CONSEQUENCES OF THE APRIL REVOLT

Like all failed coups before it, the April 1990 coup led to certain reactive (i.e. witch hunting) measures by the military against the services, units or corps that were thought to have been deeply involved in it. Military Police Battalions were downsized. A similar phenomenon occurred after the Vatsa conspiracy. However, this angle is outside the scope of this article.

In his seminal work "The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army", Major General Mohammed Alli, former Chief of Army Staff, who as a Colonel in Kano had dissociated himself and his Brigade from the coup, described the Mukoro/Orkar et al coup as one "imbued with undue radicalism." He opined that in execution, the revolt "suffered communication disconnection" (whatever that means) but that it had nevertheless "shaken the nation and the northern hegemony to their very foundation and fabric." Alli says that the 1990 coup, "like its predecessor in 1966" opened "a more precarious and frightening chapter, pointing to and crying for fundamental changes in the nation's political structure and the basis of existence and control of the Armed Forces." However, "as soon as it was subdued and suppressed, the nation went back to business as usual." One obvious consequence to civilians was the acceleration of the movement of the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja in 1990 by the Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida. It was also reported by some pundits that he was rattled by the experience and lost a considerable amount of self-confidence for quite some time. This temporary newfound humility extended to some of his apologists but it was also mixed with passive-aggressive behaviors driven by fear and insecurity.

The failure of the coup, however, marked the beginning of the rise of Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha who was now increasingly being referred to in the Press as the Khalifa (successor). Whatever anyone said of him, few could doubt his ferocity and deliberate calm under conditions of extreme danger that befell him on April 22. He had proved his mettle. As former Panamanian dictator General Noriega once said: "The ultimate sign of virility is the ability to hold on to power." It was widely acknowledged that Abacha could quite easily have taken power for himself if he wanted - although he was not highly thought of by so called 'IBB boys'. Clearly, Babangida owed him plenty and became increasingly beholden to his attitudes - particularly since there was some discussion of the merits and demerits of Babangida's abandonment of Dodan Barracks - albeit involuntarily.

Another officer who benefited from the failure of the April rebellion was Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi of the 9th Brigade. He was rewarded with the Command of the Brigade of Guards and it marked the beginning of his eventual ascendancy into the rarified atmosphere of service chiefs. It is also possible that Major General Chris Alli's eventual emergence as the first Chief of Army Staff under General Abacha may have been influenced by the standing he gained with the "caucus" during this coup attempt.

According to Kunle Amuwo, who carried out a research project on General Babangida's "personal rulership" project, the 1990 rebellion, coming as it did in the setting of Babangida's "permanent transition" undermined his credibility and may have been a factor in the way the public reacted to the deaths of over 150 middle grade officers in a subsequent C-130 plane crash in 1992. Amuwo holds the opinion that 'Even though Babangida lamented that "a whole generation of young officers (mainly Majors) has been wiped out" by the air crash, the public thought his government may have had a hand in it. During their trials, Major Gideon Orkar and his men reportedly told the military tribunal that their coup was in three layers; that unless all young officers were killed, there was no hiding place for the regime. Over 160 officers perished in the crash. That the public tended to give credence to this story is, itself, a measure of lack of trust in the General as his "tenure" dragged to an end.' The public's reaction to the gutting by a suspicious fire of the Ministry of Defence building in 1993 followed similar lines.

But there were other consequences. Although most people dismissed the so called conditional expulsion of the "far" north as a silly gamble, according to Professor Julius Ihonvbere, the coup forced certain "deep-rooted" conflicts and "critical issues" to the front page of the national discourse. Never too distant from national institutional memory anyway, right from the days of the 1957 Willink Commission report, the Ifeajuna/Nzeogwu insurrection of January 15, 1966, the Isaac Boro "Niger-Delta" rebellion, the Petroleum and Land Use Acts, these were to play out in later years as the Ogoni crisis, small concessions by Babangida on the 'onshore-offshore' issue, creation of OMPADEC, June 12 imbroglio, and more recent undercurrents of the "Sovereign National Conference", "Power Shift", "Resource Control", "Federalism", and "Sharia" polemics. There are observers who say that these fault lines in Nigerian politics portend an inevitable earthquake. I prefer the nuanced Chinese interpretation (as was once observed by the late President Kennedy) - that every crisis presents both danger and opportunity.

CASUALTIES OF THE REBELLION

A full accounting of the dead and injured from the April 1990 rebellion is not yet possible, in part because of the secretive nature of events surrounding the incident. However, it is widely assumed to be the bloodiest attempt to seize power in the history of Nigeria.

EXECUTED (incomplete list)

Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar
Captain N Harley Empere
Captain Perebo A Dakolo
Capt AA Nonju
Lt. AE Akogun
Lt. CN Odey
Lt. Cyril O Ozualor
Lt. NEO Deji
2/Lt AB Umukoro
2/Lt EJ Ejesuku
SSgt Julius Itua
Sgt Martins Ademokhai
Sgt. Pius Ilegar
WO2 Monday Bayefa
L/Cpl Francis Ogo
L/Cpl Jepta Inesei
Cpl. Sunday Effiong
L/Cpl Sam Mbakwe
L/Cpl Albert Ojerangbe
L/Cpl Godfrey Deesiiyira
L/Cpl Emma Oyemolan
Sgt. Stephen Iyeke
Cpl. Joseph Efe
WO Afolabi Moses
L/Cpl Idowu Azeez
WO Jonathan Ekini
S/Sgt Solomon Okungbowa
Private Richard Iseghoei
Private Egwolo Makpamekun
L/Cpl Edogamen Friday
S/Sgt Jolly Agbodowi
Sgt. Etim Umoh
L/Cpl Sam Obasuyi
Ex. Serviceman LC Otajareiri
Ex. Pvt Osazuwa Osifo
Ex. Pvt CP Wasiu Lawal
Ex. Pvt Peter Unuyoma
Ex. Pvt Synalman Goodluck Emefe
Ex. S/Sgt Samson Idegere
Pvt. Emmanuel Onoje
Trooper Roland Odogu
Corporal Lateef Awolola
Pvt. Dickson Omenka
Corp Ehietan Pius
Private Iroabuchi Anyalewechi
Private Henry Eguaoyi
L/Cpl Martins Odey
L/Cpl Sunday Asuquo
Trooper Celestine Ofuoku
Pvt. Anthony Korie
Pvt Thomas Angor
Pvt Edem Basi
Pvt Joseph Odey
Trooper Obioma Esiworo
L/C Magnus Ekechi
WO2 Godwin Donkon
Sgt. Ojo Adegboyega
Pvt Peter Abua
Pvt. Phillip Akamkpo
Sgt. Shehu Onleje
Corp Olanrewaju Ogunshola
L/Cpl Luka Yang
Trooper Malkily Ayogu
L/Cpl Andrew Onah
Michael Ebeku

OTHERS (At least 69 were officially executed, so this
list is incomplete)
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KILLED DURING FIGHTING

Lt. Col. UK Bello (General Babangida's ADC)
Lt. killed during altercation at Ikeja cantonment gate
3 - 5 soldiers at Ikeja

Captain Charles Idele (Idele was one of the coup leaders. He was Military Assistant to the Commandant, School of Infantry, Jaji. He left Jaji and came to Lagos to partake in the coup. His corpse was reportedly found wearing the uniform of a Major on the grounds outside Ikeja cantonment gate where he was shot by loyal troops. )

OTHERS (numbers unknown, from fighting at Dodan Barracks, Obalende and the Radio Station)




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