Sevenworldpower's Posts
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Decentdave:Who is pendu? Your girlfriend? |
Kingcalls:Morocco is already out. Experience matter in world cup. |
Gangster1ms:Exactly!! |
Mbappe is damn good. His style of play is close to Ronaldo de lima. |
Every society has a dominating ruling group. Globally, there is Anglo-American hegemony. In Nigeria, there is Arewa hegemony. In many states, there are hegemonies. Kwara and ilorin hegemony. Oyo and ibadan hegemony. Lagos and Tinubu hegemony. River and ikwerre hegemony. Another hegemony may only emerge through war or political revolution. |
What Is Russia Thinking?? By George Friedman -October 4, 2022Open as PDF The reason for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was clear: Moscow wanted strategic depth. Nothing Russia has done since, however, has been clear. The military has suffered several reversals, but this alone is not unexpected. Reversals are part of war, and prudent commanders anticipate and respond to them. Ideally, the responses are meant to solve or at least mitigate the problem as the war continues. Moscow is behaving as if the challenges it faces are a surprise. Russia assumed from the beginning that it would bring overwhelming force to bear on a much weaker military. The expectation was that the Ukrainian military would fragment and thus be unable to offer much resistance. Moscow thought Ukraine believed the same. That the Kremlin was wrong isn’t the fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is that the Russian command structure, starting at the top with Vladimir Putin, didn’t banish their confidence. An invading force should be built on the assumption it is dealing with a powerful and motivated enemy, and that it needs to prepare for a tough war. Meanwhile, Russia also did not expect the sheer amount of aid and weaponry the United States would send. It saw the U.S. as too disjointed politically and socially and with too strong an opposition to make much of a difference. The Russians have been very effective in waging psychological warfare as a key dimension of combat and engaged, as was reasonable, in creating division over the war in the United States. Moscow believed the U.S. would see the fall of Ukraine and the deployment of Russian troops to NATO’s eastern frontier as a potential recipe for another Cold War. Washington would probably want to respond but would be too fragmented to do so, or so the Russian thinking went. These failures were evident from the outset of the war. Russia deployed three armored formations to break Ukrainian resistance, which it believed would be far inferior and isolated from American assistance. Neither was the case. The Russians were blocked by logistics problems of their own, as well as Javelin anti-tank missiles. Russian tanks froze in place or made little progress. With the Ukrainians emboldened, the Russians were forced to reevaluate their adversary. But it seems as though they changed their tactics without changing their opinion of their enemy. Though they consolidated their forces in Donbas and fought an extended battle for control there, they didn’t advance to western Ukraine. They simply retreated toward their own border. This was a crucial moment for Russia. It was clear that the Ukrainians were a significant and coherent fighting force, and it was clear that the United States was not going to limit its support, even as the Poles intensified the training of Ukrainians. All the while, both tactical and strategic intelligence mapped Russian forces and anticipated Russian moves. In many cases, Ukrainian forces were able to attack Russian forces at the most vulnerable point or retreat when Russian offensives appeared too costly. It was at this point that the Russians should have reevaluated their likelihood of success. Offensive operations had had only limited success. The Ukrainian force outnumbered the Russian force and fought with discipline, while U.S. resupply and intelligence flowed. Russia retained enough potential power to alarm the West, power it ought to have used to seek peace through negotiations. In other words, Russia should have followed German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt’s advice about what should be done near the end of World War II. His answer: “Make peace you fools.” Given the confidence with which the initial attack was launched, making peace was unthinkable. All the dead, all the confidence, all of the well-spoken politicians would have been seen as a fraud. Putin has sought to turn the war from a Russian invasion to an American invasion of Russia. He has threatened nuclear war. He has mobilized truculent thousands, who may be trained by the end of winter, or perhaps never. The most difficult part of a war is ending it without victory. The United States suffered through this in Vietnam. It is the wars that appear to be easy that are sometimes the hardest to fight and always the hardest to concede. No one doubted, in Russia or America, that World War II would be long, hard and possibly lost. Neither Russia nor the United States thought it could lose in Afghanistan. It is an odd thing about confidence. Within the confines of reality, confidence is essential to fight a war. The hardest war to fight is the one in which the commander thinks victory is a given. When Russia started the war, it believed the mere sight of Russian tanks would scatter the Ukrainian army. Every reversal since has been dismissed by Moscow as simply an accident of war, instead of what it was: a war begun with certainty now confronting the reality of an enemy force superior to its own. Concern can be productive. Denial is the preface to desire. In war, the continued denial of reality is deadly. Putin is responsible because he is the president. But the general staff and intelligence services share the blame. What has happened in Ukraine is a systemic breakdown of leadership that lead the country into a poorly understood war, insisting that victory is just around the corner if it simply holds the line. Wars like this usually end in political deaths. Vietnam finished Lyndon B. Johnson, World War II the Japanese and German regimes. Each fought with the hope of something turning up. It never did. The pivotal question is: What makes Russia think it can win next week when it hasn’t won in seven months? There is sometimes an answer to that kind of question, but Russian politicians are now laying blame on others for the failure. Making peace sounds easy to those who didn’t start the war. |
Author- George Friedman |
A New Command for the Same War By George Friedman -October 11, 2022Open as PDF A few days ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to replace the military commander in charge of the Ukraine war with Gen. Sergei Surovikin, and thus change the military culture of the conflict itself. It was an important move but not necessarily for the reasons offered by most of the media. It came after Ukraine, armed primarily by the United States, had seized the initiative on the Ukrainian battlefield. Putin’s credibility was at stake even among ostensibly pro-war elements who were now starting to criticize his performance. The origin of the criticism is important. One of the loudest critics of Russia’s strategy in Ukraine has been Ramzan Kadyrov, Putin’s longtime functionary who used extreme brutality at Putin’s behest to keep the uprising in Chechnya under control. Kadyrov and Putin were both committed to halting the fragmentation of Russia and recovering what could be recovered. Kadyrov supported the invasion of Ukraine but was appalled at the weakness shown by the Russian army, particularly its high command. From his point of view, a ruthless operation against the Ukrainian public and military was required – in other words, a Chechen-type war. So here we have a stalwart Putin ally publicly lambasting the incompetence and softness of the Russian army, only for a new commander to be named. Commanders who look good in exercises and staff meetings sometimes fail in battle. Sometimes, replacing a commander no matter the circumstance is critical. It happens all the time. It’s been clear for some time now that Russia’s war plan has been flawed from the beginning. A new war plan requires a new command. The new commander immediately ordered a barrage of missiles aimed at Ukraine. War is about breaking the enemy’s will to resist; a ruthless assault in which everything is seen as a possible target is the first step. The second step is to make clear to Russian soldiers that they face extreme danger from their own side if they fail to perform on the battlefield. Morale and motivation are important, but they don’t work if the army is ill-equipped or its soldiers ill-trained. Firing missiles, then, signals what’s in store for the future, but that future won’t come only if troops are scared of their commanders. It comes with good training at all levels, with suitable weapons and other tools of modern warfare. Doing either, and ideally both, takes time. An opportunely timed missile barrage helps a little in this regard. To buy more time, an attack from the periphery would help even more. There are reports of Russian forces in Belarus, for example, and rumors that the Belarusian army is readying for war. If true, a southward thrust out of Belarus might well buy time. It would force Ukraine to defend itself on another front, and it would threaten the Ukrainian supply line from Poland. This is easier said than done, of course. It’s unclear whether Belarus is capable of fighting high intensity warfare, and the mere act of getting Russian troops there is difficult. A peripheral attack may have been possible before the Ukrainian army became battle-hardened and before the U.S. started supplying weapons to Kyiv en masse. Likewise, a peace treaty might have been possible as well – that is, if anyone was seriously interested in it. None of it is possible when Russia is, by its own standards, weak. A missile barrage, coupled with the reconstructed Russian military, is likely meant to create leverage for Russia where none had existed. The studied ferocity of the new commander could, in theory, create a basis for a settlement. Ultimately, the U.S. controls the war’s course in Ukraine, and therefore Ukraine is hostage to American interests. But because Ukraine has lives at stake, it has a limit on how long and how intensely it will fight the war. The American goal is to keep Russian forces as far east as possible, away from NATO. The Russian goal is to regain all of Ukraine. So progress one way or another in this conflict depends to some degree on how credible the new Russian military leaders are and how they can motivate existing troops while building a new force come spring. Until then, they must demonstrate that the soldiers already there are to be taken seriously and that worse may yet be coming. They must frighten the Ukrainians and Americans. Next time, the criticism of someone like Kadyrov may not do. Production of weapons is the foundation of this war, and the U.S. dominates production. If Russia can’t rapidly match that, it has to make some concessions, possibly major ones. That is the battle problem facing the new command. |
ExAngel007:People are the girls. What about the boys? I blame parents and their love for material things. Children learn from their parents. |
Fulani love power. If you doubt me read about usman dan fodio jihad. Surprisingly, no fulani is contesting for presidency either as vp or president. Apc- Tinubu ( Yoruba) , Shetima( kanuri) Pdp- Atiku( fulanized chamba) , Okowa( igbo) Lp-- Obi(igbo), Datti( Arab) |
greatness77:I smell military lies and misinformation. |
Dvdpity:North korea and Afghanistan are ideal countries. Hitler was best leader in history of the world. Continue ok. |
VictoryAssured:I am so sorry. Economy is bad. Young people should learn skills. Bricklayers, carpenters, barbers and other artisans are still surviving. Poor income earners should avoid living in cities. |
Mynd44:OK continue. If APc leaders eat shit you would definitely hail them. |
Mynd44:After paying property tax. Continue ok. |
TheRareGem1:e] They want refund |
Dvdpity:Kiev is older than Moscow. |
jkpbestseries:Which lesson? Did you teach him any lesson? |
sonofElElyon:OK some. |
sonofElElyon:And you think Putin could be assassinated by Ukraine? Most Russian/USSR leaders died mysteriously or unceremoniously while in office. Internal purging is part of Russia politics. |
od501:Start what? How can weaken Ukraine assassinate a top Russian official inside Russia? Internal purging is going on inside Russia. |
Tunjibalogun:Very correct. |
Kewtt:What is war? |
Kewtt:There are so many retards in naraland. Confirmed!!! |
ken6488:What was the reason for the civil war and later invasion by nato? |
ken6488:Did dictatorship work them? No! That was the reason for civil war and later invasion by nato. |
God1000:It will stall or reduce it but China and Russia would eventually bite each other. |
Israel is to counter America enemies in Arab world. Main enemy is Iran. South Korea to tackle North Korea in the peninsula. Taiwan to support America in Asia. Main enemy is China. Western Europe is with USA. The only threat in Pacific and Oceania is China. AUKUS will take care of that. Ukraine is likely to become nemesis of Russia in Eastern Europe to America advantage. Africa may be repartitioned second time. Though USA is loosing influence in Africa due to expansion agenda of China and Russia major military powers in the continent are still with USA. Alliance between China and Russia would be like political relationship between nazi Germany and USSR prior to invasion of Ussr by Germany. China and Russia still have unsettled territory dispute. What unites them now is their common enemy - USA. Dictators don't trust themselves. Dictators don't have friendly countries as their neighbours. |
Whobedatte:Very good! |

