9. In March 1959, the UN asked Britain to clarify the
wishes of the people living in Northern and Southern
Cameroons trusteeship territories in the run up to
the "independence" of Nigeria and Cameroun. Maps
from that period show Bakassi peninsula in the
Cameroons, not the real Nigeria.
10. On January 1st, 1960 the French Cameroons
became independent. Instruments creating the new
country and exchange of notes between France and
Cameroun rehashed all its colonial boundaries as
defined by previous colonial agreements.
11. On October 1st, 1960, Nigeria became
independent. Instruments creating the new country
and exchange of notes between Britain and Nigeria
rehashed all its colonial boundaries as defined by
previous colonial agreements. Maps dated 1960
show that the Bakassi peninsula was clearly within
the "Southern Cameroons", not "Nigeria proper."
General Gowon was only a subaltern at the time.
12. On February 11th and 12th 1961, a plebiscite
was held to " clarify the wishes of the people living in Northern and Southern Cameroons ". The population of Northern Cameroons had earlier - in 1959 - "decided to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria", while the
population of Southern Cameroons, whose plebiscite
could not be done in 1959 for security reasons, now
"decided to achieve independence by joining the
independent Republic of Cameroon" (General
Assembly resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961).
Note that there were 21 polling stations on the
Bakassi peninsula itself and that 73% of the people
living there voted to "achieve independence by
joining the independent Republic of Cameroon".
(Note the blunder here. By spelling it as "Cameroon", rather than "Cameroun", the UN created an opening for the people of the "Southern Cameroons" to say they never voted to join "Cameroun" which is the former French territory.
13. In 1962, the government of Tafawa Balewa
exchanged diplomatic notes with Cameroun
acknowledging the fact that Bakassi was not Nigerian territory. General Gowon was a T/Captain. Maps from that period show Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun, following the results of the 1961 plebiscite.
14. In January 1966, Major General Ironsi came to
power in Nigeria. He committed his government to
respect all prior international agreements made by
the Balewa government. Maps from that period show Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun.
15. In July 1966, then Lt. Col. Gowon came to power
in Nigeria. He too committed his government to
respect all prior international agreements made by
the Ironsi and Balewa governments. Maps from that
period show Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun

16. In 1970, moves began to be made by
independent Cameroun and post-civil war Nigeria to
clarify their maritime border which was vaguely
defined by the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty. Maps
from that period show Bakassi peninsula in
Cameroun, but the offshore boundary was unclear
since there was no detailed demarkation of the
"navigable portion" of the approach channel to the
Calabar estuary. Then Attorney General Elias
correctly advised the Gowon government that post-
colonial Nigeria had no legal basis for contesting the
Bakassi peninsula itself, but that work to delimit the
offshore boundary and vague sections of the land
boundary should proceed at full speed in accordance
with the original Anglo-German Treaty of 1913. The
technical problem thus became deciding exactly
what part was "navigable" and what was not. It is
this matter that was addressed on April 4th, 1971 at
Yaoundé when Nigeria's General Gowon and
Cameroun President Ahidjo, accompanied by large
delegations, signed the "Coker-Ngo" Line on British
Admiralty Chart No. 3433 "as far as the 3-nautical-
mile limit." The status of the Bakassi peninsula
proper was not an issue for discussion. Maps from
that period show Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun.
17. On June 1st, 1975, Gowon and Ahidjo signed the
Maroua Declaration for the partial extension of the
1971 maritime boundary. Again, the status of the
Bakassi peninsula proper was not even an issue for
discussion. Maps from that period show Bakassi
peninsula in Cameroun.
18. On July 29, 1975 General Gowon was overthrown
by General Murtala Muhammed. One of the first acts
of that regime was to begin to question all the
domestic and foreign policy decisions made by
General Gowon - including the offshore maritime
border with Cameroun. In the rush to smear Gowon
publicly, he was held accountable for "giving away
Bakassi" - an event that had actually occurred before
he was born. Muhammed's decision to renege on
Gowon's agreements with Ahidjo resonated with a
section of the population which had been hoping for
a way to get out of its commitments to Cameroun
deriving from the 1961 plebiscite and the colonial
heritage dating back to 1884. Still, Nigerian official
maps from that period and continuing till today
except a few that were reprinted on orders from the
Babangida government in 1991 show Bakassi
peninsula in Cameroun.
19. The rest of what transpired in 1981, 1994, 1996
and since then is well known - including General
Abacha's moves to formally create an administrative
set up there and all the military clashes.
20. On October 10, 2002 the International Court at
The Hague confirmed what Elias had said in 1970
and reiterated almost a century of colonial
agreements which had repeatedly placed Bakassi
peninsula inside Kamerun/Cameroon/Cameroun. It
also went further to provide guidelines for the final
clarification of the offshore border - which if anything,
is the only issue about which General Gowon, acting
on advice from some civil servants, may not have
been as aggressive as he could have been. But even
that is a matter of technical detail, not treason.
Post-script: On September 3, 2002 a few weeks to
the Judgement of the ICJ, Chief R Oluwole Coker, the
Nigerian Surveyor who, along with Mr. Ngo of
Cameroun decided the "Coker-Ngo" offshore line of
1971, which Gowon and Ahidjo signed, died. May his
soul rest in peace.

COUNTDOWN TO THE UN PLEBISCITE
1949 – 1954
As we noted previously, following the Second World
War, League of Nation mandates were replaced by
UN mandates. Dr. E. M. L. Endeley became President
of the Cameroon National Federation in 1949. At that
time southern Cameroons (including Bakassi
peninsula) was administered with Nigeria. Following
a dispute within the Eastern House of Assembly in
Enugu in May 1953, nine out of thirteen delegates
from the Southern Cameroons, who had originally
been elected on the platform of the National Council
for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), opted for
‘neutrality’, claiming that they were not Nigerian. Mr.
S. T. Muna, the only Southern Cameroonian in the
Eastern Executive Council at that time was actually
dismissed. This crisis led to the name change from
“National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons”, as
the NCNC was then known, to “National Council of
Nigerian Citizens.“
During the July 1953 London Constitutional
Conference, Endeley, citing fear of “Nigerian
domination”, requested the unconditional withdrawal
of the Southern Cameroons from the Eastern Region
of Nigeria, and its transformation into a separate
region of its own in line with its trusteeship status.
Britain agreed and implemented separation in 1954,
making the Southern Cameroons (including Bakassi
peninsula) a semi-autonomous quasi-region of the
Nigeria Federation with its own House of Assembly
and Executive Council located at Buea. Endeley was
called the Leader of Government Business, not
Premier, primarily because Southern Cameroons was
not yet a full region. Importantly, the Bakassi
peninsula which was part of Kamerun/Cameroon
since 1913, as inherited in the league of Nations
mandate after World War 1, was also excised from
co-administration with the eastern region along with
the rest of the southern Cameroons at that time.
There is no evidence that anyone made an issue of
the matter then (Nigeria Gazette No. 53 vol. 41,
B389-408; [D440-59]).
1955 – 1960
In 1955 there was a split in Endeley’s party which
was then allied with the Action Group (AG) and John
Ngu Foncha emerged as his rival on the platform of
the new Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP).
This party’s goal was complete secession of southern
Cameroons from Nigeria and eventual reunification
with Francophone Cameroun. Endeley was accused of
abandoning his former stance of pro-unification in
favor of integration with Nigeria. At about the same
time the Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC)
, a Bamileke based radical leftist party in
Francophone Cameroun led by Felix Moumie was
being banned by the French Governor. As they
fought a bitter and violent guerrilla war against
ruthless French troops, they would often cross over
to Bamileke sections of British Cameroons (i.e.
“Nigeria”) for sanctuary.
In mid 1957, there was a Constitutional Conference
in London to resolve issues preparatory to Nigeria’s
independence which was initially proposed for a date
in 1959, but "not later than April 2, 1960." In August
that year, Tafawa Balewa became Premier in an All
Nigeria Federal Executive Council. Among the first
three Federal Ministers from the Eastern region was a
gentleman called Okoi Arikpo. He would later feature
in the post-independence Gowon government.
On September 25th the Willink Commission was set
up to deal with the case of Nigerian minorities.
Interestingly, no submission was made to the panel
regarding the case of Bakassi peninsula, considered
then to be part of southern Cameroons. The Willink
report was published in October 1958 –
recommending against the creation of new regions in
Nigeria. Shortly thereafter the Constitutional
conference resumed in London – and once again the
Bakassi issue was not discussed, nor was the status
of Calabar as a former “protectorate” rather than
“colony” as some have said, an issue.
In the January 1959 southern Cameroons election (in
which Bakassi residents participated), Endeley was
voted out of power and replaced by Foncha, a man
with even less disguised anti-Nigerian instincts. In
October that year, the Enugu based 1st Queens Own
Nigeria regiment (1QONR) was temporarily deployed
to southern Cameroons for “Training”. However,
Bamileke UPC sympathizers in Bamenda viewed this
as a counter-insurgency deployment in support of
the hated French colonial administration. In early
1960, responding to more violence in the area, the
1QONR again returned to Bamenda area in full force,
followed shortly thereafter by the 4QONR from
Ibadan who were deployed further south to Kumba
near the coast. The 5QONR and 3QONR later replaced
both battalions respectively – followed later by the
2QONR. These shows of military force did not endear
Nigeria to certain opinion leaders in the local
population.
On October 1, 1960 Nigeria became independent.
Our first Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa signed
an exchange of notes with the United Kingdom
saying (inter alia), that
“….it is the understanding of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland that the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria agree to the
following provisions:
“(i) all obligations and responsibilities of the
Government of the United Kingdom which arises
from any valid international instrument shall,
henceforth, in so far as such instrument may be held
to have application to Nigeria, be assumed by the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria.
(ii) the rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the
Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of the
application of any such international instrument to
Nigeria shall henceforth be enjoyed by the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria……..”
By customary international law, therefore, “Nigeria”
inherited (and agreed without question) all the
present international boundary regimes of Nigeria –
with Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Chad and Cameroon -
as originally defined by various colonial Anglo-French
and Anglo-German Treaties. Therefore, the southern
Cameroons (inclusive of the Bakassi peninsula),
which was now under separate direct British rule as a
trusteeship territory, asked Nigerian troops to leave.
A British Battalion replaced them.
However, 1QONR, supported by the new Recce Unit
of the newly independent Nigerian Army were then
deployed in an internal security precaution along the
frontier to prevent spill-over of violence. The old
Anglo-German border of 1913 was resurveyed at this
time by Nigerian military foot patrols to confirm the
location of old beacons and new Police Posts were
constructed along it for clarity. [NJ Miners: The
Nigerian Army 1956-1966, Methuen 1971, page
73-74]
It was against this background that most southern
Cameroonians favored self-determination –
independent of BOTH Nigeria and Francophone
Cameroun. However, conflicting interests on the
international scene subverted their political will. The
pan-Africanist movement, led by Nkrumah, for
example, was opposed to the emergence of small
African states. Britain was initially afraid that an
allegedly economically unviable “Southern
Cameroons” would be an albatross around its
taxpayers and thus preferred that it join with large
Nigeria next door. Although southern Cameroonian
leaders preferred that the plebiscite provide a simple
choice between "integration with Nigeria" or
"secession and independence", the UN imposed
different questions on the electorate. In October
1959, General Assembly Resolution 1352 XIV,
composed the choices as follows:
(I) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining
the independent Federation of Nigeria?
or
(II) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining
the independent Republic of Cameroun?
However, popular opposition to these choices
compelled both Foncha and Endeley to request that
southern Cameroons simply be granted
independence. Initial momentum in this direction
and talks in London in November 1960, however,
collapsed in acrimony and the UN had its way. In the
countdown to the plebiscite, reunification with
Francophone Cameroun was marketed by well-
funded Francophone groups as a loose union in which
the Southern Cameroons would maintain self-rule.
The most prominent among these pro-unification
forces were elements of the Bamileke tribe who was
split by the post-World War 1 partition into British
and French territories. Its own arrangements for
independence in 1960 and infighting among its
leaders in the meantime distracted Nigeria, following
the controversial federal elections of 1959.
Simultaneously, the refusal of Britain to create new
regions for ethnic Nigerian minorities at the London
constitutional talks of 1958 made it easy for pro-
unification forces in southern Cameroons. They
mischievously advertised integration with Nigeria as
a reunion with the Eastern region from which it had
“broken away” in 1954. The effect of this was
amplified by short-sighted Nigerian politicians who
were afraid that the integration of southern
Cameroons would provide the eastern region based
NCNC with a larger geographic and political base in
the tri-regional rat race to control Nigeria.

THE PLEBISCITE
In October 1961, therefore, following the UN
Plebiscite of February 11th, the Southern Cameroons
(including the Bakassi peninsula) was federated with
the Republic of Cameroun, while the Northern
Cameroons joined Nigeria [http://
www.iupjournals.org/africatoday/aft47-2.html]. Thus,
by default, and by plebiscite, the Nigeria-Cameroun
boundary in the south - as described by the Section F
of the Legal Notice 126 of 1954-58 - and clearly
marked with resurveyed 1913 beacons, reverted to
the old Anglo-German border which antedated
Nigeria's amalgamation (http://www.gamji.com/
nowa46.htm). An Anglo-French treaty following the
partition of German Kamerun after World War 1
specified the portion in the North.
The results of the plebiscite in the North were heavily
influenced by the single-mindedness, leadership and
strategic genius of the Sardauna of Sokoto, the late
Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, assisted by Mr D.J.M. Muffett,
then Resident General in the Northern Cameroons.
Cameroun reacted unfavorably to it and even went to
the ICJ to file a complaint that voting was irregular.
However, the complaint was not sustained. The
results in the south reflected personal, ethnic and
political rivalries within southern Nigeria and
Cameroon, confusing interpretation of the plebiscite
questions on the part of villagers, background
influence from Francophone interests, and failure of
the Nigerian intelligentsia and government to
appreciate the strategic implications of what was
going on. It would prove to be a costly oversight
down the road.
Nevertheless, Nigeria, perhaps not wanting to rock
the boat, having successfully staved of Cameroun’s
challenge to the northern Cameroons plebiscite,
voted at the UN to approve the results of the
southern Cameroons plebiscite, oblivious to certain
subtle issues of legality, due process and self-interest
that were lurking in the background. Never too
comfortable with the idea, but thinking it could win
autonomy, anglophone Southern Cameroon (along
with Bakassi in the southwestern district) departed
on an uncertain journey to its future with
Francophone Cameroun.
1962
In 1962, Nigeria confirmed its approval of the results
of the plebiscite in a Diplomatic Note No. 570 of
March 27, 1962 to Cameroun, which included a map
showing Bakassi in the newly unified Cameroun.
From then on, until the 1990s Nigeria would have no
serious administrative or military presence in the
peninsula. [Even the much-touted ‘Bakassi local
government’ was only created in 1997, a full three
years AFTER the case at the ICJ had begun]. During
the first republic, in addition to the Embassy in
Yaounde, however, Nigeria opened a consulate in
Buea, capital of the Southern Cameroons - now
Western Cameroun. Presumably this was in
recognition of the large number of Nigerians living in
the region, even after the plebiscite.
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)
1963
In 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was
established. Article III, paragraph 3 of the founding
Charter states: "Respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each state and for its
inalienable right to independent existence." Nigeria
ratified this Charter.
1964
In 1964, Nigeria approved the Cairo Declaration of
the Organization of African Unity of July 1964,
committing African States to the inviolability of
colonial borders. Specifically, AHG/RES 16(1) states:
"Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge
themselves to respect the borders existing on their
achievement of national independence." Nigeria
ratified this declaration, and by implication restated
its commitment to the Nigerian-Cameroun colonial
border, as it had done in 1960 (Exchange of Notes
with the UK) and again in 1962 (Diplomatic Note
570).
BOUDAN AND DANARE DISPUTE
1965
In 1965, a number of border incidents took place
between two villages - Boudan and Danare - near
Ikom, in a forested area of the old boundary. A joint
Nigeria-Cameroun boundary demarcation team was
set up and sent to the area. The late Surveyor O.A.
Aqua as well as Surveyor Dennis Mbata represented
Nigeria. Cameroun was represented, among others
by late Surveyor G. Obenson (who later became a
Professor at the University of Lagos). As had
previously been confirmed in 1960, the area was well
demarcated by the colonial administration (based on
the 1913 Treaty) but the beacons were too far apart.
Thus the purpose of the exercise was to place
intervisible beacons along the old 1913 boundary.
This exercise was suspended on account of the
military coup of January 1966 - and never resumed
until after the civil war.
NIGERIA IN CRISIS
1966
In late 1966, in the tense circumstances following the
northern counter-rebellion of July 29, a plane carrying
weapons - allegedly ordered by Eastern region
Military Governor Lt. Col. Ojukwu - and headed for
Enugu in Nigeria's eastern region crashed over the
Cameroun mountains. It remains unclear to this day
whether the crash was accidental or the plane was
shot down. But Cameroun's President Ahidjo, who
was not informed beforehand of the flight's planned
overpass through Camerounian air space, was highly
irritated and embarassed. He would, from that point
onwards, view the Ojukwu leadership in Eastern
Nigeria - and later Biafra - with suspicion.

1967
After the events of late 1966, but before the civil war
actually broke out, Douala airport in Cameroun was a
favorite destination of foreign-based Ndigbo
returning to the Eastern region. It was also a
favourite route for getting out of Nigeria until the
border areas were partially secured by federal
Nigerian Troops during the war. In late May 1967,
following the mandate granted to Lt. Col. Ojukwu by
the Eastern Consultative Assembly to secede Lt. Col.
Gowon created 12 new States in Nigeria - including
the South-Eastern State headed by Major U. J.
Esuene, an Ibibio officer in the Air Force. The creation
of the South-Eastern State from the former eastern
region was not unnoticed across the border and was
a factor in rekindling interest in rejoining Nigeria
among Efik and Ibibio residents of Bakassi peninsula
- many of whom had actually voted in 1961 not to
pursue integration with Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria's
Consul-General at Buea, SJ King, transferred from the
foreign service to his home South-Eastern State
where he later became the Permanent Secretary.
CALABAR SECTOR DURING THE CIVIL WAR
In July, the Nigerian Civil War broke out - and lasted
until January 1970. During the war, both Nigeria and
Biafra were in an international rat race for support
and recognition. Nigeria lobbied its neighbors to
prevent Biafra from using their territory as either a
staging point for military operations or through-put
for weapons supply. Very early in the campaign a
decision was made to create a vise around Biafra by
attacking simultaneously from the North and the sea.
During operations to take Calabar on October 17 - 19,
the threat of the Bakassi peninsula being used to
outflank and surprise the Nigerian task force and
dominate the approach channel to the Calabar
estuary became an issue, necessitating more specific
diplomatic exchanges with Cameroun to clarify its
intentions. In fact, troops of the 12 Brigade, 3rd
Marine Commando under Major (later Lt. Col.) R.
Aliyu, reporting to Colonel (later Brigadier) B.
Adekunle, supported by naval and air bombardment,
could not break out from Calabar for almost a month,
only barely holding on to the town.
Major Ogbo Oji of the 9th battalion, 52 Biafran Bde,
initially led the Biafran resistance at Calabar (until he
was badly wounded). The Brigade had no
Commander after Colonel Eze was removed in
curious circumstances (Madiebo: The Nigerian
Revolution and the Biafran War, Fourth Dimension
Publishers, 1980). Lt. Col. David Okafor who was later
reinforced by Lt. Col. Adigio of the 7th battalion
replaced Oji. They were both later replaced - in
controversy - by Majors Odigwe and Omerua under a
newly formed 56 Brigade under Lt. Col Festus
Akagha who had barely escaped - in controversial
circumstances - from the Midwestern theater.
European mercenaries later took over that front. To
show its importance to Biafra, nearly all-available
ammunition - which was never enough to begin with
- was sent to that front. Nigeria got assurances from
Cameroun that the Bakassi peninsula - which Nigeria
had acknowledged as far back as 1962 was in
Cameroun and, therefore, outside its control - would
not be used by hostile elements. This pre-empted
contingency plans for "hot pursuit" operations across
the border and safeguarded the rear as federal troops
slowly pushed east of the Cross river against initially
determined Biafran troops who, nevertheless, were
eventually undermined by internal conflicts within
the Biafran political, administrative and military
structure.
The federal plan was to link up through Oban with
1st Division federal elements coming down from
Ikom against Biafran forces led by Lt. Col. Ochei. The
objective was to cut off the Biafran border point with
Cameroun at Ikang. This was finally achieved in
December. However, the road to Ikom along with the
towns of Ikot Okpara, Amolo Water Town, Mbabu Owa
and Agobi-Iwolo were not taken until the end of
January 1968, courtesy of a controversial Biafran
withdrawal ordered by European mercenaries hired
by Ojukwu. Note that in his book "My Command"
written by General Obasanjo (rtd) and published by
Heinemann in 1981, all the maps of that sector show
the Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun (page 93). In his
book “The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970. Frank
Cass, 1971” N.U. Akpan, the Secretary to the Eastern
Regional and later Biafran government, who is
himself of South-Eastern origin, also shows the
Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun in a map titled “Map
of Eastern Nigeria declared Biafra, 30th May,
1967” (page 20). The war did not begin until July 6th.
THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF CAMEROUN
AND ITS ATTITUDE TO THE NIGERIAN WAR
Late President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun was a
Fulani man whose father was originally from Kano in
Nigeria. His mother was from Garoua in Cameroun. In
fact Ahidjo grew up around Yola and Mubi in Nigeria
and was a playmate of Senator Iya Abubakar. His
former District Head in Nigeria, Ambassador Malabu,
was made Ambassador to Cameroun to cement the
relationship. It is said that every time late Alhaji
Ahidjo saw late Alhaji Malabu he would genuflect.
Thus, Nigeria gained and sustained Cameroun's
support during the civil war, not by territorial
concessions as have been widely and wrongly
reported, but by manipulating primordial links
between Ahidjo and Northern Nigeria.
In addition, Ahidjo and key elements in the
francophone Cameroun bureaucracy were afraid of
the effect - on southern Cameroons - of a precedent
for secession by supporting Biafra. It was not a secret
that southern Cameroons had always preferred self-
determination. They were also in possession of french
intelligence reports that Biafra would someday annex
the former Southern Cameroon along with Fernando
Po in a swath of territorial acquisitions in the area of
the "Bight of Biafra". Adult male Ndigbo living in
Cameroun at that time were, therefore, required
every Saturday to report to designated open fields
and kept there for many hours before being released
by Police. In this manner Ahidjo kept a tight reign on
their movements and threw them off balance. Not to
report usually led to unwelcome domestic visits by
Cameroun gendarmes. In supporting Biafra, France
was interested in breaking up Nigeria, the large
threatening anglophone nation-state, but was not
interested in the balkanization of Cameroun which it,
therefore, kept discreetly informed of goings on
inside Biafra. Such "intelligence" and "rumors" about
alleged future Biafran intentions, were never actually
officially confirmed by anyone but it played into old
rivalries in the NCNC and Eastern region going back
to the days that Southern Cameroons was
administered alongside Nigeria as a Trusteeship
territory.
1968
Equatorial Guinea, the country across from and next
to Nigeria and Cameroun in the Gulf of Guinea gained
independence and supported the federal side in the
Nigerian civil war. The immediate effect of this was
the termination of relief flights to Biafra.

1969
In 1969 a "Boundary Section" was established in the
Federal Survey Department of the Nigerian Federal
Ministry of Works. The surveyor who was asked to
run the office as "Head of Boundaries", arrived from
outside Lagos to find that the rooms allocated to him
had no chairs or desks. That was the level of
importance that "Boundaries" was given. No one
knew then that Nigeria would in due course be
consumed by a bitter international boundary dispute,
not to mention all the domestic ones. Needless to say
that the boundary section soon became the
databank, particularly for Nigeria’s International
boundaries and later for internal boundaries.
POST-WAR ISSUES
1970
After the war, General Gowon of Nigeria – with
Ahidjo’s support - decreed that the name “Bight of
Biafra” be removed from maps of the Gulf of Guinea
close to the Nigeria-Cameroun-Equatorial Guinea
border area. It was renamed “Bight of Bonny”.
Issues raised by wartime policing of the border to
prevent infiltration and exfiltration resurrected the
old quest to clarify the boundary. It was amplified by
reports that Cameroun had been exploring for Oil
along the undemarcated maritime border between
both countries while Nigeria was busy fighting its
civil war. A meeting of the Nigeria-Cameroun
Boundary Commission, therefore, took place at
Yaounde, Cameroun from August 12-14. The Nigerian
Ambassador as well as the Cameroun Foreign
Minister opened the meeting. However, they both
subsequently left and ceded authority to technical
experts from the Surveys, Fisheries, Navy,
Immigration, Justice, External Affairs, Cabinet Office
etc. departments of both countries. The most senior
Nigerian civil servant present who thus led the
delegation was Chief R. Oluwole Coker, Director of
Federal Surveys. The SouthEastern State (now Cross-
River and Aqua Ibom) was strongly represented by
technical and legal experts from the State
Government. Neither General Gowon nor Alhaji
Ahidjo was present.
Although the draft agenda submitted by Nigeria for
consideration included fresh physical and
administrative considerations for delimiting the
boundary, after considerable deliberation, the joint
commission agreed to use the 1913 Anglo-German
Treaty. The South-Eastern delegation for instance,
had initially brought cartons of tax receipts paid by
residents of Bakassi area to the Nigerian government
as a way to make a claim over the peninsula.
However, it later became apparent that the same
residents also paid taxes to the Cameroun
authorities. Many had homes on both sides of the
border. They even had fishing villages with precisely
the same name on both sides of the border.
Eventually, both sides agreed to demarcate the
border in three sectors, beginning with the maritime
sector.
When the Nigerian delegation got back to Nigeria,
interested parties, unsatisfied with the decision to
use the 1913 Treaty as the legal paradigm (and
unaware that the Balewa government had long
settled this issue), approached the Foreign Minister,
Dr. Okoi Arikpo. Arikpo, a sophisticated
anthropologist and lawyer, who was himself from
South-Eastern state, asked then Attorney General
Teslim Elias for a formal legal opinion on the matter
to guide him in making recommendations to the
Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon. The Nigerian
Mission at the UN was also contacted to clarify
whether residents of the Bakassi peninsula had taken
part in the 1961 plebiscite. On September 3rd, 1970
Teslim Elias, Nigeria's Attorney General who was also
a Professor of Law at the University of Lagos and
former academician at Oxford University, wrote his
landmark legal opinion [http://www.gamji.com/
nowa43.htm]. Unambiguously, he stated "This
Ministry has given a most careful consideration to
the whole question in the light of all the available
evidence, and the conclusion is that there is no legal
basis for Nigeria’s claims to the Bakasi peninsula for
the reasons stated herein........According to the
information received from the Federal Directorate of
Surveys, the Bakasi Peninsula has never been
included as part of Nigeria in the administrative
maps of Nigeria since the then Southern Cameroons
ceased to be part of Nigeria in 1961. Also, the
Northern Region, Western Region and Eastern Region
(Definition of Boundaries) proclamation 1954 (L. N.
126 of 154) showed the Bakasi Peninsula as forming
part of the then Southern Cameroons. Moreover, by a
Diplomatic Note No, 570 of March 27, 1962, from
your ministry to the embassy of the Cameroons in
Lagos, to which was attached a map prepared by the
Federal Surveys, Nigeria recognized the Bakasi
Peninsula as forming part of the Cameroons." Arikpo
supported Elias and recommended that Gowon not
pursue the peninsula itself as an issue during
boundary meetings with Ahidjo. Gowon was advised
to focus on the maritime border - as defined by the
1913 Anglo-German Treaty - whenever he eventually
met with Ahidjo. That is what Gowon did.
Subsequently, the UN plebiscite report arrived from
New York - accompanied by a ward and polling
station map - showing villages in the peninsula as
locations of polling stations during the 1961
plebiscite. In fact a majority of residents there voted -
along with the rest of southern Cameroons - not to
join Nigeria. This political information merely
confirmed the legal views of those who felt the
matter should not be pursued. (Note that there is no
such thing as a “Bakassi Village”. Bakassi is an area.
Without a map one would not know which villages
fall where. In interpreting it, the migrant nature of
the fishing settlements should also be noted.)
UNDERSTANDING THE 1913 TREATY AS A BASIS
FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Once the Nigerian Ministry of Justice declared that
the 1913 treaty was the legal context for boundary
discussions with Cameroun, and the Ministry of
External Affairs concurred, everything else was
subordinated to that legal opinion. Therefore, I
strongly advise readers who want to understand
what transpired under Gowon, not to read this
section without first reading the 1913 Anglo-German
Treaty and reviewing a map.
[ http://coalter@sovereigngeographic.com/
images/cameroon.pdf
]
Researchers in the Boundaries section of Surveys
looking for technical guidance in interpreting the
1913 treaty searched many sources as well as
Nigeria's National Archives Libraries for material. It
turns out that then Dr. John R. Victor Prescott, now a
Professor Emeritus at the University of Melbourne in
Australia, used to be a Surveyor at Federal Surveys in
Nigeria and later a lecturer in Geography at the
University of Ibadan from 1956-61. He wrote a PhD
thesis titled "The evolution of Nigeria's political
boundaries", a copy of which was deposited at the
University of Ibadan library. Most of the original PhD
work can be found in the following book:
Prescott, J.R.V., 1971: The Evolution of Nigeria's
International & Regional Boundaries 1961-1971.
(B.C. Geog. Series No.13), Vancouver: Tantalus
Research Ltd.
He had predicted that there would be considerable
difficulty in determining the navigable channel of the
Nigeria-Cameroun maritime boundary in accordance
with the 1913 treaty.
According to a "Dictionary of Geography" published
by the Oxford University Press, the german word
"thalweg" (also written "talwec" or "talweg" refers to
"the line of the fastest flow along the course of a
river" which usually crosses and recrosses the stream
channel. From a geological point of view it refers to
"the line defining the lowest points along the length
of a river bed or valley or subterranean stream". In
other words, the deepest part of a river or channel or
lowest point of a channel section is the thalweg. The
thalweg affects the distribution of sediments in a
river because it gathers sediments from the bank on
one side and deposits them on the other side,
forming point bars where the sediments are
deposited. With time it may even change the course
of the river. These principles explain why the 1913
Treaty contain the following provisions:
"XIX. Should the thalweg of the Lower Akwayafe,
upstream from the line Bakasi Point-King Point,
change its position in such a way as to affect the
relative positions of the thalweg and the Mangrove
Islands, a new adjustment of the boundary shall be
made, on the basis of the new positions, as
determined by a map to be made for the purpose.
XX. Should the lower course of the Akwayafe so
change its mouth as to transfer it to the Rio del Rey,
it is agreed that the area now known as the Bakasi
Peninsula shall still remain German territory. The
same condition applies to any portion of territory now
agreed to as being British, which may be cut off in a
similar way."
From the foregoing it is easy to see how the
definition of a thalweg can be problematic,
particularly if there are seasonal changes in the size
of the river. During the dry season, for example,
when water volume shrinks, the residual channel
may be assymmetrically located away from the
middle of the river valley. Indeed there is a case of a
boundary river in Adamawa State which changed
course. Because the specifications of the boundary at
that point did not contain provisions for such an
eventuality (as was written into the detailed
negotiations for Bakassi peninsula), the
Camerounians hurried to plant crops on the former
riverbed to prevent it from redirecting itself. In the
case of the Nigeria-Cameroun maritime border
(based on the 1913 Treaty), the Akpa Yafe river is
east of the Calabar Estuary into which both the
Calabar and Cross rivers empty. It is a small river,
which intersects with the Calabar estuary low down
near where the estuary empties into the Gulf of
Guinea. Ordinarily, if there is only one approach
channel to the Calabar estuary and if the position of
that approach channel does not change either
seasonally or after major storms, a good way to
determine the location of the channel is on the basis
of morphology (to account for sediment shift).
However, when one is dealing with a river per se, the
thalweg or deepest continuous channel used by
vessels is typically used to determine the boundary.
A thalweg can also be used for an approach channel
if there are dangerous shoal waters on either side of
it.
When one combines the effect of three different
rivers emptying into an estuary, however, the
question of dominant flow enters the equation. The
flow channels of the dominant rivers (Calabar and
Cross) shift that of the smaller river (Akpa Yafe)
away. Thus, the true thalweg of the Akpa Yafe is very
close to the banks of the Bakassi peninsula. The
British knew this when they specified in the 1913
treaty that
"XXI. From the centre of the navigable channel
on a line joining Bakasi Point and King Point,
the boundary shall follow the centre of the
navigable channel of the Akwayafe River as far
as the 3-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction.
For the purpose of defining this boundary, the
navigable channel of the Akwayafe River shall
be considered to lie wholly to the east of the
navigable channel of the Cross and Calabar
Rivers."
In fact, as far back as 1907 the Germans had
requested for the frontier to be continued out to sea
after reaching the mouth of the Akwa Yafe, all the
way to “the middle of the channel of the mouth of
the Old Calabar River”. The British, (according to
minutes made by a colonial official by the name
Strachey) refused this request and told the Germans
the line should follow the shore of the Bakassi
peninsula along the thalweg of the Akwa Yafe when
the actual mouth of that river was reached. In
exchange for not insisting on the impingement of the
Calabar river channel the British agreed to abrogate
Article 3 of the old Anglo-German agreement of April
14, 1893 which had prevented the Germans from
establishing trading settlements on the Bakassi
peninsula proper.
For those interested, a detailed discussion of tidal
waters can be found in the book: " 'Water
boundaries' by George M.Cole (1997) John Wiley:
New York. ISBN 0-471-17929-9."
Changing Coastlines
Although it did not feature during the negotiations,
the innocuous phrases in the 1913 Treaty, which
read "XXI. From the centre of the navigable channel
on a line joining Bakasi Point and King Point, the
boundary shall follow the centre of the navigable
channel of the Akwayafe River as far as the 3-mile
limit of territorial jurisdiction." and "XXII. The 3-mile
limit shall, as regards the mouth of the estuary, be
taken as a line 3 nautical miles seaward of a line
joining Sandy Point and Tom Shot Point" can
potentially be controversial if taken out of context. As
far back as 1903, European sailors had commented
on the changing nature and position of the coastline.
The exact location of the Bakasi, King, Sandy and
Tom Shot points, therefore, were subject to change
with time. In the days before Global Positioning
System (GPS) Technology, the location of rivers and
points was based on British Admiralty maps, updated
at regular intervals. Any clarification with regard to
the original treaty, therefore, would be meaningless
if taken out of context of the original maps that
accompanied the 1913 Treaty.

On July 29, 1975 General Gowon was overthrown in a
coup. The new regime decided to question the 1971
and 1975 Gowon-Ahidjo maritime agreements –
without really understanding the issues. In no time
the country got the impression that Gowon had given
away the “Bakassi peninsula”, an unfortunate and
totally false notion which persists in many quarters
to this day. Many commentators still do not
understand the difference between the maritime and
land components of the dispute. Nor do many realize
that the peninsula had been ceded by a series of
actions and inactions beginning as far back as 1913,
reconfirmed when Nigeria became independent in
1960, finalized with the 1961 plebiscite and affirmed
with the 1964 OAU declaration. That was the
geopolitical reality when Lt. Col. Gowon came to
power in 1966.
In late 1975, some Nigerian migrant workers were
executed at the Nigerian Embassy in Malabo,
Equatorial Guinea, allegedly prompting then Head of
State General Murtala Muhammed to order planning
and preparation for an invasion and subsequent
annexation, which was eventually put off.
(International Herald Tribune, February 28, 1976)
___________
POST-SCRIPT
1976
The Nigerian National Atlas was first published, again
showing the Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun - as all
maps since 1961 had shown. The forward was
written and signed by then Lt. General Obasanjo,
then Head of State, who succeeded General
Muhammed after the coup of February 1976
1978
Late Chief R. O. Coker (of the Coker-Ngo Line) retired
from the civil service in 1978. He was the recipient of
a National Award from the Obasanjo-1 government in
1979 for meritorious service.
1979
The 1979 constitution made no mention of a
“Bakassi Local Government.” In any case local
governments as listed in the present 1999
constitution do not have their borders defined by
standard coordinates. They are merely listed.
In his book “Diplomatic Soldiering, Spectrum Books,
1987” which discusses the conduct of Nigerian
foreign Policy from 1975 – 79, late General Joe Garba,
then the Foreign Minister, describes several incidents
of “rough handling of Nigerians in the small fishing
villages along the porous borders. The discovery of
offshore oil in the area of Rio del Rey only
compounded our problems.” Garba wrote:
“…….we resisted the temptation to use force.” I was
convinced that Nigeria’s African policies would be
seriously damaged if we took any retaliatory action
against border violations by either Cameroun or
Chad. Quiet bilateral diplomacy was the best course
with essentially local problems that were bound to
keep recurring.” (page 44)
New Calabar Channel
The Shagari government which came to office in
October 1979, also refused to recognize the “Coker-
Ngo” line. However, the Nigerian Ports Authority,
oblivious to the sensitive nature of the Calabar
channel controversy and its effect on the definition of
Nigeria's maritime border, had begun dredging a
new channel further west of the one in place at the
time of the 1913 treaty. They placed a new line of
buoys nearer the Nigerian side sometime between
1976 and 1982. The old channel is, therefore, no
longer shown on the admiralty chart No. 3433 in the
1978 and 1982 editions. Those unfamiliar with the
history of the Cross-Calabar-Akwa Yafe river channel
controversy may thus be lulled into underestimating
the error of the 3-mile compromise line of 1971 and
its Coker-Ngo extension particularly if they use the
new channel as the frame of reference.
Fortunately, the 1913 Treaty states:
“XXIII. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent
British or German vessels, whether public or
private, from using the most convenient
course between the open sea and the
Akwayafe River, and from navigating that river
without any differential treatment whatever.”
XXIV. The marking, dredging, or buoying of the
navigable channel of the Akwayafe River from
the 3-mile limit landward may be carried out,
after agreement between the two
Governments, either by the German or British
Government, or by both.
XXV. The marking, dredging, or buoying of the
navigable channels of the Cross and Calabar
Rivers from the 3-mile limit landward shall be
carried out by the British Government at the
discretion of that Government. "
Thus, since the new channel on Cross/Calabar River
is man-made, it does not preclude the use of the
disused channel for purposes of negotiation
1981
On May 16, 1981 Nigerian soldiers in three canoes
were ambushed and killed by Camerounian soldiers
[Shehu Shagari: Beckoned to Serve", Heinemann
2001, page 358]. Nigeria said the incident took place
on the Akpa Yafe (along the 1913 border) while
Cameroun said it took place on the Rio del Rey deep
inside Cameroun on the other side of the peninsula.
Eventually, on July 20, 1981, Cameroun apologized,
based presumably on the Nigerian insistence that it’s
soldiers were on the Akpa Yafe (although there are
some who still feel to this day they were actually on
the Rio-del-Rey). Nigeria did not press the case then
that even if the soldiers had been killed along the
Rio-del-Rey, Cameroun still owed an apology, thus
signalling that the Shagari government – at least
subconsciously – recognized the 1913 Treaty as all
previous governments had done. Treaty
considerations aside, African countries ought to avoid
unnecessary bloodshed over frivolous borders drawn
by white men.
1982
On May 12, 1982 Professor Geoffrey Marston, LLB,
LLM, Ph.D., of Cambridge University, submitted a
detailed report commissioned by Nigeria, to then
Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Chief ROA
Akinjide representing the government of President
Shehu Shagari. The Professor advised that:
"The boundary regime established by the Anglo-
German Agreements of 13 March 1913 and 6 July
1914 is binding on both Nigeria and Cameroun by
virtue of a rule of customary international law
reflected in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in respect of Treaties, 1978, as
well as in the Declaration of the Organization of
African Unity of July 1964 and, in respect of Nigeria,
the Exchange of Notes with the United Kingdom of 1
October 1960. This regime cannot thus be abrogated
or modified unilaterally by either Nigeria or
Cameroun."
This point of view was in line with the opinion of
Teslim Elias back in 1970. No decisive action – except
co-locating Nigerian Oil rigs in the area and freely
navigating the approaches to AkpaYafe - appears to
have been taken on the maritime aspects of the
report until the government left office in December
1983. Such actions could have included any one of
the following options, singly or in combination:
(a) Accept the 1975 Gowon/Ahidjo boundary line
because of the benefits of its vector.
(b) Insist, backed by force, on the boundary line
being moved at least to the longitude of Point 12 on
chart 3433 in order to be totally clear of the
traditional channel of Cross/ Calabar Rivers. The
implication of this would have been to accept part
(but not all) of the Gowon/Ahidjo Agreement. Nigeria
should have declared its intention to dredge the old
channel in accordance with Articles 21 and 25 of the
1913 Treaty.
(c) Reject the Gowon/Ahidjo Agreement altogether
from Bakasi Point/King Point and insist on fresh
negotiations as a matter of urgency. For this option
to have any meaning Nigeria would have had to show
physical presence in the area.
(d) Move into the maritime area south of Point 20 to
prevent Cameroun from taking the initiative in oil
exploration and exploitation in the area.
(e) Delineate a zone of interest in the Exclusive
Economic Zone vis-à-vis Camerouns, Equatorial
Guinea and Sao Tome Principe.
(f) Realising that Cameroun is normally
uncompromising in negotiations, Nigeria should take
a decisive stand in the area, considering its strategic
and economic importance.
Instead, however, according to former President
Shagari,
“Henceforth, relations between our two countries
grew from strength to strength while the border
dispute was carefully buried in files, maps and legal
documents.”
It is possible that the departure from office in
November 1982 of Cameroun President Ahidjo,
allegedly after being tricked by his physician about
the state of his health, could have contributed to this
“improvement” in Nigeria-Cameroun relations. He
eventually died in exile in November 1989. However,
the evil day was only being postponed and the
Nigerian public grew increasingly misinformed about
the details of the dispute, confusing the maritime
aspects with the land aspect.
Indeed, the former President observed in his
memoirs that minor border incidents occurred with
other countries neighboring Nigeria. Shagari wrote:
“……What complicated the Cameroonian case,
however, was that many Nigerians reside in
Cameroonian territory where they spend part of their
lives to fish or farm. While there in search of
livelihood, they often criss-cross the boundaries. Also
fishermen and traders did not bother about the
actual position of the borders, while in the territorial
waters of each of the two countries, until they were
advised or confronted as the case may be.”
It would seem therefore, that at least as far as the
land border is concerned, President Shagari and the
Nigerian government had no illusions about the
location (i.e. per the 1913 Treaty). The problem
seemed to be caused by those local villagers who did
not know where the borderlines really were.

Jaidey-one:
Your hatred for Awolowo has beclouded your sense of reasoning. So it was Awo that ceded bakassi to Cameroun? Keep exhibiting your folly

It was AWO that directed the civil policy during the war and Yes I have no love lost for a hypocrite tribalist who enriched himself through corrupt means. Once again you yoruba people can only think within the tribalism sphere, Tinibu is out formenting hate and xenophobia at his own benefit but you would rather blame others for your woes. I wonder why your people have not yet decided to opt out of Nigeria, you parasitic cowards!

lol
Igbo people and their obsession with foreigner's land. They are fighting yorubas for lagos. fighting hausas for abuja, fighting ijaws for port-harcourt, fighting cameroonians for bakassi (calabar), fighting ...shall I continue?

The country of Benin to the west of Nigeria has a huge yoruba population. Infact, their capital city is literally a yoruba city yet you don't see yorubas claiming right to Benin land. Rather, we celebrate the commonality between us as kins. we celebrate PEOPLE not land/boundaries. lol culture triumphs political boundary anyday. But we all know the igbos are just looking for financial opportunity or gain (any surprise?) rather than genuine care for their "kins" in Cameroon.

besides, why do you care if bakassi is under Nigeria or Cameroon? What is the difference to you? Aren't you supposed to be anti-nigeria? and shouldn't you actually be happy? rotfl the entire igboland will be given to cameroon if you are not careful.
i pity the poor calabar folks that have to deal with you Igbos. I wonder how all of a sudden, calabars have become Igbos all because of land greed. hahaha

Former Minister of Information, Dr Walter Ofonagoro, has said that the former Head of State, Gen.Yakubu Gowon, ceded Bakassi Peninsula, which truly belonged to the present day cross River State of Nigeria, during the civil war, so as to block arms and food from entering Biafra.
Making this revelation in a key note address delivered at the Igbo Day Celebration which held in Lagos on Saturday, he said, “General Yakubu Gowon ceded the oil-rich region to Cameroon to stop food from coming into the defunct Republic of Biafra.”
The former minister said when Nigeria Army discovered that it would notbe possible to defeat Biafran soldiers with arms, they opted for economic blockade of the old Eastern Nigeria.
He said when they discovered that food and arms were still coming into Biafra through Bakassi, Gowon decided to cede the region to Cameroon so that the blockade would be effective.
His words: “I want to say that Bakassi Peninsula belonged to the people of the old eastern region. But during the war, the Nigerian soldiers discovered that Biafran soldiers were their match so they opted for economic blockade of the region. It was in the processthat Gowon went into negotiation with the president of Cameroon and ceded the oil rich region to them so that the blockade would be effective. We all know what happened, though some people are now feigning ignorance.”
On the Major Chukwuma Nzogwu Coup of January 15,1966, he said that the purpose of the coup was to revolutionise Nigeria.
He said that calling the coupan Igbo coup was wrong since Igbos were controlling over 75 percent of the government in the First Republic.
According to him, the purpose of the coup was to bring dynamism into the government of Nigeria in line with Ghana and other African nations that were already attracting international respect.
http://thenationonlineng.net/new/news/how-gowon-blocked-arms-food-from-entering-biafra-ofonagoro/

Area4Area stop fighting Andrez123 and help yourself out with this wonderful article.
We deal on facts and figures on like you nigger-arean propagandists.

we know what happen.