₦airaland Forum

barcanista:
This election postponement is most embarrassing and a testament that Preofessor Attahiru Jega is an incompetent and clueless dude just like the President. This is the first time since we returned to democracy that the INEC Boss will openly take orders from the NSA, the Military and members of pro-PDP as regards election scheduling and rescheduling. Since when has the Military activities determines elections scheduling? The Electoral Act and the Constitution did not say NSA, Military and INEC should determine election date. Even if there is crises in a part of the country, Section 26(1) of the Electoral Act 2010 (amended) permit INEC to hold election in the peaceful area and reschedule for the trouble zone at a convenient date. Why can't Jega invoke this section and exclude Gombe, Borno, Adamawa and Yobe from Feb 14 and Feb 28 poll until March 28 and Aprill 11 respectively? Since when do we need the Military for election? What is the Statutory duties of the Police, the NSCDC, and by extension the DSS with respect to internal security? If personnels are not enough then why not bring in other paramilitary to assist? Must it be the Military? Was the Military used in 2003, 2007 and 2011 election? Militarisation started from Edo 2012,then Ondo(2012), Anambra(2011), Osun and Ekiti(2014) Gubernatorial contests. When did the Military become statutory responsible for internal security? The letter of the Chief of Defense State that was communicated to Jega through NSA Sambo Dasuki is treachery and unfortunate. Jega's announcement yesternight only confirmed that he doesn't know what he is doing. This is a shame, our democracy has been raped.

what did you expect Jega to do? He clearly stated that postponement was was not on INEC card but wouldn't want to have blood in his hands when security agencies can't gurantee the lives of Nigerians knownig how desperate Nigerian politicians are. Was it not the same security apparatus that said insurgency will not distrub general elections before they backtraked? Afghan held elections, somebody need to be fired.

Any issue with the phone? Where r u located?

Ow bout 20k

20K

Pls post his picture for internet circulation.

Wisepac:
www.punchng.com/news/ive-forgiven-the-lawmaker-that-assaulted-me-mark/

Inasmuch I lyk this post but I also bliv that Nigerian Police Force is an extension of the executive arm of goverment no matter what Doyin 'Okugbe' his saying in defence of the presidency, they cannot wash this one away.

This an attempted rape on the constitution, whether the actions of the legislators is illegal is a debate for another tym. The most important thing thing for now is that the scarilge must not stand. It is even unlawful to be lawful in this kind of situation
.
The IG took his order from somwhere, he cannot act on his volition.

The storm is over. It is well. WelL done people, Nairaland family- Happy family.

The storm is over. It is well.

Jbluv55:
Here you go .

I don upload sharp sharp. One for bbm one for whatapp

DJDola, God will grant you good health. U r in my thot and prayer. Have been on twitter and facebook all day sotey I forget say Super Eagles dey play today. Thatz my own little contribution. Can we ave a graphics that will fit into BBM display Picture. I tried to use the other one just can't fit into it without excluding the vital info.

U'r healed brother !

Am having issues with my blackberry 9360.I think this issue started when I changed the power port.
1. The b3 drains quickly even if in switch off mode it will charge then stop.
2. The fone seems not to charge anymore despite the fact that it shows the charging icon. These are new b3s. I returned it to the repair shop and they see it hold a charge for few mins so deny there is an issue
Pls I nid help

Obama's Great Big Ebola Error

"The last time a president tried to make a disease a national-security issue, he helped trigger a global pandemic that killed 50 million people."

James Jay Carafano
October 12, 2014

The White House has declared Ebola to be a top national-security concern. That ought to worry Americans. The last time a president tried to make a disease a national-security issue, he helped trigger a global pandemic that killed 50 million people.

Progressives like to expropriate the label of national security to help drive their agendas. Statist, centrally managed, with top-down direction, the national-security model is the perfect vehicle for any policy “crusade,” be it fighting global warming or raising taxes. Thus, for example, when the administration got the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to label the "debt the biggest threat to national security," it had all the cover needed to press for cutting defense and raising taxes—two cornerstones of President Obama's progressive political agenda.


But playing "national security" progressive politics with public health can bring outright disaster. When the United States entered World War I, Woodrow Wilson played the national-security card early and often. The war effort became an excuse for everything from jailing political opponents to spying on everyday Americans. But, when the president used a global war as an excuse to preempt sound public-health policy, he reaped a global catastrophe.

In 1917, the war to end all wars was well under way. At Camp Funston within the boundaries of Fort Riley, Kansas, sergeants were turning recruits into doughboys. During their training, the soldiers picked up backpacks, rifles, helmets—and a new strain of flu. They carried all these with them as they traveled from the camp to the railroads, the big cities, the ports and, ultimately, overseas. On every step of the way to the trenches in Western Europe, they spread the deadly disease.

When news of the epidemic reached Washington, the White House decided it was a national-security problem. The British and French desperately needed reinforcements to turn the tide of the war; getting our boys over there was far more important than stopping the spread of the flu over here.

The administration insisted on pressing full speed ahead with the deployments. The White House also wanted every factory worker on the job and every red-blooded American to show up at mass rallies to buy more war bonds—all activities that spread the disease more quickly.

President Wilson took one precaution. He transferred the Public Health Service to military control. Support the military effort, not the public health, became Surgeon General Rupert Blue’s main mission.

In less than a year, the Kansas outbreak had become a global pandemic. It was commonly referred to as the "Spanish flu." Spain was a nonbelligerent in the First Word War. The government had not imposed press censorship. As a result, widespread news of the disease's deadly progress appeared first in Spain. Most assumed that was where the problem started.

In the end, more died from the pandemic than from the war.

Stateside, at a military camp outside of Gettysburg, a young post commander named Dwight David Eisenhower ignored Washington’s advice to ignore the disease. Instead, he developed health protocols that broke the back of the disease’s run through the ranks. Impressed with the success of his methods, the Army ordered Eisenhower to dispatch his staff to other camps to train them on how to rein in influenza.

Likewise, many American cities got the disease under control only by ignoring the federal government and adopting responsible public-health policies.

The moral of the story is not that it’s 1918 all over again. Ebola and influenza are two very different contagious diseases. But this cautionary tale from the last century reminds us is that the best way to deal with a disease outbreak is to follow sound public-health policies, not cloud the issue with the trappings of national security.

When President Obama declared Ebola a national-security issue, he didn't calm people’s fears. He inflamed them. Many immediately jumped to suggesting all kinds of draconian solutions to keep the disease from getting here.

Additionally, the national-security talk muddled the nature of the response to stem the outbreak in West Africa. Breaking up the outbreak is clearly a humanitarian mission, not a national-security imperative. Providing some military support for overseas disaster and disease response can well be justified. But by trumpeting the deployment of troops, the president obscured the fact that what’s needed is a response supported by multiple U.S. government agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

As a result, Americans are busily debating the wisdom of sending several thousands of troops, rather than asking the more important question: Is U.S. assistance organized as efficiently and effectively as it should be?

Furthermore, the White House committed what is an unpardonable sin in responding to a public-health concern: it lost legitimacy. Rather, than make a concerted effort to deliver effective risk communications to the American people, the White House slapped a national-security label on the problem and advised us that it’s “unlikely” anyone with Ebola would ever enter the country and that the chances of an epidemic were “extremely low.” Essentially, the word from Command Central was "Don't worry, be happy."

While federal and state agencies did start getting the word out to hospitals on preparedness measures, it invested too little time in getting ahead of the issue and reaching out to Americans. Given the scale of the outbreak, it was impossible to rule out that at least a few cases would make it to American shores. By downplaying risks instead of playing it straight, the administration lost a lot of credibility with average Americans.

The president now must be on his "A" game and start providing adult leadership. That could start with more effective and vigorous risk communication and public-health responses, all framed as what they are: public-health and humanitarian issues—not pet national-security projects.

James Jay Carafano is a vice president of The Heritage Foundation and directs the think tank’s research into national security and foreign policy issues.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/obamas-great-big-ebola-error-11450?page=show

Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang: Triple Trouble on China's Periphery

"Despite the vast differences that set Hong Kong apart from Tibet and Xinjiang, we can find one plausible common explanation for the unrest in all three places..."

Minxin Pei
October 9, 2014

The ongoing demonstrations by pro-democracy students in Hong Kong since the end of last month have raised one important question: why is Beijing facing simultaneous unrest on its periphery?

Since the riots in Lhasa in March 2008, a string of violent ethnic conflicts has struck the restive border regions, particularly Xinjiang. While conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang remain fragile and no signs of enduring stability are visible, the Chinese government now finds itself confronting smartphone-waving students in Hong Kong who have won the hearts and minds of the international community.

On the surface, the situation in Hong Kong could hardly be more different from the situations in Tibet and Xinjiang. In the former British colony, Beijing has experienced, until recently, few direct conflicts with the Hong Kong public since regaining sovereignty from Great Britain in 1997 (the only exception was the 2003 protest against an attempt to adopt a national security law that would undermine Hong Kong’s civil liberties). By contrast, the Chinese hold on Tibet and Xinjiang has been more tenuous and, over the last six decades, Beijing has periodically encountered fierce resistance from the Tibetans and the Uyghurs.

Despite the vast differences that set Hong Kong apart from Tibet and Xinjiang, we can find one plausible common explanation for the unrest in all three places: Beijing’s policy of assimilation has, contrary to the wishes of the Chinese government, greatly strengthened the local identities, sharpened the sense of alienation and grievance felt by the targeted groups, and radicalized the activists among them.

The limited space here does not permit us to go into how Beijing’s strategy of assimilation, which combines economic development, migration of ethnic Hans and draconian security measures, has produced the opposite outcomes in Tibet and Xinjiang. If we examine China’s Hong Kong policy in recent years, we can find that Beijing’s strategic thinking, policy instruments it has preferred, and the counterproductive results bear important resemblance to its policies on Tibet and Xinjiang.

At first glance, it may seem absurd to claim that China has a policy of assimilation toward Hong Kong because of its commitment to the formula of “one country, two systems.” Yet, the inescapable reality is that, both politically and economically, the assimilation of Hong Kong into the mainland has been progressing inexorably in the last seventeen years.

The process of political assimilation has occurred at three levels, with varying degrees of success. At the elite level, Beijing has succeeded remarkably in co-opting most of Hong Kong’s business and political elites, who have come to identify with Beijing’s priorities and interests more than those of the Hong Kong people. At the level of political culture and attitudes, the introduction of patriotic Chinese symbols, authoritarian attitudes and suspicion of the West has been much less successful in converting the city’s ordinary people, in particular its younger generation. For example, the Hong Kong government’s plan to use textbooks that would encourage “patriotism” was soundly defeated by a protest movement organized by Joshua Wong, then only fifteen years old, who is leading today’s pro-democracy movement.

At the institutional level, Beijing’s assimilation policy fared little better. As mentioned, the Hong Kong government’s attempt to ram through the now-infamous national-security legislation in 2003 brought more than half a million protesters into the streets, humiliating both Beijing and Hong Kong’s leaders. Beijing’s efforts to maintain, “one country, one (authoritarian) system” through keeping an undemocratic electoral system, have been constantly challenged by Hong Kong’s pro-democracy forces, ultimately resulting in the ongoing confrontations in the city’s streets.

As for economic assimilation, Beijing’s policy seems immensely effective on the surface in all of the three regions—Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Trade, tourism, investments and modern infrastructure now link the periphery ever more closely with the Chinese center. But appearances are deceiving. In this case, economic integration actually further exacerbates conflicts of identities. On the surface, Hong Kong’s economy as a whole has indisputably benefited from China’s rise. But as in the case of Tibet and Xinjiang, two new sources of friction and identity conflict have emerged. One is the sharing of the benefits created by economic integration. In Hong Kong’s case, most of the benefits appeared to have gone to the elites, while ordinary people bear the costs of soaring housing prices and inequality. The other is the cultural clash between the city’s 7.2 million residents and the 40 million mainland tourists who visit Hong Kong each year.

As with most encounters of groups with distinct cultural identities, close contact breeds not amity, but animosity, mutual disrespect and a stronger self-awareness. Thus, an ironic but not incomprehensible consequence of economic integration between China and Hong Kong is: the closer they are economically, the more apart they are in terms of identity.

If this analysis is correct, then the right policy response is obvious. Beijing will have to reconsider its policy of assimilation. What is troubling to observers is that it is unlikely to happen. The prevailing political wisdom in China is that such a policy is working and there is no need for any change. Even more troubling is the likelihood that, their façades of toughness notwithstanding, Chinese policy makers don’t have the political courage to acknowledge that their Hong Kong policy is failing.

Minxin Pei is the Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and a non-resident senior fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.





http://nationalinterest.org/feature/hong-kong-tibet-xinjiang-triple-trouble-chinas-periphery-11433

South African govt or South African media? Now, when has d media become the official spokeperson for SA govt?

Op, source?

So much hate on this thread. Can we ever live in peace and harmony?

Extinguishing the "Flames of Terror" in Africa

Large numbers of African jihadists have reportedly joined insurgencies in the Middle East. What can be done to reverse such a dangerous dilemma? 
Roger Howard
September 25, 2014


Earlier this month, in a single, daring strike whose importance has nonetheless been obscured by events elsewhere in the world, the United States scored an impressive victory against one of its most ruthless enemies. On Monday, September 1, drones struck a convoy travelling in a remote part of Somalia, killing Ahmed Godane, the leader of the radical Islamist group Al Shabaab.

The assassination of Godane will be, as the White House has stated, a “major symbolic and operational loss” for the Al Qaeda-linked group, which has been responsible for a series of heinous attacks throughout East Africa, notably the assault on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi almost exactly one year ago. Because Godane has no obvious successor, Al Shabaab may disintegrate, while his loss might also strike deep fear into the hearts of other insurgents in Somalia and elsewhere.


Unfortunately, however, his execution is barely a starting point in the effort to stabilize a stricken region. This is partly because new splinter factions—more radical, bloodthirsty and vindictive—may soon appear from the ashes of Al Shabaab. Or perhaps even Godane’s immediate replacement, an unknown called Ahmad Umar, may succeed in uniting disparate clans and cliques. Rarely is the elimination of any single individual more than a negative, and sometimes superficial, development. Much more positive steps are required to secure a lasting peace.

One such constructive step that Washington could now take to help Africa move forward concerns the continent’s intelligence capabilities.

At the moment, there is glaring lack of cooperation between nearly all of the African states’ intelligence agencies. It is true that the continent’s spy chiefs belong to an arm of the African Union, the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa, but this organization is just symbolic. Instead these agencies are better known for their lack of contact and rivalry.

Yet insurgents have no respect for international boundaries, drawing recruits, moving funds and conducting operations across borders. This is of course true throughout the world—just as Western volunteers are currently filling the ranks of the Islamic State and the Syrian rebels—but it is particularly true of African countries, whose vast borders are porous and, if patrolled at all, are manned only by the corrupt and inefficient. Nearly all of the continent’s most insurgent groups operate across borders: Boko Haram in Cameroon, Niger and Chad, as well as Nigeria; Al Shabaab in Kenya and Uganda, as well as Somalia; and a ragtag mix of Islamist militants currently based in the lawless regions that straddle southern Libya, northern Chad and northern Niger.

Africa’s intelligence chiefs need to cooperate in the same way as their counterparts elsewhere in the world, just as Britain and the United States work closely with partners in hotbeds of Islamist insurgency like Pakistan. When they have worked together, Africa’s spy agencies have previously yielded impressive results, even if they have not always targeted the most deserving; for example, in 2004, the bid by a British mercenary to topple one of Africa’s most brutal dictators, President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, was foiled as a result of cooperation largely between South Africa and Zimbabwe.

A way forward is to build and fund an independent intelligence gathering and sharing organization, under the auspices of the African Union (AU), to which every state could subscribe. A prototype could be the AU-run Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CSRT), which is based in Algiers. The Center uses an extensive database to compile detailed information about cross-border threats and then sends the information in daily briefs to intelligence chiefs in all the African states.

The Center’s work could be extended considerably to include real-time actionable intelligence, and African spy agencies could use this data to work together on joint projects and operations. This would enable them to much more effectively counter insurgencies throughout the continent.

The United States could direct more funding to initiatives like the CSRT, which currently operates on a shoestring budget, and even offer training programs on intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence to some African countries. These steps could eventually lead to the development of a pan-African intelligence agency. One possible U.S. partner might be China, which has strong commercial interests in the continent and strong vested interest in promoting stability.

Successive crises in the Middle East are a reason to prioritize, not overlook or underplay, such steps. Large numbers of African jihadists have reportedly joined insurgencies in the Middle East. Equally, many Middle Eastern nationals, perhaps veterans of their own local conflicts, can easily migrate to Africa, stepping into the shoes of individuals like Ahmed Godane to ignite the flames of terror.

It is exactly one year since the attack on the Westgate shopping mall—in which at least sixty-seven people were killed and hundreds injured. This somber anniversary is a fitting reminder of the importance of enhancing cooperation between African states on intelligence issues.

Roger Howard is the author of ‘Terror in The Mall’ and an associate editor of Eye Spy magazine on intelligence issues.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/extinguishing-the-flames-terror-africa-11347

Five Reasons Why the United States Can’t Beat China in Africa

Global interest in Africa is spiking. China has invested much time and treasure in the rising continent—placing America at a big disadvantage.
Zachary Keck
August 17, 2014

Earlier this month, President Barack Obama convened nearly fifty African heads of state in Washington, DC for the first ever U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. As the largest event ever held between a U.S. president and African heads of state, the summit was the most visible expression of the Obama administration’s efforts to reengage Africa, which began with the president’s trip to the continent in the summer of 2013.

This “pivot” to Africa is being driven in no small part by a desire to counter China’s growing influence on the continent. Indeed, President Obama nearly said as much himself. While claiming that Africa was big enough for more than one global power, the president and senior administration officials repeatedly sought to draw a distinction between the United States’ and China’s engagement with Africa. Without naming China specifically, President Obama said at the summit:


We don’t look to Africa simply for its natural resources; we recognize Africa for its greatest resource, which is its people and its talents and their potential. We don’t simply want to extract minerals from the ground for our growth; we want to build genuine partnerships that create jobs and opportunity for all our peoples and that unleash the next era of African growth. That’s the kind of partnership America offers.         

The administration’s efforts to reengage Africa are well founded, especially with the growing opportunities in parts of the region such as Sub-Saharan Africa. Still, there are at least five reasons why the United States can’t beat China in Africa.

Too Far Behind

The first reason why the United States can’t beat China in Africa is because it is starting from too far behind. Although China only surpassed the United States in trade with Africa in 2009, it has quickly established a sizeable lead. Last year, America’s trade with Africa stood at just $85 billion. By contrast, China’s trade with the region stood at $200 billion. Similarly, while less than 1 percent of America’s foreign direct investment went to Africa last year, at least 3.4 percent of China’s direct FDI went to the region (and much of China’s FDI goes unreported).

Political ties between China and Africa are nearly as advanced. Since 2000, China and Africa have held the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) every three years. There is no regular forum even remotely similar between the United States and Africa, and this month’s one-time summit cannot replace an established forum. Nor is senior-level engagement between Beijing and Africa limited to the FOCAC. In the same month that Xi Jinping assumed the Chinese presidency, he visited three African nations as part of his first visit abroad. With the exception of a brief stop off in Ghana, President Obama didn’t even visit the continent until halfway through his second term. Similarly, while Vice President Joe Biden has yet to visit Africa while in office, Chinese premier Li Keqiang visited Nigeria, Angola and Kenya just over a year after taking up his current office. As a nice touch, Premier Li made his week long Africa visit the first official trip he took with his wife.

China’s Growing Interests

Another reason that the United States can’t beat China in Africa is because Beijing has expanding interests in the region. Specifically, China sees Africa as essential to securing its growing appetite for natural resources, and also hopes to increase its exports of finished goods to the region. Most notably among these, Africa is crucial to Beijing’s efforts to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil. In recent years, China has relied on Africa for as much as one-third of its imported oil. If China’s economy keeps growing at a reasonable rate, the amount of oil that Beijing imports from Africa will continue expanding.

All signs suggest that Chinese leaders are busy preparing for this future. During his trip earlier this year, Premier Li promised to double bilateral trade with Africa to $400 billion by 2020. Li also said China planned to quadruple its direct investment in Africa to $100 billion during the same time (and again, much of China’s FDI in Africa goes unreported). Given that the United States already lags far behind China in many of these indicators, it will have to accelerate its engagement at an even faster rate. For example, U.S. trade with Africa would have to more than quadruple over the next six years.

America’s Declining Interests

America has a declining interest in Africa. Despite chiding China for being only interested in Africa for its oil and natural resources, America’s interests in the region are largely the same. According to the Congressional Research Service, around 60 percent of U.S. imports from Africa are in oil. Other estimates suggest that more than 75 percent of U.S. imports from the region are made up of natural resources.

This is problematic for future U.S.-African trade given that the United States has a sharply declining need for African oil. Indeed, in the last four years alone, the United States has reduced its oil imports from Africa by an astonishing 90 percent. As the energy revolution in the Western Hemisphere continues, the United States is likely to stop importing oil from Africa altogether.

Even with the growing economic opportunities in the Sub-Saharan, this fact alone suggests that U.S.-African trade is likely to decline in the coming years. That indeed has been the trend of the last few years. As noted above, last year, America’s bilateral trade with Africa was $85 billion. That was down substantially from $125 billion in 2011. Trade with Africa is on course to further decrease this year, with the first five months of 2014 producing just $31 billion in trade. In other words, America’s chances of quadrupling trade with Africa by 2020 hover just around none.

Unfair Competition

The fourth reason that the United States can’t beat China in Africa is that the game is rigged. That is, Chinese businesses possess a number of distinct advantages over their American counterparts in the African marketplace.

Most important among these is the strong support they receive from the Chinese government. Because of the strategic nature of China’s economic interests in Africa, Beijing is willing to provide substantial backing to the (largely state-owned) Chinese businesses operating in Africa. As a result, these companies can often pay above market prices for African goods, something American businesses don’t have the luxury to afford. Similarly, Chinese businesses are often willing to invest in high-risk ventures, as well as operate in far more risky environments than their Western counterparts.

Along with the prestige projects the Chinese government is willing to fund, Chinese companies in Africa are also able to offer the bribes that are usually crucial to securing large contracts in the region. By contrast, American companies are prohibited from engaging in these practices by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Finally, because of their country’s own recent development, Chinese businesses (and bureaucrats) are usually more cognizant of Africa’s economic needs than are American ones.

Occupied Elsewhere

Stronger political engagement from the United States would not be enough to overcome these inherent economic disadvantages. Nonetheless, any increased engagement with Africa is likely to be limited—if it happens at all. For one thing, U.S. foreign policy suffers from an acute case of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and America’s transient interest in Africa (for example, one of highly publicized leadership summits) has been one of the prime symptoms of this.   

There’s no reason to expect this to change in the coming years. Indeed, American diplomatic bandwidth is more than tied up elsewhere in the world. To begin with, the United States remains obsessed with the Middle East and terrorism. As its most recent intervention in Iraq demonstrates, no matter how hard a U.S. president tries to get the country out of the Middle East, the region pulls America back in. Given the amount of instability the region is likely to encounter in the years and decades ahead, there’s little chance America’s obsession will come to pass.

Nor is the Middle East alone in hogging U.S. attention. Russia’s recent misadventures in Ukraine have sparked a renewed interest in Washington in a pivot to Europe. In fact, senior defense leaders—including Gen. Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe and chief of the U.S. European Command—are already indicating they’ll send more troops to the European theatre in the coming years.

If Secretary John Kerry’s public schedule is any guide, the amount of diplomatic attention Europe receives is also set to increase. It will also far outpace the attention Africa receives. Last year, the extent of Kerry’s time in Africa was limited to a day and a half in Ethiopia. Even that was a quick detour on a trip that was largely spent in the Middle East and Europe. So far this year, Kerry has spent a week in Africa visiting five different nations, and made quick stop offs in Morocco and Algeria on the tail end of a Europe trip, and Tunisia at the tail end of an Asia-Middle East trip. By contrast, this year alone, Kerry has made fourteen trips to Europe, visiting eleven different countries and the Holy See. Indeed, he has visited France six times alone, spending far more time in Paris than in all of Africa.

Besides the Middle East and Europe, any remaining energy and resources the United States can devote to far-sighted planning will go to the Asia-Pacific. In other words, the United States will be severely constrained in the amount of attention it can expend on Africa. This small amount is likely to be wholly consumed with counterterrorism and humanitarian interventions. Exploiting Africa’s burgeoning economic opportunities will continue to take a backseat.

In sum, the U.S.-Africa Leaders summit notwithstanding, the United States cannot compete with China in Africa. Fortunately, it doesn’t have to. The Sino-American rivalry will not be decided in Africa, and the region is one place where the two countries’ interests are not zero-sum. Instead of competing with China in Africa, the United States should seek to exploit as many opportunities as it can, while asking Beijing to do the heavy lifting in the region commensurate with its greater interests and influence.

Zachary Keck is the Managing Editor of The Diplomat, where he authors the Pacific Realist blog. He can be found on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-reasons-why-the-united-states-can%E2%80%99t-beat-china-africa-11094?page=show

March 11

Rhetorics dt bind n blind. In asmuch I want to bilv this story, wher r d pixs? Dis is a war of propanganda. Nigeria is @ war wit foreign elements,let's nt mistake bout dt. To say BH is sophisticated to this level of wanton destruction is misleading. No terrorist group operates in isolation. 1 nigira.

If you live in a glass house don't throw stone n if u can't take blow brother don't throw blow- peter tosh

More picture update.

Folks my fone shut down ,I have left the scene of the fire. I see the Nigerian police force, NEMA, Federal fire Service, Lagos Fire Service.

If your on the 3rd mainland bridge, approaching lagos island from Idumota and Apogbon u can see the thick smoke of the burning bulding.
Property and goods worth hundred of millions have been lost to this inferno.

Traders can be seen wailing, its a heartbreaking sight considering the harsh economic situation of the country.

Despite the efforts of the firefighting service the fire rages on.

Great Nigeria House on Martins street, Lagos Island is on fire @ this moment. The fire has completely taken over the ground floor. Fire fighting service are on ground to contain the fire.

According to eye witness account, the fire started @ about 3am this morning. The cause of the fire outbreak still unknown but people suspect that it may be as a result of electrical fault.

I only see three fire fighting trucks here, two belonging to the state service n 1 belonging to Union bank

Still on.

Still available.