherever the federal forces liberated lent credence to that demand. In fact, it made it imperative, particularly because the Lagos regime was not prepared to negotiate in true faith for the amicable end of the conflict.

The war strategy of the Gowon administration was hell-bent on Biafra's complete surrender without guarantees. No political and military leader will agree to that kind of suicide. I'll return to this point. But let me quote from Susan Cronje's quite illuminating book, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran war 1967-1970 ( I'd also recommend that you read the other, Biafra: Britain's Shame). Cronje writes this about the meeting in Niamey referenced by Goldstein:

"The Nigerian delegation was led by Chief Awolowo, but General Gowon arrived in Niamey on 16 July and addressed the meeting as an 'observer.' The main theme of his speech was a warning that if the 'rebels persist in their contemptuous attitude to the conference table the federal government will have no choice but to take over the remaining rebel-held areas...In military terms the rebellion is virtually suppressed already.' But the atmosphere had suibtly changed. hamani diori had altrady suggested that the committee's consultative role should be changed to a mediatory one, and after Gowon's address the committee went into closed session. Eventually it was announced that that Ojukwu had been asked to attend, and Gowon who had already returned to Lagos flew back to Niamey the following day, cancelling all engagements. His presence in Niamey was required not for a meeting with Ojukwu but to reply to a truce proposal put forward among others by General Ankrah. This called for a ten-mile wide demilitarized zone patrolled by neutral troops to allow relief supplies to pass to Biafran refugees. According to one account of the debate, Gowon is said to have turned to General Ankrah, saying, 'You are a military man: you know what it is with commanders.' The suggestion that he might be unable to restrain his army was reinforced when he warned the committee that if it did not see things his way they would have to have 'a Nigeria without me.' According to a Niamey radio report the following day, General Gowon rejected the resolution put to him by the O.A.U. committee; the main points of this resolution were the establishment of a demilitarized zone and 'an international force which would include neutral observers acceptable to both sides.' Ghana and Cameroun, the broadcast said, had offered shipping facilities for moving relief supplies.

Ojukwu arrived in Niamey on 19 July in President Houphet-Boigny's private jet. The Biafran delegation, when it was fully assembled, included Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former Nigerian president, Dr. Okpara, former Eastern Nigerian premier, Sir Louis Mbanefo, Dr. Eni Njoku and several other notables; Lagos was not far off in suggesting that the 'entire rebel leadership' had assembled in Niger. At the end of the meeting between Ojukwu and the consltative committee - Gowon had returned to Lagos two days previously - a communique was issued. Two versions appear to be in existence; the one broadcast by Niamey radio read: (1) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have agreed to meet immediately in Niamey under the chairmanship of President Diori Hamani in order to begin preliminary talks on a speedy resumption of Nigerian peace negotiations; (2) the Nigeruan Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have agreed to resume as soon as possible peace negotiations in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the O.A.U Consultative Committee on Nigeria.' The version as broadcast by Lagos - and which does not pretend to be a verbatim report - said that the committee had called on both parties to resume peace talks as soon as possible, '... with the objecvtive of preserving Nigeria's territiorial integrity and guaranteeing the security of all its inhabitants.' The committee said, according to this broadcast, that 'it will be in contact with the federal military government, and Ojukwu or his representativs may at any time contact any member government of the committee.' The Lagos version went on to cite two further point of which ther was no mention in the Niamey version, both dealing with relief, and appealing to the two sides to undertake various mesures to alleviate the suffering among war victims.

In view of the strong criticism that has been levelled at the Biafran leadership for its intrasigence, and the high praise heaped o General Gowon and his Government for humanitarian concern and magnanimity, it should be stressed that in Niamey Gowon rejected the O.A.U proposals for a partial truce and international policing of relief routes, while Ojukwu was prepared to accept both these proposals. When Ojukwu returned to Biafra, he gave a press conference at which he was asked whether his invitation to the OAU had meant any form of recognition of him. For once Ojukwu was cautious in his reply: 'Let's put it this way. My presence in Niamey for once represents the O.A.U's acceptance that there are two sides to a conflict.' He would not reveal any further details about the forthcoming Addis Ababa peace talk, but said, 'I find myself in a rather simillar situation as after Aburi.' He did not want to say anything in case Lagos started 'interpreting it, and go back to square one..." (302-303)

The foregoing provides the clear context of the situation, that it was not Ojukwu, but Gowon who rejected the proposals by which Ojukwu and the Biafran leadership was prepared to abide.The context is clearly established and makes nonsense of Golsdstein's ground for resignation.

While the Biafran government was prepared to act without precondition, the Nigerian authorities persistenly insisted on Biafran surrender. It was a deliberate and determined argument made to make certain that the only solution was by a military solution because Lagos knew that the basic grounds on which it made its offer of relief was conditional and unconscionable. It was to disavow the very basic reason why Biafra defended itself in the first place: its sovereignty as a means to the safety, security and dignity of its population. Now, were the Gowon administration acting in good faith, that would be a differet matter. What guaratees could Biafrans have, had Ojukwu surrendered as a condition for food? None.

Here is the evidence narrated by John Stremlau in his The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War how Gowon's cable upturned the agreements reached in May 1968 in kampala between Eni Njoku and Enahoro in which Eni Njoku had in fact "conceded the evntuality of one-Nigeria." As Stremalau notes, "Whereas Enahoro had left acceptance of the twelve-state structure implicit in his propsals, Gowon insisted that before any agreement was reached the rebels must explictly embrace the twelve states. In addition, Gowon stipulated that there would be no question of an interim commission for the rebel-held areas, there would be no recruitment and formation of Ibo units into the federal armed forces, and no elements of the rebel troops or police would be allowed to retain their arms. Gowon's instruction, which did not reach Kampala until shortly after Enahoro had made his presentation, clearly reflected the views of the more hawkish elements in the federal government" (172-173).

To put these in summary:

(a) Ojukwu did not reject relief, he wanted the security and guarantee of safety for Biafrans. He was in fact willing to accept the O.A.U's proposals

(b) Gowon and the Lagos administration manipulated international propaganda, as testified in the versions of the broadcasts of the Niamey agreement to further its own goals of the liquidation of Biafra

(c) The federal government was not, in spite of all the efforts made by the Biafrans willing to negotiate peace, they were hell-bent on "surrender" as the only condition for the survival of the Biafran population.

If anybody must bear responsbility, it must be those who kept using the talks to elongate the suffering of the civilian population, and clearly this are the 'hawks" who placed the only condition for peace on Biafra's surrender and liquidation. And there, you have it.

Obi Nwakanma


To: naijaintellects@googlegroups.com
CC: NaijaPolitics@yahoogroups.com; nigerianID@yahoogroups.com; OmoOdua@yahoogroups.com; USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com; Raayiriga@yahoogroups.com; nowa_o@...; ekitipanupo@yahoogroups.com
From: alukome@...
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 04:28:54 +0100

Abagworo:
Nothing is difficult to comprehend or do you want me to post pictures and videos of boat regalia and their names, the language spoken during the festival or should I dig history archives on the origin of Jaja from Isuama? The truth is that various peoples from Isuama, Ngwa, Etche, Ndoki, Ezinihitte (all Igbo groups), Efik, Ibibio, Annang etc populate the present day Opobo and to some extent Bonny. There existed some earlier Ijaw speaking people as well but something must have led to the change of language of preference to Igbo and that is where I disagree with you. The Igbo language was not forced on anyone but was adopted by everyone either as 1st or 2nd language to Ibani long before colonization. Today people are going everywhere trying to erase the Igbo part of the history on the falsehood that they have nothing in common with Igbos or that during the regional government of barely 6years, Igbos forcefully changed the language. Why have they not been able to forcefully erase the Igbo language after 43 years?

ahaika23:
There are so many Igbo speaking tribes in Rivers State which include Etche, Ikwerre, Obio/Akpor, Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Emuoha, Oyigbo, Bonny, Okirika L.G.A that speak Igbo either in part or in full and it is only natural to include your folks in Biafra afterall it was Nigeria that separated us in the first place. But because of other tribes in the region, it is therefore important to engage every member tribe fully and let each have his pride and right fully so as to make the breakaway succeed.

Amarabae:
Antagonism? When they keep humiliating Igbos before these minorities?
No wonder they insult Igbos anyhow.
Does it mean that Igbo ethnic group can't stand on its own as a country?

ahaika23:
who's begging who? It's not a thread for insults please. If you have no constructive contribution you can just read and maybe you will learn a thing or two. Thank you.

FriendNG:
The shameless goats will avoid this thread like fire. Ffk is greater than Ojukwu, Kanu and all Biafran leaders dead or alive.

LordReed:
LoL! No it will not surprise anyone paying attention in the least bit. It will in fact confirm all the allegations that Trump is a Russian stooge.

PS: You really should stop reading conspiracy websites, they're bad for mental health.

Mindfulness:
context matters and it has been saved for future reference.

Mindfulness:
Here it is:



Don't take off your panties again - in despair.

seunmsg:
oga, what exactly are you saying? I got lost right from the second paragraph.

Mindfulness:
Tell us again, which EU countries are Marxist? France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain?

Mindfulness:
To equate neoliberalism with communism is the peak of stu.pidity and ignorance.

seunmsg:
Putin is actually laughing out loud at how he's finally using Trump to break the strong bond between Europe and America. The once strong and influential USA is about to lose its influence in international affairs and you guys are still urging him on. Can't you Trump ass lickers see that this is what Putin wants all along?