Since carrying out its first
attack under Abubakar
Shekau’s leadership in
September 2010, Boko
Haram has unleashed a
wave of violence in
northern Nigeria, mostly
targeted against
government personnel
and security
officers, Muslim politicians
and traditional Muslim
religious leaders, and
Christians. [1]
Although the insurgency
began as a
local movement in
northeastern Nigeria’s
Borno State, since August
2011 there have been
increasing signs of
international collaboration
between Boko Haram and
militants outside Nigerian
territory, such as in Borno
State’s border region,
northern Mali, the Sahel,
Somalia
and other countries in the
Muslim world.
As a result of these
international
connections, Boko Haram,
which in 2009 was
known as a “machete-
wielding mob,” has now
matched—and even
exceeded—the capabilities
of some al- Qa`ida
affiliates, while also
incorporating
al-Qa`ida ideology into the
locally driven motives for
the insurgency in
northern Nigeria. This
article examines Boko
Haram’s international
connections and their
impact on the insurgency
in northern Nigeria.

Boko Haram in Mali
In November 2012, the
Movement for Unity and
Jihad in West Africa
(MUJAO)and al-Qa`ida in
the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) captured Menaka
in Mali’s Gao region from
the secular Tuareg-led
militia, the National
Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA). An MNLA
spokesman said that
MUJAO, AQIM and Boko
Haram prevented the local
population from leaving
the city so that they could
be used as human
shields.
Several sources
corroborate the
spokesman’s claim that
Boko Haram fighters are
present in Mali. First, news
reports from Mali said that
100 Boko Haram militants
reinforced MUJAO’s
positions in the battle for
Gao and that Boko Haram
helped MUJAO raid the
Algerian consulate in Gao
and kidnap the vice-
consul, who was
executed by MUJAO on
September 2, 2012, and
that Boko Haram
supported MUJAO, AQIM
and Ansar Eddine in their
January 8, 2013 attack on
Kona, central Mopti
region.
Second, displaced
persons from Gao,
including a former
parliamentarian, said that
Boko Haram is training at
MUJAO-run
camps.
Third, military officials
from Niger said that Boko
Haram militants are
transiting Niger en route
to Mali on a daily basis.
Fourth, a MUJAO
commander said in an
interview with a Beninese
journalist for Radio France
Internationale that Boko
Haram members were
arriving in Gao en masse.
Fifth,U.S. Africa
Command General Carter
Ham, who in January 2012
said Boko Haram has links
to AQIM and al-Shabab,
said in November that
Boko Haram militants train
in camps in northern Mali
and most
likely receive financing and
explosives from AQIM.
In addition, the
U.S.ambassador to
Nigeria, Nigerian minister
of foreign affairs, Nigerien
foreign minister, Malian
foreign minister and
Algerian minister for
Maghreb and African
affairs report that Boko
Haram and AQIM are
coordinating operations in
northern Mali.
A Boko Haram video
released on
November 29, 2012,
suggested that Boko
Haram leader Abubakar
Shekau may be one of the
Boko Haram militants in
northern Mali. The video
emerged only one month
after a Nigerian media
source reported that
Nigerian President
Goodluck Jonathan
discussed Shekau
coordinating attacks in
northern Nigeria from
northern Mali during the
president’s October 17
visit to Niamey and
October 19
visit to Bamako.
In contrast to Shekau’s
first five video statements
of 2012, the November 29
video is the first to show
Shekau not seated in a
room
wearing traditional Islamic
dress, but wearing green
camouflaged military
fatigues and training in a
desert with heavily armed
and veiled militants. He
did not speak in Hausa,
the predominant language
of northern Nigeria, but
spoke
entirely in Arabic, and he
praised the “brothers and
shaykhs in the Islamic
Maghreb” and “soldiers of
the Islamic State of Mali.”
The video was also not
disseminated via YouTube
like the
previous five videos, but
posted on a jihadist online
forum. In the video,
Shekau appealed to al-
Qa`ida by paying homage
to “martyred” leaders
such as Usama bin Ladin,
Abu Yahya al-Libi and Abu
Mus`ab al-Zarqawi. He
recited five of the ten
suras in the Qur’an that
are most commonly
quoted by al-Qa`ida, and
he called the United
States,the United
Kingdom, Nigeria and
Israel “crusaders” and
warned them that “jihad
has begun.”
Even if Shekau is not in
Mali, it is unlikely that he is
still in Nigeria. In contrast
to Mali’s and Niger’s vast
desert regions,where
AQIM has hosted training
camps since the
mid-2000s that Boko
Haram members have
attended, northeastern
Nigeria’s desert is not
known to have terrorist
training camps and is not
particularly remote or
uninhabited.
Shekau and the other
militants would have also
placed themselves at
unprecedented risk to
train in broad daylight, as
seen on the video, in
Nigeria only days after
Abuja announced a $
320,000 reward for
information leading
to Shekau’s capture and
lesser rewards for 18
Boko Haram Shura
Committee members.
Boko Haram militants
could have joined the
insurgency in northern
Mali in alliance with
MUJAO and AQIM, and
Abubakar Shekau and his
commanders may have
found refuge in northern
Mali or Niger to
escape the Nigerian
security forces crackdown
on Boko Haram in
northeastern Nigeria. The
crackdown led to the
capture or killing of more
than 10 commanders
since September 2012, as
well as Shekau’s
spokesman, one of his
wives and his daughter.

Shekau and other
commanders are likely
coming into greater
contact with AQIM and
therefore
attempting to steer Boko
Haram’s
ideology closer to al-
Qa`ida.
Borno’s Border Region
While some Boko Haram
members have come
from the parts of Niger,
Chad and Cameroon that
border Borno State and
where the three main
languages of Borno —
Hausa, Kanuri and Arabic
—are spoken,few
members are reported to
have come from outside
of those three countries or
Nigeria.
According to one of Boko
Haram founder
Muhammad Yusuf’s
relatives, 40% of Boko
Haram’s funding comes
from outside of Nigeria,
and as many as one-third
of its members fled
Nigeria following major
clashes with the
government in July 2009.
The architect of those
clashes was a
Nigerien, Abubakar
Kilakam. While
Kilakam was arrested and
deported to Niger, several
other Nigerien Boko
Haram leaders are still in
Nigeria, including Ali
Jalingo, who
masterminded bombings
in Borno State and
escaped an attempt to
capture him in Benue
State on January 7,2013.
Other Boko Haram leaders
are
reportedly still hiding in
Diffa,Niger, and Boko
Haram cells were
uncovered in Zinder,
Niger in September 2012
and Diffa in December
2011 and February
2012.Similarly, in 2012,
Boko Haram
members have been
reported in several
primarily Baggara Arabic-
speaking cities of Far
North Province,
Cameroon,including
Fotokol, Kousseri, Mora
and the border town of
Banki-Amchide, where on
December 19, 2012,
Cameroonian security
forces arrested 31
suspected Boko Haram
members, including two
Nigeriens, and confirmed
that a Boko Haram
logistics network facilitates
“trans-border operations”
and that Boko Haram uses
the border area to
“regroup after attacks in
Nigeria, preparing for the
next
attacks.”
Cameroon’s similar
characteristics to Nigeria,
such as a relatively poor
majority Muslim north,
which has seen trade
reduced because of
Boko Haram attacks on
border markets and
stricter border
monitoring, and a
wealthier majority
Christian south, also make
it an ideal recruiting
ground for the
group.
In terms of geography,
Niger’s vast desert
provides an ideal training
ground and refuge for
Boko Haram, while the
Mandara Mountains along
the Nigeria-Cameroon
border, where state
authority
is weak and smuggling is
pervasive, provides an
ideal supply route, hideout
and staging ground. The
recent upsurge in Boko
Haram attacks in rural
towns at the foothills of
the Mandara Mountains in
Adamawa State, where in
2004
Muhammad Yusuf’s
followers had their first
major battles with the
Nigerian security forces,
support the claims made
by high-level Nigerian and
Cameroonian officials that
Boko Haram is operating
from bases in Cameroon.
Some of these attacks
include: a December 13,
2012, burning of a police
station in Madagali, five
miles from the border; a
December 28 night raid
on a prison,customs
office, education
administration
complex and Divisional
Police
Headquarters in Maiha,
three miles from the
border, which killed 21
people, and a separate
attack on Fufore, five
miles from the border; a
December 31 attack on the
Divisional Police
Headquarters in Hong, 25
miles from the border;
and a January 3,2013,
attack involving rocket-
propelled grenades fired at
government buildings and
a police station in Song,
20 miles from the border.

Boko Haram takes
advantage of Niger,Chad
and Cameroon for refuge,
training,transit, attack
planning and recruitment.
Boko Haram does not,
however, carry out
attacks in those countries,
possibly to prevent those
governments from
cracking down on the
group and because Boko
Haram’s grievances are
rooted in Nigeria.
The porosity of the border
region is one reason why
the first Boko Haram base
called “Afghanistan” in
2003 was situated only
two miles from Nigeria’s
border with Niger.
As reports of Boko Haram
in Niger
and Cameroon have
shown, the border region
still serves similar
purposes for Boko Haram
as it did in 2003.
Boko Haram Diplomacy in
Saudi Arabia and Senegal
Boko Haram appears to
have a
“diplomatic” presence in
Saudi Arabia, in addition
to other militant
connections. In August
2012, a Boko Haram
faction led by
Abu Muhammed
negotiated in Mecca with a
Nigerian government
team led by National
Security Adviser Sambo
Dasuki and advised by
General Muhammed
Shuwa. President
Jonathan has rejected
new talks with this
faction,however, on the
grounds that “there can
be no dialogue” with Boko
Haram because it is
“faceless.”
Abu Muhammed’s
proposed negotiating
team included,among
others, the Cameroonian
Mamman
Nur, who lost a power
struggle with
Shekau to lead what
became the main Boko
Haram faction after
Muhammad Yusuf’s death
in July 2009.
Therefore,Abu
Muhammed’s claim to
represent Shekau’s faction
is likely false, and Shekau’s
spokesman called Abu
Muhammed a “fake” in
August 2012.
Boko Haram also has a
deeper history of
involvement in Saudi
Arabia: Muhammad Yusuf
found refuge in Saudi
Arabia to escape a
Nigerian security forces
crackdown in 2004;Boko
Haram has reportedly
received funding with the
help of AQIM from
organizations in the United
Kingdom and Saudi
Arabia; and Boko Haram’s
spokesman claimed that
Boko Haram leaders met
with al-Qa`ida in Saudi
Arabia during the lesser
hajj (umra) in August
2011.
More recently, the leader
of a Boko Haram cell that
was responsible for the
November 25, 2012,attack
on a church inside a
military barracks in Jaji,
Kaduna, was in Saudi
Arabia during the months
prior to the attack.

Boko Haram may also
have had dialogue with
the Nigerian government
in Senegal, where in
August 2012 the imam of
the Grand Mosque in
Bignona, southern
Senegal, claimed that
Boko Haram was
recruiting local youths.
In December 2012,
Nigerian media reported
that President Jonathan’s
adviser and minister of
Niger Delta affairs,
Godsday Orubebe, held
secret negotiations with
Boko Haram
commanders in Senegal
arranged by the Malian
and Senegalese secret
services.
Based on Orubebe’s
credentials as
the “author” of the
government’s arms-for-
amnesty peace program
with Niger Delta militants
in 2009, he may have
discussed the release of
Boko Haram members
from prison and
“compensation” for the
destruction of mosques
and Boko Haram
members’homes, which
are demands shared by all
Boko Haram factions.
Impact on Northern
Nigeria
Emulating the Taliban
Boko Haram has long
drawn inspiration from
the Taliban and was called
the “Nigerian Taliban” by
outsiders from 2003 until
2009. Some Boko Haram
members have reportedly
trained in Afghanistan,
and in northern Nigeria
Boko Haram appears to
have adopted tactics
similar to the Taliban.
For example, in the
second half of 2012, Boko
Haram systematically
destroyed hundreds of
telecom towers, causing
millions of dollars of
damages and preventing
the security forces from
tracking down its
members; used text
messages to coerce
government officials
against obstructing Boko
Haram operations and
warned civilians against
cooperating with the
government;extorted
“taxes” from merchants
with the threat of death to
the family members of
anyone who does not
pay; and employed
complex Haqqani-style
attacks with multiple
suicide bombers.
President Jonathan said
suicide bombings were
“completely alien” to
Nigeria after Nigerian
Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab attempted
to detonate explosives in
his
undergarments on a
Detroit-bound
airliner on behalf of al-
Qa`ida in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
in 2009. On June 16, 2011,
however, one day after
Boko Haram warned that
its members arrived from
Somalia “where they
received real training on
warfare,” Boko Haram
carried out its first suicide
car bombing at the
Federal Police
Headquarters in Abuja,
and then in August 2011
the Somali-trained
Mamman Nur
masterminded another
suicide car bombing at the
UN Headquarters in
Abuja.
After more than 30 Boko
Haram suicide attacks in
2012, it is now
fathomable that Boko
Haram could employ
female suicide bombers, a
tactic which the Taliban
have employed in
Afghanistan since June
2010.
As a sign of Boko Haram’s
desire to hold territory,
the group has also planted
flags with its logo in its
desired future capital of
Damatru, Yobe State, and
mobilized 500 supporters
in the streets of Damatru
in December 2011 as a
show of force after the
commissioner of police
said there were no Boko
Haram members in
the state.

Weapons Procurement
Boko Haram has procured
weapons from abroad,
which was described as a
“worrisome
development” by the
Nigerian chief
superintendent of police in
August 2012. Such
weapons include rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs)
with a 900 meter range
for attacking hardened
targets from long
distances and
improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) for
ambushing military and
police convoys. There is
also concern that Boko
Haram could use Libyan-
made man- portable air-
defense systems
(MANPADS)to shoot
down commercial airlines
flying into Niger, Chad and
Nigeria—a tactic
employed in 2002 by an
al-Qa`ida-linked Somali
terrorist cell on a
Mombasa-borne Israeli El
Al airlines flight.
The threat of a Boko
Haram attack on aviation
prompted Nigeria to place
all airports in the country
on 24-hour security
surveillance during the
Christmas holiday
in December 2012.
The weapons in Boko
Haram’s “upgrade” often
enter the country through
illegal or unmanned
border crossings and
sometimes with the
collaboration of
immigration officials. Boko
Haram attacks on border
posts, such as a 50-man
attack at Gamboru-Ngala
on the Nigerian side of the
border with Cameroon on
December 2, 2012, are
often
intended as a diversion to
smuggle
weapons through other
border areas.
Target Selection
Boko Haram’s target
selection has also been
influenced by its
interaction with militants
abroad. The Cameroonian
Mamman Nur, who is
wanted by Interpol and
the Federal Bureau of
Investigation
for masterminding the
August 26, 2011, bombing
of the UN Headquarters in
Abuja, reportedly fled to
Chad and then traveled to
Somalia to receive
explosives
training from al-Shabab
before returning to Nigeria
in the weeks before the
attack.
The UN attack remains the
only time Boko Haram
has targeted an
international institution
and was similar to al-
Qa`ida’s attack on the UN
building in Baghdad in
2003 and AQIM’s attack
on the UN building in
Algiers in 2007.
In 2012, the group also
showed a new focus on
foreigners. A British and
Italian hostage were killed
in Sokoto in March; a
German hostage was
killed in Kano in June; a
French hostage was
kidnapped in Katsina in
December; and a number
of Chinese and Indians
were killed in Borno in late
2012.
Transnational Ideology
As seen in Shekau’s
November 29 video
statement, interaction with
Islamist militias has likely
caused a shift in Shekau’s
messaging, which now
resembles al-Qa`ida’s. The
Boko Haram faction
Ansaru has also
embraced an ideology
similar to MUJAO as well
as the primary tactic of
MUJAO and
AQIM:kidnapping
foreigners.
Ansaru was placed on the
UK Proscribed Terror List
on November 23, 2012,
for kidnapping and killing
a British and Italian
hostage in March 2012
while operating under the
name “al-Qa`ida in the
Lands Beyond the Sahel.”
On December 24, 2012,
Ansaru also claimed the
kidnapping of a French
engineer in Katsina 30
miles from the Nigerien
border and said it would
continue attacking the
French government and
French citizens until
France ends its ban on the
Islamic veil and its “major
role in the planned attack
on the Islamic state in
northern Mali,”
which is virtually the
same warning that
MUJAO’s and AQIM’s
leaders have issued to
France.
According to the United
Kingdom, Ansaru is “anti-
Western” and
“broadly aligned” to al-
Qa`ida, while in its own
words Ansaru says it
wants to restore the
“dignity of Usman dan
Fodio.” Similarly, MUJAO
proclaimed at the time of
its founding in December
2011 that it wants to
spread jihad in West
Africa and that its
members are
“ideological descendants”
of Usman dan
Fodio.MUJAO and Boko
Haram have also both
threatened to attack the
West when their
capabilities enable them to
do so.

Conclusion
At a time when even al-
Qa`ida is
questioning its own
brand, militant
groups need not have
formal affiliation with al-
Qa`ida to have an
international agenda. Boko
Haram’s connections to
militants in northern Mali,
the Sahel and elsewhere in
the Muslim world enable it
to receive and provide
support to other Islamist
militias.
As a result, Boko Haram
will be capable of
surviving outside of its
main base of operations in
Borno State if the Nigerian
security forces drive out
key leaders from Nigeria
such as Abubakar
Shekau.Moreover, Boko
Haram has been
able to draw on al-
Qa`ida’s ideology and take
advantage of anti-
government and anti-
Western sentiment in
northern Nigeria to justify
its existence and recruit
new members from
Nigeria and Borno’s
border region.
As evidenced by the
collapse of the Malian state
when Tuareg fighters
based in Libya returned to
“Azawad” after the fall of
the
Mu`ammar Qadhafi
regime, the transfer of
Boko Haram fighters from
Nigeria to other countries
in the Sahel does not bode
well for the region. It
means Nigeria’s problem
will become another
country’s problem, such
as Mali, Cameroon or
Niger, or smaller countries
like Guinea,Burkina Faso
and Senegal.
Like northern Nigeria,
these countries have
majority Muslim
populations, artificial
borders,
ethnic conflicts, insufficient
educational and career
opportunities for youths
and fragile democratic
institutions, and they have
all witnessed Islamist
militant infiltration in their
countries and their
countrymen traveling to
northern Mali to
join the Islamist militias in
2012.
Although the ethnic
groups in some of these
countries differ from
northern Nigeria, Boko
Haram and Ansaru have
the potential to inspire
other “Boko Harams” in
West Africa with their
ideologies that fault the
secular government,
democracy and the West
for their troubles and hark
back to a time when
Usman dan Fodio and the
Islamic caliphate brought
“glory”
and “dignity” to the
Muslims of the region.

Madawaki IBN imam shekau

Lol