₦airaland Forum

Let me tell you about John.

John is a graphic designer. Good one. The type that people DM at midnight asking him to "quickly" turn around a flyer — and then send him colour corrections at 2am like it's normal behaviour (abeg adjust if you still do this).

For years, John was swapping his time for money. Client calls, revision rounds, the whole thing. He was making N150k some months, N60k other months. No stability. No savings. Plenty of hustle but the money never seemed to compound.

One day, somebody on Instagram posted about "digital products." John didn't understand it at first. He thought you had to create some kind of app or software.

Nahhh.

This is what John actually did:

He took the Canva template he used to create Instagram posts for his clients — a template he had built and improved over two years — and he packaged it up. Cleaned it, added instructions, made it look presentable. Put it on Selar (free to use) for 5k.

He didn't advertise it. He just mentioned it on his status and one design Facebook group he was already a member of.

In the first month: 23 sales. That's 115k from a template he already had.

He still does client work. But now he also earns from something he built once.

CSblackpink:
They do have an app, though the WhatsApp call is specifically for withdrawal verification. Quantum Zenith also has an app, but I could only get all my withdrawal transferred to my bank account after the SEC stepped in with intervention.

That's not scalable though.

Oh well...

Despite all the harsh and unnecessary insults that were traded here some 6 years ago, where is MBA today? Where is Maxwell Odum? Where is the 200billion plus raised? Where are the staunch defenders?

For those who come here for whatever reason, don't leave empty. This is how you protect yourself in the future 👇🏼.

CSblackpink:
No dedicated app is required — the entire transaction process is completed via email and WhatsApp. Furthermore, you will receive your account valuation report directly in your email inbox every Sunday.

Why email and WhatsApp though? In this 2026, there should be an app and deposits and withdrawals should be easy there.

It's not about the investment you made. It's about the research you did BEFORE making that investment.

You don't follow the crowd and win in this game. You have to be strategic.

tanigororo:
I'll pay my house rent for 5 years,
I'll buy one GLE 450 series,
I'll Marry 2 more wives,
I'll start 2 companies and employ 50 people,
Then I will invest the rest for future growth.
Does it make sense?

Solid . At least the OP didn't specify if it's 500k naira or 500k USD.

Words are easy. Actions don't correspond. And results? Only Nigerians can confirm that.

You can say what you've done but you can't grade yourself.

lordprogress:
...the last time ukraine entered kursk they were totally destroyed.

Not totally true.

It took a while and a lot of resources for Russia to regain their territory.

Source

This war would have ended since March/April 2022, but for the dexterity and determination of Ukrainian forces, as well as the support of the United States.

And that's how you defend your homeland.

Even Iran took a cue and is able to maneuver around the US.

Nigerian military leaders should have already taken a cue by now and taken the fight to dislodge BH and ISWAP from their holdings in the North-East.

The man should still be becoming.

Still building his body. His mind. His money. His craft. His own vision of life...

Love your wife. Raise your children. Carry your load oo.

But keep becoming the man you were capable of becoming.

Good reminder. Try not to get lost in the hustle and bustle of marriage.

Don't get molded by a directionless society. Find an anchor for your soul, stay grounded and keep your focus peeled on what matters.

Only Lagos youths? No way. Everyone across Nigeria is looking for options to earn beyond the 9-5.

“This divisive talk is only being pushed by people who are deeply selfish."

And we can see exactly the candidate and party who have made it a thing to push divisiveness since 2022.

This announcement does not cut it.

As a government agency, do your work:

- this announcement is too vague and just raises undue panic (and not the proper awareness),
- after identifying the issue, begin a process of reviewing the top brands in the stores (easy place to start),
- certify the ones that meet the benchmark, pull the ones that do not,
- also review the ones that are NOT branded and sold in large quantities in major open markets (which most people use),
- properly educate the public on how to know the differences,
- use all forms of media to amplify your message

This is why government exist and why taxes are paid for government to work FOR the people.

Seems SBM Intelligence is now working for the former VP.

This chart does not even begin to explain the complexity of what I think he's trying to say. Those figures should be put in proper context (of inflows, expenses, and other macroeconomic conditions), and the comparative reality of the 2 periods.

When politicians or public officials speak like this, it just shows how detached they are from the reality of everyday people.

Noble goals.

Keep your detractors talking while you do your thing.

And that's how government empower poverty.

That he had to say this publicly suggests that they are having issues with recruiting enough influencers for their propaganda.

But with the cost of things, no doubt, they will definitely see signups.

When the subsidy was removed, APC folks were saying that the people that will suffer will be the " oil subsidy cabals" and that Nigerians will be able to see the result of the savings. Oh well...

What were the brilliant things the YouTube founders did early on to make the platform stand out?

What were the challenges that made selling YouTube sensible for the founders?

Let's discuss below...

(Remember to keep it on topic and respectful).

That was almost 2 decades ago. I wonder what the "analysts" and "observers" are saying today with the huge success that YouTube has become.

And yes, it's not likely anyone could have predicted this success then, but it was not worth ignoring the huge traction YouTube began to have in c.2006.

And the Google leaders could pat themselves on the back for not missing that opportunity.

And till today, YouTube still operates like a totally separate entity from Google.

Meanwhile...

After Google acquired YouTube in 2006, the company gradually phased out Google Video’s upload capabilities.

By 2009, new video uploads were no longer accepted, and the service shifted its focus to directing users to YouTube or other video sources

Google Video officially shut down on August 20, 2012, and today, visiting video.google.com redirects users to the Google Videos search engine, which primarily links to YouTube content.

Source

Okay, the deal was done.

What next for YouTube and Google Video?

But after the purchase, Google did something very smart. Almost as if acknowledging that over-attention from the top had hobbled Google’s original video effort, the company made a conscious decision not to integrate YouTube.

“They were edgy and small, and we were getting big,” says Drummond. “We didn’t want to screw them up.”

YouTube would keep its brand and even stay in the building it had recently occupied in San Bruno, a former headquarters of the Gap. Though some aspects of Googliness would find their way up Route 101 to YouTube (such as free food and a climbing wall), the culture of YouTube—more Hawaiian shirt than T-shirt, with a dash of New York hipster vibe and guilty pleasure subscriptions to Entertainment Weekly—would persist.

Not that Google was hands off. Part of the deal’s logic was that the bigger company would lend its expertise and resources to YouTube to help it grow and, eventually, turn a profit.

Now that YouTube could tap Google’s resources, it could do things even better.

Chen and YouTube’s engineering team worked with Google’s experts on data centers and fiber, as well as product management. And certain Googlers used the YouTube acquisition to reboot their own careers in a company that seemed bigger and more impersonal than the one they had joined only two or three years before.

Chad Hurley welcomed them, at least those simpatico with the YouTube microculture.

Unlike Android, YouTube didn’t have autonomy in hiring, and Hurley was frustrated when candidates he liked were nixed by Mountain View. “It slowed us down,” he admits.

“Google gave us the freedom to fight for people we really cared about, but over time it gets a little tiring to fight.”

It was much easier to bring in Googlers who wanted to re-experience life at a smaller company.

In San Bruno, they would call the 2007 holiday the YouTube Christmas, where all sorts of devices—iPhones, other phones, set-top
boxes—came with YouTube inside.

The consumer electronics manufacturers loved it, because adding YouTube was a signal to customers that it was time to buy new gadgets that could do new tricks.

“Watch YouTube on your phone, that’s a value I can understand,” said Hunter Walk, who was a key Googler-turned-YouTuber.

Under Google’s benign management, YouTube had the luxury of continuing to build an audience and a cultural presence without having to worry too much about the bottom line.

“We could have spent more time on how we’re going to monetize the system, but we continued to focus on more growth, more users, better experience,” says Hurley.

Meanwhile, Google’s legal team did its best to extricate YouTube from its difficult copyright situation.

Google created a system that would alow it to quickly remove infringing video once its owner identified it as such. At the same time, YouTube struck a number of deals with studios like Warner Bros. and Sony.

Studios had grudgingly come to accept that it was better to have their intellectual property on the site, even for free, than to be out of sight of YouTube’s hundreds of millions of users.

In June 2010, Judge Louis L. Stanton basically affirmed Steve Chen’s gamble on the copyright violations when he granted summary
judgment to Google, dismissing Viacom’s lawsuit.

As long as YouTube wasn’t given “red flags” about the content from the actual owners, he wrote, the safe-harbor provision of the DMCA allowed YouTube to accept uploaded clips without prescreening them.

Though copyright absolutists complained and Viacom set about drafting its appeal, it seemed that the law performed a useful function. A new business had been given leeway to grow, and when it flourished under the guidance of a bigger company, its more questionable practices were tempered.

Thousands of people had jobs in a new, thriving industry.

YouTube may not have become as significant a phenomenon as Google search, but it had a huge impact on the country and the world.

With the ubiquity of cheap camcorders and video recorders on mobile phones, it became easy to upload clips to YouTube, and soon it was certain that any major goof—whether it was the comedian Michael Richards snapping at black people during a stand-up performance or Virginia Senator George Alen referring to an Indian-American opposition researcher as a “macaca”—would find its way onto YouTube, sometimes with seismic consequences.

Cannier politicians would use the service for campaign messages and town hall meetings.

A clever video could launch a band or an acting career.

Formerly private moments, from schoolyard fights to an overweight kid swinging a laser-sword toy, generated instant celebrities.

And millions of people watched cats do silly things.

And this is the funniest part...

Even while their company was suing YouTube, some Viacom employees secretly uploaded content under pseudonyms.

After Google itself, YouTube was the most popular search engine in the world.

Even someone like David Drummond, who pushed hard for Google to come up with the cash to buy YouTube, would later admit he’d had no idea of how huge a purchase it was.

“The impact YouTube has had on the culture, on politics, wasn’t on my radar screen at all,” he says.

Nonetheless, two years after the purchase, some analysts and observers were still unconvinced that Google’s YouTube deal was a smart one—because the service wasn’t making money on its own.

And in a recession, that would not do.

And now to the juicy part of how things turned began to turn around for both entities...

But some of their bosses saw YouTube as something else: an acquisition target. “They had beaten us—we had underestimated the power of user-generated content,” Google’s counsel David Drummond would later say.

“And so we looked up one day and saw YouTube building an edgy fun brand, in a way that Google Video wasn’t. We imagined that if you put that on the Google platform, and, you know, with Google distribution, Google machines, and everything, you’d take it, you’d really, really accelerate.”

Google wasn’t the only suitor; Yahoo was interested as well, as were a number of more traditional media companies, hoping to
defibrilate their flatlined Internet sites.

But for most of 2006, YouTube’s Hurley and Chen professed not to be terribly interested.

“They were talking a few hundred million dollars, and we thought there was a bigger opportunity. Our whole idea was that we were going to take this thing as far as possible,” says Hurley, neatly summing up the dynamics of YouTube’s vacillation.

Hurley and his partners were building a company for the long run, while simultaneously poising themselves to accept the right offer from the right company.

In an August 2005 video the founders made after visiting Sequoia (Mike Moritz’s venture capital firm)—a clip definitely not uploaded to YouTube—the giddy Karim asked, “At what point would we tell them our dirty little secret, which is that we actualy just want to sell out quickly?”

As the months went on, Hurley and Chen determined that the time to sell was now. YouTube was too popular: it was overwhelmed by traffic. To build up infrastructure would require a lot more money than the original $3.5 milion in venture capital it had received from
Sequoia.

YouTube got another round of funding for a total of $11.5 million, but even then it would struggle.

Serving millions of videos a day was just plain expensive.

Grappling with this reality in the early fa l of 2006, Hurley and Chen concluded that they had to sell. Yahoo and Google were the front runners. Hurley and Chen barely knew the Google ruling troika, having met them only once at the previous summer’s Sun Valey mogul conference.

But once Google realized that YouTube was truly in play, Salar Kamangar sent out the alarm. “I was building a case for why it would be worth it to us to buy them at the price they were then asking for, which we’d previously thought was too much. We heard that they were going to be sold, most likely to Yahoo” says Kamangar, who teamed up with Drummond as the biggest advocates of the deal.

They set up a series of meetings at the Denny’s in Redwood City, between Mountain View and YouTube headquarters in San Mateo. The YouTubers told Schmidt that their goal was to democratize the video experience online, and they felt that the idea resonated with him—after al, wasn’t that what Google wanted to do for the whole web?

The meeting with Brin and Page went well, too.

At one point Page turned to Hurley and asked, “Are you sure you want to sell your business?” That impressed Hurley—it meant that Larry cared about a good match, too.

“They were authentic,” says Hurley of the founders. Hurley and his partners had gone by their instincts all along, although Hurley had gotten some advice from his father-in-law, Jim Clark, the entrepreneur who had founded Silicon Graphics and Netscape.

Now their collective gut was teling them that Google was the right match. So they trusted their instincts one more time.

The “few hundred million” that Hurley originaly mentioned didn’t come out of the air—it was probably a fair valuation of the company.

In fact, Schmidt would later say in a deposition in the Viacom lawsuit that he estimated that YouTube’s worth at that point was between $600 million and $700 million. “It’s just my judgment,” he said.

“I’ve been doing this a long time.”

But Google wound up paying $1.65 billion to close the deal with YouTube.

“I’m not very good at math,” said the deposing attorney, “but I think that would be $1 billion or so more than you thought the company was, in fact, worth.”

Schmidt provided an excellent summary of deal making in Internet time, embodying the Google principles of speed, scale, and minimizing opportunity cost:

"This is a company with very little revenue, growing quickly with user adoption, growing much faster than Google Video, which is the product that Google had…. In the deal dynamics, the price, remember, is not set by my judgment or financial model, or discounted cash flow. It’s set by what people are willing to pay. And we ultimately concluded that $1.65 billion included a premium for moving quickly and making sure we could participate in the user success in YouTube."

If Google had been inclined toward remorse about the price, such worries were surely mitigated by a letter sent by Rupert Murdoch’s Twentieth Century Fox as the deal was closing.

It declared that whatever Google was paying, Fox would pay more.

In early October, as both parties scrambled to complete negotiations, both camps spent all-nighters working out the term sheets.

As it happened, Google was hosting the Google Zeitgeist conference on its campus, to which partners, tech luminaries, and some press were invited.

Hurley and Chen had long ago been invited, and when Drummond and other Google executives interacted with them at the conference, they all pretended that they hardly knew one another.

“We were like, ‘Good to meet you,’ even though we’d been up all night negotiating this thing,” says Drummund.

Google’s board convened to approve the deal in the middle of the conference, and Drummond had to smuggle Hurley and Chen individualy into the meeting past curious onlookers.

(Since Sequoia Capital had funded YouTube—and stood to rack up $516 million from its $9 million investment—Google board member Mike Moritz recused himself, but he was obviously ecstatic. “I always felt that YouTube done right was the fourth horseman of the Internet,” he says.)

I dare say he wasn't wrong.

“This is the next step in the evolution of the Internet,” said Schmidt in the conference call announcing Google’s biggest deal to date.

In the euphoria that came with winning YouTube, Google didn’t dwell on a disturbing implication: the purchase was necessary only because its own initiative had failed.

Barely a year after going public, some of its fears had been realized: when it came to plotting certain revolutions, the company was now at a distinct disadvantage.

The emails and internal presentations from both companies revealed a striking contrast. The Google Video team had spent an enormous amount of time getting approval and advice from executives.

Also, Google Video—whose product manager was herself a lawyer—was constrained by oversight by a legal team all too aware that a deep pocketed public company could not behave with the insouciance of a start-up.

The YouTube team, however, didn’t have to create multiple drafts of slide shows for bosses. They did what felt right. “It’s al ’bout
da videos, yo,” wrote Karim at one point to his cofounders.

As with any startup, in the early days, you're more focused on launching the product and gaining some traction than the rules.

In 2005, It was the same for YouTube.

The giant entertainment conglomerate Viacom would eventually sue YouTube, its attorneys arguing that the copyrighted content uploaded by users was the main reason for YouTube’s success.

More likely, it was the combination of the copyrighted content and the milions of videos created by the users themselves that made YouTube a unique and valuable property.

YouTube was a magnet for videos old and new, and its very existence led people to create their own.

In tandem with an emergent library of (mostly unauthorized) professionally produced clips, YouTube became an unbeatable destination where the short videos on the site (YouTube limited contributions to ten minutes, and most were under three) were consumed like potato chips.

As soon as one was finished, the site offered suggestions for similar diversions or maybe watching that clip reminded you of something else you wanted to see.

Could YouTube provide video evidence that a long-haired hairdresser turned rock singer named Monti Rock I had actually been a frequent guest on early 1970s talk shows? Or was that some hashish dream you had?

There he is, on Johnny Carson and Merv Gri fin! What’s more, there’s a clip recently uploaded from Monti, alive and well, doing a
cabaret act in Miami Beach!

In short, YouTube was beginning to become a video version of Google search.

In mid-2005, Google Video instituted its own system for users to upload content. “Response has been great,” Feikin said at
the time but took pains to add that such uploads—which did not get the viral boosts so often given by YouTube’s happy fans—were only one component of Google Video, which would deal with “the whole gamut of content.”

And when it came to enforcing copyright, the difference between YouTube and Google Video was as stark as the contrast between Ferris Buehler and his principal.

To keep on the sunny side of the studios it was wooing, Google took pains to avoid hosting pirated content. But there was also the feeling that copyright violations, when you came right down to it, were evil.

[And there's this whole thing about "Do no evil" at Google.]

For much of 2005, Google’s policy was to police videos over two minutes long to make sure they didn’t infringe. Even that was deemed too much for a public company to tolerate.

In December 2005, Feikin sent a memo to her team saying that the two-minute restriction was gone and Google would now do a sweep to find copyright violations of any length. She included a list of the top twenty search terms of copyrighted material, starting with “Family Guy” and ending with “Dragonball Z.”

By that time, Google was finally ready to roll out what it called the Google Video Store, an attempt to offer an online bazaar where users could get high-quality content. The offerings were a mishmash of content obviously organized by the principle of “this is what we got.”

Unlike the iTunes store, where television shows al cost $2, Google’s prices were all over the lot. Its big attractions were CBS shows—
prime-time episodes, and some “classics” from the archives, which seemed to be chosen at random, cost $2.

In contrast, YouTube was dead simple: everything was free, you could find clips from just about anything, and it played inside your browser.

God knows where its users had gotten access to some of the stuff they put up there, but because of the company’s lax policy of policing its archives, YouTube managed to have just about anything you were looking for.

YouTube users had uploaded a popular clip from Saturday Night Live called “Lazy Sunday,” which became a phenomenon — 5 million people streamed it until NBC demanded that YouTube remove the clip seven weeks after its appearance.

The clip jacked up YouTube’s traffic by 83 percent.

Later, it was cited as the event that restored luster to the aging SNL. Content providers were confused about how to deal with YouTube, but they were beginning to realize that its popularity made it impossible to ignore.

Google had an auspicious opportunity to launch its video store in January 2006: its first ever keynote presentation at the annual Consumer Electronics Show.

In an uncharacteristic display of enthusiasm for public speaking, Larry Page volunteered to do the presentation. Keynotes at CES were carefully choreographed, almost as if they were artifacts from the era of auto shows in the 1950s.

Page, [ever the AI enthusiast] had his own ideas...

Unlike other tech execs in well-tailored suits, Page gave his speech in a lab coat, spending much of the keynote ranting about the
incompatibility of power supplies in consumer devices.

By the time he got to a description of the Google Video Store, people were scratching their heads...

After the launch came the reviews of Google Video; they were uniformly dismal. Google Video was clearly a hobbled entrant into a race where one dog was already circling the track in a blur.

Yet for the next few months the Google Video team pressed on.

In the spring of 2006, the group spent weeks preparing an elaborate strategy to fend off YouTube, but the numbers presented in their slides undercut the delusional promises that a new approach could lead it to “win” the online video market.

The Google Video team acknowledged that “the user-generated trend is huge” but didn’t seem to grasp how dominant YouTube was becoming—the little start-up located over a pizza shop was streaming 25 milion videos every day, more than three times as
many as Google.

The Google Video team seemed to take comfort in reporting that premium content owners—which it still considered the key players in the field—viewed YouTube as “a small start-up with no cash,” “perceived as trafficking in mostly illegal content.”

What? Who else was seizing the opportunity?

The story continues...

In December 2004—just as Feikin and her team were finalizing plans for a January launch of Google Video—Jawed Karim, a twenty-five-year-old engineer at PayPal, began thinking about web video from the bottom up.

How, he wondered, could you make it super-easy for people to upload their homemade videos to a site where anyone could see them?

What he had in mind was a video version of the website HOT or NOT, where users looked at people’s photos and made decisions on their desirability. He shared his ideas with two coleagues at PayPal, Steve Chen and Chad Hurley.

In February 2005, Karim, Chen, and Hurley formed a company called YouTube. (Karim, who wanted to return to academia, soon went back to school and turned over the leadership to his partners.)

They set up shop in a second-floor office over a pizzeria in San Mateo, halfway between San Francisco and Palo Alto [California].

They made a few decisions early on that proved brilliant in retrospect.

First was a revelation that seemed elusive to Google Video: success in a video site hinged on making it easy for users to actually view the videos.

(Google Video didn’t launch a player until that June, and it required a separate download.) “It was important when you come to YouTube that within a few clicks you are watching video,” said Chen.

The second decision was to include YouTube in a budding movement described as Web 2.0, where online activities were seen as participation in a self-defined community.

YouTube built tools to make its videos viral; by copying and pasting a few lines of HTML code, you could stick a YouTube video into your blog or website, email it to a friend, even post it to a social network such as MySpace. [OGs here will remember MySpace. ]

In April 2005, the founders began uploading some videos of their own—inane stuff such as Karim rolling down a snowy hill or the antics of Chen’s cat, Stinky—and awaited the deluge. It didn’t happen instantly.

In May, the impatient founders took out an ad in craigslist offering “hot” women $100 for every ten videos they’d post displaying their charms.

But once the snowball started rolling, it was an avalanche.

That summer, someone named Matt Harding began posting videos of himself dancing (spastic, cringe-worthy nerd dancing but so unself-conscious that it was infectiously joyful) in various vacation spots. He became a global celebrity.

YouTube also benefited from taking a tolerant stance toward users who uploaded music videos, snippets from TV shows, and scenes from movies without the permission of those who owned the copyrights.

In an email sent in September 2005, Hurley worried about the “truckloads” of copyrighted content. Chen successfully argued that YouTube should just press forward. Even though YouTubers knew that people who were uploading videos didn’t really have the right to do so, they believed that YouTube would be alright as long as there weren’t complaints from copyright holders about specific videos, in which case they could respond.

Otherwise, they would simply assume that copyright holders permitted their content to appear on YouTube. Chen’s instinct in this case turned out to be a canny interpretation of the Digital Mi lennium Copyright Act, which promised a “safe harbor” to
sites hosting uploaded content.

But the decision to take a lax view of policing copyright was less likely a legal judgment than one determined by the carpe diem ethic of a start-up.

In 2006, YouTube was barely a year and a half old, had no clear path to making serious money, and was already struggling with the huge cost of storing and delivering video. Then Google came knocking—with $1.65 billion.

At the time, it looked like Google was paying a huge price for a risky video website.

Looking back, it looks very different.

So what did Google see in YouTube that made $1.65 billion seem like a bargain? The story started from Google Video. How many remembered Google Video?

Get the inside gist as described by Steve Levy in his book - In The Plex.

---------

Google’s original effort in the world of online television was a dud. Jennifer Feikin was a onetime entertainment lawyer who became a business development executive at AOL and then moved to Google, working under Omid Kordestani.

Her initial job involved complicated AdSense deal agreements. Before embarking on yet another one, Feikin got Omid to promise that on completion she could work on a different idea she called Google Video.

Her concept was that Google’s search should deliver links to movies, TV shows, and even news clips as well as it did to web pages. In late 2003, she began pulling together a team.

Feikin believed that in addition to providing links, Google Video should offer users a chance to view professionally produced work in categories such as television news, sports, documentaries, movies, and network television shows.

Such programming would be legally licensed and would be available for free for promotional purposes or would be ad-supported or sold. Seling videos would give a boost to the company’s perpetually struggling payment system, Google Checkout, which had never quite gathered the huge number of credit card sign-ups that competitors such as PayPal, Amazon.com, or iTunes had amassed.

“It was very important to find a way to monetize content for the entertainment industry,” Feikin says.

“Putting stuff on the Internet was very new, and there were lots of clips and promos and stuff like that, but putting the full shows online was a very interesting thing to our partners.”

Not as crucial to the Google Video approach was the long tail of Internet video.

The web, along with new and powerful digital tools for making and distributing videos, offered an opportunity for the most obscure video auteur—meaning anyone with a cheap camera and a modem—to reach an audience of billions.

It was a perfect opportunity for Google.

But someone else was seizing it.

The economy itself is also growing. The latest official GDP report shows that growth has improved from where it was earlier in the year.

The GDP is NOT the only driver of any economy (nor is the NGX. Unemployment, wages and inflation are also key factors). And those other factors affect the common man than others. Business people may look at the potential of this news to be able to get loans at cheaper rates, but the reality is different for the majority who are not in business.

Fuel prices will still continue to affect every part of the everyday economy and government need to look at some austerity measures.

Anyway, it's commendable what the government is doing by shoring up the FX reserves and trying to drive down inflation.

"A big business starts small." - Richard Branson

OAkanni001:
4. On calling Nigerians “olodo”:
You are free to criticise poor research or bandwagon investing. Many people do jump into IPOs without proper due diligence. That does not give you the right to brand an entire group of investors as fools simply because they chose to participate in a legitimate company offering. We've got institutional investors who partook in the exercise. Are you claiming they don't know what they are doing?

I'm done with ya!

This is also my issue with the OP. Lumping everyone together because of bias is not healthy for any kind of conversation. Many institutional investors (domestic and foreign) were part of the IPO. Same for SpaceX IPO a few months ago. Usually, they do their research. Some individuals have enough spare cash to be a part of the IPO at the time and took advantage of it. It's their choice. But lumping everyone together to make yourself look like a know-it-all is not useful for anyone.

People all over the world fall to hype - from the Western world to the developing world. It's known. That's why marketing works

And some have enough capital to be a part of whatever venture they desire. But that does not mean they are naive or empty-headed.

Nigerians and cruise, next levels.

Hilarious! Even Trump collect stray bullet

Trump was only worried about the pesky leftist media. CNN, MS NOW, and Politico. He wished he could ban them so they would stop putting their noses into his affairs. Luckily, some people begged Trump.

His aides told him to wait until after the midterm election so he would not be blamed if American voters choose not to re-elect Republicans. Because Trump doesn't like to be blamed for anything that goes wrong, he relented.

Trump did ban them and those ones have sued and they are likely to win because it's a direct violation of the First Amendment.

Endorsement in any form from anyone in the US does not amount to much in the grand scheme of things. The grassroot movement across the nation, media runs, manifesto, and the team are much more important and should be in the fore front.

With this Dangote IPO and the whole noise surrounding it, at the very least, many people will begin to understand more about stocks and the capital market.

And if people don't learn and earn, oh well... there will be some very disgruntled Nigerians in the near future.