https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1JyXzCIaLA

Ukrainian Varta in Action

presently own this model bullet classic 500cc

Punj Llyod-IWI Joint Venture Punj Llyod raksha systems

when i was a child the company used to manufacture tractors and agricultural equipment's , they still do

drdo HTSE 1200 turboshaft engine under development for helis

power output 1200 KW

nemesis4u:
presently own this model bullet classic 500cc

I prefer my hummerFeet

indian and french co developed shakti/ardiden turboshaft engine currently powering ALH/LCH/RUDRA

Odunayaw:
I prefer my hummerFeet

me too when i have to ditch the bike

totally reliable and state of the art for (riding) own or others (piggyback)

plus very sexy ,can even make love to them (female versions only )

kinky

nemesis4u:

me too when i have to ditch the bike
totally reliable and state of the art for (riding) own or others (piggyback)
plus very sexy ,can even make love to them (female versions only )
kinky

gerrarahere

.

tdayof:
.

most probably a TD

u forgot to give the description

odunayaw is waiting on his hummerfeet so dont keep him waiting

fuucckers here struggling with one plane and others make them for breakfast

drdo (bhel) artillery gun manufacturing facility and other facilities at haridwar

there r many other such artillery gun manufacturing facilities across the country

continue......................

nemesis4u:


most probably a TD

u forgot to give the description

odunayaw is waiting on his hummerfeet so dont keep him waiting

fuucckers here struggling with one plane and others make them for breakfast

Scaled composites owns the aircraft. Heard its stealthy I guess in design and probably materials.

tdayof:



Scaled composites owns the aircraft. Heard its stealthy I guess in design and probably materials.

trying to do a U2 maybe

nemesis4u:


trying to do a U2 maybe

They've got some funny looking aircrafts. I'll love to know how they behave aerodynamically.

drdo (bhel) 30mm naval gun with EOFCS

dont know if it is local or JV or TOT

tdayof:


They've got some funny looking aircrafts. I'll love to know how they behave aerodynamically.

i have a suspicion they r a front for darpa

the aircrafts in the pics r powered gliders basically, first 2 anyways

and i suspect they r using the manned prototypes to generate data for the unmanned ones actually in the very long endurance class maybe upto weeks at one go.

drdo (bhel) 127/64mm naval gun

this one looks like JV with oto malera with local input, not sure though

the room in the 2nd pic looks like an indian facility to me again not sure

gerrarahere

the gun who invented this word was surely drunk

prospective upgrades for existing 76/62 guns to strales standard

definitely TOT

by the way drdo has started prototyping the parts for a electromagnetic (rail) gun for naval application

tdayof:


They've got some funny looking aircrafts. I'll love to know how they behave aerodynamically.

is this one 2 separate aircraft's

or one aircraft with 6 engines and double fuselage

the noses dont seem aligned

nemesis4u:

is this one 2 separate aircraft's
or one aircraft with 6 engines and double fuselage
the noses dont seem aligned

Twin head snake.

isn't this designed to carry space aircraft?

nemesis4u:

is this one 2 separate aircraft's
or one aircraft with 6 engines and double fuselage
the noses dont seem aligned

Twin head snake.

isn't this designed to carry space aircraft?

MikeCZA:
Twin head snake.


isn't this designed to carry space aircraft?

me thinks space rocket

this will enable light weight rockets to launch sats into LEO orbits at very low costs

Just over than a week after Russia and Saudi Arabia agreed on S-400 supplies, another Middle Eastern country has expressed interest in the air defense systems.

MANAMA (Sputnik) – Bahrain and Russia are in talks on supplies of Russia’s S-400 air defense systems, Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, the commander of Bahrain's Royal Guard, said Monday.

"We are currently in the stage of negotiations, but with god’s help we will finish this process," he told reporters at the BIDEC expo.

"Bahrain and Russia have established broad cooperation in the military sector. Meetings are being held, negotiations are taking place, relations have also been established between the leadership of two countries. We would like to strengthen our relations and increase the amount of Russian weapons in Bahrain’s defense forces."
Russia, Bahrain in Talks on S-400 System's Supplies- Royal Guard Commander

The statement comes as Russia and Saudi Arabia have agreed on S-400 supplies during the "landmark" visit by the Saudi King to Moscow earlier this month. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on October 9 that that the deal to supply Saudi Arabia with S-400 SAMs has good prospects.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Kozhin, Russia's presidential aide tasked with military technical cooperation, said that the S-400 deal with the Saudis would take place "In the very near future," adding that "now there are negotiations, coordination."

Another regional state, Turkey has already made the first payment for the air defense systems. On September 12, Moscow and Ankara reached an agreement on the delivery of S-400 systems to Turkey.

The S-400 Triumph is Russia's next-generation mobile surface-to-air missile system carrying three different types of missiles capable of destroying aerial targets at a short-to-extremely-long range. It integrates a multifunctional radar, autonomous detection and targeting systems, anti-aircraft missile systems, launchers, and a command and control center.

https://sptnkne.ws/fGfM


S-400 is selling like hot cakes

but russia refused to give necessary tech for complete ownership of S-400 to turkey especially the IFF codes

and Turkish S400 will be serviced by Russian companies

...................

India has made an official request to purchase two airborne battlefield and ground surveillance aircraft under a government-to-government deal. The move comes within a month of U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ visit to India.

India-specific ISTAR aircraft for the Air Force will be equipped with active electronically scanned array radar that can scan more than a 30,000 square kilometer area in a minute, and analyze data and identify the targets in 10 to 15 minutes.

ISTAR aircraft will be supplied by Raytheon of the U.S. on a Gulfstream platform. The deal is estimated to cost $1 billion.

IAF intends to operate ISTAR aircraft as its central airborne platform for analytical, communications and sensor-related tasks to achieve real-time targeting capability in the battlefield. The aircraft will eventually be networked with the service’s indigenous air command-and-control system, or IACCS. The IACCS is designed and built on the lines of NATO’s air command-and-control system, which handles air traffic control, surveillance, air mission control, airspace management and force management functions.

this one is a force multiple able to swing land battles to ones favor.

i am puzzled why they ordered only 2, requirement was around 6+ , becz i know drdo and IAF were fighting over who will lead the technical evaluation teams for the Raytheon system , i have a feeling drdo will start its own airborne battlefield and ground surveillance aircraft program after gaining insight from the now ordered platforms and will take care of the remaining requirements.

pic for representation Raytheon Sentinel

forthcoming nirbhay long range sub sonic cruise missile test will be with locally developed manik mini turbofan engine

it was previously being powered by Russian supplied NPO Saturn 36MT engine

however with the Indian intent to mount strategic warheads on nirbhay forced it to make its own engine inorder to address Russian concerns before MCTR agreement was signed last year which makes the concerns now redundant but since the engine project had advanced it was decided to stick with it.

pic 2 manik turbofan engine under testing

drdo Mini UAV for police and para military / military

the articles below r from an old ind.... defence doc

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Introduction

1. Modern military forces require which is Information superiority (IS) “the ability to collect, process and disseminate flow of information while exploiting and/or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.” To achieve IS we must combine the capabilities of Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4); Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR); and Information Warfare (IW).

2. An Advanced Battlespace Information System (ABIS) should have the following elements within each of the three broad capability areas: -

(a) Battlespace Awareness. This includes information acquisition, precision information direction and consistent battlespace understanding. These capabilities allow the forces to control and shape the pace of the battle by providing Commanders with a broader perspective and better intuitive feel of the battlespace, including environmental conditions and operational situation

(b) Effective Employment of Forces. It encompasses proactive planning and pre-emption, integrated force management and execution of time-critical missions. These capabilities allow the Commanders to plan and execute operations in a manner that achieves an overwhelming effect at precise places and times.

(c) C4ISTAR Grid (composed of Sensor Grid, Information Grid, and Engagement Grid). It includes universal transaction services, distributed environment support and high assurance of services. These capabilities allow the Commanders to rapidly adapt to changing situation and environmental conditions and to attach high-priority to targets throughout the Battlespace. Information superiority empowers lower echelon force elements by widely distributing the Commander’s intent and the information needed for timely and effective execution. Since these capabilities inevitably degrade in the course of battle, a key objective of IS is to enable Commanders to plan for this eventuality, to identify and protect essential capabilities, and to reconfigure information flows and supporting C2 structures to meet changing needs. This high degree of flexibility can be achieved by a network-centric approach to the integration of current and future sensor, information, and engagement grids into a single C4ISTAR grid.

Battlespace Awareness

3. It includes the operational capability to acquire and assimilate information about the location and movement of friendly and adversary forces and about the geo-spatial situation (e.g., terrain, weather, space, bathymetric conditions) in which they are deployed. To provide a common picture and understanding of the situation, which will enhance and the ability of the Commander to identify and localize features of the battlespace in the face of degraded environmental conditions and hostile countermeasures.

4. The specific operational capabilities necessary to achieve battlespace awareness are as follows: -

(a) Information Acquisition. The provision of sufficient, timely, high-quality surveillance, reporting, target acquisition and assessment information on enemy, friendly, and own units, events, activities, status, capabilities, plans, and intentions to ensure that Commanders have dominant battlespace knowledge.

(b) Precision Information Direction. The capability to dynamically direct and integrate both tactical and supporting C4 and ISTAR resources for targeting, engagement, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and combat assessment to maintain the ability of the Commanders to exploit and shape the battlespace. This also includes the integration and synchronization of information into up-to-date mission products needed by the Commander and staff for effective decision making.

(c) Consistent Battlespace Understanding. The capability to elevate the level and speed of the combatants’ cognitive understanding of enemy, friendly, and geo-spatial situations and to maintain consistency in that view across tactical and supporting forces.

The C4ISTAR Grid

5. The C4ISTAR grid will support complete connectivity with flexible, rapidly configurable network services, facilitate universal user access to information, and assurance of services in stressed environments. These services will also provide flexible command structures and support for time-critical, short-duration mission tasks such as “sensor-to-shooter" integration and support. The services of the C4ISTAR grid should be to an extent conceptually separate from command structures, disseminating battlespace awareness to users when they need it and in the form that they need, to facilitate collaborative planning and execution of operations. Achieving connectivity and flexibility across heterogeneous systems will also allow the creation of "virtual staffs".

6. The critical operational capabilities of the C4ISTAR grid are: -

(a) Universal Transaction Services. The capability to provide combatants and their systems the ability to exchange and understand information, unimpeded by differences in connectivity on a "just-in-time" basis, regardless of location.

(b) Distributed Environment Support. The mechanisms and services required to allow the combatants to craft their C4ISTAR information environments from the full set of assets connected through the C4ISTAR grid, including the ability to establish distributed virtual staffs and task teams. All this also requires considerable organizational decentralization.

(c) High Assurance of Services. High-quality services that combatants must have, when needed, to meet dynamically changing demands and defend against physical and information warfare threats. This includes adaptive network management that anticipates changing requirements, and the defensive IW operational capabilities of information security, operations security, information integrity, attack detection and restoration. Information security encompasses confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and to some extent, the availability. Operations security ensures that own critical information and activities cannot be easily intercepted or observed by adversary intelligence systems. Information integrity ensures that the information to support Battlespace awareness is unimpaired.

Functional Capability.

7. The C4ISR grid continues to evolve into a “system-of-systems”. A focus on total life cycle systems engineering will be needed to achieve end-to-end performance. Some of the important functional capabilities needed to achieve information superiority are given below:-

(a) Collaborative situation assessment and BDA.

(b) Collection and distribution of weather and environmental conditions.

(c) Repair and consumables management.

(d) Theatre intelligence processing and broadcast.

(e) C4ISTAR system management.

(f) Seamless connectivity.

(g) Space assets.

(h) Knowledge-based access, retrieval, and integration of information.

(j) Information consistency, integrity, protection and authentication.

(k) Access controls / security services.

(l) Network management and control.

(m) Intrusion detection / threat warning.

(n) Large database engineering, manipulation, search and retrieval.

Conclusion.

8. Achieving IS and seamlessly integrating IS into combat operations will require both advances in technology and development of new operational concepts to exploit them. Information Superiority has significant potential to transform our approach to assigned mission and achieve worthwhile improvement in effectiveness and efficiency. However, the same will not be realised by simply creating information infrastructure. In fact we have to take decisive steps to develop IS based mission capability packages, absences of which will lead to confusion and disharmony along with degraded performance. Two key pre-requisites are, development of new and innovative IS concepts and strategies to meet mission challenges and the ability to transform these concepts and strategies into operational capabilities.

AREA MISSILE DEFENCE


Introduction

1. The vision for a future Area Missile Defence architecture represents theatre-wide set of surveillance systems, and a highly responsive C 4ISTAR network to integrate the surveillance and weapon capabilities. The netted set of surveillance systems includes airborne, ship-borne, and land-based radars in conjunction with space surveillance systems to detect launches of theatre ballistic and cruise missiles and track them until they are successfully intercepted.

2. Area Missile Defence Mission Statement. The mission of Area Missile Defence is as follows: -

(a) To demonstrate our resolve to deter aggression through the establishment of an Area Missile Defence capability.

(b) To protect deployed forces, critical assets, and areas of vital interest from attack by theatre missiles (TM).

(c) To protect population centres, fixed civilian and military assets, and mobile military units.

(d) To detect and target TM systems; to detect, warn and report a TM launch; and to coordinate a multifaceted response to a TM attack, integrating that response with other combat operations.

(e) To reduce the probability of and/or minimise the effects of damage caused by a TM attack.

Operational Capability Elements

3. This section focuses on the active defence pillar and those aspects of the C4ISTAR element that are unique to the Area Missile Defence mission. The four operational capability elements, of Area Missile Defence are as follows: -

(a) Offensive operations.

(b) Active defence.

(c) Passive defence.

(d) Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR).

4. C4ISTAR. In addition to the functional capabilities required for passive defence, the functional capability of Boost Phase InterceptLaser is essential in the target intercept area.

Functional Capabilities

5. The functional capabilities are grouped into those activities, which support the three functional areas of Acquisition Sensor, Target Intercept and C4ISTAR.

6. Acquisition Sensor Area. In the acquisition sensor area, the four functional capabilities are Detection, Tracking, Discrimination/Identification, and Communications. Rapidly detecting theatre missile launches and establishing current and accurate tracks for those missiles are essential for initiating the active defence against the attacking missiles. In addition, the detection, tracking, and communications functional capabilities strongly support passive defence by providing attack warning and impact point predictions to threatened areas. These three functional capabilities also strongly support attack operations by accurately identifying missile launch locations so that the launchers can be promptly attacked. The functional capability to distinguish a ballistic missile warhead from accompanying missile components or fragments and decoys is essential for initiating the active defence for attacking the right target. In addition, the attack characterisation information about the missile type and potentially the type of warhead from discrimination sensors moderately supports both the attack operations and passive defence operational capabilities.

7. Target Intercept. In the target intercept area, the first three functional capabilities i.e., Lethality, Envelope and Terminal Phase specifically refer to capabilities of interceptor missiles (often called kinetic energy interceptors in contrast to directed-energy or laser intercept). The capabilities of the sensors onboard the interceptor missile or laser weapon platform should be able to: -

(a) Acquire the right target based on hands-off information passed from acquisition sensors through the C3I system.

(b) Discriminate between the target warhead and missile fragments or decoys.

(c) Maintain tracking of the target until the intercept is completed.

8. Communication. The communications functional capability links the interceptor missile or laser platforms to the acquisition sensor functional capabilities. The final target intercept functional capability is boost-phase intercept with laser weapons, either airborne or space based. The laser weapon platforms because of the onboard acquisition sensor and communications capabilities envisioned for them would also support the C4ISTAR and attack operations operational capabilities by forwarding missile launch and tracking data that have been acquired.

9. C4ISTAR. The C 4ISTAR area includes functional capabilities for high capacity datalinks to rapidly pass acquisition sensor data; and for specialised waveforms to forward missile tracks among elements of the Area Missile Defence forces. C4ISTAR also includes the functional capabilities of very high throughput data processing to capture, analyse and disseminate the sensor data with minimum delays; and data fusion capability to synergistically combine tracking and discrimination data from multiple sensors of different types.

(a) Target manoeuvring is another key limitation that imposes additional lateral acceleration and diverts propulsion requirement on missile interceptor technology. Current TBMs may manoeuvre unpredictably during re-entry because of missile dynamics or re-entry vehicle asymmetries and advanced re-entry vehicle could potentially take evasive manoeuvres, thus reducing the probability of successful intercept. Therefore, technologies that enhance interceptor manoeuvrability and improve interceptor probability of kill would allow a reduction in interceptor inventory and could significantly reduce Area Missile Defence costs.

(b) Two other significant barriers for Area Missile Defence are sensor/data fusion and target signature data. Sensor fusion is a challenging technical barrier for Area Missile Defence because fusion must take place in near real-time in order to be useful for guiding intercepts. Sensor data fusion is a technique in which multiple sensors provide individual data sets on targets and backgrounds, which are then processed into a single merged set of data. The fused data present a much more accurate picture of the battlespace to the field Commanders than the sum of the individual data sets. The data fusion process occurs in one of the following three ways: -

(i) The fusion of data from several sensors on the same platform e.g., thermal imaging sensor and laser radar onboard an interceptor or a space surveillance satellite.

(ii) The transfer or handover of data from one sensor platform to another e.g., target object map data handover from one surveillance sensor to an interceptor.

(iii) The merging of track files recorded and processed from two or more geographically separated sensors e.g., ground radar and space surveillance sensor data track files.

(c) Availability of accurate target signature data is also a key barrier because successful TMD detections and intercepts, particularly hit-to-kill intercepts, require accurate and reliable target signatures. Threat signatures drive the designs of the detection and tracking radars and optical sensors and seeker hardware selections. They also establish requirements for the supporting detection, discrimination, aim-point selection and kill assessment algorithms. The primary limitation on obtaining accurate signature is generally the lack of access to the actual missile threat operating in their deployed environment. To compensate for this our R & D organisations will have to plan for a facility for signature flight and phenomenology programme where both simulated threats and acquired threats are flown and measured.

(d) Some potential barriers to operating in disturbed environments that are not unique to the Area Missile Defence mission for achieving mission goals in the presence of jamming, weather, solar and nuclear disturbances must also be borne in mind when working on key technologies associated with Area Missile Defence.

continue......

Way Ahead

10. The lower tier systems with moderate velocity missiles have only limited capability against longer-range theatre ballistic missile (TBM) threats with higher re-entry velocities, particularly if the attacking missiles are fitted with WMD warheads. Chemical or biological warheads intercepted at low altitude could still disperse hazardous materials over defended areas, particularly if the warheads contain sub-munitions. Therefore, upper tier Area Missile Defence systems with high-performance interceptor missiles capable of defending larger areas and intercepting targets, including WMD warheads at higher altitudes need to be developed for both land and sea basing. In addition, there is an urgent need to develop a highly mobile system to be deployed with manoeuvring forces to provide coverage against short-range TBMs, cruise missiles and other aerodynamic threats.

11. The characteristics of the land attack cruise missile threat presents special challenges for the Area Missile Defence mission. Cruise missiles can fly at low altitude to avoid detection, can manoeuvre unpredictably to evade intercept and can be launched from aircraft and mobile surface carriers, thus reducing the likelihood of pre-launch suppression. Furthermore, advanced cruise missiles design can have very low radar and infrared signatures that make the missiles very difficult to detect against low-altitude background clutter. Therefore, the R & D programme for Air Defence must cater for the surveillance systems and interceptor missiles possessing capabilities to detect, track and intercept cruise missiles.

12. In order to achieve speedy success in the field of Area Missile Defence, our R & D agencies must take immediate initiative to attain the perceived goals by developing the required key technologies. The various functional capabilities vis-à-vis operational capability elements along with the key technologies required for Area Missile Defence are as follows: -

(a) Operational Capability Element–C4ISTAR. Its required to coordinate exchange of information among sensors, radars, launch platforms, interceptors and command centres and for all this, the prerequisite are as follows: -

(i) Acquisition sensor communications.

(ii) Target intercept communications.

(iii) C4ISTAR viz., Datalinks, Waveform, Data Fusion and Data Processing.

(b) Active Defence Capability .

(i) The functional capabilities required are acquiring and tracking the target and handover/communication data to command centres; interceptor launch bases and laser platforms are the Acquisition sensors for Detection, Tracking, Discrimination and Communication.

(ii) The key technologies required for advanced lightweight signal processor are as follows: -

(aa) High power T/R modules.
(ab) Large – format, high – uniformity, single band and multi band LWIR focal plane arrays.
(ac) Lightweight antennae.
(ad) Cryogenic power.
(ae) Eyesafe laser radar.

(ii) In order to neutralise the threat, the key technologies required are as follows: -

(aa) Solid propellant divert.
(ab) Onboard sensor signal processor and algorithms.
(ac) Lightweight laser radar.
(ad) High-sensitivity, multispectral IR sensor.
(ae) Fast framing seeker.
(af) Sensor windows (IR and RF) for hypersonic atmospheric interceptors.
(ag) Sensor data fusion.
(ah) Target discrimination algorithms.
(aj) Lightweight chemical laser.
(ak) Adaptive optics and beam control.
(al) Atmospheric compensation and tracking.
(am) High-stiffness, lightweight structures.

(iii) The key technologies needed to receive, process and transfer data are as follows: -

(aa) Omni-EHF antenna.
(ab) Advanced fusion algorithm.

(c) Passive Defence. For early, long-range, accurate threat acquisition, tracking, and data distribution, the key technologies required are as follows: -

(i) Laser communications.

(ii) Satellite electric propulsion.

(iii) High-efficiency photovoltaic.

(iv) Active pixel visible sensor.

(v) LWIR GaAs sensor.

(d) Offensive Operation. The key technologies required to coordinate cooperative acquisition, tracking, decision-making and kill assessment are as follows: -

(i) High-speed datalinks.
(ii) Target discrimination algorithms.
(iii) CDMA spread-spectrum communications modems.

Technological Advancements

13. Technology development and demonstration efforts that directly support Area Missile Defence must focus on the following areas: -

(a) Enhancement of ground and airborne radar and space, airborne optical sensor capabilities to improve missile launch detection, tracking and discrimination.

(b) The interceptor missile performance must include onboard discrimination and divert manoeuvring capabilities for both exo/endo-atmospheric interceptors.

(c) The feasibility of boost-phase intercept with airborne and space-based laser technologies.

(d) C4ISTAR systems capable of rapid processing and transfer of massive amount of sensor and tracking data required to support defensive intercepts.

14. Some of the key technologies needed to breach the limitations for achieving the Area Missile Defence functional capabilities and to enable the AMD operational capability elements that are being addressed by the technology development and demonstration efforts in the western countries is listed below:-

(a) Discriminating interceptor technology programme.

(b) Advanced X-band module.

(c) Advanced space surveillance.

(d) Atmospheric interceptor technology.

(e) Airborne lasers for Area Missile Defence.

(f) Microwave SiC high-power amplifiers.

(g) Advanced focal plane array technology.

(h) Optical processing and memory.

(j) Photonics for control and processing of RF signals.

(k) High-density, radiation-resistant microelectronics.

(l) Space radiation mitigation for satellite operations

(m) Satellite infrared surveillance systems.

(n) Multi-mission space-based laser.

15. Conclusion. The Area Missile Defence threat is evolving rapidly. Such threats include not only Theatre Ballistic Missiles, but also Cruise missiles, UCAVs and eventually Stealth attack aircraft. There is an urgent need to enlarge the scope of the R & D programme for Air Defence to include advanced space surveillance, space-based infrared systems (SBIRS), boost phase intercept lasers, interceptor discrimination, advanced endo-atmospheric interceptor and airborne laser etc.