1. Introduction
1Kano, a predominantly Islamic urban centre, was conquered by the British in 1903. Since then, the city has experienced diverse social, economic and political changes. Economically, Kano’s pre-colonial influence, as the entreport of the trans-Saharan trade from North Africa waned with the arrival of the British. In colonial times, imported goods, mostly from Britain and Europe, came through the southern Nigerian seaports of Lagos, Port-Harcourt, and Calabar. The trade in imported and foreign goods led to significant south-north migrations in Nigeria, with many southern Nigerian immigrants settling in Kano. These immigrants into colonial and post-colonial Kano brought dramatic social changes. The physical structure of the city also changed as a result of the urban renewal policies of the British colonial officials and their Nigerian successors. All these factors produced a culture-shock for the inhabitants of Kano which preceded the inter-personal and mass violence experienced in the twentieth century.

This paper explains the violent eruptions which have occurred in Kano since 1953, and places them within the context of the urbanization of the city since the British conquest in 1903. Rather than studying acts of inter-personal violence in Kano (e.g., murder, arson and rape) which hardly differ from what obtains in any other Nigerian city, emphasis is on those acts of mass violence that have given Kano the reputation of being one of the most endangered cities in sub-Saharan Africa. The historical background of Kano is also examined. Emphasis is placed on the nature of population pressure on the city during pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times. The Islamic factor in the history of the city is also placed in the right perspective, as most of the acts of mass violence described are connected to the practice of Islam.

Historical Background
Kano is one of the most studied cities in Nigeria (see Palmer, 1928; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966; Mortimore, 1966; Trevallion, 1966; Paden, 1973; Frishman, 1977: 212-250; 1986: 464-475, etc.). The city is one of the seven legitimate Hausa states Hausa bakwai identified in the Bayajidda legends which explain the origin of Hausa states. Apart from popular legends, however, Kano has a detailed history that dates from before the seventh century (Willet, 1971: 368), making the city one of the oldest in Nigeria. The history of the city is best understood when divided into three related periods: (a) the Habe era, i.e., from origin to the 1807 Fulani jihad; (b) the Fulani era, i.e., 1807 to the 1903 British conquest and, (c) the twentieth century, i.e., from the British conquest to the present. Islam, which has produced the most pronounced contradictions in the urban character and the state of inter-group relations in twentieth century Kano, was established in the city during the Habe era. During the Fulani era the religion was consolidated.

As noted by various writers, Kano was founded before the seventh century as a settlement for Abagawa immigrant blacksmiths who came to mine iron ore from the ironstone outcrop of Dala Hill. By the tenth century, the population in Kano had become large enough to form a political structure which evolved under a Daura immigrant known as Bagauda. Bagauda’s political hegemony was however, not as well accepted as that of his son, Gigi, who located his capital to the south of Dala hill (the present Kano). To protect Kano against foreign invaders, Gigi started the construction of the famous Kano walls in 1095. These were completed in the twelfth century during the reign of Sarkin Yusa (Frishman, 1977: 214). During the reign of Sarkin Muhammadu Rumfa in the fifteenth century, the walls were extended by fifty-four per cent to accommodate the many immigrants, especially those from Bornu and North Africa, who streamed into Kano, because of its economic and, later, religious importance.

The Wangara immigrants from the old Mali Empire as well as the Sharifai, introduced Islam to Kano in the fourteenth century (see al-Hajj, 1963: 7-16). It was, however, during the reign of Sarkin Muhammadu Rumfa (1463-1499) that Islam became the official religion in Kano since the successive Sarakuna (kings) of the city were at least nominal Muslims (Paden 1973: 47). During the reign of Rumfa, Kano played host to Al-Maghili, a north African scholar from Tlemcen who radicalized the practice of Islam in Kano. Al-Maghili’s visit to Kano was as a result of ideological conflicts in the western Mediterranean and north Africa. These occurred as a result of the colonial offensive of Portugal and Spain, and the call by Pope Martin V and Pope Eugenius IV in the early fifteenth century for Christian monarchs to eliminate Muslims, who were regarded as infidels, from their domains. North African Muslims reacted to this in different ways. Al-Maghili and many other Islamic scholars, who later revolutionarized the practice of Islam in the Sahara and South equator, developed their strong following after this (Yahya, 1989: 20). The major task Al-Maghili set for himself in Kano was that of establishing a firm framework on which the practice of Islam could rest. He produced for Sarkin Muhammadu Rumfa a treatise of political administration which incorporated the political, religious, societal and economic issues concerning the Islamic state. As a result of the activities of Al-Maghili and other Arab scholars, the traditional animists, Maguzawa, in Kano were overthrown. Kano thus became a dominantly Islamic society, with its architecture, economy and social character patterned after that of other Islamic urban centres in the Middle East and North Africa (Frishman, 1986).

Between 1807 and 1903, Kano came under the control of the Sokoto jihadists. The Sokoto Jihad which started in 1804 was extended to Kano in 1807 on the excuse that the Habe rulers of the city had incorporated some elements of the Maguzawa (animists) theocratic practices in their administration. After its conquest in 1807 by the Sokoto jihadists, Kano came under the Sokoto Caliphate. This led to the further consolidation of Islam in the city and the elevation of Kano to the status of a prominent Islamic centre (Yahya, 1989: 21; Mahadi, 1989: 202-203). According to Mahadi, Kano played host to a variety of displaced people as well as Islamic scholars during the Sokoto Jihad. This led to a further increase in the city’s population. The story is told of how Prophet Mohammed stayed briefly in Kano and went to the top of Dala hill to pray on his ascension (Isra) to legitimize the new image of Kano as a centre of Islamic excellence. His footprints are believed to be still visible on the hill. The activities of Al-Maghili in Kano were also believed to have been directed by the Prophet himself, thus strengthening the Islamic traditions in the city. In the light of this, the Kanawa (i.e., the indigenous Kano people) see themselves as pure Muslims who received their Islamic traditions directly from Prophet Mohammed (Yahya, 1989: 22). These were the people that the British Christian colonial forces conquered in 1903. The transformation of the urban character of Kano started with the establishment of British colonial rule immediately after the 1903 conquest.

Having perceived Islam as a great threat to inter-group relations in Kano, the British administrators divided the city into three segregated districts. The old-walled city, Birni, occupied by the pre-colonial Hausa/Fulani Kanawa, was exclusively reserved for them. No twentieth century immigrants, especially the Christian southerners that streamed into Kano after the British occupation, were allowed to reside there. The latter were settled in ‘Sabon Gari’, the settlement which was specially established for them around 1911 (see Albert, 1994). The northern Nigerian Muslims, who distanced themselves from the Kanawa by agreeing to work under the British, were settled at Tundun-Wada and Gwargwarma. Sabon Gari, Tundun-Wada and Gwargwarma therefore constituted a second district in Kano. The third district was the ‘township’ occupied by the British administrators during colonial rule. At present, this third district is occupied by top civil servants, public establishments and major companies in Kano.

The impact of Western urbanization on Kano from 1903 continues to be felt even in the present time. It became more pronounced with the commencement of military rule in the 1960s. Since then, there has been a marked differentiation between urban Kano and its rural areas in terms of development. Kano state was formed in 1968 by the amalgamation of the Emirates of Kano, Gumel, Kazaure and Hadejia. The state was larger than some African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Cameroun and Burkina Faso. As a result of the creation of the state, most public and private investments concentrated in metropolitan Kano. While rural areas in the state started to experience a drastic reversal in economic activities, the city of Kano experienced economic growth. Many rural dwellers had no better option therefore, than to migrate into the city even when some had no work or business there. Other factors that necessitated the rural-urban drift to Kano included the Sahelian drought in some countries north of Nigeria – Chad and Niger; the collapse of the groundnut industry from which the vast number of the rural people earned their living and the temporary boom experienced by the construction industry in Kano which employed many unskilled labourers (Lubeck, 1986:45-46). The population of Kano which was about 300,000 in 1963 had risen to more than one million by 1980.

With the increase of population came other social problems. The population of the city had to expand to peri-urban areas along the Zaria, Katsina, Wudil and Hadejia roads. Furthermore, the population explosion increased the problem of land density as more buildings were crammed into the limited land area. The city also became more heterogenous in terms of its demographic composition. Lubeck noted however that:

Despite the enormous increase in population, no adequate drainage or sewer system has been constructed. Public health conditions for the majority of the urban population are increasingly squalid, and the incidence of and potential for epidemic diseases such as cholera, remain exceedingly high. (Lubeck, 1986: 46)
10The most important problem faced by the rural-urban migrants in Kano was employment. Many had no skills suitable for jobs in the city. Yet, it appeared the Kano city planners did not consider such social problems as employment in their planning policies, otherwise specially designed jobs could have been created for those graduating from Koranic schools. Many of the migrants therefore became liabilities to the urban system in Kano. As will be seen, these disadvantaged people constitute the highest percentage of religious fanatics and ethnic chauvinists in Kano. The conservatism of some of them is also likely to have been responsible for what is considered as Violence against women’ in this study.

The violence resulting from contemporary urbanization in Kano is discussed under four sub-headings:

1. ethnic violence
2. religious violence
3. violence by the almajirai (children in Koranic schools)
4. violence against women

Ethnic Violence
12The paradigm of ethnicity as demonstrated by Cohen (1974), Nnoli (1978), Sanda (1976) and Otite (1991) is one of the most virile tools for analysing the problem of inter-group conflict in any urban community. Cultural identity, economic factors and politics are important elements in ethnic conflict. In most cases, economic competition between sections of the urban community take the outward shape of violent ethnic conflict. However, as Nnoli has shown, contact between people of different ethnic groups does not necessarily result in conflict. Rather, it is the competition between them that makes one group consider the other as ‘strangers’ or ‘parasites’. Within this context, violence can erupt between conflicting groups. The economic aggressiveness of strangers, more than their political activities has been noted by Shack (1979: 6) as responsible in most African societies, for hostility against them. Using a Sierra-Leonian example, Leighton (1979: 85-104) also noted that the economic success of urban strangers could generate the opposition of their hosts. Such opposition could be violently expressed.

13The major incident of ethnic violence that has taken place in Kano since the British conquest of 1903 was between the Kanawa (indigenous Kano people) and the mainly southern Nigerian immigrants resident in the Sabon Gari settlement. The crisis between the two is best understood against the background of British colonial policies in Kano. As noted earlier, the British decided to settle all non-Muslim immigrants in Kano, i.e., Ghanaians, Sierra Leonians, southern Nigerians, etc. in the Sabon Gari settlement in 1911. The British expressed the fear that culture-shock resulting from the contact between the Kanawa and Christian immigrants and missionaries in Kano could produce Mahdist (jihadist) revolts against the colonial administrators. They also feared that the more educated southern Nigerians could teach the Kanawa to disobey the British administrators, thus paving the way for future insurgencies. To prevent contact between the two groups, therefore, the Christian immigrants were settled in Sabon Gari. The Kanawa were proscribed from living in the settlement just as the southern Nigerians, for whom Sabon Gari was established, were forbidden from residing in the walled city, Birni (see Albert, 1994: 59-78).

14Rather than solving the problem of culture-shock, the residential segregation of the Kanawa from southern Nigerian immigrants engendered hostility between members of the two groups. They both found it very difficult to tolerate, understand and positively adjust to each other. To the highly Islamized Kanawa, Sabon Gari was nothing but a settlement of infidels (harna or kafiri in Hausa). The southern Nigerians, who were more concerned with their economic prosperity in Kano, worked hard and succeeded in gaining effective control of the formal and informal sectors of the Kano economy, most especially in the period preceding the ‘northernization’ policy of the 1960s. They dominated the staff list of the post offices, banks, industries, local and foreign companies, etc., because they were better educated than their northern Nigerian counterparts. They also controlled the Sabon Gari market where economic activities contributed to the collapse of the long-established Kurmi market inside the Birni. All these factors made the average Kanawa hold the southern Nigerian immigrants in their midst in great hatred. The strangers were seen as interlopers. Of all the Sabon Gari immigrants, the Igbo were the most detested by the Kanawa because of their superior economic interests and ‘uncompromising religious activities’ (Albert, 1993).

15The first major clash between the Kanawa and their Sabon Gari ‘guests’ took place in March 1953. The problem was an extension of the ethnicity problem that had bedevilled Nigeria before her independence in 1960. It was catalysed by a disagreement on the floor of the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos over the question of when Nigeria should be granted independence. The independence motion was moved by Chief Anthony Enahoro, a member of the Yoruba-dominated Action Group (AG). The motion which was aimed at making the British grant self-government to Nigeria in 1956, was opposed by the Hausa-Fulani members who saw the 1956 proposal as a ploy of the southerners to dominate the North, especially since the northerners did not have enough Western educated people to manage their civil service. This meant that the North would have had to depend on the southerners for the administration of their region when the colonialists left. The protest of the northerners was supported by the British and therefore, the motion was not passed. At the end of the parliamentary debates, the northern Nigerian politicians were openly booed and insulted by the southerners who declared them stooges of the British. The southern press was also critical of the northerners. The news of what happened in Lagos was received with mixed feelings by the northern Nigerians who thought that the southern Nigerians did not want the Hausa-Fulani in the Nigerian federation. The northerners considered secession from Nigeria but were discouraged by the British (Sklar, 1983: 131-132).

16The Northerners were more offended when the AG decided to carry its campaign for independence in 1956 to Kano during the month of March 1953. A peaceful demonstration against the AG tour was organized by NPC leaders and the Emir of Kano. Championed by the native administration staff in Kano and the gardawa (the unemployed youths), the ‘peaceful demonstration’ soon metamorphosed into a violent encounter with the southern Nigerian residents in the Sabon Gari settlement. These Sabon Gari residents were considered kinsmen of the southern Nigerians who had opposed the northerners in Lagos. Therefore, northern aggression was unleashed on them. The demonstrators who first built up in Fagge, increased numerically as they moved towards Sabon Gari, chanting ‘We do not want the Yoruba here’. They were, however, more interested in attacking the Igbo than the Yoruba. This has been explained in an earlier study (Albert, 1993) as being due to the economic aggressiveness of the Igbo in Kano as well as their refusal to accept Islam, while many Yoruba settlers in northern Nigeria did so. The 1953 Kano riot which started on 15 May lasted until 18 May 1953. Thirty-six people were officially declared dead and 241 wounded (see table 1 below).

The appeal of the emirs to all Nigerians living in the northern provinces to remain calm and to assist ‘… in remedying the harm that has been done’ fell on deaf ears. Several thousands of Igbo-speaking people fled the region. Later events indicated that the Hausa-Fulani were not appeased either. They looked forward to the next opportunity to engage the Igbos in open battle for the ‘sins’ committed by their sons in the army who championed the January 15, 1966 coup and the new Nigerian Head of State, Major General Ironsi, who seemed only interested in working against Hausa-Fulani interests. The Ironsi case was addressed on 29 July 1966 when a group of northern Nigerian soldiers struck in Ibadan. The coup which was tagged a ‘return match’ led to the death of Major General Ironsi; several Igbo officers and Lt. Col. F. A. Fajuyi, the military governor of Western Nigeria who was hosting the Head of State in Ibadan. In Kano, and in other northern Nigerian cities, the carnage against the Igbo started once again. Several thousands lost their lives. As a result, more Igbo people fled from northern Nigeria. In all, about 100,000 of them returned to eastern Nigeria. This was a prelude to the Nigerian civil war in which the Igbo were pitched against the other Nigerians (see Tamuno and Ukpabi, 1989).

4.3[b] The 1991 Muslim-Christian riots[/b]
32In 1991 there were three major incidents of anti-Christian violence in northern Nigeria. The first took place in Katsina in April 1991. It was sponsored by a fundamentalist Islamic sect – the Shiite movement led by Ibrahim el Zaky Zaky. The April religious demonstration in Katsina was anti-establishment and had as one of its main objectives the drive to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state. In the course of the demonstration, many Christians in Katsina were attacked and their property burnt or looted. During the same month, there was a more bloody religious riot in Bauchi between Muslims and Christians. The crisis started in Tafawa Balewa where some Christians were reported to have assaulted their Muslim counterparts. The vengeance against the aggressive Christians in Tafawa Balewa later took place in Bauchi, the capital city of Bauchi state. Here, the Muslims burnt twelve churches and vandalized several hotels and commercial establishments. The loss of lives-was estimated at around 600 people (Vanguard April 25, 1991; Okeke, 1992: 109). The most vulnerable to attack during the Bauchi riots were the predominantly Christian Sayawa people of Tafawa Balewa origin and the Igbo who dominated economic activities in Bauchi (Okeke, 1992:110). The Bauchi religious demonstration was followed by one in Kano in October 1991.

33The Kano religious riot of October 1991 was one of the moves made by Muslims to check the fast spread of Christianity in northern Nigeria. The problem was catalyzed by an attempt by the Christians under the umbrella of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Kano State branch and the Reinhard Bonnke Ministry from Germany to organize an evangelistic crusade around the theme, Kano for Jesus. CAN in Kano gave the Reinhard Bonnke crusade wide publicity, much more than for previous events and several thousands of posters were pasted around Kano city. Some of the posters, according to Mukhtar (1992: 17), carried the message ‘Jesus for all by the year 2000’ and The Christian Crusade’. The word ‘crusade’ was not interpreted by the Muslims as the Christians meant it to be understood. To the Muslims the word meant religious warfare against the Islamic religion. The messages on these different posters were written not only in English but also in Hausa and Ajami (i.e., Hausa language written in Arabic letters), to ensure that the local Kanawa could read it. One side of some of the posters carried the photograph of a group of people (formerly blind) and on the other side of the poster were the bundles of sticks left behind by them after they had received their sight. This was an open invitation to the many handicapped in Kano to come forward for healing during the Reinhard Bonnke crusade. This annoyed the Kanawa, who are predominantly Muslim. They resolved to ensure that the Christian crusade did not hold.

34For a start, efforts were made to ensure that the Christians did not use the Kano Race Course which had been earlier scheduled for the crusade. The Muslims mounted pressure on the government to cancel the permit given to the Christians to use the place. Then the Christians changed the venue to the compound of St. Thomas/St. Louis School in Sabon Gari. The only alternative left to the Muslims was to physically prevent the crusade from holding. This they started on 13 October 1991 as soon as Evangelist Bonnke arrived in Kano. The Christians resident in Sabon Gari, Rimi Kebe and Tundun Murtala were attacked by the Muslims. The Christians (especially those in the Sabon Gari), unlike their practice in the past, launched counter-attacks killing as many of their aggressors as they could see. At the end of the crisis, over 500 people were recorded dead on both sides and much property destroyed (Daily Champion, 23 Oct. 1991; Newswatch, 28 Oct. 1991; Albert, 1993: 15-16). Many southern Nigerian immigrants in Kano fled the city after the religious riot, while those that remained resolved to be more aggressive in any future encounters with the Muslims, in defence of their investments in Kano.

35Religious violence in Kano is not limited to those incidents catalyzed by factors internal to the city. In some cases, the Muslim population in the city react negatively to impulses from other parts of the country. The most outstanding case mentioned here by way of concluding this aspect of the study is the 1987 Kafanchan religious riot which President Ibrahim Babangida described as ‘the civilian equivalent of an attempted coup d’etat’. The problem had its roots in an incident on March 7, 1987 at the College of Education, Kafanchan, Kaduna State which led to conflict between the Christian and Muslim students during a fellowship meeting organized by a group known as the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA). A bearded young man who was formerly known as Abubakar Bello, but who ‘had now accepted Christ into his life’, was said to have ridiculed the Islamic religion by drawing some disparaging conclusions from his comparison of the contents of the Bible and the Qur’an. He was challenged by a Muslim lady. Then the fighting started. As the news of the fracas filtered to Kafanchan, the dwellers in the city came out in defence of whatever faith they professed, using any dangerous weapon they could lay their hands on. Gradually, the riot spread from one town in Kaduna State to the other.

36In Kano, the students of the Bayero University demonstrated against the Kafanchan incident on the streets, burning four vehicles. The Muslim students in the school were later summoned to an emergency meeting by their counterparts from other institutions. The president of the Muslim Students Society (MSS), Mallam Adamu Ahmed, consequently issued an ultimatum to the Federal Government, giving it until March 14, 1987, demanding that he punish ‘the infidels’ at Kafanchan or ‘else there will be war’. He then banned all Christian activities in the Bayero University and warned all ‘naked girls’, i.e., non-Muslim students who did not wear veils, to steer clear of the University campus. The Muslim students then proceeded to the Emir of Kano’s palace to formally register their grievances against the Christians The governor of Kano State, Mohammed Umaru, had to quickly close down all the schools in his domain (This Week, March 30, 1987: 20-1).

Violence by the Almajirai
37The prevalence of child rioters, most especially the Almajirai (singular Almajiri), in all the violent outbreaks in Kano has been well noted by many writers on the city. The Almajiri educational system in Kano is typical of most northern Nigerian societies, in which parents send their young children to Islamic scholars, Mallamai (singular, Mallam) to study the Qur’an, Hadith and other branches of Islamic knowledge. Since such children are not usually given any material support by their parents, but rather abandoned with the Mallamai, they often go about begging for alms to take care of themselves and their teachers (Balogun 1989: 70 f. 33: Yahya, 1984). A popular Quranic injunction enjoins all faithful Muslims to give alms (sakat) to the poor, and so the Almajirai find willing patrons as they go about begging. They can be found in different parts of Kano – on the streets, in the market places, in open restaurants, in front of cinema houses, etc.

38The Almajirai or gardawa have been indicted by various sources for providing the instigating many of the past riots in Kano. In explaining how the 1966 riot in Kano started, Paden (1973: 334) described how the gardawa and Van haya’ (bicycle renters) invaded the Sabon Gari settlement on May 30, 1966 attacking the Igbo. About six hundred people lost their lives in this particular encounter. Justice Anthony N. Aniagolu’s report on the 1980 Maitatsine riot in Kano was also emphatic about the contribution of the Almajirai to the precipitation and prosecution of urban violence in the city. The Almajiri system was exploited by Muhammadu Marwa to recruit his well over six thousand strong followership (see FGN, 1981; Balogun, 1989: 67; Tamuno, 1991: 175). The Almajirai were also said to have constituted the bulk of the demonstrators that invaded the Igbo shops along Court Road and France Road in Sabon Gari, Kano on October 14, 1991 as a result of which the 1991 religious riot in Kano broke out (Albert, 1994). When the Maitatsinists struck at Funtua in January 1993, killing several hundreds of people, the police reportedly arrested ninety-four of the fanatics. Forty-five of them were confirmed to be Almajirai (Zakka and Jega, 1993: 11).

39The Almajiri system, a pre-capitalist institution, is an aberration in a capitalist economy. The system was instituted when the knowledge of how to read and write Arabic was a source of social, economic and political mobility. The exploits of Al-Maghili and many other north African scholars in Kano in the period preceding the European incursion into the city, were chiefly made possible by their Islamic scholarship. Before 1903, the Mallamai (Ulama) occupied eminent positions in the socio-political structure of Kano. But all of this was changed in the twentieth century by the advent of British colonialism and the modern system of urbanization that Kano was exposed to. Under the new dispensation, the intellectual and judicial status of Islamic scholars was altered with the modern system’s emphasis on Western education. The jobs offered by government establishments, factories, companies and private individuals became available only to those with Western certificates. This meant that the Almajirai, after completing their studies, found themselves in a labour market where no specific provision was made for them. The Mallamai and the generality of the peasant class who benefited less from the modern system were additionally overstressed by the excessive taxation of colonial and post-colonial state agents. These factors made most of the Almajirai and gardawa oppose the capitalist environment. As Yahya (1989: 27) observed, the involvement of the Almajirai and probably many of their Mallamai in past riots in Kano is most likely a protest against the colonial legacies around them. ‘The spontaneous nature of the riots was also a demonstration of the popular mind and a reflection of popular frustrations against the status quo’.

40If Kano, like many other northern Nigerian cities is to be made peaceful, the Almajiri system must be reformed. Writing on this Adamu (1993: 9) noted that:

…though unfortunately the only system that has kept the Quran alive in our midst - is archaic, and now a potential breeding ground for the Maitatsine phenomenon. It ought to be reformed …doing this doesn’t have to take forever.