Last week, a
foreign
source
identified
two of the
Nigerians
he alleges
to be
behind the
Boko Haram
militants.
One of
them:
former
military
Chief of Army Staff, Lt-General Azubuike
Ihejirika. The other: a former state governor
Modu Sheriff.
The disclosure was made in Australia by
Stephen Davis, a hostage negotiator reportedly
hired by the Nigerian government to interface
with Boko Haram, from whom he got the two
names. General Ihejirika swiftly denied any
involvement.
The news was broken in Nigeria on Thursday
by Nasir El-Rufai, a former Minister.
Ihejirika, who was fired from his plum job last
January, immediately picked up his weapons
and aimed them in the direction of El-Rufai,
calling him a Boko Haram “commander.”
“The likes of El-Rufai have been supporting
Boko Haram,” he said in his rebuttal. “In fact,
El-Rufai and his likes are the same group of
people that ensured the army did not get the
requested equipment to deal with this menace
once and for all, as they used their cohorts to
tell the government that procuring modern
equipment were not necessary.”
He did not forget to throw in the ethnic card,
either. “When the Boko Haram operation
started, supporters of the sect like El-Rufai
said that there was nothing like Boko Haram
and that the army was just killing innocent
youths. El-Rufai said that I was re-inventing
the killing of the Ibos during the Biafra war
following government’s determination to rid
the country of terrorism.”
For some reason, Ihejirika seemed to
concentrate his bullets on the emissary, rather
than the message, which was Davis. He did not
say what he did about “the El-Rufais” when he
was in office.
That describes Nigeria rather well, in terms of
our persistent refusal to face the issues that
confront us. For a government which claims it
really wants to treat the Boko Haram infection,
the Davis intervention is a vital opening.
To begin with, the government, which knew—
or ought to have known—about the Davis
allegations before El-Rufai rang the bell, ought
to have commenced immediate investigations
into the allegations right away.
Ihejirika and Sheriff ought to have been
arrested the same day, and left with no chance
to influence the narrative.
The problem is the government of doubt in
Abuja: doubting itself, doubting its
responsibilities, doubting yesterday, doubting
the questions, questioning the doubts.
But for Abuja’s self-esteem crisis, we might
actually have reached the Davis level two and a
half years ago when President Goodluck
Jonathan himself first announced that he had
Boko Haram sympathizers in his government.
“Some of them are in the executive arm of
government, some of them are in the
parliamentary/legislative arm of government,
while some of them are even in the judiciary.
Some are also in the armed forces, the police
and other security agencies.”
How in the world does a leader identify the
enemy in the same room as he, but do nothing
about it even as that enemy inflicts increasing
carnage in the country?
But for Abuja’s self-esteem issues, we might
actually have reached the Davis level in April
2012 when National Security Adviser, Owoeye
Azazi, speaking a few months after Mr.
Jonathan’s remarks, said Nigeria needed to
investigate the root of the level of violence in
Northeastern Nigeria [to establish] whether it
had escalated because the group out of the
blue became better trained, better equipped
and better funded.
He attributed the growing insecurity to what
he called “undemocratic practices” by the
political parties, and specifically indicting the
ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP).
“The issue of violence did not increase in
Nigeria until when there was a declaration by
the current president that he was going to
contest. PDP got it wrong from the beginning.
The party started by saying Mr. A can rule, and
Mr. B cannot rule, according to PDP
conventions, rules and regulations and not
according to the constitution. That created the
climate for what is happening or manifesting
itself in the country…”
The PDP, which is defined by power, not
responsibility, hated that kind of talk from an
official it considered to be its property rather
than a servant of the country. Two months
later, Azazi was fired. Seven months later, he
died in a helicopter accident.
Azazi’s death ended any hopes of any more
uncomfortable questions from within the
upper echelons of power, but the disclosure by
Dr. Davis means that the old file ought to be
re-opened. Will the government of doubt do
that? Better still, what will the government do?
Judging solely from the track record of the
Jonathan government, we are to expect
nothing. Even if he did set up an investigation,
such a process will be abandoned once public
focus is no longer as harsh. His government,
lacking interest in accountability,
characteristically and routinely ignores such
reports.
The truth is that this is how the Boko Haram
insurgency grew out of control. In the past
couple of years, not only has it unveiled itself
as the most destructive and divisive force
since independence, it has exposed the
Jonathan government as divided and
incompetent, and the security agencies as
overblown and overrated.
While the presidential fleet of jets continues
to grow, Nigeria’s military has been exposed as
being of limited training and equipment; while
the Nigerian government continues to spend
money recklessly on its privileged inner circle,
Nigeria’s infrastructure decays; while Nigeria’s
rulers make speeches, the poverty and
disenchantment are growing.
What next? The future is already here:
Nigerian soldiers refusing to fight, preferring
the humiliation of being court-martialed to
execution by better-armed, and perhaps
better-trained militants.
The future is already here: a country where a
small group of violent militants armed itself,
as well as trained and mastered the terrain
better than all of the security agencies put
together.
It is a sad, shameful day when Nigeria’s rulers
declare a state of emergency in the worst-
affected states, only for the militants to prove
to be even more diabolical in those states. It
is an even more shameful day to consider that
a man of Ihejirika was in charge of the army
during a significant part of this period, only to
start pointing fingers after he has been called
out.
This is the tragedy of the Jonathan era: self-
doubting governance where fear is nurtured
rather than combatted; where the hard
treatment is avoided and the patient dies;
where the criminals are pardoned, not
prosecuted. Our prize is that million and
millions of young citizens are left on the
streets to fend for themselves.
Hopefully, Boko Haram is as deep as we will
ever sink. It need not be this way. A
responsible government must find the courage
to isolate the enemy to defeat it. This can only
be done if it first establishes a capacity for
social justice and the rule of law. That is what
#BringBackOurGirls is really about, and why it
defines the Jonathan government so well.
Who are the sponsors of Boko Haram? Now
Nigeria has a good opportunity to find out.
Can her government of doubt find the heart?
for more visit http://www.rhapsodiaffos..com/

Like seriously I didn't read all this but


Gej is really vexing me he know d sponsors and supporters why didn't he arrest them it seems some peeps are right for calling him clueless





ANIWAYS###GEJ TILL 2029

snowprince07:
Like seriously I didn't read all this but


Gej is really vexing me he know d sponsors and supporters why didn't he arrest them it seems some peeps are right for calling him clueless





ANIWAYS###GEJ TILL 2029

there are no tangible evidence to nail them with.....aside from the president,there are stake holders so wat if they are involve?

Terrorism will never cease in a country where the so-called leaders are criminals and terrorists in disguise.
Michael Bassey Johnson

what is the Op talking about? I tried reading it, but could not

pls learn to summarize

hushmail:
what is the Op talking about? I tried reading it, but could not

pls learn to summarize

lol if na Blue film u fit watch am till the end abi?