₦airaland Forum

Katsumoto: Please see page 222 of Larry Diamonds 'Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic.

I guess we can add Larry Diamond to your list of hack writers.

I have told you to educate yourself but you refuse to listen. Aren't you tired of having your ar.se handed to you regularly by me? Isn't there someone else who can take over from Pa Dede1? I am starting to feel sore from the constant raping I give you.

Perhaps the constitution did not allow for the President to meet with the service chiefs.


'The prime minister had already demonstrated his control over the military and readiness to deploy it in the tense final days before the elections. As the confrontation hardened following the election debacle, President Azikiwe made his own play for control of the armed forces. Summoning Army Commander Major-General Welby-Everard, Navy Commodore Wey and Police Inspector-General edet to the State House, Azikiwe ‘is alleged to have pointed out that they owed allegiance first to him as President of the Republic’ and Commander-In-Chief. Anticipating such a claim, the service chiefs had sought constitutional advice, which confirmed that operational command of the three services was clearly vested in the Prime Minister or his designate. Commodore Wey told the President he could take orders only from the Prime Minister. As an expatriate, General Welby-Everard did not wish to get enmeshed in a political dispute and politely withdrew, but then circulated to all his officers an explanation of the constitutional position, in particular ‘to remove the doubts felt by some Ibo officers. Thus the President found that he did not have the armed forces or the police on his side’.

Constitutional crisis of January 1965: Following the controversial Federal Election of December 1964, ceremonial President Azikiwe of the NCNC, urged by radical intelligentsia, refused to invite Prime Minister Balewa of the NPC to form a government and issued orders mobilizing the Army to enforce his authority to suspend the government, annul the elections and appoint a temporary interim administrator to conduct elections. However,
the oath of allegiance of the officer corps was not only to the Commander in Chief but also to the government of Nigeria. The Army Act (#26 of 1960) and the Navy Act (#9 of 1960) were also clear on lines of authority and control.
While the Army and Navy were "under the general authority" of the Defence Minister in matters of "command, discipline and administration", the authority for operational use and control was vested in the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. President Azikiwe and the service chiefs were so advised by the Chief Justice and Attorney General of the Federation.
Thus the Navy Commander, Commodore Wey politely told the President that the Navy (under him), the Army (under Major General Welby-Everard) and the Police (under Louis Edet) had decided to refuse his orders. After a week of cliff hanging tension, in which the military stood aside, a political compromise was eventually reached and a government of "national unity"
formed under Prime Minister Balewa.

http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui5.htm


Could the paragraphs below explain why Zik did nothing?

Constitutional crisis of January 1965: Following the controversial Federal Election of December 1964, ceremonial President Azikiwe of the NCNC, urged by radical intelligentsia, refused to invite Prime Minister Balewa of the NPC to form a government and issued orders mobilizing the Army to enforce his authority to suspend the government, annul the elections and appoint a temporary interim administrator to conduct elections. However, the oath of allegiance of the officer corps was not only to the Commander in Chief but also to the government of Nigeria.


The Army Act (#26 of 1960) and the Navy Act (#9 of 1960) were also clear on lines of authority and control. While the Army and Navy were "under the general authority" of the Defence Minister in matters of "command, discipline and administration", the authority for operational use and control was vested in the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. President Azikiwe and the service chiefs were so advised by the Chief Justice and Attorney General of the Federation.

Thus the Navy Commander, Commodore Wey politely told the President that the Navy (under him), the Army (under Major General Welby-Everard) and the Police (under Louis Edet) had decided to refuse his orders. After a week of cliff hanging tension, in which the military stood aside, a political compromise was eventually reached and a government of "national unity" formed under Prime Minister Balewa.

http://www.citizensfornigeria.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=34&Itemid=45



All of the above came from you, from different sources and saying the same crap from Nowa Omoigui.

Katsumoto:

Yes Dede1, we know all non-Igbo commentators/writers/witnesses were/are liars. You were with Wey everyday, so you know for certain that he didn't communicate with Azikiwe.

7. Constitutional crisis of January 1965: Following the controversial Federal Election of December 1964, ceremonial President Azikiwe of the NCNC, urged by radical intelligentsia, refused to invite Prime Minister Balewa of the NPC to form a government and issued orders mobilizing the Army to enforce his authority to suspend the government, annul the elections and appoint a temporary interim administrator to conduct elections. However, the oath of allegiance of the officer corps was not only to the Commander in Chief but also to the government of Nigeria. The Army Act (#26 of 1960) and the Navy Act (#9 of 1960) were also clear on lines of authority and control. While the Army and Navy were "under the general authority" of the Defence Minister in matters of "command, discipline and administration", the authority for operational use and control was vested in the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. President Azikiwe and the service chiefs were so advised by the Chief Justice and Attorney General of the Federation. Thus the Navy Commander, Commodore Wey politely told the President that the Navy (under him), the Army (under Major General Welby-Everard) and the Police (under Louis Edet) had decided to refuse his orders. After a week
of cliff hanging tension, in which the military stood aside, a political compromise was eventually reached and a government of "national unity"
formed under Prime Minister Balewa. In the US Diplomatic Archives: Nigeria 1964-1968, the situation was characterized in this manner: "Very
complicated African politics, in which tribes, religions and economics all play a part, are involved in the situation. The Northern Premier is at odds with the Eastern Premier in whose region large oil deposits have been discovered. In the heat of the election campaign, there have been threats of secession by the east; threats of violence "that would make Congo look like child's play" from the north.." At the same time, strong rumors of an impending Army coup purportedly planned for the annual Army Shooting competition were also heard in political circles. But the status quo held, albeit temporarily.

It is very true certain attributes exhibited by humans are inherent in nature. The level of your deceitfulness can not be habit it is character and inherent one. Why did not append the source of the above crap? We know it is from you god, Nowa Omoigui, who had be informed that services chiefs never had such audience with the Prime Minister talk less of the President in such circumstance. My group pointed to the 1963 Nigerians constitution which clearly decreed the chain of command. Service Chiefs only meet with Defense Minister who in turn meets with Prime Minister or President as protocol guarantees. Nowa Omoigui apologized for the error and misinformation he created. This one of series misinformation Nowa Omoigui is noted. Other notable fallacies included Fajuiyi’s crap, only five graduates in Nigerian armed forces and Ewu Na Ebe Akwa.

Sometimes it is very human to use the God given faculty to eschew and verify the veracity of craps written by hack writers such as Nowa Omoigui and Robin Luckham. It is unfortunate few individuals have become tender of “copy and paste”.

ilugunboy: Northerners don't deny that July '66 was their month....why are Ibos laboriously denying their footprint of Jan '66?

Only a drooling dullard will equate northerners with Igbo. Be wise for a moment, there were northerners, easterners, westerners, midwesterners and southerners. I guess it better to teach a monkey than you.

Katsumoto: Hahahahahahahahahahaha

The same way Azikiwe refused to swear-in Balewa during the Consitutional crisis in 1965. Or have you forgotten that Azikiwe refused to swear-in Balewa? What did Azikiwe do instead? Did he not call in the military before he was told politely by Admiral Wey that they only answer to the PM? Even the President, Azikiwe, did not know the limitations of his power. Similarly, the NCNC chieftains sought and did deny an NPC/NNDP selected candidate from becoming PM.

Another set of idiotic conjecture via Nowa Omoigiu. Admiral Wey had never had audience with Zik in such circumstance.

ilugunboy: DendeM0ron

Just fvck off from here...you are not bringing any new information to the thread but regurgitating your usual verbose and balderdash.

You are worse than a domesticated monkey.

Katsumoto: No doubt Ironsi to seized power for himself but he was only able to do so because the NCNC members were debating an issue that they weren't constitutionally allowed to. The NPC/NNDP caucas had selected Dipcharima to lead them. NCNC which didn't have a majority also caucused and selected Mbadiwe. Constitutionally, there was no need for an agreement. Orizu was well aware of this, Ironsi was well aware of this, and the NCNC members were well aware of this.

There was no provision for a military intervention in the Constitution and the path to succession was clear and laid out. At the first meeting of the cabinet, Orizu refused the request of the NPC/NNDP coalition saying he needed to speak with Zik. At the second meeting, Ironsi, saw what was going and seized power for himself. So it may be that most likely Ironsi could have killed the ministers but he was only emboldened by the greed of the NCNC ministers who had no constitutional rights to select a PM.

The above is a plain display of idiocy. Why would a party with no stake in the government caucus to present a candidate for the position of Prime Minister? Why did AG not caucus to present a candidate for the position of Prime Minister? Why did NEPU not caucus to present a candidate for the position of Prime Minister? Why UMBC not caucus to present a candidate for the position Prime Minister?

Today is first time in my life I heared there was coalition between NPC and NNDP instead of alliance. I suggest you listen to your conjectural crap. I hope few intelligent Nigerians are reading the posts on NL so as to see the degree of deceitfulness of certain people in Nigeria.

Katsumoto: Stop being obtuse you silly old man. NPC/NNDP (Akinjide, Shagari, etc) selected Didpcharima but your greedy brothers failed to acknowledge it. Their greed got in the way. They shouldn't have been in government but for Balewa. Yet they wanted to appoint the PM even though they had no clear way to majority. Isn't that the opportunity Orizu seized to handover to Ironsi plus the fact that there was confusion everywhere. NNA (NPC/NNDP) had a majority and it isn't something I manufactured. Use your brain for once.

Add to that the statement from Shagari and Akinjide that Ironsi forced the handover. Power grab all the way.

Your obfuscation is legendary, silly young man. It is good to know your issue with Ndigbo is no longer the need to dominate but greed. I wonder how a group that should not have been in government but Balewa had the constitutional authority to block the so-called majority from presenting a prime ministerial candidate. In fact, you are entitled to your silly opinions.

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Katsumoto: How could it have been a coalition if NPC/NNDP achieved a majority without NCNC? You are a joke; Balewa's magnanimity was the reason NCNC ministers were in government. I ask you again, if NPC/NNDP achieved a majority, how was NCNC going to form a government without a majority?

See below

The election was postponed for several weeks because of discrepancies between the number of names on voting rolls and on census returns. Even then the UPGA was not satisfied and called on its supporters to boycott the election. The boycott was effective in the Eastern Region, where polling places did not open in fifty-one constituencies that had more than one candidate running for office. In other constituencies in the region, UPGA candidates ran unopposed. Nationwide, only 4 million voters cast ballots, out of 15 million who were eligible. The NNA elected 198 candidates, of whom 162 represented the NPC, from the 261 constituencies returning results. After an embarrassing delay, President Azikiwe agreed to ask Balewa to form a government with the NNA majority. The boycott had failed to stop the election, and in March 1965 supplementary elections were held in those areas in the Eastern Region and in Lagos where the boycott had been honored. UPGA candidates were elected in all these constituencies, bringing the NCNC-dominated coalition a total of 108 seats in the House of Representatives. The UPGA became the official opposition.

Read more at http://www.mongabay.com/history/nigeria/nigeria-the_1964-65_elections.html#q1GsXlUp81S8QEtu.99

You still need to enlighten yourself on the intrigues involving coalition and alliance.

Katsumoto: How could it have been a coalition if NPC/NNDP achieved a majority without NCNC? You are a joke; Balewa's magnanimity was the reason NCNC ministers were in government. I ask you again, if NPC/NNDP achieved a majority, how was NCNC going to form a government without a majority?

See below

The election was postponed for several weeks because of discrepancies between the number of names on voting rolls and on census returns. Even then the UPGA was not satisfied and called on its supporters to boycott the election. The boycott was effective in the Eastern Region, where polling places did not open in fifty-one constituencies that had more than one candidate running for office. In other constituencies in the region, UPGA candidates ran unopposed. Nationwide, only 4 million voters cast ballots, out of 15 million who were eligible. The NNA elected 198 candidates, of whom 162 represented the NPC, from the 261 constituencies returning results. After an embarrassing delay, President Azikiwe agreed to ask Balewa to form a government with the NNA majority. The boycott had failed to stop the election, and in March 1965 supplementary elections were held in those areas in the Eastern Region and in Lagos where the boycott had been honored. UPGA candidates were elected in all these constituencies, bringing the NCNC-dominated coalition a total of 108 seats in the House of Representatives. The UPGA became the official opposition.

Read more at http://www.mongabay.com/history/nigeria/nigeria-the_1964-65_elections.html#q1GsXlUp81S8QEtu.99

It is equally good to note that there was line in the appended crap from Robin Luckham which reads, “in any case the cabinet was unable to agree on whom to appoint”. The line has rubbish everything you have posted so far on this discussion and goofy crap from Richard Akinjide. If NPC was majority as you would want us to believe, why did the cabinet unable to agree on whom to appoint as Prime Minister?

Katsumoto: Your problem is that you think yourself too important to assimilate information from outside Alaigbo.

Angela Merkel's party won the elections last Sunday but didn't get the majority. Why is the SPD, which came second not forming the government? The Tories won the last elections but didn't get the majority. It formed a coalition with the Lib dems but the Tories selected the PM. Why not the libdems? If something were to happen to Cameron today, do you think the libdems would select the PM?

Now to clear your ignorance. The NCNC couldn't form the government in 1964 because there was no way for it to achieve a majority. NPC won 38%, Akintola's NNDP won 15%, AG won 9%, Northern Progessive front won 5%, Midwest Democratic won 2%. The coalition of NPC and NNDP was a majority; so how was NCNC going to form a government with no majority? Please educate yourself before commenting on these issues that are clearly above your head. NCNC had no business trying to select the PM when it had no clear way to form a government.

It appears you derive joy by exposing your ignorance on the subject matter. I guess you are the only person in Nigeria who did not know Nigeria government of 1966 was a government forged on the coalition between NPC and NCNC.

Again, there is a difference between a coalition and an alliance. I am not interested in going in details on this subject because of considerable number of donkeys that have hopped onto this debate.

Katsumoto: 1 & 2. NCNC couldn't lead the coalition because it couldn't form the government without NPC. NPC on the otherhand had a majority with its alliance with NNDP. There were also two issues wrong with the first two questions – a) The PM from the North was killed by Igbo sons and (b)the PM was from the party that won most seats in the 1959 & 64/65 elections. Of course you wouldn’t see anything wrong in it, just as the NCNC ministers in 1966 didn’t. Your lust for power and your greed will never allow you your senses and your brain to realize what is just and fair. Once you see an opportunity, you go for it. You couldn’t defeat him at the polls or negotiate yourselves into power so you send one of your sons to waste the lives of the PM and others. In most places, people are shocked beyond words at the murder of high ranking officials but not you folks. Balewa and a host of other innocent people had been murdered in cold blood but the Igbo leaders didn’t care. All that was in their minds was ‘this is a fantastic opportunity for us.’ The simple truth is that some of you are so greedy that you covet what belongs to others. Little wonder you have been shouting yourself hoarse about Lagos. Plain and simple – at worst, you are already a thief and at best a potential thief.

3. In July 2000, at a public book launching ceremony in Nigeria, Chief Richard Akinjide stated:
"Talking on the first coup, when Balewa got missing, we knew Okotie-Eboh had been held, we knew Akintola had been killed. We, the members of the Balewa cabinet started meeting. But how can you have a cabinet meeting without the Prime Minister acting or Prime Minister presiding. So, unanimously, we nominated acting Prime Minister amongst us. Then we continued holding our meetings. Then we got a message that we should all assemble at the Cabinet office. All the Ministers were requested by the G.O.C. of the Nigerian Army, General Ironsi to assemble. What was amazing at that time was that Ironsi was going all over Lagos unarmed. We assembled there. Having nominated ZANA Diphcharima as our acting Prime Minister in the absence of the Prime Minister, whose whereabout we didn't know, we approached the acting President, Nwafor Orizu to swear him in because he cannot legitimately act as the Prime Minister except he is sworn- in. Nwafor Orizu refused. He said he needed to contact Zik who was then in West Indies.

You can also see page 24 of Robin Luckham's book. I have attached a screenshot below

4. The words of Ajuluchukwu are good enough for me. He was afterall an NCNC chieftain and one of Azikiwe’s closest lieutenants.

5. You want video evidence, why don’t you go and dig up Ironsi’s body and ask him instead. Video evidence ko, teleconference ni. The problem is that you are lazy and refuse to read. You question everything that is presented to you. You challenge books, websites. You need to hear everything yourself. You want video evidence. It is clear you didn't go to school or you went to a mushroom school. Do you want Video evidence that Julius Caesar was a Roman Emperor?

Above is simply a joke and attempt to confuse ill-educated jokers abounded on this forum. NCNC could have formed coalition with AG if Awolowo was honest and not a tribal bigot. In such coalition, NCNC would have been the senior partner. Due to doubletalk embarked by the AG leaders, the NCNC leadership decided to form coalition with NPC for the government that produced Tafawa Belawa as Prime Minister.

In addition, only Yoruba people who are known as tribal bigots will take Richard Akinjide seriously. What else more does a person expect from a character such as Richard Akinjide who decamped from NCNC due to tribal reason than a fabricated crap such as the bolded in above post?

It is funny you can attach a nonsensical conjecture from Robin Luckham’s book but could not attach the list of officers in Nigerian armed forces prior January 15, 1966 as you claimed. Since such list is not forthcoming from you or Robin Luckham, I have concluded it does not exist.

It is equally good to note that there was a line in the appended crap from Robin Luckham which reads, “in any case the cabinet was unable to agree on whom to appoint”. The line has rubbish everything you have posted so far on this discussion and goofy crap from Richard Akinjide. If NPC was majority as you would want us to believe, why did the cabinet unable to agree on whom to appoint as Prime Minister?

Katsumoto: Luckham addressed mainly the composition of the plotters. He explains how the ‘the right conditions for forming peer groups could have been developed by some of the plotters attending Sandhurst. And that being from the same tribe would have made it easier for them to plan a coup. Luckham then explains how the Ewes in Ghana planned the February 66 coup in Ghana and were able to embark on a successful political programme. He reasons that since the coup wasn’t successful, we wouldn’t know how successful their reforms would have been.

He mentions that the Igbo soldiers were mostly to be the group affected by any interference from Northern ministers. He admits that the officers would be concerned about the security of their own careers. He talks about how Ironsi being in tears when meeting with ministers made it seem like he wasn’t aware of the plan but Luckham then states that Ironsi was most likely briefed about the coup by Njoku which is consistent with his actions on the night of the coup.

I have to disagree with Luckham because:

1. After Balewa had been killed, NPC, the majority party caucused and selected Dipcharima as its nominee to replace Balewa. NCNC, which was the junior partner, also caucused and selected Mbadiwe. Why was the NCNC, which was predominantly an Eastern party caucusing to select the PM, after Eastern sons had murdered in cold blood,the PM who was from the North? Was it the NCNC that selected Balewa in the first place?

2. After Dipcharima had been selected by the NPC, Orizu said he needed to speak with Zik first before swearing in Dipcharima. After speaking with Zik, he preferred to handover to Ironsi. All three actions to deny the Northerners power on that day were taken by Igbo sons –
a) The plotters
b) Orizu/Zik
c) Ironsi who seized power for himself

3. The Ewes and the Igbos are not the same; there weren’t too many similarities between Ghana and Nigeria in that era. How does Luckham know what Ifeajuna would have done if he had succeeded. In any case, the Ewes were accused of domination afterwards.

4. Luckham does not fully address the composition of the murdered politicians and Soldiers. He states that afterall, they killed Unegbe who is from their ethnic group. He claims that friendliness may have been responsible for the inability of the plotters to kill Igbo officers such as Njoku, Anwuna, and Imo.

5. Luckham also ignores the constitutional crisis of January 1965 and the elction fiasco of 1964; the deteriorating relationship between NCNC and NPC since the Census in 1962 and Zik’s annoyance at returning Akintola as premier of the West

6. Luckham ignores the absence of Zik from the country and does not explore the relationship between Zik and Ifeajuna. Ajuluchukwu, who was Zik’s right hand man, stated publicly that Ifeajuna was Zik’s cousin. He also assigns little importance to the visit by Ifeajuna to Okpara, although he admits that some commentators took that as complicity on Okpara’s part.

7. Nzeogwu and Nwobosi were both of the view that the execution of the coup in the South was tribalistic and incompetent; Luckham sees Nzeogwu’s assessment as harsh

8. Luckham provides that Ironsi’s explanation for escaping with his life was contradictory; Ironsi had more than one story

9. Luckham puts the failure of the plotters to kill Ironsi before his junior officers as bad planning. Was that really bad planning?

10. Luckham couldn’t see that there were two different objectives for the coup and lumped them together – Nzeogwu’s noble and patriotic act & Ifeajuna’s ethnically motivated murders and power grabbing

11. Igbo actions after the coup
a) Decree 34 – unifying the civil service under Nwokedi
b) Advisory group – all Igbo
c) Lifting the moratorium on promotions with 76% of promotions going to Igbo
d) Exporting civil servants from Enugu to Kaduna and Lagos

Well, Luckham is at liberty to reach his own conclusions just as I am at liberty to reach my own conclusions. My opinion and analyses is merely academic at this point. In 1966, those who felt it was an Igbo coup took action.

Above crap is another attempt to be smart instead you exposed lack of knowledge about the subject matter. There is no doubt you know little or nothing about coalition process as evidenced in your silly niche to obfuscate.

In the #1 stanza of your load of rubbish, you claimed NPC was a majority party. Also in your deceitful manner, you said NCNC was the junior partner in the coalition government. I guess you need to reeducate yourself on the issues of parliamentary system of government. If a party wins the majority seats in parliamentary election, such party forms the government.

However, if any party did not win majority seats, the parties are allowed to form coalition to forge a majority and form government. In most case, the party that won largest number of seats may turn out as minority party if it fails to form a coalition with other parties.

For example, NPC won the largest number of seats but did not have enough number to declare it majority. Also, NCNC won considerable number of seats but not enough to declare majority. So did AG. If AG and NCNC had successfully formed coalition, NPC would have been a minority party in the parliament even it won the largest number of seats.

Now it is really foolish attempt to conclude that NPC was a majority party and NCNC a junior partner when indeed NPC was mere coalition partner with NCNC. By the way, you can not have a majority part and junior partner. It is either a majority or minority and senior partner or junior partner based on the lexicon.

I shall not attempt to speculate whatever arrangements NPC and NCNC made in order to form a coalition government. However it turned out NPC produced the Prime Minister while NCNC produced the President and Rank Minister (Deputy Prime Minister).

It is funny you asked the question “Was it the NCNC that selected Balewa in the first place?” This question showed you are barrenly clueless about the process of coalition government. The coalition process that saw the Prime Minister and Ranking Minister were firstly carried out by caucus of each party in the coalition. NPC produced Tafawa Balewa and NCNC produced KO Mbadiwe. During the joint caucuses of the two parties, Belawa emerged as the Prime Minister and Mbadiwe as the Ranking Minister.

Firstly, there should have been no need for caucusing at the time in point if certain section of the country did not think that British had created Nigeria for them to rule. There was a ranking minister who had deputized for the Prime Minister in various ministerial meetings. The situation in the country called for the Ranking Minister to continue as Prime Minister until new election is scheduled.

The statements in your #2 stanza were another conjectural crap from the figment of imagination of a tribal bigot. In the scheme of things of the era in discussion, Zana Dipcharima was a junior minister and had been a minister of state under KO Mbadiwe.

It is complete fallacy to say “After Dipcharima had been selected by the NPC, Orizu said he needed to speak with Zik first before swearing in Dipcharima”. The Yoruba peeps will bear any form of falsehood to appear relevant. Nowo Omoigui has been forced to recount much of these craps after faced with facts not fictions.

NPC has no constitutional pedigree to select Prime Ministerial candidate without the consent of NCNC that was a partner in the coalition government. The fact remains that NPC caucus presented Dipcharima while NCNC caucus presented Mbadiwe. Orizu rightfully informed the coalition parties to reach a consensus on one candidate. Since the two parties could not reach a consensus on the candidates and coupled with coup, the parliament was dissolved, hence the handover of power to entity that was capable of restoring peace and order in the country.

All other stanzas in the junk above are silly jokes meant for animal farm.

PhysicsQED: @ DerideGull,

Whenever you return to the thread, I have another question, and I hope you can explain this to me because something seems a bit puzzling about your current list right now. You mentioned Captain A.G. Ozumba in your list that you posted earlier in this thread. But wasn't A.G. Ozumba a captain in the Nigerian Navy, not the Army? I have the same question about Captain E Ukiwe that you mentioned as well. If I am mistaken on this count, please give a correction and an explanation of when they became officers in the Navy or if they never did. It seems some of those on your list were in the armed forces, but not in the Army.

I went back to look at Luckham's book (because I thought I might be able to discover how you and Luckham were arriving at different figures on a rather simple and straightforward question), only to find that those particular statistics in Luckham's book (511 officers, 330 of these being combat status officers) are for the Army, not the entire military and he explicitly says that he's referring only to the Army, not the entire Armed Forces, in those instances where he's talking about those 330 officers.

I suspect that you and Katsumoto can come closer to reaching a consensus on this issue if it is made more explicit whether you guys are talking about one particular branch of the armed forces (the Army) or about the entire military. Honestly, it's not clear which of these two groups (the Army, or the entire military) this officers disagreement between you and Katsumoto was truly about and I think that in the course of your debates, it may have become unclear which group (the Army alone, or the entire military) was being considered. For example, in your post earlier in this thread where you listed those Igbo officers, before the names in the list, you wrote above that:

"Igbo Officers in Nigerian Army as of January 15, 1966 by Dede1"

So one would think that you really meant the Nigerian Army. However, in your most recent comment towards me, where you quoted me, you said:

"Dede1 has painstakingly listed the names and ranks of Igbo officers in Nigerian armed forces from Major General to Captain as of January 15, 1966"

So, in this instance, one would think you really meant the entire Nigerian armed forces.

There seems to be a disconnect between those two statements.

I guess the issue really is, what are you and Katsumoto disagreeing about - the ethnic composition of the officers in the Nigerian Army as of January 1966, or the ethnic composition of the officers in the entire Nigerian Armed Forces as of January 1966?


@ Katsumoto,

What do you think of the part in pp. 47-50 of the book (in the section called 'The spectre of tribalism'), where Luckham casts serious doubt (with what I think is a rather convincing argument) on the idea of it being an "Igbo coup"? I remember we discussed this issue before a long time ago, but I think Luckham makes a better argument than I did against the idea (although he doesn't talk much about the political climate in that particular section of the book). Is there some particular reason that you think Luckham's doubts (against the "Igbo coup" idea) are misguided or unconvincing?

I have said you can not even fool a kindergarten pupil about your partiality in this discussion so I suggest you stop pretending to be neutral observer. During the era in discussion, the armed forces of the Nigeria have not been properly departmentalized as many army boys were seconded to air force hence officers such as Andrew Nwankwo was still referred in the official gazette as Captain instead of Flt Lieutenant.

However, Dede1 made sure that such ambiguity was curtailed by listing the navy and air force ranks in brackets. Although a tribal and partisan participant such as you who is blinded by tribal bias could not make out differences in the list provided by Dede1.

PhysicsQED: I think you're not being objective here. Yes, you "painstakingly" compiled the list, but your research so far has not been "painstaking" enough.

In the first place, you said repeatedly that the list you posted does not even include all the Igbo officers as of Jan. 1966 - so it's clearly not meant to be a list of all the Igbo officers, whether combat status or non-combatant. ('Dede1 still have hundreds of Igbo officers from the ranks of Lieutenant to Second Lieutenant that were not listed.' - your earlier post)

At the same time, the list you originally posted still included some non-combatant officers - so it wasn't even meant to be a list of just the combat status officers either.

When you take the time to

a) actually form a list that includes all the Igbo officers as of Jan. 1966, whether combat status or non-combatant

and

a) compare such a list to a list of all the Nigerian officers as of Jan. 1966, regardless of ethnicity


or


b) actually form a list that includes all the combat-status Igbo officers only

and

b) compare such a list to a list of all the combat-status Nigerian officers as of Jan. 1966, regardless of ethnicity


Then you can determine what the percentage was (of combat status officers, or of all officers) that was Igbo and determine whether or not the existing published statistics that have been referenced previously are flawed. Until you make an actual comparison, it doesn't seem that there's much significance to your list just by itself. It seems to me that the burden of proof is on you (to disprove the existing statistics), but you don't seem willing to carry out (b) above, and for some strange reason, think your list alone is enough.

By the way, even if I had had some serious interest in this (rather minor) detail to begin with, I can't see myself scanning and uploading all the Official Gazettes of the government from the 1950s to 1966, if I'm not going to publish something on that. However, I think I've actually done you a favor - if you actually wish to attempt to debunk Luckham's research, or put your claims on firmer ground, I've directed you (and another poster) in this thread to exactly the resource to use to do that.

Finally, I'm not sure what relevance the list of Yoruba or Edo officers is supposed to have here - there were a lot of other ethnic groups in Nigeria in 1966, in case you forgot.

You have started once on this forum that you have never stepped onto a parade ground in your life. May ask you how you identify a combat and non-combat officer? Even there are combat engineers and medical corps in every armed force.

In this discussion, your insincerity and lack of objectivity know no boundaries. You can not even fool a kindergarten pupil on you assumed impartiality.

One of the problems of Africans is their inability to think outside the box. The relevance about the list of Yoruba and Edo officers is to form a benchmark in order to gauge the correctness of the figures provided by the British named Robin Luckham. We must try to embrace the truth and sincerity in Nigeria instead of hiding behind tribal bias and intellectual laziness.

Katsumoto: First, Ndigbo did not gather together to decide on the coup but the beneficiaries of the coup were indeed Igbo. Ironsi became head of state, Ironsi's advisory council was 100% Igbo, 76% of promotions in the army officer corp went to Igbo. The civil service jobs that opened up in the North as a result of Ironsi unifying the civil service (decree 34) and cancelling the requirement for Hausa tests in the North were to be filled by the senior civil servants that Ojukwu announced would be exported from Enugu to Kaduna and Lagos.

Second, Ironsi was the most senior army officer, he wasn't killed but all those killed were his juniors. Bello and Akintola were killed, Okpara who wasn't a saint was not killed. The revenge coup of July 1966 was an ethnic coup and it succeeded so ethnic coups succeed. The January coup was also ethnic and it succeeded in changing the balance of power.

Third, First coup was Igbo executed, the second coup was Northern executed

Are you alright you wrote the above crap especially the third stanza? Like everything to post on this forum, you find cunning niche to show your tribally biased colors. To you, the first coup was Igbo not south, west, midwest or east but the second coup was north not Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Tiv, Idoma or Nupe.

No wonder the northerners think they were born to rule Nigeria because large number of confused southerners are readily available to defend their silly acts.

PhysicsQED: Well, after reading this, I have to say that unless Dede1 can show that the Official Gazettes were factually incorrect or they were interpreted incorrectly, it doesn't seem that he has much of an argument to make about what the percentage really was.

Dede1 has painstakingly listed the names and ranks of Igbo officers in Nigerian armed forces from Major General to Captain as of January 15, 1966, the number has already trumped the total number the goofy British named Robin Luckham got from Nigeria during the war, yet PhysicsQED and Katsumoto are in doubt.

I have asked the doubters to produce their lists of Edo and Yoruba Officers of Nigerian armed forces prior to January 15, 1966 or shut their putrid mouths. Since PhysicsQED has been busy talking about Official Gazettes, it will settle issue if PhysicsQED could provide the Official Gazettes so the few donkeys that jumped onto this thread could judge for them selves.

I hate Nigeria because of people such as PhysicsQED and Katsumoto who seemed to embrace intellectual laziness. Certain issues that engulfed Nigeria and were propagated by rumors and innuendos fueled by tribal bias spurred me to embark on exploratory research on the formatives years of Nigeria.

Mafia Man: Shut up you this gutter dwelling maggot. I know the antics of frustrated rotten toad as you. Indeed, but Achebe northernized C. Nzoegwu in his compilation of lies and you bought it? At 80 and you are still lying?

You lacked human manners. No wonder you rant like a dog. I have tried to make iota of sense of human intellects from your posts but drew blank. I am convinced that maggots are better and more intelligence than you. At least, they know how to submerge when they sense danger.

Katsumoto: So Igbo constituted 87% of combatant forces only or 87% including noncombatants? How did you arrive at 87%? You are still failing miserably to explain this.

Dynamisms in research? So after submitting a report, you go back and change it even though the figures are in the past and not subject to change?

I shall not support the unusual laziness you have shown on this issue. I suggest you get up from your lazy ar.se and do some exploratory researchs. It does not hurt to attempt.

Orlando Owoh: Not only that, Igbo people printed two pictures on T-shirts, making caricature of those killed on January 15 1966 which they even sold in Northern Region. On one of the T-shirts, Ladoke Akintola and Ahmadu Bello were seen being prevented from entering Heaven by an angel who claimed the place was not meant for riggers. On the other one, some other politicians' corpses were lying on the floor while a cork, the symbol of NCNC, was standing on their chests.
Igbo people caused the present state of Nigeria, where there is distrust, enmity, and so on because of their selfishness. That is why, to be honest, I am indifferent on whatever evil that is befalling them. If you sow to the wind, expect to reap the whirlwind. Ife onye metaru.

I am not surprised a jackass such as you would support a fellow bedmate in display of idiocy. What a bunch of moronic dingbats.

Katsumoto: How did you arrive at your changing percentagez of 87%, 67%, and 50%? Is that too hard to explain? Do the honourable thing and accept that you pulled the numbers from your ar.se.

I understand you do not know the dynamisms evolved in a research. The numbers kept changing back and front as more names and benchmarks are discovered. The initial percentile quoted by Dede1 stands as the correct figure.

Mafia Man: After the ethnic cleansing and murder of non ibos by the ibo power thirty cold hearted animals, [size=30pt]Celestine Ukwu,a popular Igbo musician, released songs titled Ewu Ne Ba Akwa (Goats Are Crying) [/size]

Can any of you ibos explain this?

You are a debilitating dunce. Please note that original exponent of the crap you posted have been shamed and forced to recount the junk. In a manner in which Nowo Omoigiu was meant to apologize for his recklessness over Ewu Ne Ebe Akwa issue could be visited with Rubin Luckham and his lunatic stats.

I had once told you that a domesticated monkey would do better than you. The artist of Ewu Ne Ebe Akwa was Ijo not Igbo, ololdo.

Mafia Man: So, the non combatant officers were meat sellers? You are just a lying toad. By the way, where is the source to this lies? (I don't actually expect any)

I had more readily given an answer to question from a domesticated toad than give answer to question from you. Please go and eat more grass than respond to post meant for humans.

PhysicsQED: I've been watching this thread for a little while, and after seeing the officers argument between Katsumoto and Dede1/DerideGull come up yet again, I decided to actually look at Luckham's 1971 book.

What I saw is that Luckham notes in the book that as of January of 1966, the Nigerian army had only 511 officers, and of these 511, 330 were of combat status (see page 90 of the book). So actually Luckham was well aware of the fact that there were more than 330 officers in the Nigerian army as of January 1966 and he does not claim that there were only 330 officers.

I think this may be at least part of the reason for this unresolved dispute on the ethnic composition of the officers between Katsumoto and Dede1 - the discussion so far does not seem to have taken into account whether or not combat status officers alone are being considered, or whether the number also includes non-combatant officers. Perhaps if it was made explicit which group was being considered - all officers or just the combat status officers - some sort of consensus could be reached.

On the issue of Luckham's sources for his information, if one actually looks at Luckham's book, they will see that all of the figures, numbers, etc. for the various statistics for the military are actually from Nigerian sources from the 1960s, such as the gazettes of the Nigerian government that were published on the respective dates which the author is referencing (the Official Gazettes of 1960-1966, etc.). So if the data Luckham quoted was inaccurate, it would mean that the data from each year of the 1960s (prior to 1967) put out by the federal government was itself inaccurate, and this would have little bearing on Luckham's objectivity or competence as a researcher, since the fault would lie not with him, but with the secretaries, civil servants, etc. of the government of the First Republic.

The list provided by Dede1 consisted mostly of core combatant soldiers who were drawn from short service or regular cadre officers trained at MOMs, Aldershort and RMA, Sandhurst respectively. Even officers such as Ojukwu, Ifeajuna, Banjo, Rotimi and Ademoyega transferred to regular unit by losing one year of seniority. Other than officers such as Elechi Amadi: Corp of Education, E Aghanya: Corp of Engineer, S Ofole, A Okonkwo, E Offor and U Emordi: Medical Corps, every officer in Dede1’s list was combatant soldier.

Dede1 still have hundreds of Igbo officers from the ranks of Lieutenant to Second Lieutenant that were not listed. All were young subalterns.

Katsumoto: Dominating the officer corp doesn't translate into dominating the country. All the actions taken by Ironsi, Ifeajuna, Orizu, Mbadiwe pointed to domination.

The above post is a sign of clutching straw. What actions taken by Mbadiwe or Orizu signified domination? It appears Yoruba peeps as usual will say anything to appear relevant.

software man: No am not. The problem is that you seems to believe only figures acceptable to you. The figures of the breakdown of the officer corps including percentages according to region were provided by madiebo and ademoyega in their books. But the only figures you will accept is the one that supports your position.
Secondly, what is the major relevance of this to the fact that the January 1966 coup was a power grab by IGBOS to dominate the army and the country?

Do you think it is sensible to embark on coup for power grab by IGBO to dominate the army and country when the Igbo officers had already dominated the officers’ cadre of Nigerian armed forces?

Katsumoto: You provided an unverifiable list; it simply has no source. All you have to do is provide some real names and mix in some fictitious names. Again, do not assume that others are fools. This is an intellectual exercise.

Second, to ensure that you understand how percentages are derived, you are required to answer the questions

Try to solve the two word problems below

1) There were 10 pupils in a class - 3 Nigerians, 2 Kenyans, 3 Indians, and 2 Somalis

What is the percentage of the Nigerians in the class

2) There were 4 Nigerians in a class

What is the percentage of Nigerians in the class

NB - Both questions are mutually exclusive; do not use data provided in either question to support your calculation in the other question.

How did you arrive at your percentages? Is this too hard for you?

The above post is silly attempt to be busy. Every name that appeared on the list was active soldier before January 15, 1966 coup, killed during the July 29, 1966 coup, fought on Biafran side during war, killed during civil war, absolved into Nigerian armed forces after the civil war, retired after civil war or dismissed from Nigerian army after civil.

Baring laziness, there is enough avenue provided by the list to engender active learning.

God of Igbo land will not see the day Yoruba culture of Broom is introduced in Igbo land by incompetent Efulefu and his sycophantic gangs. Aluu, ashii gbaa kwa Ihie ojo

software man: To arrive at a percentage, all we need is the total population of the officer corps and the total number of igbo officers as at 1966. If I use your list of the total number of igbo officers against the total number of the officer corps as at 1966, 135/330 ×100 does that come to 87% ? All you need to counter me here is dispute the two figures of 135 and 330 to show how you arrived at your percentage. You do not need a full list of names to arrive at a percentage figure.

Are you a slow learner? The list provided does not even include officers from the ranks of Lieutenants and Second Lieutenants. I suggest you stay away from blunders committed by goofy British named Robin Luckham. There are more than hundred Igbo officers within the ranks of Lieutenants and Second Lieutenants that were not listed.

pazienza: Provide luckham list of names,how difficult can that be? Unless of course,neither you nor luckham have any list,both of you were just pulling out percentages from thin air.

Bros I have asked for the list as compiled by Robin Luckham. It is almost a decade such request was made yet all we hear is all about goofy stuff said by a British lunatic called Robin Luckham. I mean any fool can throw in figures and percentiles however names and ranks beat such acts of idiocy any day.

Katsumoto: And how does this prove 87% or 67% or 50%? Let us test your knowledge of percentages.

Try to solve the two word problems below

1) There were 10 pupils in a class - 3 Nigerians, 2 Kenyans, 3 Indians, and 2 Somalis

What is the percentage of the Nigerians in the class

2) There were 4 Nigerians in a class

What is the percentage of Nigerians in the class

NB - Both questions are mutually exclusive; do not use data provided in either question to support your calculation in the other question.

This are serious questions.

The above is arrant nonsense. The list provided by Dede1 had already trumped the number of Igbo officers provided by your god, Robin Luckham. Unless a person is emotionally blind, the crap provided by partisan Robin Luckham was just a fraud. I guess the joker secured huge contract from federal government of Nigeria by providing such feel-happy list to massage the primordial ego of western and northern regions of Nigeria as well set in motion that northerners were born to rule in Nigeria during the civil war

ilugunboy: Dede,... please exit this thread if all you are going to be doing is trolling and throwing vulgarities all over the place.

Sharaaap there!!! Do not attempt to enjoy senior’s joke.