₦airaland Forum

naptu2: There was also a time, when Dr. K.O Mbadiwe and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe fell apart, following a disagreement, and at that time, Mbadiwe was the parliamentary leader of the NCNC ministers in the coalition government of the NCNC and the Northern People's Congress. Following the dispute, Mbadiwe was dismissed from the party and dropped as a minister and, of course, as a leader of the NCNC ministers. The Prime Minister created a post in his office, which never existed before and appointed Mbadiwe as Liaison Officer for Africa. The Prime Minister took the decision for two reasons: first, that such a highly-placed political office holder should not be kept idle but respected, occupied and indeed he was very useful. Secondly, Balewa wanted to buy time to reconcile Mbadiwe and Azikiwe. Shortly after the reconciliation, Mbadiwe was readmitted into the party and reappointed a minister, while his position as the leader of the NCNC was also restored.

Abubakar was neither a member of the NCNC nor an Igbo man, and party divides did not prevent him from taking actions that would promote the greater interest of Nigeria. These were the leaders we had who respected one another irrespective of their political difference; disciplined leaders who wanted to see their followers disciplined. They were good disciplinarians, and leaders who ventured into politics to serve but not to be served, to give but not to take. These were the leaders who had great dreams for Nigeria; all of them were praying, hoping and dreaming that Nigeria would become a great, united and prosperous country, whose citizens would be their brothers' keepers. They dreamed of a country that would take its proper place in the comity of nations, a country that would offer leadership to the rest of the continent, a country that would inspire other developing nations. These were their dreams because they laid a solid foundation.

For now, there is no leadership; there is no comparison; what is happening in Nigeria today is not in our character. In the days gone by, we were a decent society; our leaders were responsible, reliable, dependable, conscientious, men of integrity, both financial and moral; our leaders loved the nation and placed its interest above their personal interest.

naptu2: At the first constitutional conference in London, Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello complained to Chief Awolowo that one of his followers saw him twice but failed to honour him. In a sharp reaction, Chief Awolowo looked around and found the man who was among the delegation, held him by the arm and brought him before the Sardauna of Sokoto and ordered him to kneel down and greet the Sardauna, warning that next time he sighted the Sardauna and failed to greet him, he would have no alternative than to dismiss him from the Action Group (AG).

Chief Awolowo, told his party man point blank: I am not running a party of irresponsible people. That was Chief Awolowo.

naptu2: Politically, our leaders at that time respected one another. If the House was sitting, and before it starts, I would cross the carpet as a young minister at that time and walk straight to Chief Obafemi Awolowo's seat, who was the leader of the opposition, kneel down in the presence of members and greet him. With a smile, Awolowo would respond: "Good Maitama, how are you this morning?"

"Sir, I am very well".

Awolowo was the leader of the Action Group and in the opposition party, whereas I was an NPC minister.

The Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, called me and said: "Dan Masani, I have observed an unholy alliance between you and the chief. And I told him: sir, you taught me; you did not teach me to disrespect elders. Everybody knew that I was the Prime Minister's favourite, who appointed me minister at that tender age - 29. And if I showed any disrespect to any elder, people might accuse him of inciting or encouraging me to do that. The Prime Minister was a gentleman, who would not encourage me to do such a thing. The Prime Minister responded: "God bless you, keep it up."

Pennywise: What I really like to know is how does Charly boy get these his weird costumes? Does he make them?

entadaplace1: I REALLY APPRECIATE THE UNBAN. PLS IS THERE A WAY U CAN HELP ME REDUCE D WAY IT BANS ME! I WILL REALLY APPRECIATE THAT. IMMEDIATELY I PUT MY LINK I GET BANNED AT THAT INSTANCE. THANKS SO MUCH. I REALLY APPRECIATE UR KIND GESTURE TO MY MOD OF LIFE.

berem: Did he really say that? Oh ok! 2015 will tell if Southsouth is really an enemy of Southeast. Our votes will surely be necessary to bring an Ijaw man to power. smh

la furia: are you a member of Boko Haram, u pretty much know how they operate,. Not all Boko Haram attacks have been successful, they tried bombing this day office in kadauna, the bomb refuse to explode,

Dibiachukwu: do not be caught rejoicing about the death of your enemy.rather pray for a change of heart. rip to the dead and may Chukwu give us wisdom to live on this earth.

patriot4: Frankly I think there are more chadians than Nigerians among boko haram.
In this video you can see a boko haram commander wearing a chadian military bullet proof vest:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bptPcRb1iis

hotbabe001: Bokoharam are hausa plp dat don't want to grow up. Fools

omenka: Wow. Not aware of that. He must have balls of steel.

omenka: I like the direction to which he leans but all these wouldave been much more appreciated had he been on ground in Nigeria. The folks these messages wouldave been most suited for (almajeris, and the illiterate poor muslims who stand most vulnerable to recruitment by the radical sects) hardly or don't have access to both print and electronic media; at most, you find them with a transistor radio listenin to VOA hausa, and I doubt if the man's sermons are being aired there.

Now, let's take a look at some passages from the telegram.

1

"hiding " at his home

The High Commissioner said that they had to search for Yusuf and that he was hiding at his home. Wouldn't his house be an obvious place to look for him? Therefore how come the High Commission had a difficult time "finding him"? If he was indeed hiding, wouldn't his home be an obvious place for the coupist to find him? So, if he was cowardly and hiding, why would he be hiding at his home?

3. When finally located at mid-day friday, yusufu seemed resigned to whatever might happen to him, refusing a high commission offer to move him out of his house to a safe location "where he might be able to regroup his colleagues."

If Yusuf was cowardly, gutless and hiding, wouldn't he have taken up the British offer to move him to a safe location (which the coup plotters would not know about) rather than staying at his home (which would be an obvious target for the coupists)?

he has been reliably informed that they "ran home" and changed into civilian clothes as soon as they heard the dimka broadcast. Garba was not heard from for the rest of the day.

Reliably informed by whom and how do we judge the reliability of the informant?

As for danjuma, he went to the bonny camp on victoria island around midday to rally loyalist military forces but was so unnerved and out-of-control that his principal staff officer col. Isama, had to take charge.

Once again, what's the source off this information and how do we judge the reliability of the source?

http://elombah.com/index.php/special-reports/15409-dimka-s-coup-obasanjo-danjuma-are-cowards-uk-high-commissioner

The UK High Commission said it had great difficulty locating M.D. Yusufu, inspector general of police and one of the top six members of the Muhammed government, finally tracking him down shortly after noon "hiding” at his home. Yusufu's behaviour that Friday matched that of Murtalla Mohammed’s second in command, Olusegun Obasanjo, and

army chief -of-staff, Theophilus Danjuma and MEA commissioner Garba, which he characterized as "gutless." ---------1976 US DIPLOMATIC CABLES - RELEASED THIS WEEK BY WIKILEAKS AND DISCOVERED BY ELOMBAH.COM.

Dimka's Visit To Uk High Commissioner

1. Lt. Col. B.S. dimka, the reported assassin of murtala muhammed, called on UK high commissioner Sir Martin Lequesne February 13 1976, about an hour after the late nigerian head of state was killed. Given below (paragraph 5 and following) is the verbatim text of the report of the conversation as submitted by lequesne to the fco. Lequesne gave me a copy of the report this morning.

2. Immediately after dictating the report friday morning, lequesne arranged for a copy of it to be taken urgently to m.d. ysufu, inspector general of police and one of the top six members of the muhammed government. The high commission had great difficulty locating yusufu, finally tracking him down shortly after noon "hiding " at his home. Le quesne told me this morning that yusufu's behavior on friday matched that of obasanjo, army chief-of-staff danjuma and mea commissioner garba, which he characterized as "gutless."

3. When finally located at mid-day friday, yusufu seemed resigned to whatever might happen to him, refusing a high commission offer to move him out of his house to a safe location "where he might be able to regroup his colleagues."

As for the behaviour of the other three, lequesne says he has been reliably informed that they "ran home" and changed into civilian clothes as soon as they heard the dimka broadcast. Garba was not heard from for the rest of the day.

Obasanjo made no appearance until mid-afternoon and chances for the counter-coup appeared good.

As for danjuma, he went to the bonny camp on victoria island around midday to rally loyalist military forces but was so unnerved and out-of-control that his principal staff officer col. Isama, had to take charge.

It was isama who persuaded the others that the operation to retake the radio station should be surgical and careful so as not to injure civilian technicians and equipment that would be needed if the attack were successful.

Danjuma had reportedly instructed that the station be "smashed down" with armored cars and heavy guns. It was isama who led the counterattack on radio station in the early afternoon.

(comment: this does not jibe with information from embassy's dao that attack on radio station was led by col. Ibrahim babangida, director of armor of the nigerian army. Dao saw babangida leading his armor past embassy chancery on way to station. Force consisted of three british scorpion tanks, two french ferret armored cars, three panhard armored cars with ninety millimeter guns, and three truck loads of infantry totalling about 100 men.)

4. Readers will note dimka's statement to lequesne to the effect that obasanjo had been killed. This corroborates indications we have received from other sources to the effect that he was indeed one of the targets of dimka's operation. We and the british surmise that col. Dumuja, who was shot in his mercedes automobile friday morning while proceeding along the same route to dodan barracks nromally followed by obasanjo, was mistaken for obasanjo.

5. Following is the text of Lequesne's memorandum to the FCO.

Quote:

1. At about 9:10 a.m. on 13 february the head of changery informed me that colonel dimka had come to the high commission and wished to see me. I went out to meet him. Three armed soldiers were in the outer waiting-room and colonel dimka, unarmed and without his cap, was in the inner waitng-room. I brought him into my room. He showed no particular sense of urgency or hurry at any stage in our conversation. The head of chancery was present throughout.

2.colonel dimka started by saying that he had taken control of the government and had come to ask me to transmit a message urgently to general gowon that he should come to togo. Generals muhammed and obasanjo had to his regret been killed "resisting arrest." i asked what had happened to general danjuma. Colonel dimka said that he had not yet been found. When he was it would depend on him. Colonel dimka indicated clearly that he meant by this that if general danjuma opposed the new "government" he too would be killed.

3. I asked colonel kimka why he had taken this step. His reply was far from clear. He said that under general muhammed the country was going communist, which was “contrary to our constitution" and to what the country wanted. "we" wanted to change the policy and get back to real non-alignment. The present situation was one-sided. A parti- cular group had been running the country in its own way. Genrral muhammed had accepted a bribe of twenty five million pounds from the russians.

4. He criticised the recent promotions to general rank which had ignored the established tradition of promotion. General dajnuma was not the best officer in the army. He had neglected the other ranks.

Many people had been sacked for corruption while others who had been equally corrupt continued to occupy high places. Those who had been corrupt would be dealt with by legal means. He implied that some of those recently dismissed would be reinstated though he denied, in reply to my euestion, that it was his intention to recall them all.


5. A lot of charges were needed at home. The present government had done noting but carry out probes. The military governors were being directed from lagos and had no opportunity to exercise individual initiative. "we" intend to draw a straight line under the past and get the country right again from its basic foundations. "none of us is interested in political appointments. We want someone to come in and reconcile the bad feelings." that is why general gowon should come back. There may have been a need for general gowon 's leadership to be changed, but he should have been given a chance to do this.

6. I told colonel dimka that, as a diplomatic representative it would be improper for me to play any part in nigerian domestic poli- tics. To send a message to general gowon as he requested would be to do just this. I could not therefore do what he wanted. Colonel dimka accepted this without demur and immediately changed his tack and said that what he wanted was that i should report what he had said to my government. I said that i would of course do this.

7. I asked colonel dimka who his colleagues were to whom he referred throughout as "we". His reply was again imprecise. He said "we are the young revolutionaries." he was the most senior officer in the group the others were majors. They had acted because the other ranks were waiting for a bloody rising. The coup in 1966 had been started by the other ranks.

8. I asked what support he had in the country. He said airily that there had been moves in ibadan, kaduna, kano and jos - but it struck me as he spoke that his reply was more an enumeration of the major cities outside lagos than the statement of a man who actually knew what was being done in these places.

9. I told colonel dimka that i found some contradiction between his claim to be a leader of young revolutionaries and his criticism of the government for a left-ward trend. He gave a rather vague reply to the effect that he and his colleagues wanted changes.

10. Our conversation ended at about 0945. I accompanied colonel dkmka outside to the waiting-room, and then to the top of the stairs. He said that he would return later to see me again. He did not.

11. I arranged for a copy of the telegram which i sent to london reporting this conversation to be shown to the inspector gen- eral of police later in the morning.

12. Colonel dimka was throughout calm and apparently under no feeling of urgency. I judged that the vagueness and incoherence of most of what he said was due not to any stress but to the fact that his ideas were indeed incoherent and unformulated. Even had he seriously wanted me to send a message to general gowon it was incredible that, having, as he claimed, just taken over the responsibility of government, he should take the time himself to come down to hajola house to make the request. But in fact he dropped his request without argument when i said i could not comply with it. There was something almost frivolous about the whole business and he left me with no impression that he was acting in accordance with any predetermined plan.