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Them go chop tire. My homie in Bristol does £100 per hour locum work...NHS dey sweet. |
[quote author=PARADIZEPRIEST post=104449165]NIGERIA IS BLESSED NATION BUT PPL LEADIN NAIJA FROM 1967 ARE CURSED TO CAUSE D NATION BACKWARDNESS. > You think the English are stupid, they knew what they were doing |
Correct gentleman. This is the calibre of person who should be president instead of these gun holding, genocidal killers. He has better ideas and wisdom at 95 than Buhari and all of his ministers. |
EmmaxKeys:Many Plans in this life. Choose yours? Plan Mbappe. Plan PHD. Plan HushPuppy Plan Extradition Plan Bourdillon |
Wait till the US start seizing land title and freezing/shutting down bank accounts of the political elite. You will then see the sacrificial lamb being handed over with a napkin and salad. |
Reshuffling faeces...ends up as ..... |
KillMNKnow:See tears ![]() |
Violent clashes between Fulani and Dogon have recently escalated in the Seeno plains in central Mali. After failing to defeat a “jihadist” insurgency dominated by Fulani, the Malian army has sponsored and trained a Dogon militia, which has systematically attacked Fulani villages, and again caused counterattacks. In addition, internal conflicts within Fulani and Dogon society have emerged. This demonstrates the complexities of the current crisis in Mali and how simplistic narratives about its causes are unhelpful. It also shows how views of the enemy as “terrorists” or “jihadists” are dangerous and able to further fuel violent conflicts. At 4 am on the 23rd March 2019, an armed group of Dogon traditional hunters1 attacked and killed 175 Fulani villagers in Ogossagou village in the Seeno plains in central Mali. About half of the casualties in this horrid attack were children. It immediately made international news headlines and was reported as another example of African “ethnic violence”. But, since Dogon primarily identify as farmers and Fulani2 as pastoralists,3 the violence also was presented as resulting from classic tensions between farmers and herders. Media reports often add that these old conflicts are exacerbated by climate change and population growth leading to increased natural resource scarcity.4 Ogossagou village in fact consists of two separated sub-villages – one Fulani (Ogossagou Peul) and one Dogon (Ogossagou Dogon). From the 19th century Fulani military power dominated the plains and chased the Dogon in the area back to the nearby escarpment where most of the Dogon population lived. Those who did not want to abandon their farms had to accept to become integrated into Fulani society as Rimaybe – “slaves” or “servants” of the Rimbe (Fulani of higher status). After the French colonial power took control over the area early in the 20th century and especially after Mali’s independence in 1960, Dogon gradually moved down again from the nearby escarpment to farm on the plains below (Petit, 1998). Dogon had moved up to the escarpment to escape Othman don Fodio Islamic conquests by the sword. On 14th February 2020, Ogossagou was tragically again attacked by Dogon militia. This time 31 Fulani villagers were killed. These two assaults are, however, not unique, although the former stands out with its high number of casualties. According to data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Locations and Event Data), 60% of deaths caused by violence in Mali in 2019 were found in this dry savanna belt below the Dogon Escarpment and Plateau (called the Seeno, see Figure 1) (cited by International Crisis Group, 2020).5 In this article, we aim to explain the background of this violence between Dogon and Fulani in central Mali. Our point of departure is that violence needs to be seen in its wider political-economic and historical context with a focus on access and control over land and natural resources. In such a study of the materiality of natural resources governance and politics, the dialectic of actors and land represent the main object of study. This type of materialist political ecology moves, however, beyond studying conflicts as simple causal chains with resource scarcity having negative consequences for livelihoods and again leading to migration and conflicts (Peluso and Watts, 2001). While climate change and population growth may play a role, in addition to religion in the case of jihadist violence, we argue that the current conflicts in the Sahel can only be fully understood by including a political ecology framing with a focus on the material politics of land governance in a historical and political economic context (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2021). As a pioneer in studies of the political ecology of farmer-herder conflicts, Bassett (1988) saw these conflicts as “responses in context”, while Turner (2004) also used political ecology in his critique of the scarcity narrative that widely informs perceptions of farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel, and stressed that these conflicts should be understood as more than just resource conflicts. In a similar vein, Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) studied a long-standing farmer-herder conflict in the inland delta of the Niger river in Mali, with a focus on the power relations associated with the rent seeking and marginalization that fueled such conflicts. Furthermore, Benjaminsen et al. (2012) combined a study of another farmer-herder conflict in the inland Niger delta with a quantitative analysis of 820 land use conflicts in central Mali during 1992–2009 correlated with rainfall trends over the same period. The analysis gave little substance to claims that climate variability is an important driver of these conflicts. Instead, the study argued that the main causes of conflicts were agricultural encroachment impeding livestock mobility, a political vacuum during the transition from military rule to democracy in the early 1990s that provided space for opportunistic behavior among rural actors, and rent seeking among government officials. Also, a number of other case studies from African drylands have found that the scarcity lens leads to a narrow reading of farmer-herder clashes – e. g. Hagberg (2005), Moritz (2006), Witsenburg and Adano (2007), Kevane and Gray (2008), Benjaminsen, Maganga, and Abdallah (2009), and Akov (2017). |
JISOS!!! NEW BALANCE - NEW HELL Ado pikin - is showing us his New balance. I do not like it This is deep abuse and criminalisation. He will enjoy the power of holding it - at 10 years ooo. adults will be hailing him, imagine his own age-mates, sick behaviour |
Online things! |
Audio money...there will be so many conditions attached so that UK companies will be tied into receive 124 million of that loot |
We just like too much skeleton with belle as presido for naija |
Dat warri guy go update video soon ooo! |
Talk say like US dey handle Naija like Colombia with Escobar |
Did Soldiers ask for permission before they travel through the Caliphate? You cannot drive into Cameroon without being approached now. |
Harrisonwo:Spill beans na, abeg. |
Naija's big brother....2023 loading |
When the Fulani man was admonishing the naija players in Swiss, idiots here were criticising him. See as your yanshs dey open. |
haslaw:Go carry your survey to NNPC beg |
haslaw:You dey yarn this yanga while ignoring Buhari's administration ![]() Too funny. If you like make your own ummah team. |
Beancounter94:I doff my slanted baseball cap to you sir. Some of these posters have no understanding of the world around them, due to limited travels and awareness. We should just call this Nigeria team our foreign Legion basketball team. It will become like this in many other sports with the lack of facilities and decent sports management. |
Seun:Non-negotiable - so you be oyibo slave abi- - see these colonial colons Na you be the naija village man in 1860 saying your fetish go chase the white man away with his guns |
dmbb:
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Jeezos, na only young killing their seniors dey for naira land at the moment. #FearYouths |
blackbriar:On the Index of it's history, people and treatment by the imperialist dogs, it is an Afrikan country. Note the spelling. |
Will be state by 2024 |
olisaEze:GBAM - SA is just doing the dance their oyibo masters want them to do on trans matter. Want to know the truth, ask the average SA man in Joburg to marry trans-woman - u go see real reaction |
Na the same way Arafat die - SPEED is no joke |
We should all withhold $£and Yen for one year - Nigeria will howl ![]() |
Digital Cow coin is born....good luck ![]() |
