Jarle Simensen, Professor
Emeritus, Department of
archaeology, conservation and
history, University of Oslo
The decolonisation of Africa in the
1960s was a watershed experience
for the generation that watched a
whole continent open up; it spurred
widespread engagement and
intellectual curiosity. Partner
countries south of the Sahara
became the focus of Norway’s
recently established development
aid, and today more than half of
Norway’s bilateral assistance still
goes to countries in Africa. Even so,
the continent has become
marginalised in the public debate.
This is probably partly due to
disappointment over Africa’s lack of
development, reinforced by the
one-sided, negative picture painted
by the media. At the same time, an
intellectual curiosity persists;
underdevelopment is just as
interesting as success. The need for
a robust Africa policy is greater than
ever.
Internal causes of
underdevelopment
A historical perspective is essential
in order to understand why African
countries have failed to take part in
the international economic
development we have seen in this
era of globalisation. But a
reservation is necessary in the
context of this article: we must bear
in mind that we are employing one
specific standard, namely economic
growth, which is different from
painting a full and balanced picture
of the continent’s history and
culture. Most of the issues dealt
with here are the subject of
considerable debate, but a fuller
account of them is beyond the scope
of an article of this kind. I will focus
on sub-Saharan Africa, but I will not
go into the specific situation of the
Republic of South Africa in any
detail.
Geographical and demographic
conditions are key factors in Africa’s
development, as is confirmed by
many of today’s crises. The
agricultural revolution and the use
of iron tools came to sub-Saharan
Africa later than to other parts of
the world; indeed some have talked
of a “1000-year lag”. The continent
as a whole is inhospitable for
agriculture. It is also home to a
number of indigenous diseases that
afflict both humans and animals.
For example, the disease-carrying
tsetse fly, which is found all over the
continent and can incapacitate
draught animals, may itself explain
the traditional low use of ploughs
and other animal-drawn
implements.
Africa’s demographic history has
been characterised by low density of
population and continuous
migration and settlement of new
areas. This has continued right up to
the present day, and there is still
more migration on this continent –
including migration between urban
and rural areas – than anywhere
else in the world. There have been
few tightly-knit, stable settlements
with established social structures
that could form the basis for
enduring states and empires of the
kind that have fostered advanced
civilisations in other parts of the
world. This does not mean that
African history has been devoid of
political dynamism. The medieval
kingdoms by the Niger River, the
Ethiopian Empire, and the
progressive kingdoms in West Africa
in the 19th century testify to the
contrary. Nevertheless, monumental
stone constructions and local written
traditions like those found in
advanced cultures elsewhere in the
world are lacking in Africa.
An important reason for the
continent’s technological
underdevelopment is the
geographical obstacles to
communication both internally and
with the rest of the world. The
Sahara has been a barrier in the
north, and the Atlantic coast had no
contact with the rest of the world
until the first Europeans arrived
around 1500. Influence from the
Arab world and India came mainly
via the Nile Valley and the East
African coast, and had little spillover
effect further inland. With the
exception of the Niger and the Nile,
the continent’s rivers with their large
waterfalls have not provided a
navigable route to the interior, in
contrast to the rivers of Europe and
Asia. The problems of today’s land-
locked states illustrate the great
importance of communication for
economic and cultural development.
Lack of political stability accounts for
many of the development problems
in post-colonial Africa, and has deep
historical roots. The ethnic diversity
of the continent is extraordinary;
linguists have identified around 900
separate language groups. Nation-
building in Africa’s independent
states has thus been particularly
difficult. National endeavours have
been hampered by internal conflicts
and civil wars, and at worst a form
of anarchy, as seen in the Congo.
The forces behind these conflicts are
often complex. But once the parties
have resorted to violence, we see in
Africa, just as in the Balkans and the
Caucasus, that ethnicity overrides
all other forms of loyalty with a
ferocity that defies belief, but is
easier to understand if we bear in
mind the role that nationalism has
played in European history. Shrewd
and ambitious politicians are aware
of this, and know how to take
advantage of the “tribal instinct” for
all it is worth.

Slave trade and colonialism
Can the slave trade and colonialism
be regarded as a cause of
underdevelopment in Africa today?
Africa’s integration into the world
market following 1500 – during what
we may term the “protoglobalisation
era” – took on a perverted form
when slaves became the dominant
merchandise from around 1650. The
cruelties of this trade have left deep
scars in both the African and the
European psyche. The export of an
estimated 12 million people across
the Atlantic, and possibly a similar
number to the Arab world in the
course of a full millennium may
have been a factor in Africa’s lower
population growth compared with
that of other continents. In
economic terms, the slave trade
tended to overshadow trade in
other goods, and although it
enabled certain strong kingdoms to
increase their power, it was
devastating for the groups affected
by the kidnappings and conflicts
that the trade entailed. In political
terms, the rulers who controlled the
trade on the African side were
caught up in a particular form of
dependence that had profound
effects on African political culture.
At the same time, African labour
played a key role in building up the
“Atlantic system”, and was thus a
decisive factor in American and
European (including Norway’s)
development. Here the foundations
were laid for a closely knit web of
development and
underdevelopment. The present day
African claims for reparation are
understandable. But slavery was
also widely practised in African
societies, and it was African leaders
and intermediaries who brought
almost all of the slaves to the coast.
African historians have long sought
to put the record straight on this
chapter of the continent’s history.
Colonial rule can be regarded as the
next phase of Africa’s integration
into the international system.
European policies varied
considerably between regions and
over time, from a brutal period of
conquest at the end of the 19th
century to active development
efforts following the Second World
War. The main achievement of
colonial rule was state-building.
However, this involved imposing the
European system of competing
nation states onto the continent
through a process of conquest that
was largely motivated by European
strategic interests. The result was a
political map that is economically
irrational and dysfunctional. Basil
Davidson sums up this state of
affairs in the title of one of his
books: The Black Man’s Burden:
Africa and the Curse of the Nation
State . One of the most important
tasks today is to offset and
overcome the limitations of the
nation state through the
development of regional and
continental bodies based on the
European model.
The colonial powers developed
modern export systems,
infrastructure and education
facilities that were necessary to
make the whole colonisation
venture profitable. And indeed, it is
difficult to envisage any other way
in which Africa could have become
integrated into the world market so
rapidly. Various counterfactual
development scenarios have of
course been discussed, and there is
an ongoing debate on how realistic
they are. Nevertheless, the colonial
system can be criticised on several
points: for its extreme use of
violence during the first phase (for
example in southern Africa, where
land was confiscated and Africans
subjected to forced labour); for
taking a disproportionate share of
the value created; and for failing to
use state power to promote broader
development until after the Second
World War (particularly regarding
higher education).
However, the connection between
colonisation and underdevelopment
is not straightforward. Independent
Ethiopia came at the bottom of all
tables of development statistics at
the time colonisation was coming to
an end in the rest of Africa, and
most of the successful newly
industrialised countries in South
East Asia are also former colonies.
Cultivating a victim image will not
lead to a productive development
strategy.
Post-colonial problems
Why were the post-colonial African
states unable to keep up with
international economic growth in
the way that countries in Asia did?
The first answer is that, due to the
factors described above, Africa was
at a lower general development
level at the time of independence.
The colonial economy had not
penetrated so deeply into African
society as it had in the Asian
countries that had been under
European and Japanese rule.
Decolonisation in Africa was
primarily triggered by international
factors, and most territories were
unprepared as regards internal
development. Moreover, apart from
the European minorities in the
southern part of the continent,
Africa lacked strong, enterprising
minority groups with transnational
networks of the type formed by the
Chinese in South Asian countries.
Indians in Africa were discriminated
against both under the apartheid
regime in South Africa and under
the Africanisation policy in East
Africa.
But the main reason for the weak
development of African countries
after independence is the failure of
the state. The “development state”,
based on a state-controlled
economy with a high level of
protectionism took on a particular
and unfortunate form in Africa. In
reality, these countries became
what Frederick Cooper has called
“gatekeeper states” – states that
acquired most of their revenue from
customs duties, concessions to
foreign companies, visas, foreign
exchange control, and foreign aid.
In many ways, this built upon the
legacy of the colonial period and the
slave trade. It led to a particularly
fierce political competition for
control of the state apparatus, and
authoritarian regimes – both
military and civilian under various
ideological banners – became the
order of the day in African countries
from the end of the 1960s.
Development was not necessarily
the primary objective of these
regimes; their first priority was to
tighten political control, control the
flow of resources and develop
personal networks rather than
building well-functioning public
institutions. The number of
government employees escalated as
a result.
In many ways, this form of
governance, referred to in the
literature as “patrimonial rule” or
“personal rule”, reflects traditional
African political culture. Here the
key unit was – and is – the extended
family. It alone could provide
security in a state without welfare
benefits; and it was unavoidable
that family interests would clash
with bureaucratic efficiency. The
same can be said of ethnic loyalties.
This legacy was clearly an obstacle
to the development of efficient
modern institutions and enterprises.
Other factors preventing efficiency
were a lack of time discipline and a
concept of maintenance. Nobel
Laureate Gunnar Myrdal concluded
in his major development study,
Asian Drama, that institutions and
attitudes are the most important
factors in economic progress; this is
extensively illustrated in Africa.
To what extent has the crisis of
African development states been
caused by external factors? On the
one hand, the new system of
international development aid after
the Second World War provided
significant advantages; never before
had newly independent states
begun their existence with access to
so much development assistance, in
some cases amounting to from 30 to
50 per cent of the national budget.
This aid played a decisive part in
the development that really did take
place in the health and education
sectors, but it also helped to
consolidate the regimes in power at
the time. Nearly 30 donor countries
– with little coordination of efforts
and at times in intense competition
with each other – sparked off a new
“Scramble for Africa” that was again
irrational in economic terms.
Fluctuations in the prices of raw
materials were a recurring problem.
The surge in oil prices after 1973
was a hard blow, and is part of the
explanation for the mounting debt
problems on the continent.
However, it is once again relevant to
make a comparison with countries
in Asia. They operated in the same
international environment, but
during this period they were able to
take major steps forward, employing
a more open, export-oriented
strategy and putting great emphasis
on higher education, particularly in
technical subjects. A key factor was
a tight fiscal policy that ensured
stable exchange rates and thus won
the confidence of foreign investors.
Meanwhile, African countries were
plunged into economic crisis on
account of artificially high exchange
rates, unbridled printing of money
and overoptimistic loans from
abroad. The hour of truth arrived,
bringing hyperinflation and debt
crises in the mid-1980s. By then,
most African countries were in
practice bankrupt, and the
international financial institutions,
supported by Western aid agencies,
marched in to set up debt
management arrangements and
promote reforms.

The advantages of globalisation
The term “globalisation” came into
general use from the middle of the
1980s, primarily in the field of
economics, but also in a broader
political and cultural sense. This
phase of globalisation in Africa can
be said to date back to the debt
negotiations with the IMF and the
World Bank. What positive effects
did this have for African countries?
The most important were the
financial reforms: reasonable
macroeconomic order was imposed
through devaluation (up to 70–80
per cent in many countries) and
deep cuts in public budgets.
However, as government leaders
safeguarded their position and
interests through the budget
allocations for so-called sovereignty
expenses (the military, the
diplomatic service, the apparatus
supporting the president’s office,
etc.), the cuts primarily affected the
general public in the form of
reductions in food subsidies and in
government spending on schools,
health care and other public
services. The IMF, the World Bank
and Western aid agencies can be
criticised for not injecting new funds
to alleviate these cuts in social
services. There was, in fact, a
general reduction in development
assistance following the recession
that hit the Western economies at
the end of the 1980s. The IMF and
the World Bank later admitted that
their policy had been too rigid. The
recipe used after 1990 was to
promote a lean, but effective state
that could play an active role in
development and provide the right
conditions for private sector
development, along similar lines to
Asia.
Another element in the economic
reforms was the lowering of tariff
barriers and privatisation of state
companies. As early as the 1960s,
Raul Prebisch, then Secretary-
General of UNCTAD, concluded that
the policy of import substituting
industrialisation (ISI) – i.e.
industrialisation behind tariff walls
– had its limitations, and that
allowing foreign competition could
enhance productivity and
international competitiveness. But
the radical demands imposed by
the IMF and the World Bank
immediately created new problems
for African manufacturers, even
though these demands were only
partially met in practice. Indeed
African economies are still less open
than economies in other regions.
The closure or privatisation of most
state-owned companies would have
become necessary in any case. They
were hampered by the same
problems as African societies in
general: corruption, lack of technical
expertise and little institutional
loyalty. Norwegian experts observed
this first hand in Ghana, where the
State Fishing Corporation went from
bankruptcy to bankruptcy, and in
Tanzania, where industry was
extensively nationalised and came
to a practical standstill in the 1980s.
However, the subsequent takeover
of state-owned enterprises by
foreign companies led not only to an
injection of new capital and
expertise, but also to new forms of
exploitation in countries with a weak
state and poor negotiating and
monitoring capacity.
The political effects of the new
globalisation from the 1980s were
dramatic. In 1989, most African
countries were one-party states or
military dictatorships; three years
later, most had governments that
had come into power through multi-
party elections, and constitutions
that – at least in principle –
recognised individual political
rights. The World Bank and the
Western aid agencies had set
political reform as a condition for
debt arrangements throughout the
1980s. Broad popular opposition to
authoritarian regimes was triggered
by the global wave of democracy
that swept in with the fall of
communism and the end of the Cold
War. However, the new political
unrest also gave rise to an increase
in violent internal conflicts, largely,
but not solely along ethnic lines. The
new-found strength of ethnic feeling
was a global phenomenon, and is
not easy to explain; in Africa it was
clearly strengthened by a
combination of economic crises,
social frustrations and weak
governance.
The growing international
engagement in peace processes in
the 1990s must be seen as a
positive consequence of
globalisation. The African Union has
a long tradition of mediation, which
reflects the traditional African
political culture of consensus. The
G8 countries have stipulated that
African leaders must monitor each
other’s human rights performance in
order to qualify for increased
development funding, and
initiatives such as the New Economic
Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD) have been established with
this in view. However, as we have
seen in Zimbabwe, this is no easy
matter. The UN failed in Rwanda, as
it did in the Balkans, and so far it
has achieved far too little in Darfur.
But the UN has also played a key
role in a number of peace
agreements. It has mobilised
emergency relief on a huge scale.
And its largest ever peacekeeping
force is currently deployed in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.

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