WHAT IS THE STORY BEHIND THIS "YET ANOTHER MYSTERY HELICOPTER" SEEN ACTIVE AT YOLA LAST NOVEMBER?

Please I want to join the army and be posted to fight this insurgency though am off age.i have been seeing the pics of young men out there and my heart yearns to join.how do I go about it .I want it so bad.

Wadosky:
Please I want to join the army and be posted to fight this insurgency though am off age.i have been seeing the pics of young men out there and my heart yearns to join.how do I go about it .I want it so bad.

Dude remove it from thought. There's nothing interesting about being in combat. You don't want to be involved in combat trust me.

Wadosky:
Please I want to join the army and be posted to fight this insurgency though am off age.i have been seeing the pics of young men out there and my heart yearns to join.how do I go about it .I want it so bad.

@ unknown87 BIG tnk's, @ wadosky men are dying and men will still die, there is a War going and people in other regions of nigeria thinks fighting terrorism is "rice and beans" ! Its not good for me to post pictures of fallen soldiers,I mean When and how they died!
I. Don't wnt to scare u bro ?, joing the NA now its not a good idea !

SMARSHED BH MILITANT'S !

bidexiii:


@ unknown87 BIG tnk's, @ wadosky men are dying and men will still die, there is a War going and people in other regions of nigeria thinks fighting terrorism is "rice and beans" ! Its not. Good for me to post pictures of fallen soldiers,I mean When and how they died!
I. Don't wnt to scare u bro ?, joing the NA now its not a good idea !

am not a kid and know men die in wars .am just pursuing what will give me satisfaction and it didn't start today.

OPERATIONAL PICTURES

1st picture re NA soldiers on patrol's inside the dreaded sambisa forest

2nd picture is a NAF VIP AW101 transport helicopter, about to take up in the desert.

3rd picture is a NAF alpha jet loaded with a 500kg unguided bomb, @ the background is an HIND helicopter.

@bidexii, BHs incessant attacks on villages really baffles the mind. How well is the army doing at securing these villages? It seems BH have mastered the art of carefully choosing their target and carrying out raids on these villages and towns without arousing military attention. Is it that the military is over stretched?

This news is quite disturbing, I think the casualty rate is high.

If 72 bat lost 28 men then what of 7th division… 500?

I believe they are like our commandos

persius555:
@bidexii, BHs incessant attacks on villages really baffles the mind. How well is the army doing at securing these villages? It seems BH have mastered the art of carefully choosing their target and carrying out raids on these villages and towns without arousing military attention. Is it that the military is over stretched?

You are totally right, maiduguri on it's self is very biG,now talk of yobe and adamawa state. Now BH is weakened and they've changed there way of attack that I call ;"hit and run" a kind og guerrilla attack style.
The truth is NA soldier can't be @ every where ? I think what we need is more of the "Quick reaction force" ;like the 72 mobile strike force and that as airborne capabilities and thats why we need the chinox helicopter badly and a 3rd generation attack helo ! I think these would reduce the BH hit and run style !

Ray1251:
If 72 bat lost 28 men then what of 7th division… 500?

Yeap u might be more than right because they r doing well in there operations and they do the dirty works so they might have such casualties rate ?

For the 7th division I don't think it will be up to 500. But Nigeria armed forces run these type of "secrecy style" ? And don't make a mistake the 72 mobile strike force is under the command of the 7th division ! But in total I don't think we,ve lost such numbers of men up to 500 ?

Ray1251:
If 72 bat lost 28 men then what of 7th division… 500?

7th division was due to gross negligence from their commanders.was it not from this division they courtmartialed so many soldiers.

Ray1251:
I believe they are like our commandos

Yeap they are !

bidexiii:


Yeap they are !

please since most of the soldiers are not equipped with night vision goggles , how do you guard against insurgents that may just creep up to positions, what will alarm the soldiers of an impending attack.i would have said or used a dog which may start barking n thereby alerting me to take cover.please pardon my ignorance.

Wadosky:

please since most of the soldiers are not equipped with night vision goggles , how do you guard against insurgents that may just creep up to positions, what will alarm the soldiers of an impending attack.i would have said or used a dog which may start barking n thereby alerting me to take cover.please pardon my ignorance.

Really its much about NVG's but tactics and doctrine. Studying ur enemy and information/intelligence gathering NA is poor about these ! About the k9 dogs is not such a bad idea honestly but what about night patrols in dreaded or enemy territories where soldiers are ambushed and it is in these NA soldiers casualties is highest and lately I.E.D !
The basics is that we lack basic equipment and hardware take for instance mine sweepers ; in the whole of NA I av not come across such picture of one sweeper and I don't think we have them in our inventory. Its of recent I heard some where procured and I don't think they've arrived till now !
Second NA lack fire power,some times ? Around 2012 till early 2014 and casualties was very high then when soldiers abordon,desert and run for there dear life because of BH AA technicals like the,HMG ; chord,diskh,NSv and the shikla AA guns. It was after dis loses the NA chiefs see d need to replace there GPMG and browning machine gun with NSV,Chord,Norincho HMG,dishk and there is this singapore HMG ?
My pont is u do not av to wait till it happens. Wise nations don't joke with security issues ! The "fire brigade approach" is killing us ! Government should budget good and reasonable amount for security and the security chiefs should see the funds are judiciously spent !

» Army looses 11 to northern farmer crises, Boko Haram «

The 72 Special Force Battalion in Makurdi, Benue State,
says it has lost eleven of its personnel in the incessant
crises between farmers and fulani herdsmen in Benue
State.
The Commanding Officer of the battalion, Col. Timothy
Lagbaja, said the deceased included four officers and
seven soldiers. He disclosed further that of the number,
eight of them (including two officers and six soldiers) were
killed in one day in an Agatu raid.
Lagbaja made the disclosure yesterday during a courtesy
visit of the correspondent chapel of the state’s Nigeria
Union of Journalists (NUJ) to his office. The deaths were
recorded between 2012 and 2015.
Lagbaja also said that the battalion has lost 16 soldiers to
Boko Haram in the Northeast of the country between
November last year and June this year, while surviving injured are receiving the best of medical treatment at home and abroad.
He said the battalion was installing a monument at the
barrack’s entrance to engrave names of the fallen heroes
as a mark of remembrance for the soldiers killed in the
fight against insurgents.
The commander, nonetheless, added that his men are not
deterred and are still in high spirits to join forces with
their colleagues across the country to put an end to the
security crises in the nation.
Meanwhile, Lagbaja attributed the relative peace currently
being enjoyed in the state to the deployment of nearly 500
soldiers attached to two separate joint task forces to crisis
prone rural areas in several local government areas of the
state to combat the recurring herders and farmers clashes.
“We have gone a very long way in combating the challenge.
People can now drive safely to those places that came
under heavy attack previously. What we have now
are isolated clashes. They are no longer on a daily basis as
it used to be. We have also been able to mop out arms in
large quantity from various militias,” he said, Earlier in his speech, chairman of the chapel, Aloysius Umalo, commended the army for ensuring peace and
quiet in the state, even as he condoled with the families
who lost loved ones to the clashes.

Wadosky:

am not a kid and know men die in wars .am just pursuing what will give me satisfaction and it didn't start today.

Very brave and admirable!

OPERATIONAL PICTURES


Nigeria Army light utility vehicle that over-ran (underneath) a laden I.E.D !
The blast effect can be seeing from out side, the rear back and from inside of the utility truck container.

NIGERIA ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE


The Nigerian Army [NA] is functionally organized into combat arms, which are infantry and armored; the combat support arms, which are artillery, engineers and signals; the combat support services comprise medical, supply and transport, ordinance and finance. Others include the military police, intelligence, physical training, chaplains, public relations and band. Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) located in Minna is responsible for doctrinal, training and combat development with an R & D outfit. There are 17 Corps Training Schools and an NA College
of Logistics (NACOL).
Hierarchically, it is organized into the army headquarters, divisions, brigades, battalions / regiments,companies, platoons and sections. A division is a combined-arms
organization with 7,000-22,000 military personnel commanded by a major general. It includes minimum of 2 brigadesas manuver elements,
an artillery brigade, a division
signals and other supporting
elements. A brigade is an
organization of units, 3 battalions
and other support elements. A
battalion is a reasonably self
sufficient unit. It is the basic unit for
combat and support of an army. A
platoon consists of 3 sections and
commanded by a lieutenant or
captain. A section is an organization
larger than a squad and smaller than a platoon. The divisions operate
combined arms force structures with
complements of combat support and combat support services. Each is
designed to operate either on its
own in special operations or
conventionally jointly with the 2
other Services.
The 1990 structure is what existed a
decade later. In that exercise, the NA
wa structured into two Mechanised
Divisions, one Armored Division, a
Composite Division, Lagos Garrison
Command (LGC) and a Brigade of
Guards (for ceremonial duties and
Presidential Security). Each
Mechanised Division comprised two Mechanised Brigades
and an Artillery Brigade complete with the combat support
services. By one account the composite division comprised
one Amphibious Brigade, one Motorized Brigade, one
Paratroop Battalion with their combat support services
elements. Each division and the LGC in addition to having
appropriate combat support and services had a Recce Battalion deployed close to Nigeria'S international frontiers within their Areas of Operational Responsibility (AOR) for
reconnaissance and early warning. The units and the
formations were strategically deployed to enable them
provide adequate internal and external security obligations
to the country.


(1) ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (NASOC)

Nigeria announced 13 January 2014 the creation of the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) at a Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Lessons Learned Exchange between the United States and Nigeria. US has been involved in capacity-building for military
personnel. There have been various workshops on civil–military relations, strategic communication and counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, which were supported by
the United States. Through such collaboration,the Nigerian Army established Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC).

Below is NASOC batch in sigma.

GAURDS AND BRIGADGE


Brigade of Guards has two battalions (3 and 26 Battalions). There is need to beef up the status to three battalions like other Brigades of NA to meet its commitments Guards Brigade
.

3 Guards Battalion
26 Guards Battalion.


1st MECHANIZED DIVISION (1 DIVISION)

Headquarters 1 Division Nigerian Army is located in Kaduna. It was established during the civil war. It is charged with the responsibility of securing its Area of Responsibility (AOR) covering the North Western flank of Nigeria and also
ensuring that the borders located in its AOR are secured. The division is a mechanized infantry with affiliated combat support and combat service support units. 1 Division Nigerian Army known as "the first" - formerly known as the
"First Infantry Division"- was born out of the former "1st Brigade" of the Nigerian Army which was later christened, "1 Area Command".

214 Recce Battalion
1 Mechanised Brigade
65 Mechanised Battalion
81 Motorized Battalion
223 Light Battalion
3 Motorized Brigade
5 Motorized Battalion
29 Motorized Battalion
82 Motorized Battalion
31 Field Artillery Brigade
311 Field Artillery Regiment
312 Field Artillery Regiment
313 Air Defense Regiment


2nd MECHANIZED DIVISION (2 DIVISION)

Headquarters 2 Division Nigerian Army is located in Ibadan, Oyo State. It was established during the civil war. It is charged with the responsibility of securing its Area of
Responsibility (AOR) covering the South Western flank of Nigeria and also ensuring that the borders located in its AOR are secured. The division is a mechanized infantry with affiliated combat support and combat service support
units. The history of 2 Division (formerly 2 Infantry Division and later 2 Mechanized Division) Nigerian Army dates back to the Nigerian Civil War. As of the year 2000, in the 2 Mechanised Division of the NA, the arms holding was 65%,
the ammunition holding was less than 40%,vehicles' holding is also less than 40%. The manpower state was about 65% due to the engagement of some units in ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone.

244 Recce Battalion
4 Mechanised Brigade
177 Motorized Battalion
221 Light Tank Battalion
222 Mechanised Battalion
9 Motorized Brigade
149 Motorized Battalion
174 Motorized Battalion
192 Motorized Battalion
32 Field Artillery Brigade
321 Field Artillery Regiment
322 Field Artillery Regiment
323 Air Defense Regiment
engineer brigade .

Below are the divisions ; batch in sigma accordingly gaurds,1st and 2nd division respectively.

3rd ARMORED DIVISION (3 DIVISION)


Headquarters 3 Division Nigerian Army is located in Jos, Plateau State. It was established during the civil war. It is charged with the responsibility of securing its Area of
Responsibility (AOR) covering the Northern Eastern flank of Nigeria and also ensuring that the borders located in its AOR are secured. The division is an armored division with affiliated combat support and combat service support
units.

243 Recce Battalion
21 Armored Brigade
211 Tank Battalion
212 Tank Battalion
93 Mechanized Battalion
23 Armored Brigade
231 Tank Battalion
232 Tank Battalion
3 Mechanized Battalion
33 Field Artillery Brigade
331 Field Artillery Regiment
332 Field Artillery Regiment
333 Air Defense Regiment
engineer brigade


7th INFANTRY DIVISION (7 DIVISION)

The 7th Infantry Division was established in August 2013 for the war against Boko Haram. In the months since the creation of the 7th Division, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) has been removed four times. Two instances of mutiny in May 2014 by soldiers of the 7th Division delivers a strong message: the junior officers are willing to be court-martialed, rather than continue to be
sabotaged, humiliated and killed by the corruption and incompetence of the military top command and federal government. Already, there was 23 Brigade in Yola,
Adamawa State, 21 Brigade in Maiduguri and 22 Brigade in Ilorin, all Armored brigades which would form the new 7th Division of the Nigerian Army. Only a battalion, known as 241 Reece Battalion, is in Yobe, and this may latter graduate to a new brigade as the new division settles down.

241 Recce Battalion
21 Brigade
Battalion
22 Brigade
Battalion

23 Brigade
Battalion

engineer brigade


81st DIVISION (LAGOS GARRISON COMMAND)

81 Division was formed on 26 May 2002 when Lagos Garrison Command (as it then was) was upgraded to a full-fledged Division. The Division therefore inherited the security roles hitherto performed by the defunct Lagos Garrison Command.
The 4 Infantry Division, formerly known as the Lagos Garrison Organization (LGO), was created and located at Abalti Barracks, Lagos in January 1964. 82 Division, formerly known as 4 Infantry Division came into existence in August 1975, following a reorganization of the Nigerian Army (NA) in the same year. The LGC, which is to provide security in Lagos and part of Ogun state, has two fighting battalions (165 and 19 Mechanized Battalions) and 242 Recce Battalion with the service support elements. This implies, a fighting
Brigade has more force disposition than LGC.
In the face of a credible opposition, LGC might not fare satisfactorily.

19 Mechanized Battalion
165 Mechanized Battalion
242 Recce Battalion

The pictures below are the batches/insigma of the divisions respectively.

82 COMPOSITE DIVISION (82 DIVISION)


Headquarters 82 Division Nigerian Army is located in Enugu. It was established in 1975. It is charged with the responsibility of securing its Area of Responsibility (AOR) covering the South Eastern and South Southern flanks of Nigeria and also ensuring that the borders located in its
AOR are secured. The division is a composite division with affiliated combat support and combat service support units.
The outbreak of civil hostilities in Nigeria in 1967 necessitated the creation of additional divisions of the nation's army. At the heat of the battle, a unique army division was formed, and was given a name that was synonymous to its terrain of operation. The 3rd Marine
Commando "Division" was a regular army formation, assembled during the civil war, with some amphibious capabilities as part of their remit.
By one account the composite division comprised one Amphibious Brigade, one Motorized Brigade, one Paratroop Battalion with their combat support services elements.
While 13 Motorized Brigade is authoritatively attested as of 1999, by the year 2010 the unit is authoritatively attested as 13 Amphibious Brigade. By the year 2010 the 93 Amphibious Battalion is authoritatively attested, without
Brigade affiliation identified, while no such unit was attested in 1999. Orbat.com reports an Airborne Battalion [72 Parachute Battalion], but no such unit was attested as of 1999.

245 Recce Battalion
7 Amphibious Battalion
93 Amphibious Battalion
146 Amphibious Battalion
2 Amphibious Brigade
1 Amphibious Battalion
20 Amphibious Battalion
41 Motorized Battalion
13 Motorized Brigade
4 Motorized Battalion
103 Motorized Battalion
35 Amphibious Battalion
34 Field Artillery Brigade
341 Field Artillery Regiment
342 Field Artillery Regiment
343 Air Defense Regiment
engineer brigade ?


NA AMPHIBIOUS BATTALION

OPERATION SEA DOG in 1985 was the first attempt at exercising the Nigerian Armed Forces aimed at identifying their strength and weaknesses in joint operations
exercises (JOPEX). The main aim of OPERATION SEA DOG was to exercise troops in scenario where they could employ amphibious landing tactics to recover a territory occupied by a hostile force. The ability of the NN to land troops at the beach was vital to OPERATION SEA DOG. The forces involved were composed in such a way as to create a worthwhile and realistic joint training exercise for the Nigerian Armed Forces. However, lack of interoperability and compatibility of equipment of the 3 Services affected the exercise. The abysmal performance in OPERATION SEA DOG were attributed partly to inadequate training for joint operations. The report of the exercise revealed that there was poor logistics support due to the inability of NAF aircraft to carry bulky NA equipment to the operation area. Another problem encountered during the exercise include the inability of the Army, Navy and the Air Force to communicate among themselves. Similarly in Liberia during the ECOMOG operations, the NA could not integrate fully with NN. The problems encountered by the 2 Services was the delayed movement into Liberia from Sierra Leone as a result of malfunction of the loading ramp on the LST. Even when the ramp was repaired through combined efforts of the NN and NA Engineers, the problem re-occurred on landing at Freeport Monrovia. Also the armaments carried by the LST were not functional. This had impacted negatively on the confidence and high morale of the NA troops. The reason for these problems were attributed to lack of training for joint operations by the NA and NN before induction into the operation in Liberia.
Operation TAKUTE EKPE (Lion Trap) was held 10-15 May
2004 off the Eleko-Iberekodo-Akode Owode road, in the
South Eastern part of the economic capital city of Lagos. The
conduct of the exercise was fraught with similar problems
encountered during “SEA DOG”, but the experience was
worse. The five-day exercise exercise, which was last done
18 years earlier under the code name "Operation Seadog" at Oron in Cross River, was a military exercise designed to
practice a Brigade with corresponding Nigerian Navy and Air
Force Task Groups in conventional warfare, amphibious and
internal security. It became imperative because the armed
forces involvement in peace keeping operations have
exposed some inadequacies in the military.
The choice of Eleko-Iberekodo-Akode Owode as the "battle
front" between two fictitious countries of Franco-phone
Democratic Republic of Pedara (DRP) and Anglo-phone
Federal Republic of Kumanda was to enable the three
Services operate jointly in an amphibious training exercise
which will have President Olusegun Obasanjo in attendance
on the 12th while other dignitaries were expected to arrive
on the 13th.
Operation TAKUTE EKPE was a one-sided field training
exercise with a controlled enemy, designed to practice a
brigade with corresponding NN and NAF task groups in
conventional and amphibious warfare as well as internal
security operations. It was also to test the compatibility and
inter-operability of the tri-Service platforms and equipment
of the Armed Forces.
Inadequate logistic planning impaired the conduct of
Operation TAKUTE EKPE. Despite the plans made, a series of
communications problems were experienced during the
exercise. There were difficulties in establishing radio
communications between NNS AMBE, the ship that was to
beach land the troops and other participating forces. The
planning did not take cognizance of the different systems in
use by the 3 Services and there was no pre-exercise
communication interoperability rehearsal. The resultant
effect of this was the inability of the 3 Services to operate
together effectively. These caused the unsuccessful
execution of the exercise.
TAKUTE EKPE was aborted at the last minute because NNS
AMBE, the main amphibious ship, failed to arrive at the
designated landing site at the scheduled time ostensibly due
to defects. On that occasion, NN operational efficiency
suffered due to no ship availability. The NN landing ship that was to land troops in the theater of operation never got
there until after the exercise had been deactivated because
the state of the ship was not considered in the planning of
the exercise. The NN ship was unserviceable and yet it was
earmarked for the exercise. This was a typical example of an exercise marred by poor logistic planning and lack of
coordination due to the absence of a joint logistics system.
Operation OLOGUN META (Yoruba words for Three Warriors) involved beach landing operations, harbor defense, riverine operations and insertion of troops, advance quick attack, deliberate attack phase and Internal Security Operations (ISOs).The 8-day Joint Operations Exercise (JOPEX) ended Friday 27 March 2009 at Okitipupa, Ondo State. It was based on the scenario of a militant group in an oil producing area taking over an island and declaring their independence, over resource control agitation. The President and Commander- in-Chief of the supposed Nambia country then tasked the Chief of Defence Staff to flush out the militants from their positions and take back the island. Nigeria has a joint exploration venture with Sao Tome and Principe within the Gulf of Guinea on cost-sharing basis.
The beach landing part of the exercise involved the
simulation of naval and combat aircraft bombardments all
around the surrounding beachfront, signaling the start of
assault on enemy positions. The landing beach contingents
sailed to the harbor in small Nigerian Navy. The troops
came from three naval mother warships – NNS KYANWA,
NNS OBULA & NNS NWAMBA – stationed in the Atlantic
Ocean. And the three warships, in addition to acting as
amphibious troops, softened the beachfront base of ‘enemy’
positions. The troops, drawn from a Brigade of the Nigerian
Army, had stayed for three days aboard the three naval cat-
class warships. The vessels spent 15 hours in the journey
from Lagos to the exercise area.
As the Nigerian Navy gunboats ferried the troops into the
beachfront exercise area, about six squadrons of the
Nigerian Air Force helicopters provided close air support,
with simulations of aerial bombardments. The assault
troops, brought in by naval assault ships, landed at the
beach front, taking positions. Waves of amphibious forces
continued to beach land, to support earlier troops.
The joint exercise Operation OLOGUN META was adjudged
to be the most successful exercise in the history of Nigerian
Armed Forces joint operations. This was ascribed to the
effective provision of communication support. However,
electronic warfare and communication security were lacking
because the Nigerian Armed Forces lacked the capability to
provide them.
In December 2010 a six day joint military exercise aimed at
protecting the nation’s coastal and offshore installations
against militant attacks, other economic saboteurs and
Search and Rescue operations was conducted in Calabar,
Cross River State. The operation, Code-named Operation
NEMO, was specifically aimed at testing the operational
capability of Nigerian Navy warships and platform in the
protection of deep sea oil and gas installations against
economic saboteurs. It is also to evaluate the Navy’s
Command and Control especially in integrating small boat
operations with that of major combat forces. It involved a
total of five naval vessels, two light weight Augusta
helicopters, three special boats, a Nigerian Army
amphibious platoon and a Nigerian Air Force Maritime
Patrol Aircraft. The naval warships include the two latest
inventory to the Navy – NNS Zaria and NNS BURUTU, two of
the four cat-class buoy tenders transferred to the Navy by
the United States Coast Guard – NNS NWAMBA and NNS
KYANWA and the naval tug boat – TUG DOLPHIN RIMA. The
joint exercise was conducted in the area around the Calabar
Fair Way Buoy (FWB) and south of Bonny FWB, a strategic
gateway for Nigeria critical for the economic survival of the
nation.
In 2011 Governor Imoke of Cross River State attributed the
peaceful status which the State has enjoyed to the presence
of the Nigerian Army and other Security Agencies. The oldest Army Barracks in the country is located in Calabar and that it remains one of the tourism heritage sites in the country while the road leading there, Barracks Road, remains one of the busiest in the metropolis. The Governor appealed that the Amphibious Brigade which is situated in Calabar should be expanded and upgraded as well as the proposed training planned by the COAS be extended there to enable its officers and men be equipped to police the Water Ways of the nation in order to curb the incidence of piracy and militancy as other security operatives in Operation Messa, a peace keeping outfit, have partnered the Nigerian Army to curb crime and other forms of violence in the State.


83rd MECHANIZED DIVISION ( 83 DIVISION)

Orbat.com reports this division at Benin City, Niger Delta It does not appear on the Nigerian Army website, but Orbat.com claims to have an identification for it. Raised around 2001-02, it is sometimes also referred to as a composite division.


Below are pictures of 82nd and the NA amphibious batches/insigma .

A NA (SF) Member of the 72mobile strike force. With a beryl riffle mounted with an advance thermal imaging scope !

Under which division is 72 brigade

Ray1251:
Under which division is 72 brigade

Orbat.com reports an Airborne Battalion [72 Parachute Battalion], but no such unit was attested as of 1999.
Its under the 83rd mechanized division and till now its not well established !

I haven,t heard of "72 battalion" ?

bidexiii:
WHAT IS THE STORY BEHIND THIS "YET ANOTHER MYSTERY HELICOPTER" SEEN ACTIVE AT YOLA LAST NOVEMBER?

This was the mysterious helicopter that crashed a while back near Yola with Caucasians on-board with lots of cash and ammunition.

Mistaken for NAF or NA Aviation assets, but I'll bet they are PMC operated through the NSA.

bidexiii:
A NA (SF) Member of the 72mobile strike force. With a beryl riffle mounted with an advance thermal imaging scope !

Haaaaaaleluyaaah!!!!

If I see pictures of PMP laughing again in the coming days I will be forced to join people calling him names.

Captwahala:


This was the mysterious helicopter that crashed a while back near Yola with Caucasians on-board with lots of cash and ammunition.

Mistaken for NAF or NA Aviation assets, but I'll bet they are PMC operated through the NSA.

Yeap the then crashed helicopter marches the description of the "mysTerious helicopter". The paintings does not look like a military aircraft, talk less of it own by NAF. Definately it might belong to PMC ?