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Dear all, its on bloomberg headlines " CFA success rates drops down to 38% from june" ![]() |
sudan is playing much better ![]() |
Gbawe:Is there currently any plan by anyone in the government to adequately tackle the power issue? A proper structural planned which is timed with its costs properly stated and made public. Watching from a distance is truly irritating without being able to do anything. ![]() |
It just became breaking news on BBC right now! A new anti-terrorist force to be set up |
I usually prefer to read and not comment due to the deterioration of many postings currently Having said that, i would prefer onlytruth. usually on point and not abusive. Beaf was very sharp this year as was Gbawe. Hopefully this new year would bring forward analytical discourse as opposed to drivel |
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_contributions_to_Medieval_Europe Dont be silly. Islam as a religion has contributed to civilization in the fields of: Music Architecture and painting Mathematics Sciences It is a shame reading posts like this when you all are supposedly "educated" Do you actually know what "sharia" is and what "islamic banking" is? PS: Google is your friend! |
OAM4J, how do i send emails or msgs to you? |
Andre Uweh:That picture was actually on keith's show on msnbc, worst people. those were contractors who made lots of mistakes in spelling, why bk has to equate that with igbos is beyond me |
source: http://www.kwenu.com/publications/nnamani/biafra_retrospect2.htm i would paste a simple snippet. , CONCLUSION If the foregoing has been a litany of woes, it is because the main aim of this retrospect is to bring out once more to the fore, the calamities and the ripple effects of the war. Inversely, from these woes, a lot of positive things have also emerged. Biafran technological breakthrough remains one of the most remarkable things the black race has achieved even when the story is distorted or the books containing them are allowed to rot away on the floor in Nigerian libraries. It has gone into the annals of history and, as the story is told from one generation to another, those monumental ideas and the ingenuity of those heroes who produced them may one day resurrect and be harnessed to free the black race from the shackles of economic slavery imposed on it since the white man set foot in the black nation. According Prof. Ikenna Nzimiro (1982), part of the lessons from the war consisted also in the fact that international observers testified to the ingenuity of the Biafran engineers who built Uli Airport. The Biafran Directorate of Propaganda led by Uche Chukwumerije was described by Harold Wilson the then British Prime Minister as "success unparalled in the history of communication in modern societies" (John Stremlau, 1977). The Research and Production Directorate (RAP) produced 56% of arms used in Biafra. The "Ojukwu Bunker" in Umuahia also demonstrates that it is possible to build underground tunnels to decongest traffics in Nigerian cities. Biafra also refined crude oil using only local materials. Refineries built at Uzuakoli and Amandugba were capable of refining 50,000 gallons of fuel per day. Yet today, Nigeria imports refined fuel because none of her refineries is working at full capacity. Biafran chemists also produced 10 tons of pure salt per month. It was estimated to increase up to 50 tons if production continued. In the area of consumer goods, items which were usually imported such as toilet soaps, face-creams, Vaseline, biscuits, liquor, dyes, protein extracts and engine oil were all produced by Biafran scientists and engineers. Biafran engineers in the United Kingdom were also able to design plastic housing units for refugees. In fact, with regard to the principle of self-reliance which is what Africa so badly needs today, Biafra was a pace-setter. If this breakthrough were integrated and harnessed by Nigeria after the war, her crushing external debt would have been contained at least to a certain extent. The Igbo have also learned a lot from the war. They now know that no matter how much money they make and keep outside, home is still home and that if the worst case scenario arises again, they have kept some sizable reserve to fall back on. Axel Harneit-Sievers et al point out that "it was common for successful Igbo migrants to invest in property at the places where they had spent most of their lifetime, today more investment is directed to home areas". Another positive lesson from the war is a sense of 'cooperation and self-help' it instilled in the people. The illusion of self-sufficiency and narrow sectionalism was shattered by the war. S. O. O. Ogazi sums it up in this way: [The war] thought many people exactly how we are. We are not the rich people that we think we were. We discovered that without Hausa nama [cow], we couldn't get meat. We thought that we are self-sufficient in food and in the end we discovered that we depended so much on outsiders. Not that it has altered their way of life as such, but they were now more conscious of the dependence upon others. The self-help syndrome of the Igbo became more prevalent when it became clear to them that the federal government rehabilitation and reconstruction plan was a political propaganda. With the help of the then East Central State government social clubs and age-grades in virtually every town or community began to reconstruct their damaged amenities and built new ones. The early 1970s and 1980s witnessed a boom in social clubs, which rendered help to needy members such as during funerals, marriages, and setting up of businesses etc. Unfortunately, the level of cooperation among Ndiigbo in the early post-Biafran period is waning very rapidly; this will not augur well for Ndiigbo at all. The survival of Ndiigbo in a contemporary Nigerian society consists in a coalition of forces to rebuild eroded social capital and networking, to re-energise, harness and re-channel Igbo spirit and ingenuity for a total integration into the mainstream of Nigerian affairs and/or a peaceful parting of ways. |
smoothline what are not keeping into consideration is simple: japan was the initial aggressor, they were beaten back after their wars in the phillipines, china and pearl habor. their development was also as a result of a "single people unit" coming together not a number of tribes most people here are not even properly aware of the actual sequence of the nigerian-biafran conflict and they are here blabbing on heresay even other african countries like SA, rwanda had open sessions of meeting in order to "heal" how do you move forward if you dont know where you have been. PS: if we talk of moving forward in the fields of commerce, education etc then of course you know the answer to that. wishing all nigerians peace |
source: http://www.kwenu.com/igbo/igbowebpages/Igbo.dir/Biafra/ugo_biafra.htm Personalizing Nigerian history is a favourable past-time for many. This tendency has come out clearly recently on Naijanet, especially regarding the Biafran War of 1967-70. This contribution is, in a way, an embelishment of Ukobasi Orji's rough chronology of the 1966-67 crisis. It also touches on the rejoinder by one other politicIZED scientist, Bolaji Aluko. On Wed, 19 Apr 1995, Mobolaji E. Aluko wrote in extending Orji's argument: > (1) WAS OUR OJUKWU MADE INTO A "FALL GUY" HERE ? HOW COULD > SUCH A FINAL SERIOUS DECISION BE PUT ON ONE SHOULDER ? > I SUSPECT THAT IT WAS MORE LIKE: LEAD US OR GET OUT > OF THE WAY ! PERSONAL ACCOUNT (AGAIN MY FATHER) > INDICATES THAT THE TIDE WAS BY THEN TOO FAR FOR HIM TO STEM, > AND HE IN FACT FEARED FOR HIS LIFE IF HE DID NOT GO ALONG WITH THE SECESSION. > > Bolaji Aluko > Aluko's analysis is accurate on this score. His position should have answered a lot of questions. It does not seem to have done so for many who hear with one ear but let what they hear escape through the other. One is not suggesting that the tendency to blame Ojukwu for the war is confined to Naijanet. Some dramatis personae on both sides of the crisis also express this view. For instance, war-time federal commander, Brigadier Ben Adekunle, told *This Week* magazine in 1987 that the war arose out of personality conflict between Ojukwu and Gowon. Two ex-Biafran senior commanders, Col. I.N.C.A. and Col. E.O. (full names withheld), who in 1989 spoke to me on Ojukwu's role in the declaration of Biafra, also centred their analyses on the person of Ojukwu. For reasons that are given in the Footnote below, I had to accept their interpretation of this particular matter. These reasons are derived directly from these men's own separate accounts rendered to me in 1989. Moreover, their accounts are inconsistent with the historical record, that is, the well-known events of 1966-67 and their implications. My failure to accept their interpretations does not detract respect for these men. Col. I.N.C.A. said that secession was not necessary at the time. He did not say why but gave me the impression that it should be obvious. He refused to elaborate. On the other hand, Col. E.O., said that secession was necessary, but he disagreed with the timing. He did not say why but insisted that "Ojukwu, with his education, would have been able to appease his people until they were ready." Col. E.O. did not say how Ojukwu could have done this, but continued, "That's what we are talking about. , Why did he join the army with [a] masters [degree]? , The man was looking for something." Let us see the merits of Col. E.O.'s analysis. To be sure, Ojukwu was ambitious. He admitted this fact in an interview held in Umuahia on 4 November 1968. This is no news. The lack of ambition is not a virtue. Suffice it to say that in 1967 the question of ambition is secondary to what had happened to easterners and what was happening to them. To date, there has been no conclusive evidence suggesting that Ojukwu was bent on creating Biafra in order to satisfy some inordinate ambition. Available evidence points otherwise. After the initial phase of the pogroms in the north in July-August 1966, Ojukwu urged eastern survivors to return to the north after conferring with his friend, Ado Bayero (the Emir of Kano). (Ojukwu had just appointed this man the Chancellor of the UNN, as a replacement to Zik.) The easterners who heeded Ojukwu's call met more massacres. There is no need to revisit the pogroms of 1966 here. It is sufficient to say, a vast majority of easterners were disenchanted with a Nigeria that did not guarantee them freedom of life and property. An estimated thirty thousand had been murdered in other parts of Nigeria. Their relatives were not happy. Millions had returned empty-handed as refugees from other parts of Nigeria. Easterners' property had been "abandoned" for looting in other parts of Nigeria. Millions were looking up to Ojukwu to provide the kind of leadership that would lead to the fair resolution of this problem. On 19 October 1966, Gowon imposed a food blockade on Eastern Nigeria. On 31 October, Ojukwu wrote the other military governors inviting them to a meeting either in Port Harcourt or Calabar. The idea was to discuss the problems of course. Meanwhile, he also sent delegates for talks with representatives of other regions. These delegates were talking until the eastern participants felt unsafe to continue, or so they said. But tell me why I should not believe them. On 4 October, Gowon turned down the eastern proposal for confederation. UNN students began to protest chanting that "the push is complete." In effect, they were reminding Ojukwu of his earlier caveat that the east would not secede unless "pushed out". These demonstrations continued all around the region. On new Years' eve 1967, Ojukwu warned that time was "running out while the ship of state is drifting." These were the circumstances that foreshadowed Aburi. At Aburi, Ojukwu pressed his case. He did so successfully because he had one, not necessarily, as Kirk-Greene put it, that Ojukwu was "the cleverest" or had "skillful histrionics and superior intellectual adroitness." Indeed, this characterization of Ojukwu vis a vis the other actors is true. (In fact, Brigadier Adekunle said that it was because Gowon was indolent.) But I cannot see what Ojukwu could have done if he had no case. Ojukwu went to Aburi as the sole representative of a people struggling for survival. He successfully negotiated self-determination for them. On the other hand, Gowon had ascended the highest throne in the land. He was beginning to feel comfortable in that post. The majrity of non-eastern elites were also comfortable. The fleeing easterners had abandoned property, civil and military positions which people from other parts of the country were quick to fill. While his colleagues of the SMC were wishing away the past, Ojukwu was serious consolidating his argument on that past. Ojukwu's success at Aburi owed more to the logic of immediate circumstances than to his political brinksmanship. Back in the east, this success shored up Ojukwu's popularity. Rather than offset this popularity, Gowon's unilateral repudiation of the agreements fueled it. The crisis deepened because the interests of the two sides were diametrically opposed, in part, arising from the meddling of external interests. As easterners clamoured "On Aburi We Stand," the rest of the country clamoured for its repudiation. Ojukwu warned in a broadcast that, if by 31 March 1967, the federal side had not implemented Aburi, he would take "whatever measures may be necessary to give effect to those agreements." Ojukwu started to issue the "Survival Edicts" aimed at countering the federal blockade. The federal government declared a state of emergency in the Eastern Region and announced the creation of 12 states on 26 May 1967. In response, Ojukwu presented three options for the consideration of the Joint Secession of the Council of Chiefs and Elders. These were: (1) accepting the terms of the North and Gowon and, therefore, submitting to the domination of the North; (2) continuing the stalemate and to drift; and (3) to ensure the survival of the people of Eastern Nigeria by asserting their autonomy. It is now history that the assemblymen and chiefs chose the third option. On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu proclaimed the independent state of Biafra. If one accepts the ambition thesis, then the Joint Session had given legitimacy to Ojukwu's inordinate desires. But one cannot successfully condemn Ojukwu's action in presenting these options without suggesting [viable] alternatives that Ojukwu may have left out in his submission to the Joint Session. Could Ojukwu have postponed secession? In view of the federal government measures, such a postponement would have been unwarranted. For instance, the creation of states was unilateral and designed to undermine the geographical basis of Eastern Nigeria. Apart, from secession, the only option left to Ojukwu was to step down. This would have been dishonorable at a time when Easterners' grievances had not been addressed. In these circumstances, the real option open to Ojukwu was resignation. But this was dishonourable. People who never wished the easterners to live may continue to vent their frustration on Ojukwu for fulfilling a responsibility. This is how Nigerians come across when they scapegoat Ojukwu for leading their war of survival. No one can in good faith single Ojukwu out as a "former rebel," except if we accept that such a person is a crass ignoramus. One does not have to be Igbo or easterner, or their friends to see this fact. The unpreparedness of Biafra to withstand the rigours of independence at that time was widely known, even by Ojukwu himself. He took time to warn the Joint Session of the grave consequences of secession. (Don't mind that he would tell the world a few days later that no power in "Black Africa" could beat Biafra in war.) Most people in Eastern Nigeria realized that it was better to try and die fighting than just wait to be annihilated. The dangers were real. They were not merely "perceived", as i read often on Naijanet. Ojukwu realized that the people were not looking for a wimp. A good number of capable officers could have filled the void, had Ojukwu created one. Some of these were the surviving executioners of the January 1966 coup such as Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Chukwuma Nzeogwu, Tim Onwuatuegwu and Ben Gbulie. There were also their Yoruba counterparts who had taken refuge in the east. These were Major Ademoyega, Col. Banjo, Lt. Olafemihon and Lt. Oyewole. All these January officers had no jobs or commands in the army parlance. (To give them commands to Nzeogwu & co. would be to give them power. Their remaining idle was not good as well.) I am sure that the saying, which my elementary school teacher later thought me, "an idle man is a devil's workshop," was already in vogue at the time. The January officers played cards and chequers. Nobody, including Ojukwu, was at ease with these men's presence. They had done it before and could well do it again. Actually, Major General Alex Madiebo, who later became the Biafran Army Commander, grumbles in his book that Ojukwu gave these men a lot of amenities in order to placate them. Proper attention has not been given to the implications the presence of these men may have had on the declaration of Biafra. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOOTNOTE Both Col. I.N.C.A. and Col. E.O. were bitter with Ojukwu, for different reasons. Col. I.N.C.A. originally had a privileged position as Biafra's accredited arms purchaser in Lisbon. According to Col. I.N.C.A. himself, Mojekwu, who led a Biafran delegation to Europe, thought that it was absurd that such a well-trained, young major escounced in Europe while others were fighting the war. Col. I.N.C.A. made the necessary connections when Ojukwu recalled him a few days later. As the commander of a Biafran brigade in the bad days in 1968, Col. I.N.C.A. lost so much ground, men and equipment that Ojukwu found it necessary to summon the young colonel to account for his losses in the Oron-Ikot Ekpene-Uyo theartre. While going to meet Ojukwu at the State House, Umuahia, Col. I.N.C.A. did two suspicious things. First, he went with an unusually large convoy of troops. Second, he went in to meet Ojukwu, armed with a signal pistol. He was found to have a small arm when he went in to see Ojukwu, but was arrested. He remained in jail until the end of the war. He told me he had a pen-sized signal pistol, a non-offensive weapon. Why I took Col. E.O.'s account with a pinch of salt was because he, a Sandhurst-trained regular, disliked all those university graduates, Ojukwu merely included, who "spoiled" the army as a result of political ambition. According to him, it was this section of the offier corps who masterminded the January 1966 coup. Col. E.O. was the Adjutant of the Ikeja-based battalion during that coup. He argued further that it was this ambition that drove Ojukwu into going to war. It is also clear that Col. E.O. did not quite like the prominence that Ojukwu gave to the Biafran officers like Joe Achuzia who had not been regulars in the Nigerian Army. Something else happened which Col.E.O. did not like. In December 1968, when he was commanding the Otuocha-based 57 Brigade, he went to assume command of the Commando Division on the ostensible recommendation of Ojukwu. He found the Deputy GOC of the division, Col. Conrad Nwawo fully in charge. Col. E.O. went back to Otuocha and to his brigade a bitter man. Another grouse which Col. E.O. expressed against Ojukwu was that "Ojukwu led well, being that he made sure that nobody had any alternative [than to carry on with the war], especially those of us who were senior officers." It was Col. E.O.'s view that Ojukwu ordered the execution of some of his closest friends early during the war in order to instill fear into the Biafran officers. The executed men were Col. Victor Banjo, Major Ifeajuna, Major Philip Alale (Ojukwu's brother-in-law), and the star of the Biafran diplomatic corps, Sam Agbam. G. Ugo Nwokeji |
hi everyone, just reading through you post, ppl in the west would kill for your kind of qualifications, it is too diverse sad that the governments wouldn't even provide the basic infrastructure to support you guys, shame |
candylips:you must have read " A random walk down wall street" actually for someone to believe in the random walk model, he has to believe in the efficiency of prices which contradicts the fundamental analysis that you were pointing out, |
DICKtator:i dont blame you, because you got dumped. why else would you be so incensed? ![]() |
Kobojunkie:this is not dubai |
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sherrify:i dont know who informed you that you require 800k to purchase an apt in dubai. for an owner of a real estate agency, you should know that international city and discovery gardens in dubai have studios which cost less than 350k dirhams which is 100k U.S.dollars. you dont even know where those properties are located so how can you start condeming a woman you dont know. as for your info, we nigerians have been in dubai for ten year plus so please dont put things out of context. PS: I dont know the woman at all so i cant speculate on her business dealings |
lovemoi2:oh i know, i just dont know the real ones talkless of the NL ones, plus i suppose some of them are under the assumption that trying to know them better as friends means you want something else, too busy here to be worried about it though!!! PS: poor me!!! or do you mean lucky me? ![]() |
to the OP: i dunno, haven't had a nigerian female friend for 9 years plus as i dont stay in naija. even the community here and i dont cross paths, i see the guys sometimes though, once in a few months or so. terrible i know but the naija guys here dont date some of them them for silly reasons, |
Arizona1:no worries, dont stress |
weird topic |
naijaking1:no that is a state's license but you can apply for it in the traffic dept and pay a small fee. you should have your normal license to be presented to them that's all i think, at least that is how we do it here (40$) |
also remember to train your body to be used to the heat. an hour a day in the sauna should do ![]() i was in nigeria a few months ago for the first time in about ten years. totally worth it although i stayed for 5 days and enjoyed five hours of electricity! the street life though is interesting. food is always fresher with no funny chemicals. the roads are not good to be honest. we were racing through potholes and have some money with you. expect some slight police questioning. they stop cars to ask for license and stuff like that. make sure you get your international driving license the pace of life was very slow for me in the evenings, except the noise of the generators, it was alright you tend to laugh a lot in nigeria, dubai is too fast paced |
k |
are you reading a lot of rich dad poor dad? |
queenesthr:it would depend on your target audience. it can start with affluent ppl in ur neighbourhood. create a simple matrix. place a few goods like textiles( if it isn't banned), electronics, food products etc. find out how much it costs in nigeria and its corresponding cost here. approach the suppliers and dont be worried if they say no. the smart ones will be willing for someone else to take over their travelling costs if they can get the right price, you just focus on your margins. if nigerian schools for example are now incorporating technology in the class rooms, ask them how much they'd budget for say 100 comp. gather the orders from schools or banks across the region and simply make a big order to take advantage of cost savings, you can also export from nigeria. it seems the govt will prob be more happy. more trade revenue to them. lol |
Jummy4real:i thought the textile importation of business was not allowed or maybe i have been wrapped up in my own world |
why anyone would want to give money to a stranger who promsies to double his money is still beyond me!!! if you had the secret of doubling money, wont you double yours? |
Rolante:asking for a game plan with your broker is the same as asking your barber if you need a haircut. a broker is a salesman. just focus on conducting your own analysis on companies if you cant afford an expensive security analyst. simply spending time by learning how to analyze financial systems would be the first step |
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