The bandits are mainly Kenyan pastoralist herders from the Pokot tribe. lately, we have seen increased instances of the herders armed with M-16 variant ( Norinco Type CQ 5.56,)
According to some sources, the rifles are smuggled mainly from South Sudan where they are used by both by state and non-state actors.

Covert1:


I beg to disagree with the term "grandstanding" in the event of a military intervention in Guinea to restore constitutional democracy. We've been here before in our history. I don't know how old you are but some of us bore the brunt of military misrule in Nigeria. And whilst none of us wants to leave pressing matters at home to go fight any foreign war at this point in time the circumstances are just too dangerous to look away. It is in our national interest and security to do something immediately about Guinea, Mali and speed up the political calendar in Chad. It is irresponsibility and criminality for someone to usurp power just because he holds the gun whatever the sins of who is in power. Just look at the diatribe of this so called special forces soldiers in power now in Mali and Guinea anything different from coupists in the past. They get there and make a mess. If we do nothing it will come home to roost.

Here below is a fine article on the matter. The contents are not mine. But I largely agree with his submissions on the recent Guinea coup.

https://punchng.com/guinea-buhari-should-arrest-malady-doumbouya/

Lifting a quote from twitter...

'Where was ECOWAS chair when Alpha Conde was amending their constitution to favour him for a third term? What did African leaders do or say?' An 83 year old man too? Lol!

Unless Guineans descend into a full blown crisis, its an absolute waste of time!

NTSA:
The bandits are mainly Kenyan pastoralist herders from the Pokot tribe. lately, we have seen increased instances of the herders armed with M-16 variant ( Norinco Type CQ 5.56,)
According to some sources, the rifles are smuggled mainly from South Sudan where they are used by both by state and non-state actors.

In northern Kenya sites of Herders carrying rifles as they move with their livestock is a common sight. The guns are often traded at cattle markets right alongside the livestock others are smuggled into Kenya across land borders.
Edit
Northern Sudan(sudan) is also a big participant in the diffusion of this weapon in East Africa,the country produce the Norinco CQ M311/5.56 rifle under the name 'Terab'

BlackBaron:

Lifting a quote from twitter...

'Where was ECOWAS chair when Alpha Conde was amending their constitution to favour him for a third term? What did African leaders do or say?' An 83 year old man too? Lol!

Unless Guineans descend into a full blown crisis, its an absolute waste of time!

One word for this position: shortsightedness

Whatever happened to the dictum: prevention is better than cure". I'll add why take the medicine after death. You might want to re-read ur statement a little bit more slowly again because the question to that would be so we should be the ones going to die for them in their civil war when we could prevent it in the first place. What a tragedy that would be.

Conde did himself but so too ECOWAS which should now pay the price but a smarter way.

Members of the Oromo Liberation Army in Ethiopia with 5,56 × 45 mm 'Terab' rifles.

I found myself in Argentina when Standard Bank of SA expanded to south America. Argentinians have always regarded themselves as the "Giants of S. America historically, from when their country was the 7th richest in the world.

Later on I spent some time in Brazil, when South African Breweries expanded there, and got to appreciate the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.

The Brazilians always had an answer when I told them about the claims made by the Argentinians:

"Of our 2 countries, whose multitudes are migrating to whom?"

I ended up using that informal index in my financial analysis and reports.

NTSA:
Kenya police (RDU) deploying to Laikipia following unrest caused by bandits.

Bandits in Kenya too?

Lol look at this ape head South African

Covert1:


One word for this position: shortsightedness

Whatever happened to the dictum: prevention is better than cure". I'll add why take the medicine after death. You might want to re-read ur statement a little bit more slowly again because the question to that would be so we should be the ones going to die for them in their civil war when we could prevent it in the first place. What a tragedy that would be.

Conde did himself but so too ECOWAS which should now pay the price but a smarter way.

Don't get the fascination to put out a smoulder in Guinea when we still have full blown fires raging all over our home turf.

I hope some of us here don't just read just this thread and gaze at military photos but rather read wide too; economy, finance, debt repayment, restructuring and other issues of Nigeria.

Hypothetically, we take out the junta with already inadequate hardware, overstretched battle weary personnel and funds we have little of.

Might seem farfetched, but let ECOWAS spell out to leaders that any attempt to lift term controls should be highly discouraged, threats of expulsion from the body and possible sanctions.

ECOWAS stabilised Ivory Coast but Outtara played the field, when tomorrow doo doo hits the ceiling, Nigeria and the others would have to step in to their childish squabbles again right?


We can agree to disagree.

SA vs Naij

Don't you guys ever get tired
You guys should act matured for once.

Lurker4Long:


Further to your question re SA SF carrying AKMs in Mozambique, a few operational photos of SA SF in Angola in the 80s.

And to reiterate, when conducting deep reconnaissance, the enemy is not supposed to know you're there, and should you be discovered and a firefight ensues, using same weapons and same uniforms will ensure some confusion which will buy a small team some time to e&e.

Thanks. I know it was a given that the SA Army at the time used FAL's and some AK's. I've also seen many SOF units in training using AK's at the training camp. Seeing SOF in Mozambique with AK's, all with attached and identical 40mm M-203 grenade launcher made it seem like it was a gradual wider shift to standard issue.

South African SOF. Frogman training

Elite SANDF SOF unit with US 10th Special forces group

SANDF wasn't messing around when those riots got out of control. Rooikat fire support vehicles

New female NAF fighter pilot in training

NN SBS

Female NN seaman of gurd duty

BlackBaron:

Don't get the fascination to put out a smoulder in Guinea when we still have full blown fires raging all over our home turf.

I hope some of us here don't just read just this thread and gaze at military photos but rather read wide too; economy, finance, debt repayment, restructuring and other issues of Nigeria.

Hypothetically, we take out the junta with already inadequate hardware, overstretched battle weary personnel and funds we have little of.

Might seem farfetched, but let ECOWAS spell out to leaders that any attempt to lift term controls should be highly discouraged, threats of expulsion from the body and possible sanctions.

ECOWAS stabilised Ivory Coast but Outtara played the field, when tomorrow doo doo hits the ceiling, Nigeria and the others would have to step in to their childish squabbles again right?


We can agree to disagree.

Of course agreeing to disagree makes for a healthy discussion something I insinuated earlier. Point is we are saying the same thing but different means to an end. Kabe1 had said the same thing too especially that leaders should stick to term limits. I went further to add it makes it a moral problem to intervene under such circumstances. But then again your latest treatise doesn't see eye to eye with my thinking of an appropriate measure to deter further coups in the sub-region. To me you simply mean throwing away the baby with the bath water. Doesn't solve the problem.

Battle Prognosis - Others can submit theirs
In view of our present military commitments at home. I don't suggest deploying boots at this stage. We can declare a no fly zone over Conakry and institute a Naval blockade. You know things that will make the people turn against the fashion of coups. This is a lot harsher than mere economic sanctions that these irresponsible soldiers have learnt to circumvent. We can have a timeline for that and if he refuses to budge we can take out key elements that make the military and society function. Short of that an outright invasion by 2 × battalion of mechanized infantry battalion and 1 × Special Forces Unit preferably SBS.

The Nigerians can be sitting in the presidential palace in Conakry in 48 hours. There's no evidence all of the military in Guinea is behind this coup making it a less arduous task.

Go and play that on ARMA and let those with the job do their job

We know you want to be heard. We have heard you now let us doing the job do the job.

Nairaland Armed Forces

Exposing ignorance, insecure minds, foo.lery, illiteracy and primitiveness on Nairaland. Someone has nothing to offer but stupidity and I'm supposed to engage such base minds, no I don't thinks so. A case of blind leading the blind. Such I.diots bereft of borderline sense.

Here a material for thinkers on the matter

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

Guinea: The Causes and Consequences of West Africa’s Latest Coup

September 8, 2021

The Guinean military’s overthrow of President Alpha Condé—an outcome of autocratic overreach, economic mismanagement, and eroding democratic norms—points to the failure of regional bodies and international partners to anticipate and respond to an evolving coup playbook. On September 5, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya ousted the country’s civilian leader Alpha Condé, proclaiming that “the duty of a soldier is to save the country.” The military putsch is the country’s third coup d’état since independence in 1958 and the latest in a string of unconstitutional power grabs in the region, including in neighboring Mali and Chad, during the past two years.

Q1: Who is Guinea’s new military leader and what are his objectives?

A1: Colonel Doumbouya is a 41-year-old former French legionnaire and commander of the country’s elite Special Forces Group. He has received training from France, Israel, Senegal, and Gabon, as well as participated in at least one U.S. special forces exercise. According to his official bio, he also served in missions in Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, and Djibouti. Since the coup, he has twice quoted former Ghanaian coup leader Jerry Rawlings, who infamously publicly executed several of his military predecessors. In a 2017 speech, Doumbouya expressed resentment about U.S and French influence in Guinea. According to the BBC, Doumbouya was one of 25 Guineans that EU members of parliament threatened to sanction for alleged human rights abuses during Condé’s presidency—although neither his name nor that of the unit he commanded have appeared in international human rights reports about the repression of protests and other abuses in recent years.

As of September 8, Doumbouya and the ruling junta, known as the National Rally and Development Committee (CNRD), have revealed very little about their plans, a troubling sign in a region where young coup leaders have resisted pressure to swiftly hand over power to civilians. The CNRD detained Condé and other top officials, dissolved the government, and imposed a nightly curfew. It has pledged to form a transitional government soon and committed to “rewrite a constitution together.” The junta failed to share additional details on the transition or present a timeline for a return to civilian rule. Doumbouya, however, has paid special attention to the bauxite mining sector, which saw prices leap to a decade high in the wake of the coup. He tried to assure business and economic interests, “asking mining companies to continue their activities” and exempting mining areas from the curfew.

Q2: What local, regional, and international drivers explain this coup d’état?

A2: While Doumbouya’s personal motivations are unclear, Condé’s decision to amend the constitution to run for a third term and recent missteps on the economy set the stage for the military putsch. In his first statement following the coup, Doumbouya vowed that “we will no longer entrust politics to one man; we will entrust it to the people.” He presumably was referring to President Condé’s increasingly messianic leadership. Condé, who had been a longtime opposition leader before his election in 2010, argued that he was the only one who could rule Guinea during a private meeting at CSIS in 2019. Condé proceeded to hold a controversial referendum and problematic election during the pandemic to secure a third term in office. Condé’s move was an affront to the public; according to Afrobarometer polling, more than 8 out of 10 Guineans favor a two-term limit on presidential mandates. Doumbouya also alluded to Condé’s economic mismanagement and the regime’s corruption. He deplored the “state of our roads . . . the state of our hospitals” and said that “we don't need to rape Guinea anymore, we just need to make love to her.” In another survey, Afrobarometer polling revealed that 63 percent of Guineans believed corruption had increased during the previous year.

Doumbouya also probably assessed that the region and international community, which had weakly protested Condé’s third term, would do little substantively to oppose the coup, judging from their ham-fisted responses to recent unconstitutional moves in Mali and Chad. The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), France, and the United States have been hesitant to exact significant penalties in recent years, a contrast to past decades of principled responses to unconstitutional takeovers.

In Mali, 37-year-old colonel Assimi Goïta, who also served in a special forces unit, ousted civilian president Ibrahim Boubacar in August 2020. While ECOWAS suspended Mali from the regional body and the United States quietly imposed coup-related aid restrictions, France continued its counterterrorism operations and ECOWAS acceded to an 18-month transition led by a retired military general. A year later, Goïta removed Mali’s civilian transition leadership and declared himself interim president. His government seems in no rush to leave power. It has missed several deadlines, failing to submit a draft constitution or conduct voter registration. There has been limited international outcry or concern about this inevitable delay.

In Chad, 37-year-old Mahamat Idriss Déby assumed control following his father’s death on the battlefield in April 2020. The United States called for a transition of power in accordance with the Chadian constitution, but changed its tune following France and the African Union’s support for the young leader’s rule. When French president Macron attended the funeral for Déby’s father, he vowed that “France will not let anybody put into question or threaten today or tomorrow Chad's stability and integrity.” Déby, similar to his counterparts in Mali, promised an 18-month military-led transition, a dialogue, and a new constitution.
Q3: What are the coup’s implications, and what steps should be taken to arrest a democratic backsliding?

A3: Doumbouya’s age, temperament, and admiration for the region’s past coup leaders bode poorly for Guinea’s transition to civilian rule. Doumbouya is in the same age cohort as Goïta and Déby, all of whom served in elite military units. Rawlings, Doumbouya’s hero, seized power in a second coup in 1981 before he finally stepped down in 2000. (Goïta visited Rawlings, who recently died, for advice, as well as Moussa Traore, Mali’s military leader from 1968 to 1991.)

Doumbouya and the CNRD probably will use the same coup playbook perfected by Goïta and Déby, parroting the 18-month transition timeline and pledge to rewrite the constitution to placate the international community. If Guinea’s neighbors and external partners quietly accept these conditions, it will serve as a signal to ambitious soldiers in Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, and Niger—to name just a few potential candidates—that there are limited consequences for seizing power. While it is hard to prove a contagion effect, coups d’état in the region tend to occur in waves. Between November 1965 and February 1966, there were military takeovers in Congo, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Nigeria, and Ghana.

Africa’s regional bodies and international partners need to act more decisively to anticipate and respond to this alarming trend and evolving coup playbook.

Confront Democratic Backsliding. The international community has been meek in responding to problematic elections in Benin, ambivalent in tackling corruption in Mali, and uneven about term limits in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. While West Africa has suffered the fastest decline in political rights and civil liberties, its partners have prioritized counterterrorism or strategic competition with China and Russia over democracy promotion. This regression has set the conditions for soldiers to seize power or at least use it as pretext for military action.

Apply Lasting Penalties. Africa’s regional bodies and international partners have been going through the motions, instituting temporary suspensions and occasionally levying economic sanctions. These punitive measures usually are lifted quickly either because other priorities are paramount or at the slightest sign of progress. This leniency has enabled coup leaders to make minimal concessions while preparing for longer stays in power.

Shape the Transition. The international community has been lulled into accepting an increasingly similar transition plan, including dialogues and 18-month timelines, without questioning the process or objective. In Chad, for example, there is no pressing need to revise the constitution except for the fact that it bars Déby for running for the presidency because of his youth. In Mali, the junta has put forward a transition agenda that is simultaneously expansive and vague, making it difficult to identify priorities or assess progress. Transitions should be fit for purpose, and local, regional, and international stakeholders should help set the various milestones and timelines.

Prioritize Collective Action. The growing gap between neighboring countries, regional bodies, and foreign governments, especially ECOWAS, France, and the United States, have enabled authoritarian rulers and coup leaders to forum shop and undercut more forceful responses. President Biden’s Summit for Democracy could start a much-needed discussion on coordination and develop a new repertoire of responses to antidemocratic actions and coups d’état in the region.
Judd Devermont is director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

WRITTEN BY

Judd Devermont
Director, Africa Program

mi 24 MK III , AAF

Algerian Meko A200 frigate in toulon ,france for an exercise this days

NTSA:
The bandits are mainly Kenyan pastoralist herders from the Pokot tribe. lately, we have seen increased instances of the herders armed with M-16 variant ( Norinco Type CQ 5.56,)
According to some sources, the rifles are smuggled mainly from South Sudan where they are used by both by state and non-state actors.

never knew China had its variant of the American M16, thought the only massed produced the Ak47..

Anyway give me an AR-15 and you've stolen my heart

algerian army
pic1- H&K MP 5 A3

New batch of 100 Bigfoot MRAPs for the Nigerian Army shipped. NA seems to be building up and investing significantly on protected mobility in anticipation for the dry season offensive operation. I hear 35-40 Isotrex Legions Mraps are currently in Abuja pre deployment, along with new tracked APC's ordered after the impact made by the FV-103 Scorpions

kilo 636 M submarine and a meko a200 frigate , Algerian navy

russian arms exports to africa from 2015 to 2019 by millions dollars

source : sipri

shadowprimezero:
New batch of 100 Bigfoot MRAPs for the Nigerian Army shipped. NA seems to be building up and investing significantly on protected mobility in anticipation for the dry season offensive operation. I hear 35-40 Isotrex Legions Mraps are currently in Abuja pre deployment, along with new tracked APC's ordered after the impact made by the FV-103 Scorpions

Ohh my God, I pray that the enemies of Nigeria should think twice after see this

shadowprimezero:
New batch of 100 Bigfoot MRAPs for the Nigerian Army shipped. NA seems to be building up and investing significantly on protected mobility in anticipation for the dry season offensive operation. I hear 35-40 Isotrex Legions Mraps are currently in Abuja pre deployment, along with new tracked APC's ordered after the impact made by the FV-103 Scorpions

We should really look at building, investing in our local manufacturers.

Purchasing these many vehicles from abroad makes no sense to me, especially when we are dealing with a not so technical equipment, where a strong local alternative exists.

shadowprimezero:
New batch of 100 Bigfoot MRAPs for the Nigerian Army shipped. NA seems to be building up and investing significantly on protected mobility in anticipation for the dry season offensive operation. I hear 35-40 Isotrex Legions Mraps are currently in Abuja pre deployment, along with new tracked APC's ordered after the impact made by the FV-103 Scorpions

What about those MRAPS at the back? Are they coming to Nigeria also?