₦airaland Forum

Sincere 9gerian: Board appointments are PERIPHERAL appointments. Yes peripheral appointments can be used to compensate party faithfuls. GEJ went for competence and FIRST ELEVEN in selecting his ministers and heads of departments. These are the people that do the REAL work that affect you and I. They are the DRIVERS of the transformation agenda. Check them out:
Dr Ngozi Okonjo Iweala
Dr Akinwumi Adeshina
Prof Onyebuchi Chukwu
Prof Rufuqayyatu
Mrs Mobola Johnson
Dr Sam Amadi
Barr Nyesoh Wike
Arch Mike Onolememe
Mrs Stella Oduah
Olusegun Aganga
Etc, etc
This squad is tight, any day, any time. Over 80% of these persons are not even politicians.
In the past even ministerial position was used to compensate party faithfuls. Who were the ministers and heads of departments under Yar Adua and OBJ? Were they not mostly party faithfuls? Who are the commissioners in Lagos as we speak? Are they not mostly stalwarts of ACN? I beg make we hear word. Yeye 'retardinhos'.
Anonymous Internet noise makers can only do what they know how to do best, MAKE NOISE, hurl insults and abuses. Fortunately, their display of INSANITY has no bearing on what is on ground.

I am not shocked that someone called you a slowpoke, or the fact that your brain as failed on this day. Okonjo iweala is just a wolf in sheep's clothings. An IMF agent to economically enslave the country in connivance with corrupt politicians. Dr Adesina is just a noisemaker who has done nothing to bring down the cost of agricultural produce, instead cost of food keeps skyrocketing everyday. Stella Oduah knows nothing about the aviation sector, and her tenure has witnessed more air disasters than any other in the history of Nigeria.

Akpan107: the majority are Southerners... With these, Goodluck has weaken the Haramist! I pray Boko Haram would be eradicated before 2013. All the boko haram soldiers should be removed from the top position. Thank you.

Bolo, when Azazi was stealing arms and ammunitions from the Nigerian army and selling to Niger delta millitants, were u asleep?

During the weekend of July 29,
1966, following a violent rolling mutiny, Gowon
emerged as the new Supreme Commander of the
Nigerian Armed Forces – even though (by most
accounts) he did not plan the mutiny/coup and did
not partake in implementing it. That he emerged
over the actual coup leader – then Lt. Col. Murtala
Rufai Mohammed – was a function of several factors:
1. Gowon was very senior to Mohammed (having
joined the Army four years before him) and this
factor influenced the leanings of northern officers
(and Lt. Col. David Ejoor of the Midwest) who felt that
the most senior northern officer should take charge.
Although Murtala Mohammed was a “temporary Lt.
Col.” at the time, he was actually only a substantive
Captain. He assumed the rank of Acting Major in
November 1963 and was appointed Temporary Lt.
Col. in 1966 and Inspector of Signals by Major
General Ironsi in an effort to placate the far north.
Among those who most strongly opposed
Mohammed’s precocious ambitions then was his
classmate at Sandhurst, Temporary Lt. Col. Shuwa,
commander of the 5th battalion in Kano (and later
Commander, 1st Brigade), who was also from the
“far north” albeit the north-eastern end. Although
both Shuwa and Mohammed (along with IBM Haruna
and Iliya Bissalla) were commissioned from
Sandhurst in 1961, Mohammed had gained a
month’s seniority over Shuwa in late 1963. In
Shuwa’s view (supported by Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina),
the order of precedence was Maimalari, Kur
Mohammed, Largema, Pam, Gowon, Katsina, Akahan,
Kyari, Haruna and Bissalla - even before Mohammed
and himself. Since Maimalari, Kur Mohammed,
Largema and Pam had been killed, Gowon was next
in line (among ‘northern’ officers). Mohammed never
forgave him for this and the personal animosity
between both men, which almost brought them to
exchange blows during the civil war (when Shuwa
criticized Mohammed’s military disaster at Onitsha),
was to reveal itself again in 1975.
2. Quite apart from the “northern seniority” factor,
Gowon was the Chief of Staff (Army) – a position,
which despite its weakness was symbolic of Army-
wide authority at a time of breakdown of law and
order.
3. Seniority aside, Mohammed had lost momentum
and “coup leadership” because of the manner the
mutiny evolved. It basically started as a coup-within-
a-coup triggered by Lieutenant Pam Mwadkon’s
mutiny at Abeokuta, followed in sequence by Ibadan.
Faced with a fait accompli, Mohammed later ordered
others in Lagos to “adjust to the situation” but he
could not have been oblivious to the implications of
what had happened. He had vacillated at the last
minute and even more junior officers – particularly
from the middle belt - took charge.
4. Then there was the geopolitical factor. Joining and
staying in the British colonial Nigerian Army had
never been very popular with the true Hausa and
Fulani people. Young and fiery Murtala Mohammed,
from Kano in Hausa heartland (subsequent claims
about his ancestry aside), was not viewed as
belonging to so called "martial" minority areas of
northern Nigeria. Such groups included the Dakokori
of Niger, Tiv, Jukun and Idoma of Benue, various
tribes of Plateau, Bachama/Numan of Adamawa and
Kanuri of Bornu provinces respectively. And yet, on
the ground, holding the guns of July, were soldiers
from precisely these jurisdictions. Even his fellow
‘coup commanders’, Captain Martin Adamu and
Major TY Danjuma, were middle belters. Who was
going to back him against “nice man” Gowon? Not
even Hassan Katsina, a Fulani Prince who was
professionally senior to him, would do so.
5. Geopolitics and control of the troops on the ground
was also a factor in the inability of Brigadier
Ogundipe, then Chief of Staff, Supreme HQ, to
impose his authority. He had tried to launch an
attack on Ikeja Barracks and the airport to dislodge
the mutineers but it failed. When he tried to give an
order to a northern NCO from the Federal Guards Unit
the soldier said he would only accept orders from
Captain JN Garba, the 2ic of the unit and a fellow
northerner. To complicate Ogundipe’s position, the
Attorney General, GC Onyiuke, told him that he had
no authority to deputize for the Supreme
Commander. When Ogundipe sent Gowon to
negotiate with the mutineers at Ikeja, Gowon was co-
opted.
After he emerged from the power tussle, he initially
appointed Mohammed to the Supreme Military
Council (SMC). But Gowon kept Mohammed out of
any significant official policy-making position outside
his role at Army Signals. After a magazine article in
the Nigerian Outlook poked fun at him, Mohammed
then stopped attending SMC meetings. And so,
Murtala Mohammed, whose personality, upbringing
and approach to leadership was radically different
from Gowon’s, withdrew into his shell, content with
sniping at Gowon from a distance as the unofficial
military “opposition” or “alternative view”, second
guessing everything Gowon did.
Frustrated, he even resigned his commission at the
end of 1966. The letter he wrote to Gowon was to
become the first of many he would later write, asking
to be released. In the first letter he allegedly said he
did not want to be seen to be undermining Gowon,
particularly since there were rumors that he was
planning to force Gowon out using troops from the
“far North.” Gowon had to contact some Kano
politicians – like his Uncle, Alhaji Inua Wada - to
convince Mohammed to return to the Army. He did so
two weeks later, but, according to Major General
Garba (deceased), their rivalry actually worsened
until they were ‘reconciled’ (by Garba) in 1972.
During the run-up period to the civil war, for
example, Mohammed expressed the view - to anyone
who would listen - that Gowon was weak and
indecisive. As far back as October 1966 he even
predicted that Nigeria was headed to war and that
early decisive confrontation with Ojukwu was the
right approach. Gowon, however, preferred a non-
confrontational, consensus-building method. Viewed
as a “hawk”, Mohammed was, therefore, excluded
from the Nigerian delegation to the Aburi talks in
1967. When the war did eventually breakout,
however, and Lagos was threatened by the Biafran
invasion of August 9, 1967, Gowon found in
Mohammed’s personality the commander he needed
for the situation. And sure enough, supported by
elements of the Federal Guard, and a detachment of
Colonel Adekunle’s 3MCDO, with active
encouragement from most of the local population,
Mohammed rolled back Biafran troops from the West
and Midwest.
Nevertheless, they had their clashes. Mohammed, for
example, appointed T/Lt. Col. Samuel Ogbemudia as
Administrator of the Midwest without checking with
Gowon. It took about 57 agonizing days for Gowon to
ratify the appointment. He was caught by lobbyists
for the job (like Colonel David Ejoor and Mr. Timothy
Omo-Bare of the Police and their supporters). He was
indignant with Mohammed for lack of due process.
But he had appreciation for Ogbemudia – famous for
his skills with the mortar - on account of his loyalty to
the federal cause. While there was also the need to
show Mohammed who was in charge, there was also
the need not to make his own Divisional Commander
look bad in public. It was classic Gowon.
It did not stop there. The 2nd Division was involved
in violations of Gowon’s wartime operational code of
conduct at Asaba in October 1967. Mohammed later
lost an untold number of men and millions of dollars
in equipment during his unsuccessful attempts to
take Onitsha via an assault river crossing. Amid
blistering criticism from colleagues (like Shuwa) as
well as AHQ, Mohammed later adopted a less
ambitious approach, eventually taking Onitsha via an
unopposed crossing into the 1st Division area. The
officer who actually took Onitsha in 1968 under
Mohammed’s supervision, was a young man from
Katsina, Sandhurst trained T/Major (later Major
General) Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (now deceased). This
was followed by another military disaster at
Abagana, after which Mohammed simply left the
country to get some rest. He later requested a
posting back to Army signals when he learnt that he
had been replaced as the Divisional Commander.
That he was not court-martialled for some of these
transgressions is amazing. However, in an interview
with Elaigwu, Gowon said,
“Honestly, mine is not to destroy anyone.
There is no doubt about it, for his contribution
to the war efforts and to the country generally,
I thought one must not use a big hand and
destroy such a promising young man.
Honestly, I just allowed him to get on with his
work. He virtually cut off himself except
concentrating on his signals and since he was
getting our communications properly through I
did not bother until when I decided to appoint
him the Commissioner for Communications…”
Gowon’s emergence on July 29th/30th 1966,
therefore, created, on one hand, an internal
“northern” schism with Murtala Mohammed – a
schism that perpetuated old political rivalries
between the middle belt and the core northwest (far
north). Then Lt. Col. (later Major General) Hassan
Katsina’s stabilizing influence, however, ensured that
it did not get out of hand – at least for a while.
Gowon and Ojukwu
On the other hand, the Military Governor of the
Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, who was
promoted Lt. Col. on the same day April 1st 1964
alongside Yakubu Gowon and David Ejoor, refused to
accept Gowon as the new Supreme Commander.
Gowon actually joined the Army several years before
Ojukwu and was commissioned 2/Lt. on October 19,
1955 (his 21st birthday). But Ojukwu’s date of
commission was backdated to September 22, 1955
on account of his University degree. Gowon became a
Lt. on September 9, 1957, 13 days before Ojukwu.
But Ojukwu became a Captain on September 22,
1961, just shy of one month before Gowon became a
Captain. On March 7, 1963 Ojukwu was promoted
Major, two days before Gowon. However, both men
became Lt. Cols. on the same day.
Ojukwu’s refusal to recognize Gowon was advertised
as a regimental preference for maintaining Army
seniority (even though Ojukwu, as Military Governor
of the Eastern region and later C-in-C of Biafra, was
not the most senior eastern officer either). Brigadier
Ogundipe, Colonel Adebayo and Lt. Cols. Wellington
Bassey, Hilary Njoku and Imo were senior to Gowon.
(Bassey and Njoku were even made temporary
Brigadiers by Ironsi) Ejoor had originally been senior
to him (as a young officer) too but had since become
his mate (alongside Ojukwu). Nevertheless,
practically speaking, none of the aforementioned
officers could exercise control over the mutinying
troops and even Gowon had great difficulty doing so.
This was not by any means a normal situation.
Thus the “seniority” schism of 1966 with Lt. Col.
Odumegwu Ojukwu was a factor (among others) in
the outbreak of the civil war. The “seniority” schism
of 1966 with Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed would later
explode into the open – as one of several factors - on
July 29, 1975.
Gowon as wartime commander
The strategic success of Gowon as a wartime leader
must be acknowledged. He led a large and
complicated country through a difficult crisis.
Although reviled as “weak” and “compromising” by
his critics who hold him partly responsible for the
long duration of the war, there are many well-
informed officers who still hold the view that only
someone with his forgiving and tolerant character
could have held Nigeria together at that time. His
decision to create 12 States in May 1967 – on the
advice of civil servants - is still regarded by many on
both sides of the isle (including former Biafran
Intelligence Chief Odogwu) as a masterstroke that
helped spell doom for Biafra. His wartime code of
conduct for troops was the first of its kind in Africa –
although it was often ignored. His handling of the
difficult diplomatic scene was also brilliant –
although Biafra proved to be a formidable adversary
on that front. Nevertheless, none of Nigeria’s
neighbors supported the break-up of the country. His
magnanimity after victory in 1970 by avoiding
Nuremberg type trials won him international stature.
However, the structural weaknesses that would
eventually consume the Gowon regime were put in
place fairly early. Soon after he was anointed as the
new ‘Supreme Commander’, the “separation” from
the Army began. Like Ironsi, the title “Supreme
Commander” conferred certain absolute powers on
him. However, complex political negotiations with
regional representatives who in turn were reporting
to the various regional military governors, set the
tone for Federal-State relations and the subsequent
emergence of powerful State Governors. These
Governors used the distractions of the federal
government first with restoration of law and order in
the barracks and later with the prosecution of the
war to consolidate their powers. It was not that
obvious during the conflict but became apparent
afterwards, particularly from the standpoint of their
military colleagues in the barracks. At federal level,
Gowon, who had little prior experience in non-
military public administration, was soon ensconced
within the outstretched arms of sophisticated civil
servants.
At the “Meeting of Nigerian Military Leaders” held at
Aburi in Jan 1967, for example, discussants
comprised Lt. Col. Gowon, Regional Governors (Col.
Adeyinka Adebayo, Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu, Lt. Col.
David Ejoor and Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina), and the
Chief of Staff SHQ and Naval Chief, Commodore JEA
Wey. Others were the Administrator of Lagos, Major
Mobolaji Johnson, the Police IG, Alhaji Kam Salem
and another senior Police officer, Mr. T Omo-Bare. The
civil servants who were present – as secretaries -
were Mr. SIA Akenzua (Cabinet Office) – now the Oba
of Benin, Mr. PT Odumosu (Secretary to the
Government, West), Mr. NU Akpan (Secretary to the
Government, East), Mr. DP Lawani (Governor’s Office,
Midwest), and Alhaji Ali Akilu ((Secretary to the
Government, North). None of the “three musketeers”
of July 1966, (Mohammed, Danjuma and Adamu) was
present. Years later, this oversight would be cited by
Gowon’s Army critics (perhaps unfairly) as one
reason for Ojukwu’s ability to allegedly manipulate
the conference, leaving Gowon vulnerable where it
not for the subsequent intercession of federal
permanent secretaries.
The organization and management of AHQ during the
war also revealed certain trends. The Supreme
Commander (Gowon) had no prior field command
experience above the sub-unit level. He was very well
trained no doubt (perhaps one of the best trained),
and had plenty of staff experience, but he had never
actually commanded a battalion (except over the
weekend of January 15), let alone a Brigade – and
certainly not a Division. The divisional commanders
were mostly independent, doing what they wanted to
do. When they misbehaved, as was the case with
Mohammed and Adekunle, Gowon preferred a non-
confrontational approach. Then Major General Gowon
hardly visited the warfront – the first time being in
early 1969 after the war had already been in
progress for almost two years. He also had a
penchant for communicating directly with Field
Commanders, using a radio set at Dodan Barracks,
bypassing the AHQ. This habit was a contributor to
Adekunle’s disastrous “Operation OAU” which Gowon
had secretly authorized without AHQ input. There
was plenty of waste and massive corruption not only
in the Ministry of Defence but also among arms
purchasing teams (and dealers) sent abroad to
acquire weapons and ammo. Many of these problems
(as well as detailed plans for future operations) were
detailed in a special report prepared by the British
Defence Attache, Colonel Robert E Scott, in
December 1969 titled “Appreciation of the Nigerian
Conflict.” It was later leaked to The Sunday Telegraph
and parts of it published in January 1970. The
Nigerian Government was very upset. Colonel Scott
was declared persona non grata.
Political undercurrents were never far from the
surface either. When he created States in May 1967
he openly promised that those who were dissatisfied
with it would get a chance to make amends. In
January 1969, Gowon warned the Army that they had
limited capacity to run a complex civilian
administration and that a process for handing over
the country to elected government was essential
after the war. In October 1969 in the setting of the
resolution of the Agbekoya problem in the West, he
reiterated the promise to review the Creation of
States issue again.
But also, in 1969, Gowon got married to Ms. Victoria
Zakari in a State and Society wedding in Lagos
which, considering the wartime situation and
ongoing suffering appeared lavishly distasteful and
imperious to many observers, including warfront
commanders. The presence of a resident woman in
his life naturally resulted in a decrease in Gowon’s
interactions with former fellow bachelor, and wartime
pal, then Lt. Col. JN Garba.
Before the war ended, Mohammed, who Gowon
wrongly assumed “virtually cut off himself except
concentrating on his signals “, was at it again. He
secretly approached Colonel Obasanjo of the 3MCDO
in October 1969 and requested that he slow down
the push to end the war in order that certain Army
Officers could use the delay to extract concessions
from Gowon and force him to share power in a
“Presidential Commission”. Mohammed was fearful
that a victorious and internationally recognized
Gowon after the war would be less amenable to Army
influence. According to him,
“…you will be lucky, the man will be a victorious
general and you will not be able to talk to him.’
Nevertheless, Obasanjo refused.
When the war finally ended on January 12, an
editorial in the Nigerian Observer the next day
commented that
“All of us must have learned the bitter lesson that in
war there are no victors nor vanquished but only
losers.”
This became a maxim of the Gowon regime.
Boards of Inquiry into activities of former federal
officers in Biafra aside, many officers felt that there
should be no medals or decorations awarded for the
civil war – seen as a fight between brothers. That is
why there is no “Civil War” medal to this day. This
attitude in the Army reflected the broader challenges
of reconstruction, reconciliation, and rehabilitation.
Within the federal army, however, one major concern
was what to do with officers who had been rapidly
promoted or commissioned from the ranks in
wartime. In 1970, fear that they would be asked to
give up their status and remunerations nearly led to
a mutiny by certain field officers in the 2nd Division.
On March 6, therefore, Brigadier Hassan Katsina,
Army Chief of Staff, announced that there would be
no general demobilization – even though the Army
had grown in size from 10,000 to approximately
250,000 men. Gowon himself, acutely aware of the
inherent instability of military regimes would later be
quoted by the Chicago Daily News on August 29 as
saying:
“The trouble with military rule is that every colonel or
general is soon full of ambition. The navy takes over
today and the army tomorrow”
He was right.
However, in his book, “Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria”,
Kirk-Greene reflected on a quotation from JG
Randall’s book Lincoln, “One can say that [he] was
honest, but not that the country was free from
corruption during [his] administration.” Even at this
stage some of Gowon’s Governors were already
perfecting the art of provocation. Back in February
1970, for example, as domestic and international
organizations were scrambling to rush food and
medical supplies into starving Biafran enclaves, and
plant yam seedlings, Rivers State Governor Diete-
Spiff ordered champagne and caviare for a wedding.
The act created an international Press furor – but it
would not be the last.
From an ethnic standpoint, one of the consequences
of the creation of 12 States and the ethnic
distribution of top policy making appointments at the
center in his regime was that none of the three major
ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo) exercised much
political power. Unlike during the first republic, the
minorities were in a very strong position. On a
strategic political level Gowon had to decide whether
to pursue post-war constitutional or administrative
reforms prior to handing over to civilians.
Meanwhile, with the war now over, Colonel Murtala
Mohammed ran into Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo
again and reportedly said:
“We told you not to end the war the way you did so
as to sort things out, you went gadam…gadam…
gadam…and finished it. And now you have a lion in
your hand, a lion that does not roar, bite nor claw –
absolutely inefficient and ineffective.”
The Nine Point Plan
In October 1970, Gowon announced a six-year nine-
point plan, which he said, must be accomplished
“before the government of the country can be
handed over with a full sense of responsibility”.
The points were as follows:
1. Reorganization of the Armed Forces.
2. Implementation of the National Development Plan
and reconstruction of wartime damage.
3. Eradication of corruption.
4. Creation of more States.
5. Adoption of a new Constitution.
6. Introduction of a new revenue allocation formula.
7. Conducting a National census.
8. Organization of new genuinely national political
parties.
9. Organization of elections at state and federal level.
According to Gowon, “The target year for completing
our political program and returning the country to
normal constitutional government is 1976.”
www.dawodu.com/omoigui39.htm

General Yakubu Cinwa Gowon was the fifth child of
his father – a Christian evangelist who had to take up
farming (once again) after relocating from Pankshin
in modern day Plateau State to Wusasa near Zaria.
He was born in October 1934 and grew up in humble
and sometimes difficult circumstances occasioned by
difficulties his father had trying to settle down as an
evangelist in his new home – appropriately described
as an island in an otherwise predominantly Islamic
environment. Gowon’s family miraculously survived
the hardships of those difficult years – sometimes
unsure of the next meal - simply by having faith. His
father was a highly principled moralist whose
missionary imprint would deeply influence his son’s
future career. His mother was reportedly very strict.
Gowon attended then Government (now Barewa)
College Zaria. Thus, he shared the same alma mater
with some of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC)
leaders and senior northern Army officers of his day.
As is well known, these leaders were assassinated on
January 15, 1966. Gowon himself narrowly escaped
being killed. One of the students who was four years
his junior at the same school was later to emerge as
his political and military rival. The name of the
student (at that time) was Murtala Rufai Mohammed.
Although his eldest brother died on active service
during the Second World War and another brother
survived the conflict, how Yakubu Gowon decided to
enter the Army is quite interesting. Encouraged by
his British Principal and Vice-Principal to go military,
he was nevertheless torn between a career in the
Army and competing options as a teacher, engineer,
or physician. So he wrote out the options on little
pieces of paper placed them inside a Bible and
prayed. Then, with his eyes closed, he opened the
Bible and picked one at random. It was the Army.
Throughout his military career he would repeatedly
approach issues with a rifle in one hand and a Bible
in the other. Years later he would come to be
regarded by most as a model of a “kinder, gentler”
soldier. Some have nicknamed him “The Preacher”.
In 1954, after passing an entrance examination, he
attended several interviews before being sent to the
Regular Officers Cadet School at Teshie in Ghana –
along with Patrick Anwuna, Alexander Madiebo,
Michael Okwechime and Arthur Unegbe. This was
followed by a course at Eton Hall in Chester, UK,
followed by formal cadet training at the Royal
Military Academy, Sandhurst (RMAS). He was a Cadet
Sergeant at the RMAS and was commissioned 2/Lt in
December 1956. It was at the RMAS that he acquired
the nickname “Jack,” the closest sound to “Yakubu”
his British instructors could think of.
Gowon then attended the Young Officers Course at
Hythe and the School of Infantry at Warminster
before returning to Nigeria in July 1957. He was
initially a platoon commander at the 4QNR, Ibadan
before returning to Ghana for training as a Mortar
Officer followed by another support weapons course
in England. When he came back to Nigeria in
September 1959, he was made the adjutant to the
4QNR.
From January to May 1960, Gowon saw action as a
Platoon Commander during the Cameroon counter-
insurgency campaign. In November he was deployed
for ONUC along with the rest of the 4QNR under Lt.
Col. Rolo Price to Manono in Katanga, Congo. In
Congo he was recommended for the Military Cross
but did not get it. Upon his return he was made a
Staff Officer at AHQ. In 1962, as a Captain, he
attended the Staff College at Camberley, UK.
In January 1963 he was appointed the Brigade Major
at the Nigerian Brigade HQ, Luluaborg, Congo. When
he returned he was promoted Lt. Col. and appointed
the first Nigerian Adjutant General at the AHQ. It was
as the Adjutant General that he spotted a young
Lieutenant from the 4th battalion whose height,
turnout and ramrod stiff poise convinced Gowon that
he was a good material for the ceremonial Federal
Guards Company in Lagos. The name of that officer
was Joseph Nanven Garba.
In May 1965, he was off again, this time to attend the
Joint Services Staff College (JSSC) at Lartimer, UK. It
was upon his return from the JSSC in January 1966
that Gowon was appointed the Commander of the
2nd Battalion at Ikeja Barracks.
As incoming Commander of the 2nd Battalion,
Gowon, along with some key company commanders
like Majors Igboba (from the Midwest) and Anago
(from Cameroons), played a key role in putting down
the violent weekend January 15 mutiny in Lagos. All
this occurred in spite of an alleged attempt to delay
handing over the Ikeja battalion to him by Lt. Col.
Hilary Njoku - who was later said by one of the
January mutineers (Major Ademoyega) to have had
foreknowledge of the plot. After taking power from
the rump civilian cabinet – ostensibly to restore law
and order - Major General Ironsi later appointed
Gowon – the only surviving senior officer of northern
origin - Chief of Staff (Army), thus inadvertently
denying him his first – and only – career chance to
hold a field command. Njoku became the
Commander of the 2nd Brigade. Igboba took over the
2nd Battalion. The position of Chief of Staff (Army)
was a staff appointment – essentially the “chief
clerk” to the Supreme Commander.
In an interview with the Army Historical Team,
Gowon insists that he was not present at the meeting
between General Ironsi and the surviving federal
cabinet, at which Ironsi was allegedly “requested” to
take political power. He was only told later (at a
meeting of Army Officers) that the civilian cabinet
had “handed over.” It was not until much later that
he heard alternative accounts of what had actually
transpired with the civilian cabinet. Had he known at
the time – he says - that the cabinet did not
voluntarily hand over power to Ironsi as he was led to
believe, he would not have supported Ironsi’s
emergence as Head of State and Supreme
Commander. I suspect that Gowon’s confidence in
making this assertion comes from the fact that he
was – for just under 48 hours – de facto Commanding
Officer of the 2nd Battalion Ikeja whose troops were
in control of the streets of Lagos.
As Chief of Staff (Army), he says he repeatedly
advised General Ironsi to court-martial and punish
the January mutineers in the interest of Army
discipline. However, when ordered to do so, he
dutifully went around Barracks in the country in an
effort to pacify troops of northern origin – prior to
Ironsi’s nationwide tour. This was reportedly a very
difficult assignment because of his personal
relationship with many of the Lagos victims of the
January putsch. Aside from being military colleagues,
Lt. Col. James Pam, for example, was virtually like a
brother to him. Brigadier Maimalari, Colonel Kur
Mohammed and Lt. Col. Abogo Largema were former
schoolmates at Barewa (as was Pam). Lt. Col. Arthur
Unegbe was his classmate at Sandhurst – and,
according to one unconfirmed account – Gowon may
have been the Best man at his wedding

On July 29, 1975 General Gowon was overthrown in a
coup. The new regime decided to question the 1971
and 1975 Gowon-Ahidjo maritime agreements –
without really understanding the issues. In no time
the country got the impression that Gowon had given
away the “Bakassi peninsula”, an unfortunate and
totally false notion which persists in many quarters
to this day. Many commentators still do not
understand the difference between the maritime and
land components of the dispute. Nor do many realize
that the peninsula had been ceded by a series of
actions and inactions beginning as far back as 1913,
reconfirmed when Nigeria became independent in
1960, finalized with the 1961 plebiscite and affirmed
with the 1964 OAU declaration. That was the
geopolitical reality when Lt. Col. Gowon came to
power in 1966.
In late 1975, some Nigerian migrant workers were
executed at the Nigerian Embassy in Malabo,
Equatorial Guinea, allegedly prompting then Head of
State General Murtala Muhammed to order planning
and preparation for an invasion and subsequent
annexation, which was eventually put off.
(International Herald Tribune, February 28, 1976)
___________
POST-SCRIPT
1976
The Nigerian National Atlas was first published, again
showing the Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun - as all
maps since 1961 had shown. The forward was
written and signed by then Lt. General Obasanjo,
then Head of State, who succeeded General
Muhammed after the coup of February 1976
1978
Late Chief R. O. Coker (of the Coker-Ngo Line) retired
from the civil service in 1978. He was the recipient of
a National Award from the Obasanjo-1 government in
1979 for meritorious service.
1979
The 1979 constitution made no mention of a
“Bakassi Local Government.” In any case local
governments as listed in the present 1999
constitution do not have their borders defined by
standard coordinates. They are merely listed.
In his book “Diplomatic Soldiering, Spectrum Books,
1987” which discusses the conduct of Nigerian
foreign Policy from 1975 – 79, late General Joe Garba,
then the Foreign Minister, describes several incidents
of “rough handling of Nigerians in the small fishing
villages along the porous borders. The discovery of
offshore oil in the area of Rio del Rey only
compounded our problems.” Garba wrote:
“…….we resisted the temptation to use force.” I was
convinced that Nigeria’s African policies would be
seriously damaged if we took any retaliatory action
against border violations by either Cameroun or
Chad. Quiet bilateral diplomacy was the best course
with essentially local problems that were bound to
keep recurring.” (page 44)
New Calabar Channel
The Shagari government which came to office in
October 1979, also refused to recognize the “Coker-
Ngo” line. However, the Nigerian Ports Authority,
oblivious to the sensitive nature of the Calabar
channel controversy and its effect on the definition of
Nigeria's maritime border, had begun dredging a
new channel further west of the one in place at the
time of the 1913 treaty. They placed a new line of
buoys nearer the Nigerian side sometime between
1976 and 1982. The old channel is, therefore, no
longer shown on the admiralty chart No. 3433 in the
1978 and 1982 editions. Those unfamiliar with the
history of the Cross-Calabar-Akwa Yafe river channel
controversy may thus be lulled into underestimating
the error of the 3-mile compromise line of 1971 and
its Coker-Ngo extension particularly if they use the
new channel as the frame of reference.
Fortunately, the 1913 Treaty states:
“XXIII. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent
British or German vessels, whether public or
private, from using the most convenient
course between the open sea and the
Akwayafe River, and from navigating that river
without any differential treatment whatever.”
XXIV. The marking, dredging, or buoying of the
navigable channel of the Akwayafe River from
the 3-mile limit landward may be carried out,
after agreement between the two
Governments, either by the German or British
Government, or by both.
XXV. The marking, dredging, or buoying of the
navigable channels of the Cross and Calabar
Rivers from the 3-mile limit landward shall be
carried out by the British Government at the
discretion of that Government. "
Thus, since the new channel on Cross/Calabar River
is man-made, it does not preclude the use of the
disused channel for purposes of negotiation
1981
On May 16, 1981 Nigerian soldiers in three canoes
were ambushed and killed by Camerounian soldiers
[Shehu Shagari: Beckoned to Serve", Heinemann
2001, page 358]. Nigeria said the incident took place
on the Akpa Yafe (along the 1913 border) while
Cameroun said it took place on the Rio del Rey deep
inside Cameroun on the other side of the peninsula.
Eventually, on July 20, 1981, Cameroun apologized,
based presumably on the Nigerian insistence that it’s
soldiers were on the Akpa Yafe (although there are
some who still feel to this day they were actually on
the Rio-del-Rey). Nigeria did not press the case then
that even if the soldiers had been killed along the
Rio-del-Rey, Cameroun still owed an apology, thus
signalling that the Shagari government – at least
subconsciously – recognized the 1913 Treaty as all
previous governments had done. Treaty
considerations aside, African countries ought to avoid
unnecessary bloodshed over frivolous borders drawn
by white men.
1982
On May 12, 1982 Professor Geoffrey Marston, LLB,
LLM, Ph.D., of Cambridge University, submitted a
detailed report commissioned by Nigeria, to then
Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Chief ROA
Akinjide representing the government of President
Shehu Shagari. The Professor advised that:
"The boundary regime established by the Anglo-
German Agreements of 13 March 1913 and 6 July
1914 is binding on both Nigeria and Cameroun by
virtue of a rule of customary international law
reflected in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in respect of Treaties, 1978, as
well as in the Declaration of the Organization of
African Unity of July 1964 and, in respect of Nigeria,
the Exchange of Notes with the United Kingdom of 1
October 1960. This regime cannot thus be abrogated
or modified unilaterally by either Nigeria or
Cameroun."
This point of view was in line with the opinion of
Teslim Elias back in 1970. No decisive action – except
co-locating Nigerian Oil rigs in the area and freely
navigating the approaches to AkpaYafe - appears to
have been taken on the maritime aspects of the
report until the government left office in December
1983. Such actions could have included any one of
the following options, singly or in combination:
(a) Accept the 1975 Gowon/Ahidjo boundary line
because of the benefits of its vector.
(b) Insist, backed by force, on the boundary line
being moved at least to the longitude of Point 12 on
chart 3433 in order to be totally clear of the
traditional channel of Cross/ Calabar Rivers. The
implication of this would have been to accept part
(but not all) of the Gowon/Ahidjo Agreement. Nigeria
should have declared its intention to dredge the old
channel in accordance with Articles 21 and 25 of the
1913 Treaty.
(c) Reject the Gowon/Ahidjo Agreement altogether
from Bakasi Point/King Point and insist on fresh
negotiations as a matter of urgency. For this option
to have any meaning Nigeria would have had to show
physical presence in the area.
(d) Move into the maritime area south of Point 20 to
prevent Cameroun from taking the initiative in oil
exploration and exploitation in the area.
(e) Delineate a zone of interest in the Exclusive
Economic Zone vis-à-vis Camerouns, Equatorial
Guinea and Sao Tome Principe.
(f) Realising that Cameroun is normally
uncompromising in negotiations, Nigeria should take
a decisive stand in the area, considering its strategic
and economic importance.
Instead, however, according to former President
Shagari,
“Henceforth, relations between our two countries
grew from strength to strength while the border
dispute was carefully buried in files, maps and legal
documents.”
It is possible that the departure from office in
November 1982 of Cameroun President Ahidjo,
allegedly after being tricked by his physician about
the state of his health, could have contributed to this
“improvement” in Nigeria-Cameroun relations. He
eventually died in exile in November 1989. However,
the evil day was only being postponed and the
Nigerian public grew increasingly misinformed about
the details of the dispute, confusing the maritime
aspects with the land aspect.
Indeed, the former President observed in his
memoirs that minor border incidents occurred with
other countries neighboring Nigeria. Shagari wrote:
“……What complicated the Cameroonian case,
however, was that many Nigerians reside in
Cameroonian territory where they spend part of their
lives to fish or farm. While there in search of
livelihood, they often criss-cross the boundaries. Also
fishermen and traders did not bother about the
actual position of the borders, while in the territorial
waters of each of the two countries, until they were
advised or confronted as the case may be.”
It would seem therefore, that at least as far as the
land border is concerned, President Shagari and the
Nigerian government had no illusions about the
location (i.e. per the 1913 Treaty). The problem
seemed to be caused by those local villagers who did
not know where the borderlines really were.

1969
In 1969 a "Boundary Section" was established in the
Federal Survey Department of the Nigerian Federal
Ministry of Works. The surveyor who was asked to
run the office as "Head of Boundaries", arrived from
outside Lagos to find that the rooms allocated to him
had no chairs or desks. That was the level of
importance that "Boundaries" was given. No one
knew then that Nigeria would in due course be
consumed by a bitter international boundary dispute,
not to mention all the domestic ones. Needless to say
that the boundary section soon became the
databank, particularly for Nigeria’s International
boundaries and later for internal boundaries.
POST-WAR ISSUES
1970
After the war, General Gowon of Nigeria – with
Ahidjo’s support - decreed that the name “Bight of
Biafra” be removed from maps of the Gulf of Guinea
close to the Nigeria-Cameroun-Equatorial Guinea
border area. It was renamed “Bight of Bonny”.
Issues raised by wartime policing of the border to
prevent infiltration and exfiltration resurrected the
old quest to clarify the boundary. It was amplified by
reports that Cameroun had been exploring for Oil
along the undemarcated maritime border between
both countries while Nigeria was busy fighting its
civil war. A meeting of the Nigeria-Cameroun
Boundary Commission, therefore, took place at
Yaounde, Cameroun from August 12-14. The Nigerian
Ambassador as well as the Cameroun Foreign
Minister opened the meeting. However, they both
subsequently left and ceded authority to technical
experts from the Surveys, Fisheries, Navy,
Immigration, Justice, External Affairs, Cabinet Office
etc. departments of both countries. The most senior
Nigerian civil servant present who thus led the
delegation was Chief R. Oluwole Coker, Director of
Federal Surveys. The SouthEastern State (now Cross-
River and Aqua Ibom) was strongly represented by
technical and legal experts from the State
Government. Neither General Gowon nor Alhaji
Ahidjo was present.
Although the draft agenda submitted by Nigeria for
consideration included fresh physical and
administrative considerations for delimiting the
boundary, after considerable deliberation, the joint
commission agreed to use the 1913 Anglo-German
Treaty. The South-Eastern delegation for instance,
had initially brought cartons of tax receipts paid by
residents of Bakassi area to the Nigerian government
as a way to make a claim over the peninsula.
However, it later became apparent that the same
residents also paid taxes to the Cameroun
authorities. Many had homes on both sides of the
border. They even had fishing villages with precisely
the same name on both sides of the border.
Eventually, both sides agreed to demarcate the
border in three sectors, beginning with the maritime
sector.
When the Nigerian delegation got back to Nigeria,
interested parties, unsatisfied with the decision to
use the 1913 Treaty as the legal paradigm (and
unaware that the Balewa government had long
settled this issue), approached the Foreign Minister,
Dr. Okoi Arikpo. Arikpo, a sophisticated
anthropologist and lawyer, who was himself from
South-Eastern state, asked then Attorney General
Teslim Elias for a formal legal opinion on the matter
to guide him in making recommendations to the
Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon. The Nigerian
Mission at the UN was also contacted to clarify
whether residents of the Bakassi peninsula had taken
part in the 1961 plebiscite. On September 3rd, 1970
Teslim Elias, Nigeria's Attorney General who was also
a Professor of Law at the University of Lagos and
former academician at Oxford University, wrote his
landmark legal opinion [http://www.gamji.com/
nowa43.htm]. Unambiguously, he stated "This
Ministry has given a most careful consideration to
the whole question in the light of all the available
evidence, and the conclusion is that there is no legal
basis for Nigeria’s claims to the Bakasi peninsula for
the reasons stated herein........According to the
information received from the Federal Directorate of
Surveys, the Bakasi Peninsula has never been
included as part of Nigeria in the administrative
maps of Nigeria since the then Southern Cameroons
ceased to be part of Nigeria in 1961. Also, the
Northern Region, Western Region and Eastern Region
(Definition of Boundaries) proclamation 1954 (L. N.
126 of 154) showed the Bakasi Peninsula as forming
part of the then Southern Cameroons. Moreover, by a
Diplomatic Note No, 570 of March 27, 1962, from
your ministry to the embassy of the Cameroons in
Lagos, to which was attached a map prepared by the
Federal Surveys, Nigeria recognized the Bakasi
Peninsula as forming part of the Cameroons." Arikpo
supported Elias and recommended that Gowon not
pursue the peninsula itself as an issue during
boundary meetings with Ahidjo. Gowon was advised
to focus on the maritime border - as defined by the
1913 Anglo-German Treaty - whenever he eventually
met with Ahidjo. That is what Gowon did.
Subsequently, the UN plebiscite report arrived from
New York - accompanied by a ward and polling
station map - showing villages in the peninsula as
locations of polling stations during the 1961
plebiscite. In fact a majority of residents there voted -
along with the rest of southern Cameroons - not to
join Nigeria. This political information merely
confirmed the legal views of those who felt the
matter should not be pursued. (Note that there is no
such thing as a “Bakassi Village”. Bakassi is an area.
Without a map one would not know which villages
fall where. In interpreting it, the migrant nature of
the fishing settlements should also be noted.)
UNDERSTANDING THE 1913 TREATY AS A BASIS
FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Once the Nigerian Ministry of Justice declared that
the 1913 treaty was the legal context for boundary
discussions with Cameroun, and the Ministry of
External Affairs concurred, everything else was
subordinated to that legal opinion. Therefore, I
strongly advise readers who want to understand
what transpired under Gowon, not to read this
section without first reading the 1913 Anglo-German
Treaty and reviewing a map.
[ http://coalter@sovereigngeographic.com/
images/cameroon.pdf
]
Researchers in the Boundaries section of Surveys
looking for technical guidance in interpreting the
1913 treaty searched many sources as well as
Nigeria's National Archives Libraries for material. It
turns out that then Dr. John R. Victor Prescott, now a
Professor Emeritus at the University of Melbourne in
Australia, used to be a Surveyor at Federal Surveys in
Nigeria and later a lecturer in Geography at the
University of Ibadan from 1956-61. He wrote a PhD
thesis titled "The evolution of Nigeria's political
boundaries", a copy of which was deposited at the
University of Ibadan library. Most of the original PhD
work can be found in the following book:
Prescott, J.R.V., 1971: The Evolution of Nigeria's
International & Regional Boundaries 1961-1971.
(B.C. Geog. Series No.13), Vancouver: Tantalus
Research Ltd.
He had predicted that there would be considerable
difficulty in determining the navigable channel of the
Nigeria-Cameroun maritime boundary in accordance
with the 1913 treaty.
According to a "Dictionary of Geography" published
by the Oxford University Press, the german word
"thalweg" (also written "talwec" or "talweg" refers to
"the line of the fastest flow along the course of a
river" which usually crosses and recrosses the stream
channel. From a geological point of view it refers to
"the line defining the lowest points along the length
of a river bed or valley or subterranean stream". In
other words, the deepest part of a river or channel or
lowest point of a channel section is the thalweg. The
thalweg affects the distribution of sediments in a
river because it gathers sediments from the bank on
one side and deposits them on the other side,
forming point bars where the sediments are
deposited. With time it may even change the course
of the river. These principles explain why the 1913
Treaty contain the following provisions:
"XIX. Should the thalweg of the Lower Akwayafe,
upstream from the line Bakasi Point-King Point,
change its position in such a way as to affect the
relative positions of the thalweg and the Mangrove
Islands, a new adjustment of the boundary shall be
made, on the basis of the new positions, as
determined by a map to be made for the purpose.
XX. Should the lower course of the Akwayafe so
change its mouth as to transfer it to the Rio del Rey,
it is agreed that the area now known as the Bakasi
Peninsula shall still remain German territory. The
same condition applies to any portion of territory now
agreed to as being British, which may be cut off in a
similar way."
From the foregoing it is easy to see how the
definition of a thalweg can be problematic,
particularly if there are seasonal changes in the size
of the river. During the dry season, for example,
when water volume shrinks, the residual channel
may be assymmetrically located away from the
middle of the river valley. Indeed there is a case of a
boundary river in Adamawa State which changed
course. Because the specifications of the boundary at
that point did not contain provisions for such an
eventuality (as was written into the detailed
negotiations for Bakassi peninsula), the
Camerounians hurried to plant crops on the former
riverbed to prevent it from redirecting itself. In the
case of the Nigeria-Cameroun maritime border
(based on the 1913 Treaty), the Akpa Yafe river is
east of the Calabar Estuary into which both the
Calabar and Cross rivers empty. It is a small river,
which intersects with the Calabar estuary low down
near where the estuary empties into the Gulf of
Guinea. Ordinarily, if there is only one approach
channel to the Calabar estuary and if the position of
that approach channel does not change either
seasonally or after major storms, a good way to
determine the location of the channel is on the basis
of morphology (to account for sediment shift).
However, when one is dealing with a river per se, the
thalweg or deepest continuous channel used by
vessels is typically used to determine the boundary.
A thalweg can also be used for an approach channel
if there are dangerous shoal waters on either side of
it.
When one combines the effect of three different
rivers emptying into an estuary, however, the
question of dominant flow enters the equation. The
flow channels of the dominant rivers (Calabar and
Cross) shift that of the smaller river (Akpa Yafe)
away. Thus, the true thalweg of the Akpa Yafe is very
close to the banks of the Bakassi peninsula. The
British knew this when they specified in the 1913
treaty that
"XXI. From the centre of the navigable channel
on a line joining Bakasi Point and King Point,
the boundary shall follow the centre of the
navigable channel of the Akwayafe River as far
as the 3-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction.
For the purpose of defining this boundary, the
navigable channel of the Akwayafe River shall
be considered to lie wholly to the east of the
navigable channel of the Cross and Calabar
Rivers."
In fact, as far back as 1907 the Germans had
requested for the frontier to be continued out to sea
after reaching the mouth of the Akwa Yafe, all the
way to “the middle of the channel of the mouth of
the Old Calabar River”. The British, (according to
minutes made by a colonial official by the name
Strachey) refused this request and told the Germans
the line should follow the shore of the Bakassi
peninsula along the thalweg of the Akwa Yafe when
the actual mouth of that river was reached. In
exchange for not insisting on the impingement of the
Calabar river channel the British agreed to abrogate
Article 3 of the old Anglo-German agreement of April
14, 1893 which had prevented the Germans from
establishing trading settlements on the Bakassi
peninsula proper.
For those interested, a detailed discussion of tidal
waters can be found in the book: " 'Water
boundaries' by George M.Cole (1997) John Wiley:
New York. ISBN 0-471-17929-9."
Changing Coastlines
Although it did not feature during the negotiations,
the innocuous phrases in the 1913 Treaty, which
read "XXI. From the centre of the navigable channel
on a line joining Bakasi Point and King Point, the
boundary shall follow the centre of the navigable
channel of the Akwayafe River as far as the 3-mile
limit of territorial jurisdiction." and "XXII. The 3-mile
limit shall, as regards the mouth of the estuary, be
taken as a line 3 nautical miles seaward of a line
joining Sandy Point and Tom Shot Point" can
potentially be controversial if taken out of context. As
far back as 1903, European sailors had commented
on the changing nature and position of the coastline.
The exact location of the Bakasi, King, Sandy and
Tom Shot points, therefore, were subject to change
with time. In the days before Global Positioning
System (GPS) Technology, the location of rivers and
points was based on British Admiralty maps, updated
at regular intervals. Any clarification with regard to
the original treaty, therefore, would be meaningless
if taken out of context of the original maps that
accompanied the 1913 Treaty.

1967
After the events of late 1966, but before the civil war
actually broke out, Douala airport in Cameroun was a
favorite destination of foreign-based Ndigbo
returning to the Eastern region. It was also a
favourite route for getting out of Nigeria until the
border areas were partially secured by federal
Nigerian Troops during the war. In late May 1967,
following the mandate granted to Lt. Col. Ojukwu by
the Eastern Consultative Assembly to secede Lt. Col.
Gowon created 12 new States in Nigeria - including
the South-Eastern State headed by Major U. J.
Esuene, an Ibibio officer in the Air Force. The creation
of the South-Eastern State from the former eastern
region was not unnoticed across the border and was
a factor in rekindling interest in rejoining Nigeria
among Efik and Ibibio residents of Bakassi peninsula
- many of whom had actually voted in 1961 not to
pursue integration with Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria's
Consul-General at Buea, SJ King, transferred from the
foreign service to his home South-Eastern State
where he later became the Permanent Secretary.
CALABAR SECTOR DURING THE CIVIL WAR
In July, the Nigerian Civil War broke out - and lasted
until January 1970. During the war, both Nigeria and
Biafra were in an international rat race for support
and recognition. Nigeria lobbied its neighbors to
prevent Biafra from using their territory as either a
staging point for military operations or through-put
for weapons supply. Very early in the campaign a
decision was made to create a vise around Biafra by
attacking simultaneously from the North and the sea.
During operations to take Calabar on October 17 - 19,
the threat of the Bakassi peninsula being used to
outflank and surprise the Nigerian task force and
dominate the approach channel to the Calabar
estuary became an issue, necessitating more specific
diplomatic exchanges with Cameroun to clarify its
intentions. In fact, troops of the 12 Brigade, 3rd
Marine Commando under Major (later Lt. Col.) R.
Aliyu, reporting to Colonel (later Brigadier) B.
Adekunle, supported by naval and air bombardment,
could not break out from Calabar for almost a month,
only barely holding on to the town.
Major Ogbo Oji of the 9th battalion, 52 Biafran Bde,
initially led the Biafran resistance at Calabar (until he
was badly wounded). The Brigade had no
Commander after Colonel Eze was removed in
curious circumstances (Madiebo: The Nigerian
Revolution and the Biafran War, Fourth Dimension
Publishers, 1980). Lt. Col. David Okafor who was later
reinforced by Lt. Col. Adigio of the 7th battalion
replaced Oji. They were both later replaced - in
controversy - by Majors Odigwe and Omerua under a
newly formed 56 Brigade under Lt. Col Festus
Akagha who had barely escaped - in controversial
circumstances - from the Midwestern theater.
European mercenaries later took over that front. To
show its importance to Biafra, nearly all-available
ammunition - which was never enough to begin with
- was sent to that front. Nigeria got assurances from
Cameroun that the Bakassi peninsula - which Nigeria
had acknowledged as far back as 1962 was in
Cameroun and, therefore, outside its control - would
not be used by hostile elements. This pre-empted
contingency plans for "hot pursuit" operations across
the border and safeguarded the rear as federal troops
slowly pushed east of the Cross river against initially
determined Biafran troops who, nevertheless, were
eventually undermined by internal conflicts within
the Biafran political, administrative and military
structure.
The federal plan was to link up through Oban with
1st Division federal elements coming down from
Ikom against Biafran forces led by Lt. Col. Ochei. The
objective was to cut off the Biafran border point with
Cameroun at Ikang. This was finally achieved in
December. However, the road to Ikom along with the
towns of Ikot Okpara, Amolo Water Town, Mbabu Owa
and Agobi-Iwolo were not taken until the end of
January 1968, courtesy of a controversial Biafran
withdrawal ordered by European mercenaries hired
by Ojukwu. Note that in his book "My Command"
written by General Obasanjo (rtd) and published by
Heinemann in 1981, all the maps of that sector show
the Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun (page 93). In his
book “The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970. Frank
Cass, 1971” N.U. Akpan, the Secretary to the Eastern
Regional and later Biafran government, who is
himself of South-Eastern origin, also shows the
Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun in a map titled “Map
of Eastern Nigeria declared Biafra, 30th May,
1967” (page 20). The war did not begin until July 6th.
THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF CAMEROUN
AND ITS ATTITUDE TO THE NIGERIAN WAR
Late President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun was a
Fulani man whose father was originally from Kano in
Nigeria. His mother was from Garoua in Cameroun. In
fact Ahidjo grew up around Yola and Mubi in Nigeria
and was a playmate of Senator Iya Abubakar. His
former District Head in Nigeria, Ambassador Malabu,
was made Ambassador to Cameroun to cement the
relationship. It is said that every time late Alhaji
Ahidjo saw late Alhaji Malabu he would genuflect.
Thus, Nigeria gained and sustained Cameroun's
support during the civil war, not by territorial
concessions as have been widely and wrongly
reported, but by manipulating primordial links
between Ahidjo and Northern Nigeria.
In addition, Ahidjo and key elements in the
francophone Cameroun bureaucracy were afraid of
the effect - on southern Cameroons - of a precedent
for secession by supporting Biafra. It was not a secret
that southern Cameroons had always preferred self-
determination. They were also in possession of french
intelligence reports that Biafra would someday annex
the former Southern Cameroon along with Fernando
Po in a swath of territorial acquisitions in the area of
the "Bight of Biafra". Adult male Ndigbo living in
Cameroun at that time were, therefore, required
every Saturday to report to designated open fields
and kept there for many hours before being released
by Police. In this manner Ahidjo kept a tight reign on
their movements and threw them off balance. Not to
report usually led to unwelcome domestic visits by
Cameroun gendarmes. In supporting Biafra, France
was interested in breaking up Nigeria, the large
threatening anglophone nation-state, but was not
interested in the balkanization of Cameroun which it,
therefore, kept discreetly informed of goings on
inside Biafra. Such "intelligence" and "rumors" about
alleged future Biafran intentions, were never actually
officially confirmed by anyone but it played into old
rivalries in the NCNC and Eastern region going back
to the days that Southern Cameroons was
administered alongside Nigeria as a Trusteeship
territory.
1968
Equatorial Guinea, the country across from and next
to Nigeria and Cameroun in the Gulf of Guinea gained
independence and supported the federal side in the
Nigerian civil war. The immediate effect of this was
the termination of relief flights to Biafra.

THE PLEBISCITE
In October 1961, therefore, following the UN
Plebiscite of February 11th, the Southern Cameroons
(including the Bakassi peninsula) was federated with
the Republic of Cameroun, while the Northern
Cameroons joined Nigeria [http://
www.iupjournals.org/africatoday/aft47-2.html]. Thus,
by default, and by plebiscite, the Nigeria-Cameroun
boundary in the south - as described by the Section F
of the Legal Notice 126 of 1954-58 - and clearly
marked with resurveyed 1913 beacons, reverted to
the old Anglo-German border which antedated
Nigeria's amalgamation (http://www.gamji.com/
nowa46.htm). An Anglo-French treaty following the
partition of German Kamerun after World War 1
specified the portion in the North.
The results of the plebiscite in the North were heavily
influenced by the single-mindedness, leadership and
strategic genius of the Sardauna of Sokoto, the late
Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, assisted by Mr D.J.M. Muffett,
then Resident General in the Northern Cameroons.
Cameroun reacted unfavorably to it and even went to
the ICJ to file a complaint that voting was irregular.
However, the complaint was not sustained. The
results in the south reflected personal, ethnic and
political rivalries within southern Nigeria and
Cameroon, confusing interpretation of the plebiscite
questions on the part of villagers, background
influence from Francophone interests, and failure of
the Nigerian intelligentsia and government to
appreciate the strategic implications of what was
going on. It would prove to be a costly oversight
down the road.
Nevertheless, Nigeria, perhaps not wanting to rock
the boat, having successfully staved of Cameroun’s
challenge to the northern Cameroons plebiscite,
voted at the UN to approve the results of the
southern Cameroons plebiscite, oblivious to certain
subtle issues of legality, due process and self-interest
that were lurking in the background. Never too
comfortable with the idea, but thinking it could win
autonomy, anglophone Southern Cameroon (along
with Bakassi in the southwestern district) departed
on an uncertain journey to its future with
Francophone Cameroun.
1962
In 1962, Nigeria confirmed its approval of the results
of the plebiscite in a Diplomatic Note No. 570 of
March 27, 1962 to Cameroun, which included a map
showing Bakassi in the newly unified Cameroun.
From then on, until the 1990s Nigeria would have no
serious administrative or military presence in the
peninsula. [Even the much-touted ‘Bakassi local
government’ was only created in 1997, a full three
years AFTER the case at the ICJ had begun]. During
the first republic, in addition to the Embassy in
Yaounde, however, Nigeria opened a consulate in
Buea, capital of the Southern Cameroons - now
Western Cameroun. Presumably this was in
recognition of the large number of Nigerians living in
the region, even after the plebiscite.
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)
1963
In 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was
established. Article III, paragraph 3 of the founding
Charter states: "Respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each state and for its
inalienable right to independent existence." Nigeria
ratified this Charter.
1964
In 1964, Nigeria approved the Cairo Declaration of
the Organization of African Unity of July 1964,
committing African States to the inviolability of
colonial borders. Specifically, AHG/RES 16(1) states:
"Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge
themselves to respect the borders existing on their
achievement of national independence." Nigeria
ratified this declaration, and by implication restated
its commitment to the Nigerian-Cameroun colonial
border, as it had done in 1960 (Exchange of Notes
with the UK) and again in 1962 (Diplomatic Note
570).
BOUDAN AND DANARE DISPUTE
1965
In 1965, a number of border incidents took place
between two villages - Boudan and Danare - near
Ikom, in a forested area of the old boundary. A joint
Nigeria-Cameroun boundary demarcation team was
set up and sent to the area. The late Surveyor O.A.
Aqua as well as Surveyor Dennis Mbata represented
Nigeria. Cameroun was represented, among others
by late Surveyor G. Obenson (who later became a
Professor at the University of Lagos). As had
previously been confirmed in 1960, the area was well
demarcated by the colonial administration (based on
the 1913 Treaty) but the beacons were too far apart.
Thus the purpose of the exercise was to place
intervisible beacons along the old 1913 boundary.
This exercise was suspended on account of the
military coup of January 1966 - and never resumed
until after the civil war.
NIGERIA IN CRISIS
1966
In late 1966, in the tense circumstances following the
northern counter-rebellion of July 29, a plane carrying
weapons - allegedly ordered by Eastern region
Military Governor Lt. Col. Ojukwu - and headed for
Enugu in Nigeria's eastern region crashed over the
Cameroun mountains. It remains unclear to this day
whether the crash was accidental or the plane was
shot down. But Cameroun's President Ahidjo, who
was not informed beforehand of the flight's planned
overpass through Camerounian air space, was highly
irritated and embarassed. He would, from that point
onwards, view the Ojukwu leadership in Eastern
Nigeria - and later Biafra - with suspicion.

COUNTDOWN TO THE UN PLEBISCITE
1949 – 1954
As we noted previously, following the Second World
War, League of Nation mandates were replaced by
UN mandates. Dr. E. M. L. Endeley became President
of the Cameroon National Federation in 1949. At that
time southern Cameroons (including Bakassi
peninsula) was administered with Nigeria. Following
a dispute within the Eastern House of Assembly in
Enugu in May 1953, nine out of thirteen delegates
from the Southern Cameroons, who had originally
been elected on the platform of the National Council
for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), opted for
‘neutrality’, claiming that they were not Nigerian. Mr.
S. T. Muna, the only Southern Cameroonian in the
Eastern Executive Council at that time was actually
dismissed. This crisis led to the name change from
“National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons”, as
the NCNC was then known, to “National Council of
Nigerian Citizens.“
During the July 1953 London Constitutional
Conference, Endeley, citing fear of “Nigerian
domination”, requested the unconditional withdrawal
of the Southern Cameroons from the Eastern Region
of Nigeria, and its transformation into a separate
region of its own in line with its trusteeship status.
Britain agreed and implemented separation in 1954,
making the Southern Cameroons (including Bakassi
peninsula) a semi-autonomous quasi-region of the
Nigeria Federation with its own House of Assembly
and Executive Council located at Buea. Endeley was
called the Leader of Government Business, not
Premier, primarily because Southern Cameroons was
not yet a full region. Importantly, the Bakassi
peninsula which was part of Kamerun/Cameroon
since 1913, as inherited in the league of Nations
mandate after World War 1, was also excised from
co-administration with the eastern region along with
the rest of the southern Cameroons at that time.
There is no evidence that anyone made an issue of
the matter then (Nigeria Gazette No. 53 vol. 41,
B389-408; [D440-59]).
1955 – 1960
In 1955 there was a split in Endeley’s party which
was then allied with the Action Group (AG) and John
Ngu Foncha emerged as his rival on the platform of
the new Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP).
This party’s goal was complete secession of southern
Cameroons from Nigeria and eventual reunification
with Francophone Cameroun. Endeley was accused of
abandoning his former stance of pro-unification in
favor of integration with Nigeria. At about the same
time the Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC)
, a Bamileke based radical leftist party in
Francophone Cameroun led by Felix Moumie was
being banned by the French Governor. As they
fought a bitter and violent guerrilla war against
ruthless French troops, they would often cross over
to Bamileke sections of British Cameroons (i.e.
“Nigeria”) for sanctuary.
In mid 1957, there was a Constitutional Conference
in London to resolve issues preparatory to Nigeria’s
independence which was initially proposed for a date
in 1959, but "not later than April 2, 1960." In August
that year, Tafawa Balewa became Premier in an All
Nigeria Federal Executive Council. Among the first
three Federal Ministers from the Eastern region was a
gentleman called Okoi Arikpo. He would later feature
in the post-independence Gowon government.
On September 25th the Willink Commission was set
up to deal with the case of Nigerian minorities.
Interestingly, no submission was made to the panel
regarding the case of Bakassi peninsula, considered
then to be part of southern Cameroons. The Willink
report was published in October 1958 –
recommending against the creation of new regions in
Nigeria. Shortly thereafter the Constitutional
conference resumed in London – and once again the
Bakassi issue was not discussed, nor was the status
of Calabar as a former “protectorate” rather than
“colony” as some have said, an issue.
In the January 1959 southern Cameroons election (in
which Bakassi residents participated), Endeley was
voted out of power and replaced by Foncha, a man
with even less disguised anti-Nigerian instincts. In
October that year, the Enugu based 1st Queens Own
Nigeria regiment (1QONR) was temporarily deployed
to southern Cameroons for “Training”. However,
Bamileke UPC sympathizers in Bamenda viewed this
as a counter-insurgency deployment in support of
the hated French colonial administration. In early
1960, responding to more violence in the area, the
1QONR again returned to Bamenda area in full force,
followed shortly thereafter by the 4QONR from
Ibadan who were deployed further south to Kumba
near the coast. The 5QONR and 3QONR later replaced
both battalions respectively – followed later by the
2QONR. These shows of military force did not endear
Nigeria to certain opinion leaders in the local
population.
On October 1, 1960 Nigeria became independent.
Our first Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa signed
an exchange of notes with the United Kingdom
saying (inter alia), that
“….it is the understanding of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland that the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria agree to the
following provisions:
“(i) all obligations and responsibilities of the
Government of the United Kingdom which arises
from any valid international instrument shall,
henceforth, in so far as such instrument may be held
to have application to Nigeria, be assumed by the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria.
(ii) the rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the
Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of the
application of any such international instrument to
Nigeria shall henceforth be enjoyed by the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria……..”
By customary international law, therefore, “Nigeria”
inherited (and agreed without question) all the
present international boundary regimes of Nigeria –
with Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Chad and Cameroon -
as originally defined by various colonial Anglo-French
and Anglo-German Treaties. Therefore, the southern
Cameroons (inclusive of the Bakassi peninsula),
which was now under separate direct British rule as a
trusteeship territory, asked Nigerian troops to leave.
A British Battalion replaced them.
However, 1QONR, supported by the new Recce Unit
of the newly independent Nigerian Army were then
deployed in an internal security precaution along the
frontier to prevent spill-over of violence. The old
Anglo-German border of 1913 was resurveyed at this
time by Nigerian military foot patrols to confirm the
location of old beacons and new Police Posts were
constructed along it for clarity. [NJ Miners: The
Nigerian Army 1956-1966, Methuen 1971, page
73-74]
It was against this background that most southern
Cameroonians favored self-determination –
independent of BOTH Nigeria and Francophone
Cameroun. However, conflicting interests on the
international scene subverted their political will. The
pan-Africanist movement, led by Nkrumah, for
example, was opposed to the emergence of small
African states. Britain was initially afraid that an
allegedly economically unviable “Southern
Cameroons” would be an albatross around its
taxpayers and thus preferred that it join with large
Nigeria next door. Although southern Cameroonian
leaders preferred that the plebiscite provide a simple
choice between "integration with Nigeria" or
"secession and independence", the UN imposed
different questions on the electorate. In October
1959, General Assembly Resolution 1352 XIV,
composed the choices as follows:
(I) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining
the independent Federation of Nigeria?
or
(II) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining
the independent Republic of Cameroun?
However, popular opposition to these choices
compelled both Foncha and Endeley to request that
southern Cameroons simply be granted
independence. Initial momentum in this direction
and talks in London in November 1960, however,
collapsed in acrimony and the UN had its way. In the
countdown to the plebiscite, reunification with
Francophone Cameroun was marketed by well-
funded Francophone groups as a loose union in which
the Southern Cameroons would maintain self-rule.
The most prominent among these pro-unification
forces were elements of the Bamileke tribe who was
split by the post-World War 1 partition into British
and French territories. Its own arrangements for
independence in 1960 and infighting among its
leaders in the meantime distracted Nigeria, following
the controversial federal elections of 1959.
Simultaneously, the refusal of Britain to create new
regions for ethnic Nigerian minorities at the London
constitutional talks of 1958 made it easy for pro-
unification forces in southern Cameroons. They
mischievously advertised integration with Nigeria as
a reunion with the Eastern region from which it had
“broken away” in 1954. The effect of this was
amplified by short-sighted Nigerian politicians who
were afraid that the integration of southern
Cameroons would provide the eastern region based
NCNC with a larger geographic and political base in
the tri-regional rat race to control Nigeria.

16. In 1970, moves began to be made by
independent Cameroun and post-civil war Nigeria to
clarify their maritime border which was vaguely
defined by the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty. Maps
from that period show Bakassi peninsula in
Cameroun, but the offshore boundary was unclear
since there was no detailed demarkation of the
"navigable portion" of the approach channel to the
Calabar estuary. Then Attorney General Elias
correctly advised the Gowon government that post-
colonial Nigeria had no legal basis for contesting the
Bakassi peninsula itself, but that work to delimit the
offshore boundary and vague sections of the land
boundary should proceed at full speed in accordance
with the original Anglo-German Treaty of 1913. The
technical problem thus became deciding exactly
what part was "navigable" and what was not. It is
this matter that was addressed on April 4th, 1971 at
Yaoundé when Nigeria's General Gowon and
Cameroun President Ahidjo, accompanied by large
delegations, signed the "Coker-Ngo" Line on British
Admiralty Chart No. 3433 "as far as the 3-nautical-
mile limit." The status of the Bakassi peninsula
proper was not an issue for discussion. Maps from
that period show Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun.
17. On June 1st, 1975, Gowon and Ahidjo signed the
Maroua Declaration for the partial extension of the
1971 maritime boundary. Again, the status of the
Bakassi peninsula proper was not even an issue for
discussion. Maps from that period show Bakassi
peninsula in Cameroun.
18. On July 29, 1975 General Gowon was overthrown
by General Murtala Muhammed. One of the first acts
of that regime was to begin to question all the
domestic and foreign policy decisions made by
General Gowon - including the offshore maritime
border with Cameroun. In the rush to smear Gowon
publicly, he was held accountable for "giving away
Bakassi" - an event that had actually occurred before
he was born. Muhammed's decision to renege on
Gowon's agreements with Ahidjo resonated with a
section of the population which had been hoping for
a way to get out of its commitments to Cameroun
deriving from the 1961 plebiscite and the colonial
heritage dating back to 1884. Still, Nigerian official
maps from that period and continuing till today
except a few that were reprinted on orders from the
Babangida government in 1991 show Bakassi
peninsula in Cameroun.
19. The rest of what transpired in 1981, 1994, 1996
and since then is well known - including General
Abacha's moves to formally create an administrative
set up there and all the military clashes.
20. On October 10, 2002 the International Court at
The Hague confirmed what Elias had said in 1970
and reiterated almost a century of colonial
agreements which had repeatedly placed Bakassi
peninsula inside Kamerun/Cameroon/Cameroun. It
also went further to provide guidelines for the final
clarification of the offshore border - which if anything,
is the only issue about which General Gowon, acting
on advice from some civil servants, may not have
been as aggressive as he could have been. But even
that is a matter of technical detail, not treason.
Post-script: On September 3, 2002 a few weeks to
the Judgement of the ICJ, Chief R Oluwole Coker, the
Nigerian Surveyor who, along with Mr. Ngo of
Cameroun decided the "Coker-Ngo" offshore line of
1971, which Gowon and Ahidjo signed, died. May his
soul rest in peace.

9. In March 1959, the UN asked Britain to clarify the
wishes of the people living in Northern and Southern
Cameroons trusteeship territories in the run up to
the "independence" of Nigeria and Cameroun. Maps
from that period show Bakassi peninsula in the
Cameroons, not the real Nigeria.
10. On January 1st, 1960 the French Cameroons
became independent. Instruments creating the new
country and exchange of notes between France and
Cameroun rehashed all its colonial boundaries as
defined by previous colonial agreements.
11. On October 1st, 1960, Nigeria became
independent. Instruments creating the new country
and exchange of notes between Britain and Nigeria
rehashed all its colonial boundaries as defined by
previous colonial agreements. Maps dated 1960
show that the Bakassi peninsula was clearly within
the "Southern Cameroons", not "Nigeria proper."
General Gowon was only a subaltern at the time.
12. On February 11th and 12th 1961, a plebiscite
was held to " clarify the wishes of the people living in Northern and Southern Cameroons ". The population of Northern Cameroons had earlier - in 1959 - "decided to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria", while the
population of Southern Cameroons, whose plebiscite
could not be done in 1959 for security reasons, now
"decided to achieve independence by joining the
independent Republic of Cameroon" (General
Assembly resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961).
Note that there were 21 polling stations on the
Bakassi peninsula itself and that 73% of the people
living there voted to "achieve independence by
joining the independent Republic of Cameroon".
(Note the blunder here. By spelling it as "Cameroon", rather than "Cameroun", the UN created an opening for the people of the "Southern Cameroons" to say they never voted to join "Cameroun" which is the former French territory.
13. In 1962, the government of Tafawa Balewa
exchanged diplomatic notes with Cameroun
acknowledging the fact that Bakassi was not Nigerian territory. General Gowon was a T/Captain. Maps from that period show Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun, following the results of the 1961 plebiscite.
14. In January 1966, Major General Ironsi came to
power in Nigeria. He committed his government to
respect all prior international agreements made by
the Balewa government. Maps from that period show Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun.
15. In July 1966, then Lt. Col. Gowon came to power
in Nigeria. He too committed his government to
respect all prior international agreements made by
the Ironsi and Balewa governments. Maps from that
period show Bakassi peninsula in Cameroun

5. The First World War broke out in 1914. In 1916,
Britain invaded German Kamerun. Among the
Nigerian troops and carriers fighting for Britain were
natives of Nigeria, including some from present
Cross- River State. At the end of the war, all German
territories were divided between France and Britain
by the Treaty of Versailles. The League of Nations
placed them under British or French mandate. The
boundaries between British and French mandated
Kamerun was defined by the Franco-British
Declaration of July 10, 1919 by Viscount Milner, the
British Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Henry
Simon, the French Minister for the Colonies. In this
agreement Bakassi and the rest of what became
known as "British Cameroons" were placed under
British mandate and administered coterminous with
"Nigeria" but not actually merged. The old 1913
border was retained. To codify this further, another
agreement was signed December 29, 1929 and
January 31, 1930 between Sir Graeme Thomson,
Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria,
and Paul Marchand, Commissaire de la République
Française au Cameroun. This Declaration was ratified
and incorporated in an Exchange of Notes on January
9, 1931 between the French Ambassador in London
and the British Foreign Minister. Again, maps from
that period show the Bakassi peninsula within
"British Cameroons", not the "Colony and
Protectorate of Nigeria". Neither the Obong nor his
people, nor any other "native Nigerians" protested.
General Gowon was born a few years later.
6. The Second World War broke out in 1939. Native
Nigerians also fought for Britain. After the war, the
British and French League of Nations mandates over
the Southern and Northern Cameroons and
Cameroun were replaced by trusteeship agreements
under the new United Nations - approved by the
General Assembly on December 13, 1946. These UN
agreements re-ratified the prior borders as codified
by the previous Anglo-German and Anglo-French
agreements. Maps from that period show Bakassi
peninsula in the Cameroons, not the real Nigeria.
7. On August 2nd, 1946 Britain divided the
Cameroons into two, called "Northern Cameroons"
and "Southern Cameroons". The 1946 'Order in
Council' contained detailed provisions describing the
border separating these two regions, now
conveniently administered from colonial Nigeria - but
not part of it.
8. In 1954, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
issued a legal order defining the border between
Nigeria's "Eastern region" and the "Southern
Cameroons". Bakassi Peninsula was in the "Southern
Cameroons", distinct from the Eastern region and the
Calabar province and maps from that period show
this very clearly. General Gowon had not yet joined
the Nigerian Army. Neither the Obong nor his people
nor any other native Nigerians protested.

1. When the Obong of Calabar signed a "Treaty of
Protection" with Britain on September 10, 1884
Britain agreed to "extend its protection" to the
Obong and his Chiefs. The Obong agreed and
promised to refrain from entering into any
agreements or treaties with foreign nations or Powers
without the prior approval of the British Government.
That is, he signed away his Kingdom as a British
protectorate. This type of subterfuge was carried out
with many of our ancestors. All of this was before
"Nigeria" was created. Note too that unlike
agreements between metropolitan powers these so
called protectorate agreements with African
Kingdoms did not have precise definitions of
boundaries. On November 15, 1893, Britain and
Germany defined their boundaries in Africa,
supplemented by another agreement on March 19,
1906. These covered British and German Territories
from Yola to Lake Chad.
2. In 1900, 1903 and 1906, key declarations made -
and militarily enforced - which created the colonies of
'Northern Nigeria' and 'Southern Nigeria' (inclusive of
the Colony of Lagos). The Obong of Calabar was
neither consulted nor did he resist. This was all
conducted between metropolitan powers and they
understood what they were doing. "Protectorates"
became "Colonies". Note the difference.
3. In 1913, Britain - for the colonies of "Southern" and
"Northern" Nigeria - and Germany - for "Kamerun" -
reached an agreement on their border from Yola to
the Sea. The first of these agreements was signed in
London on March 11, 1913 titled: "(1) The Settlement
of the Frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons,
from Yola to the Sea and (2) The Regulation of
Navigation on the Cross River". The second was
signed at Obokum on April 12, 1913 by Hans
Detzner, representing Germany, and W. V. Nugent,
representing Britain. It addressed the precise
demarcation of the Anglo-German Boundary between
Nigeria and Kamerun from Yola to the Cross River.
There were eight accompanying maps.
For Bakassi (also spelled Bakasi) peninsula in
particular, the Germans were interested in shrimps
and an undertaking that Britain would not seek to
expand eastwards. The British were interested in
uninterrupted and secure sea lane access to Calabar,
a key trading post. Since the Germans already had
the option of using Douala environs as a port, they
conceded the "navigable portion" of the offshore
border to Britain. In exchange, Britain conceded the
Bakassi peninsula proper to Germany. In other words,
to get Germany's cooperation not to threaten access
to Calabar, Bakassi peninsula was conceded by
Britain. The Obong did not resist. Note that "Nigeria"
did not yet exist. This was long before General Gowon
was born.
4. In January 1914, "Nigeria" was created by
amalgamation. Neither the Obong nor any other
traditional ruler, Emir, or Chief anywhere in "Nigeria"
was consulted about it let alone its borders. As was
the practice then, it was done for British economic
reasons - to extend the railway system of "Northern
Nigeria" to the sea and to use excess tax revenues -
derived from spirits - from "Southern Nigeria" to
correct a budget deficit in "Northern Nigeria". British
and German maps of "Nigeria" from January 1914
clearly show Bakassi peninsula in Kamerun. There
was no resistance from the Obong of Calabar or his
people or any other native "Nigerians" for that
matter

Ye shall know the truth and the truth shalt set ye
free? Here is the truth: the predator capitalists in
cassock and collar are rich men in the manner of that poignant parable of Christ in Matthew 19. A rich man, who has followed the commandments, comes to the barefoot carpenter to know what else he might do to gain eternal life. Jesus says tells him to go and sell all that he has, distribute to the poor so he shall have treasure in heaven, and then “come and follow me.” Whereupon the rich man went away sorrowful, “ƒσя he had great possessions.” Prompting Christ to utter the famous words, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.”

Akokites have won several global Tech contests. This is another feather to the cap. Proud to be an (Ex)Akokite.

He was offered to the blood Sucking Vampires in Aso rock in place of Dame.

advocate666: Why do mad men run around naked?

Why does coke taste differently from fanta?

ITbomb: Sometimes we are forced to speak in tongues.
Have u ever been to a church and Pastor say just open ur mouth and flow and u open ur mouth but nothing comes out, the pastor with authority keep on intimidating u and u don't want to be the one that is making the pastor ineffective and u start speaking nonsense then he pushes u and u just have to fall so that he can move over to the next person.

I can bet my arse on this. You experienced this at christembassy or BLW

In the case of the Nigerian civil war though, the story didnot stop at the fact that a blockade was imposed by the Federal Government which led to the suffering, starvation, pain,death and hardship of the civilian Igbo population or that Awolowo defended it. That is only half the story. There was a lot more to it and the fact thatAchebe and most of our Igbo brothers and sisters always conveniently forget to mention the other half of the story is something that causes some of us from outside Igboland considerable concern andnever ceases to amaze us. The bitter truthis that if anyone is to be blamed for the hundreds of thousands of Igbos that died from starvation during the civil war, it was not Chief Awolowo or even General YakubuGowon but rather it was Colonel Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu himself. I say this because it is a matter of public record and a historical fact that the Federal Government of Nigeria made a very generous offer to Ojukwu and the Biafrans to open a road corridor for food to be ferried to the Igbos and to lessen the suffering of their civilian population. This was as a consequence of a deal that was brokered by the international community who were concerned about the suffering of the igbo civilian population and the death and hardship that the blockade was causing them. Unfortunately Ojukwu turned this down flatly and instead insisted that the food should be flown into Biafra by air in the dead of the night. This was unacceptable to the Federal Government because it meant that the Biafrans could, and indeed would, have used such night flights to smuggle badly needed arms and ammunition into their country for usage by their soldiers. That was where the problem came from and that was the issue. Quite apart from that Ojukwu found it expedient and convenientto allow his people to starve to death and to broadcast it on television screens all over the world in order to attract sympathy for the Igbo cause and for propaganda purposes. And this worked beautifully for him.
Ambassador Ralph Uweche, who was the Special Envoy to France for the Biafran Government during the civil war and who is the leader of Ohaeneze, the leading igbo political and socio-cultural organisation today, attested to this in his excellent book titled ”Reflections On The Nigerian Civil War”. That book was factual and honest and I would urge people like Achebe to go and read it well. The self-serving role of Ojukwu and many of the Biafran intelligensia and elites and their insensitivity to the suffering of their own people during the course of the war was well enunciated in that book. The fact of the matter is that the starvation and suffering of hundreds of thousands of Igbo men, women and children during the civil war was seen and used as a convenient tool of propaganda by Ojukwu and that is precisely why he rejected the offer of a food corridor by the Nigerian Government. When those that belong to the post civil war generation of the Igbo are wondering who was responsible for the genocide and mass starvation of their forefathers during the war they must firstly look within themselves and point their fingers at their own past leaders and certainly not Awolowo or Gowon. The person that was solely responsible for that suffering, for that starvation and for those slow and painful deaths was none other than Colonel Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, the leader of Biafra, himself.
I have written many good things about Ojukwu on many occassions in the past and I stand by every word that I have eversaid or written about him. In my view he was a man of courage and immense fortitude, he stood against the mass murder of his people in the north and he brought them home and created a safe haven for them in the east. For him, and indeed the whole of Biafra, the war was anattempt to exercise their legitimate right of self-determination and leave Nigeria due to the atrocities that they had been subjected to in the north. I cannot blame him or his people for that and frankly I have always admired his stand. However he was not infallible and he also made some terrible mistakes, just as all great leaders do from time to time. The fact thathe rejected the Nigerian Federal Government’s offer of a food corridor was one of those terrible mistakes and this cost him and his people dearly. Professor Chinua Achebe surely ought to have reflected that in his book as well.
When it comes to the Nigerian civil war there were no villains or angels. During that brutal conflict no less than two millionNigerians and Biafrans died and the Yoruba who, unlike others, did not ever discriminate or attack any non-Yoruba thatlived in their territory before the civil war or carry out any coups or attempted coups, suffered at every point as well. For example prominent Yoruba sons and daughters were killed on the night of the first Igbo coup of January 1966 and again in the northern ”revenge” coup of July 1966. Many of our people were also killed in the north before the outbreak of the civil war and again in the Mid-west and theeast during the course and prosecution of the war itself. It was indeed the predominantly Yoruba Third Marine Commando, under the command of General Benjamin Adekunle (the ”Black Scorpion”) and later General Olusegun Obasanjo, that not only liberated the Mid-west and drove the Biafrans out of there but they also marched into Igboland itself, occupied it, defeated the Biafran Army in battle, captured all their major towns and forced the Igbo to surrender. Third Marine Commando was made up of Yoruba soldiers and I can say without any fear of contradiction that we the Yoruba therefore paid a terrible and heavy price as well during the war because many of our boys were killed on the war front by the Biafrans.
The sacrifice of these proud sons of the South-west that died in the battle to keep Nigeria one must not be belittled, mocked or ignored. Clearly it was not only the Igbo that suffered during the civil war. Neither does it auger well for the unity of our nation for Achebe and the igbo intelligentsia that are hailing his self-serving book to cast aspertions on the character, role and noble intentions of the late and revered Leader of the Yoruba, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, during the civil war. The man may have made one or two mistakes in the past, like every other great leader. And of course, there was a deep and bitter political division in Yorubaland itself just before the civil war started and throughout the early ’60′s. Yetby no stretch of the imagination can Awolowo be described as an Igbo-hating genocidal maniac and he most certainly did not delight in the starvation of millions of Igbo men, women and children as Achebe has tried to suggest.
My advice to this respected author is that he should leave Chief Awolowo alone and allow him to continue to rest in peace. Thissubtle attempt to denigrate the Yoruba and their past leaders, to place a question mark on their noble and selfless role in thewar and to belittle their efforts and sacrifice to keep Nigeria together as one will always be vigorously resisted by those of us that have the good fortune of still being alive and who are aware of the facts. We will not remain silent and allow anyone, no matter how respected or revered, to re-write history.
Simply put, by writing this book and making some of these baseless and nonsensical assertions, Achebe was simplyindulging in the greatest mendacity of Nigerian modern history and his crude distortion of the facts has no basis in reality or rationality. We must not mistake fiction and story telling for historical fact. The two are completely different. The truth is that Professor Chinua Achebe owesthe Awolowo family and the Yoruba peoplea big apology for his tale of pure fantasy.

http://premiumtimesng.com/opinion/102766-obafemi-awolowo-and-chinua-achebes-tale-of-fantasy-by-femi-fani-kayode.html

6 pages and there is nothing new I can learn about the igbo, and I am even more confused now. Nobody has been able to tell us specifically the origin of Igbo. Someone is trying to tell me Ngwa is not Igbo. Another is saying some igbos are Isrealites while others are not. May be Chinua Achebe should do research on the origin of Igbos and write å book, instead of spewing crap about Awolowo. The pride that characterizes an average Igbo man has also been displayed on this thread. Nobody wants to agree they share the same origin, despite the fact that they all speak same language (though dialects might vary slightly), and vast majority have identical body structures, everyone is trying to prove they are unique and silently trying to infer that are superior to one another. Na wah o!
@Dayokanu I know say your footprints go dey this thread.

Miss Ope: How can i sacrifice for a man.....chaiiii....well for me any gurl wey sacrifice for man na wowo girlllll.....
As for me I cheated on my guy...three times and he still begged to have me back...dat is true love.......ladies if u really wanna know how much a guy loves u let him pray and fast abeg...let him go thru helll...if he doesnt give up believe he is ur man...
I LOVE MY MAN

You cheated on him 3ce? I hope this is not the same Ope i am dating presently. I need to set up a committee to probe her past.

pixconsult: I phucked in a cinema last week

Moderator, where d phuck are you? This post should be hidden. It offends my moral being. I am in church and accidentally stumbles across this post. *just feeling holy this sunday morning*

pixconsult: I phucked in a cinema last week

Moderator, where d phuck are you? This post should be hidden. It offends my moral being. I am in church and accidentally stumbles across this post.

Wadeoye: If I were Fashola I would have banned them on all roads since. Of what good is Okada to us and the people thinking they are making a living from it? People have been killed and maimed - passengers and the riders themselves. They have also turned Okada into an robbery instrument.

Please ban them on all roads - let them go back to their villages to farm if they are not lazy. We need food and nobody is farming any longer.

Can you see how poor your reasoning is? If you need food, you and your fada should go back to the village and farm. Ode osi. For the fact that people have been maimed and killed in okada accident, is banning the quick solution? Are more people not killed in car, bus, trailer and plane crashes? Then why not ban those modes of transportation as a solution too. Taxis are used for kidnapping, buses are used for robbery (one chance), then they should be banned too if that is our you reason. more people die in accidents due to bad road, then d govt which is responsible for such roads should be disbanded.

webaplanet: The source said the owner of the pig (name withheld) had lied to the woman that the pig fell into a ditch. Apparently due to the intimidating size of the pig and its relative cheapness, the woman quickly entered a bargain and bought the meat not knowing it was sick and had been treated recently by a veterinary doctor who also advised that in the event of its death, the animal should be buried. A source quoted the doctor who has been quizzed by the police as saying that he advised the pig farmer to bury the animal if it died within three weeks of the injection.

Now I understand why 'Igbo culture’s
emphasis on change, individualism and
competitiveness gave his ethnic group an edge
over the Hausa/Fulani man who was hindered by
a “wary religion” and the Yoruba man who was
hampered by” traditional hierarchies' this is according to that senile old f@@l Achebe. This is how å typical Ibo man strives to make it inspite of all odds. So tell me why Nigerians won't hate them.

webaplanet: The source said the owner of the pig (name withheld) had lied to the woman that the pig fell into a ditch. Apparently due to the intimidating size of the pig and its relative cheapness, the woman quickly entered a bargain and bought the meat not knowing it was sick and had been treated recently by a veterinary doctor who also advised that in the event of its death, the animal should be buried. A source quoted the doctor who has been quizzed by the police as saying that he advised the pig farmer to bury the animal if it died within three weeks of the injection.

Now I understand why 'Igbo culture’s
emphasis on change, individualism and
competitiveness gave his ethnic group an edge
over the Hausa/Fulani man who was hindered by
a “wary religion” and the Yoruba man who was
hampered by” traditional hierarchies' this is according to that senile old f@@l Achebe. This is how å typical Ibo man strives to make it inspite of all odds. So tell me why Nigerians won't hate them.

Onlytruth: Your statistics even support Achebe! hehehe

Here we go.

If I add Igbo share in Lagos 33 billion (1/3 of 33 billion), to Igbo share in Delta (about 1/3) to Igbo share in Rivers (about 1/3) to all the SE states, just the first digits (not adding fractions), I come up with roughly $64 billion under Igbo control..
If I do the same for all your Yoruba states and add you share of 1/3 in Lagos, I come up with $54 billion.

You see my friend, we top you by about $10 billion.

I think that intelligent people in Nigeria already know that because we send our females to school more than you, there is NO WAY you can be richer than us.

Swallow your pride. Stop beating your wives and marrying 10 wives! Send them to school!

You ibos keep bragging about how educated u fellows are. Did you miss this headline "Three “graduates” of Enugu State University of Science and Technology mobilised to participate in the National Youth Service Corps scheme have shown lack of competence and intelligence levelexpected of genuine degree holders"

ocelot2006: @ OP, are u sure those are not links to a computer virus? When I first tried to download the "song", our state's EDGE service failed briefly. Now my BB keeps hanging.

I guess u are using a smart phone. All original smart phones cannot successfully download this kinda songs.

Etisalat Nigeria presents d critically acclaimed reality show NIGERIAN IDOL 3. Auditions start 13th Oct, 2012. Nigerian Idol is an extension of d global Idol franchise, the best music reality show with #1 rating worldwide. winner gets N7.5M with a brand NEW SUV 2 b presented by Etisalat and recording contract worth N7.5m
Auditions will take place in Abuja,PH Owerri, Benin&Lagos on 13th,20th,27thoct,3rd&10th nov respectively.
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PH: Presidential Hotel, Aba road Port-harcourt. Date :20th Oct,Time :9am

Imo: IMO Concorde hotel, Concorde Boulevard Off Port Harcourt Road Owerri,Date:27th Oct,Time:9am

Benin: Excalibur Hotel, 23B Etete road GRA,Benin City, Date:3rd Nov, Time:9am

Lagos: Bamako Studios,Bamako street, opposite Omole phase 1,Lagos,Date :10th Nov, Time:9am
Follow this link to register online for the auditions.
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ziccoit: On a diversionary note, where is this Beaf?

Even Beaf has given up on his boss' hopeless situation.

Jerie: Jona...! It is better to have a brain and have no shoes, than to have a multitude of shoes and no brain. You have made it clear to the world that Dame is a reflection of your reasoning. By the way, Dame, get well soon.

How can she get well soon, when the spirits of the people who died in the Dana air crash are seriously haunting her.