Continuation .....

According to the secret US document of 1 July 1967, Edith’s
parents, having lived in the North for 30 years, where she
too was born, had fled back to the East in October 1966
because of that year’s massacre of the Igbo. Not 30,000 but
around 7,000 were killed, according to the American
documents. Donald Patterson of the Political Section and
Tom Smith of the Economic Section travelled from the US
Embassy in Lagos to the North after the pogrom. “The
Sabon-Garis were ghost towns, deserted, with the detritus of
people, who had fled rapidly, left behind. Most Northerners
we talked to had no apologies for what had happened to the
Ibos, for the pogrom that had killed so many. There were
exceptions, but in general, there was no remorse and the
feeling was one of good riddance.
“One day, our Hausa gardener attacked and tried to beat up
our Ibo cook. We fired the gardener, but not long
afterwards, the cook left for the East,” said Patterson.
Earlier that week, Gowon called the West German
Ambassador in Lagos. The Germans were eager to be in the
good graces of the Gowon administration. A war loomed.
And in wars, buildings, roads, bridges, and other
infrastructure are destroyed. These would need rebuilding.
The contract for the 2nd Mainland Bridge (later called Eko
Bridge) was signed two years earlier by the Ambassador,
CEO of Julius Berger Tiefbau AG and Shehu Shagari, Federal
Commissioner for Works and Survey. That was Julius
Berger’s first contract in Nigeria. It was due for completion
in less than two years and they wanted more bilateral
cooperation. The ambassador assured Gowon over the
phone that he had taken care of all the details and
guaranteed the safety of Edith, the nation’s “First Girlfriend”.
On the evening of 30 June, just before her departure on a
commercial airline, Edith told the American Defense Attaché
Standish Brooks, and his wife, Gail, that she actually wanted
to go to the UK or USA, but Jack, as she affectionately called
Gowon, insisted that she could be exposed to danger in
either of the two countries. Germany, he reasoned, would
be safer.
To Major B.M. Usman and other northern officers around
Gowon, who had attributed his slow response to the
secession to the fact that his girlfriend was Igbo and that her
parents were resettled in the East, it was such a huge relief
that at the Supreme Military Council meeting of 3 July 1967,
Gowon authorized the long awaited military campaign.
Edith had safely landed in West Germany. Gowon told the
gathering: “Gentlemen, we are going to crush the rebellion,
but note that we are going after the rebels, not the Ibos.”
The military action, which was to become the Nigerian Civil
War or the Biafran War or Operation Unicord, as it was
coded in military circles, officially started on 6 July 1967 at 5
a.m. The North was minded to use the war as a tool to reassert its dominance of national affairs. Mallam Kagu, Damboa, Regional Editor of the Morning Post, told the American consul in Kaduna: “No one should kid himself that this is a fight between the East and the rest of Nigeria. It is a fight between the North and the Ibo.” He added that the rebels would be flushed out of Enugu within six weeks. Lt. Colonel Hassan Katsina went further to say with the level of
enthusiasm among the soldiers; it would be a matter of
“only hours before Ojukwu and his men were rounded up”.
The northern section of the Nigerian military was the best
equipped in the country. To ensure the region’s continued
dominance, the British assigned most of the army and air
force resources to the North. It was only the Navy’s they
could not transfer. All the elite military schools were there.
The headquarters of the infantry and artillery corps were
there. Kaduna alone was home to the headquarters of the
1st Division of the Nigerian Army, Defense Industries
Corporation of Nigeria (Army Depot), Air Force Training
School and, Nigerian Defence Academy.
Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power in 1966, once
told the story of how Muhammadu Ribadu, his counterpart
in Defence Ministry, went to the Nigerian Military School,
Zaria, and the British Commandant of the school told him
many of the students could not continue because they failed
woefully. When Ribadu thumbed through the list, Sule said,
it was a Mohammed, an Ibrahim, a Yusuf or an Abdullahi.
“You don’t know what you are doing and because of this you
cannot continue to head the school,” an irate Ribadu was
said to have told the commandant.
Shehu Musa Yar’Adua was one of the students for whom the commandant was sacked. “You can see what Yar’Adua later became in life. He became the vice president. This is the power of forward planning,” Sule declared.
Unknown to the forward planners, according to the US
documents, Ojukwu had been meticulously preparing for
war as early as October 1966, after the second round of
massacre in the North. He had stopped the Eastern share of
revenues that were supposed to accrue to the Federation
Account. By 30 April 1967, he had recalled all Igbos serving
in Nigeria embassies and foreign missions and those that
heeded his call were placed on the payroll of the
government of Eastern Region. The 77,000 square
kilometres of the Republic of Biafra–a mere 8 per cent of the size of Nigeria–was already divided into 20 provinces, with leaders selected for each. They had their own judiciary,
legislative councils, ministries and ambassadors. Alouette
helicopters and a B26 bomber were procured from the
French Air Force through a Luxemburg trading company.
Hank Warton, the German-American arms dealer, had been
flying in Czech and Israeli arms via Spain and Portugal since
October 1966. The military hardware, they could not get,
they seized. A DC3 and a Fokker F27 were seized from the
Nigerian Air Force in April. NNS Ibadan, a Nigerian Navy
Seaward Defence Boat (SDB) that docked in Calabar Port,
was quickly made Biafran.
Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, who was supposed to be in
Enugu in prison for his role in 1966 coup, joined in training
recruits in Abakaliki. Foreign mercenaries were training
indoctrinated old people, young men and teenagers
recruited as NCOs [Non-commissioned Officers] in jungle
warfare, bomb making, mortar and other artillery firing.
Ojukwu, through speeches, town hall meetings, market
square performances and radio broadcasts, succeeded in
convincing his people that their destiny was death or a
separate state. All his performances in Ghana that
culminated in the Aburi Accord of January 1967, or
discussions with the Awolowo-led National Conciliation
Committee five months later, turned out to be ruse.
The underground war preparations, the secret arms
stockpiles openly manifested themselves as Ojukwu’s
stubborn refusal to accept offers or concessions during
these peace meetings.
But the Biafrans knew that their vulnerable line was along
Ogoja, Ikom, Calabar, Port Harcourt, and Yenogoa. Support
from the six million people making up the Eastern
minorities was very much unsure. The minorities viewed
their leaders in Biafra high command as traitors. And
without the minorities, Biafra would be landlocked and most likely, unviable as a state. More so, their vast oil and gas resources were the reason they contemplated secession in the first place. The Biafra high command believed that if
there was going to be any troop incursion from there, they
are going to be transported through ship. They already had
a B26 bomber to deal fire to Nigeria’s only transport ship,
NNS Lokoja, anytime it approached the Biafran coastline.
The Biafrans also knew that Gowon wanted to respect the
neutrality of Midwest and not invade through Niger Bridge,
which would have driven the people of the Midwest into
waiting Biafran hands. But if Gowon changed his mind and
there was a general mobilization of the two battalions of the
federal troops there, they had trustworthy men there that
would alert Enugu. And if that failed, according to the US
documents, the Niger Bridge had been mined using
“explosives with metal covering across the roadbed at
second pier out from the eastern side”.
The Biafrans also knew that the Yoruba, who were sworn
enemies of the Northern hegemony, would never join the
North militarily or politically against the Biafrans. When
Gowon vouched to “crush the rebellion,” progressive Yoruba
intellectuals deplored the language. Professor Hezekiah
Oluwasanmi, Vice Chancellor of University of Ife, described
the use of the word as unfortunate. Justice Kayode Eso of
the Western Court of Appeal said: “Crushing the East was not the way to make Nigeria one.”
Mr. Strong, the American consul in Ibadan, whom they had
been speaking to, confidentially wrote: “As intellectuals and
modernizers, they see the conflict in terms of continuing
determination of conservative North to dominate the more
advanced South and they expressed fear that once North
subdues East, it will seek to assert outright dominance over
the West. The centre of trouble might then swing back to the
West, where it all started.”
The Biafrans understood, therefore, that their strongest
defence perimeter would be along Nsukka, Obudu, Gakem
and Nyonya in Ogoja province, where they share border
with the North. That was where they concentrated. On 8 July
after three days of fighting, only four Biafran troops were
dead and nine wounded in Obudu, while up to 100 Nigerian
troops were dead, according to the Irish Embassy official,
Eamon O’tuathail, who visited the Catholic Mission Hospital
in Obudu. He said: “Forty five (45) of the dead had already
been buried and the villagers were seen carrying the heads
of the remaining around town.” In June before fighting
started, Ojukwu charged on Biafra Radio: “Each Biafran
soldier should bring back ten or twenty Hausa heads.”
At Nyanya, Nigerian troops attempted to seize the bridge
linking Obudu and Ogoja, but were beaten back by the
Biafran troops on 7 July at 1400hrs. According to the New
York Times’ Lloyd Garrison’s dispatch of 8 July: “The Biafran
Air Force–a lone B-26 fighter bomber–flew sorties from
Enugu today, bombing and strafing enemy columns. Asked
what damage it had inflicted, its European pilot replied:
“Frankly, I don’t know. But we made a lot of smoke.
Hundreds of Enugu pedestrians waved and cheered each
time the plane returned from a mission and swooped low
over the city buzzing Ogui Avenue.”
Tunde Akingbade of the Daily Times, who was returning
from the frontlines, said the first Nigerian battalion in Ogoja
area was “almost completely wiped out by a combination of
mines and electrical devices (Ogbunigwe)”.
In the first few weeks of the war, the Biafrans were clearly
on top. “Enugu is very calm,” the confidential cable of 13 July 1967 noted. “Ojukwu is dining with Field Commanders in State House tonight.”
On the federal side, confusion reigned. They had grossly
underestimated Biafran capabilities. “Gowon and his
immediate military advisers believe they can carry out a
successful operation putting their trust in the superiority of
the Hausa soldier,” the British High Commissioner, Sir David
Hunt, told his American counterpart on 31 May 1967. He
said further: “A northern incursion would be hastily
mounted, ill-conceived and more in the nature of a foray.”
Even the Nigerian infantry, which advanced as far as Obolo
on Oturkpo-Nsukka Road, was easily repelled. It ran out of
ammunition. At the Supreme Headquarters in Lagos, they
were accusing Shuwa, the commander, of not sending
enough information about what was going on. Shuwa
counter-accused that he was not getting enough and timely
orders. Requests for ammunition and hardware
procurement were chaotically coming to the Federal
Armament Board from different units, not collectively from
the central command.
Major S.A. Alao, acting commander of Nigerian Air Force
(after George Kurubo defected to Biafran High Command)
together with the German adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Karl
Shipp, had travelled to many European cities to buy jets.
They were unsuccessful. Gowon had written to the American
president for arms. The State Department declined military
assistance to either side. Gowon replied that he was not
requesting for assistance, but a right to buy arms from the
American market. That too was rejected.
The CIA had predicted a victory for Ojukwu, but American
diplomatic and consular corps in Nigeria predicted victory
for the Federal side and concluded that a united Nigeria
served American interests better than the one without the
Eastern Region. Two conflicting conclusions from an
important department and a useful agency. The American
government chose to be neutral. Dean Rusk, America’s
Secretary of State said: “America is not in a position to take
action as Nigeria is an area under British influence.”
The British on the other hand were foot-dragging. At the
insistence of Awolowo, “the acting prime minister” as he was
called in diplomatic circles, Gowon approached the Soviet
Union.
According to a secret cable (dated 24/08/67) sent by Dr.
Martin Hillenbrand, American Ambassador in East Germany,
to his counterpart in Lagos, MCK Ajuluchukwu, Ojukwu’s
special envoy, met Soviet Ambassador to Nigeria, Alexandr
Romanov, in Moscow in June 1967. Romanov said that for
USSR to recognize Biafra and supply it arms, the latter had
to nationalize the oil industry. Ojukwu refused, saying that
he had no money to reimburse the oil companies and that
Biafrans did not have the expertise to run the oil
installations.
A month later, Anthony Enahoro, the Federal Commissioner for Information and Labour, went to Moscow, signed a cultural agreement with Moscow and promised to nationalize the oil industry, including its allied industries once they got arms to recapture them from the Biafrans. Within days, 15 MiGs arrived in sections in Ikeja and Kano airports, awaiting assemblage. There was no nationalization. Meanwhile, buoyed by the confidence from early success, the Biafrans went on the offensive. Their B26 (one of the six originally intended for use against the Nigerian Navy) was fitted with multiple canon and 50mm calibre machine gun mounts. It conducted bombing raids on Makurdi airfield, Kano and Kaduna. Luckily for Nigeria, the two transport DC3s had gone to Lagos to get more reserve mortar and 106-artillery ammo. In Kano, there were no fatalities, only a slight damage to the wing of a commercial plane.
Kaduna, however, was not that lucky. On 10 August 1967, the B26 dropped bombs on Kaduna airbase, damaging many buildings and the main hangar. The German consulate in Kaduna confirmed that a German citizen, a Dornier technician tasked with maintaining Nigerian military planes, was killed and two others injured.
A week later, the senior traffic control officer, A.O. Amaku,
was arrested for sabotage. He was accused of failing to shut
off the airport’s homing device, thus giving the Biafran plane
navigational assistance. His British assistant, Mr. Palfrey,
was similarly suspected. He resigned and immediately
returned to the UK. However, Major Obada, the airbase
commanding officer and an Urhobo from the Midwest,
strongly defended the accused.
The daring bomb raid provoked many more Northern
civilians to run to the nearest army base and enlist to fight.
According to a report by US Ambassador Elbert Matthews,
cabled to Washington on 3 July 1967, unidentified men tried
to bomb the police headquarters in Lagos on the night of 2
July. They attempted to drive an automobile into the
compound, but the guards did not open the gate. They
packed the car across the street near a small house opposite a petrol station. Leaving the car, the men fled and within seconds, an explosion took place. The house was
demolished and all its occupants killed, but the petrol
station was unaffected. Eleven people, including some of the guards at the police headquarters, were injured.
Two hours later, a second explosion, from explosives in a
car parked by a petrol station, rocked Yaba. This time, the
station caught fire. The ambassador remarked: “It is possible this is a start of campaign of terrorism…public reactions could further jeopardize safety of Ibos in Lagos.” And sure it
did. A Lagos resident, who visited the police headquarters after the attack, told the Australian ambassador “Ibos must be killed.”

Continuation ...... !


There was panic all over Lagos. Anti-Igbo riots broke out.
Northern soldiers at the 2nd Battalion Barracks in Ikeja used the opportunity to launch a mini-version of the previous year’s torture and massacre of the Igbo in the North. On 7 July 1967, Lagos State governor, Lieutenant Colonel Mobolaji Johnson, condemned the bombing in a radio broadcast. “A good number of Igbos in Lagos is innocent and loyal to the federal government. It is only fair that they be allowed to go about their business unmolested so long as they abide by the law and are not agents and evildoers,” Johnson said.
He called for Lagosians to join civil defence units and for
Easterners to come and register with the police. Meanwhile, the corpses of troops and soldiers wounded in Yahe, Wakande, Obudu and Gakem that arrived Kaduna by train on 11 July 1967 sparked enormous interest in enlistment and volunteering. Recruitment centres were established in Ibadan, Enugu, Lagos and Kano. But it was at the Kano centre, headquarters of the 4th Battalion of the Nigerian Regiment that generated the biggest number of recruits. According to the US confidential cable of 17 July 1967, 20,000 of these were veterans, who had been recruited to fight on the British side in Burma. The Burma veterans marched angrily to the recruitment offices to replace those that had been killed or injured. Around 7,000 were accepted. Of these, 5,000 were immediately sent to the
frontline. They said they needed no training; only guns.
As they advanced, towards the outskirts of Ikem, 4km
southeast of Nsukka, when mortal fires from the Biafran
artillery landed close by, inexperienced recruits ducked for
cover behind their transport columns out of fear and
incompetence in bush warfare. Not these Burma veterans.
Damboa, the Regional Editor of the Morning Post, was
embedded with some of these veterans under the command of Major Shande, formerly of the 5th Battalion, Kano, which Ojukwu commanded in 1963.
One day, at about 2a.m, Biafran forces began firing from the jungle in the hope of drawing a return fire if the enemy was ahead. “But the veterans were too smart and began to creep towards the source of firing. After some time, the Biafran troops began to advance thinking that there were no federal troops ahead since there was no return of fire. They walked straight into the pointing guns of these veterans, their fingers squeezed the triggers,” said Damboa to a US
Consulate officer named Arp.
These veterans were shooting at innocent Igbo civilians, too. Damboa further told Arp, when he came back from the
frontlines on 17 September 1967, that “federal troops were
shooting most Ibo civilians on sight, including women and
children except for women with babies in their arms.
Initially they observed the rules laid down by Gowon on the
treatment of civilians. Then, after the takeover of the
Midwest, they heard stories that Ibo soldiers had killed all
the northerners they found residing in the Midwest. Since
that time, Federal troops have been shooting Ibo civilians on sight,” added Damboa.
The Midwest Invasion Something was happening to Biafran soldiers, which the Federal troops observed but could not explain. Indeed, the fortunes of the Federal troops were improving. Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s 3rd Marine Commando had landed on 25 July 1967 at Bonny Island, establishing a heavy presence of federal forces in the creeks. Two L29 Delfins fighter jets from Czechoslovakia (NAF 401 and NAF 402) were at the Ikeja Airport and battle ready.
Five more, on board Polish vessel Krakow, were a week
away from the Apapa Ports. Major Lal, an ammunition
ordnance officer seconded from the Indian Army to Nigeria,
had arrived from Eastern Europe, where he had gone to
acquire information necessary to utilize Czech aerial
ordnance. Sections of 15 Soviet MiG bombers hidden in NAF
hangars were being assembled by 40 Russian technicians
lodging in Central Hotel, Kano. Bruce Brent of Mobil Oil was
flying jet oil to Kano to fuel these bombers. Captain N.O.
Sandburg of Nigerian Airlines had flown in seven pilots, who
had previously done mercenary work in South Africa and
Congo, to fly the MiGs. Names, birthdates and passport
numbers of 26 Russians, who were to serve as military
advisors had been passed to Edwin Ogbu, Permanent
Secretary, External Affairs Ministry. They were in Western
Europe awaiting a direct flight to Lagos.
But George Kurubo, the Federal Air Force Chief of Staff, who had earlier joined the Biafran high command, had defected back to the fold and had been sent to Moscow as
ambassador to facilitate the flow of more arms from the
Soviets. Lt. Colonel Oluwole Rotimi, Quartermaster-General of the Nigerian Army, went to western Europe with a fat
chequebook.
What followed was the arrival of Norwegian ship, Hoegh
Bell, bearing 2,000 cases of ammunition; and British ship,
Perang, which discharged its own 2000 cases of ammunition. A German ship Suderholm also arrived. Those in charge of it claimed she was in Apapa to offload gypsum. But the US defense attaché reported that it was carrying “300 tonnes of 60mm and 90mm ammo.” The Ghanaian vessel, Sakumo Lagoon, was already in Lome, heading to Apapa to discharge its own ammo. A cache of 1,000 automatic fabriquenationale rifles had arrived Lagos by air on 8 August 1967 from the UK.
Speaking secretly to UK Defence Attaché, Lt. Colonel Ikwue
said he too had gone to the German Defence Firm, Merex, to buy ammunition: 106mm US recoilless rifles at $86 per
round; 84mm ammo for the Carl Gustav recoilless rifles at
$72 per round; 105mm HEAT- High Explosive Anti-Tank
warheads at $47 per round. Ikwue also bought three English
Electra Canberra, eight Mark II Bombers at $105,000 each,
15 Sabre MK VI-T33 Jets at $100,000 each.
With all of these, Awolowo, rejected Hassan Katsina’s
request for funding of 55, 000 more rifles for new recruits.
However, he agreed once Gowon intervened and assured
him it was not a request inspired by fraudulent intentions.
Federal troops had captured Nsukka, 56km from Enugu.
Over 200 non-Igbo Biafran policemen had fled across the
Mamfe border into Cameroun. In Ogoja, the Ishibori, Mbube and other non-Igbo Biafrans welcomed the federal troops after driving out the Biafran troops in a fierce battle.
The Biafrans blew up the bridge over the Ayim River at
Mfume as they retreated.
The momentum was with the Federal side, but they knew
their victories were not only because of their military
superiority. At critical stages of battle, even when the
Biafrans were clearly winning, they suddenly withdrew. An
instance was on 15 July 1967, to the west of Nsukka on the
route to Obolo. According to a conversation Colonel J.R.
Akahan, Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, had with British
Defence Advisor, the Nigerian infantry companies of the 4th
Battalion, totally unaware of the presence of the 8th
Battalion of the Biafran army, were buried under a hail of
bullets and mortar.
Yet, the Biafran forces began to retreat. This enabled the
remnants of the federal infantry company to regroup and
successfully counter-attack. Even more senior Biafran
commanders that should have been aware that the area had come under federal control were driving into the arms of the federal side. Nzeogwu and Tome Bigger (Ojukwu’s half-brother) were victims of the mysterious happening. Ojukwu initially put this down to breakdown of communication in the chain of command. During a special announcement over Biafran radio on 15 July 1967, Ojukwu said: “Yesterday, a special attack, which would have completely sealed the doom of enemy troops in the Nsukka sector of the northern front, was ruthlessly sabotaged by a mysterious order from the army high command…Our valiant troops were treacherously exposed to enemy flanks.” At 9.30p.m on 8 August 1967, Biafran forces invaded the Midwest. In the recollection of Major (Dr.) Albert Nwazu
Okonkwo, military administrator of Midwest, made available in confidence through an American teacher living in Asaba to Clinton Olson, Deputy Chief of Mission in Lagos on 1 November 1967, it was known by 4 August 1967 in Asaba that the Midwest, West and Lagos would soon be invaded.
On 5 August, Ojukwu had warned the Midwest government,
headed by Colonel David Ejoor, that if northern troops were
allowed to stay in the Midwest, the region would become a
battleground. Many Midwestern officers knew of the plans;
some of them had gone to Biafra earlier to help in the
preparations. Lt Col. Nwawo, Commander of the Fourth Area
Command at Benin, was probably aware. Lt Col. Okwechime, according to the document, certainly knew of it. Lt Col. Nwajei did not know and was never trusted by the anti-Lagos elements in the Midwest. “After the Biafran takeover,Nwajei was sent back to his village of Ibusa, where he was said to be engaged in repainting his home until just the arrival of Nigerian troops in the area,” disclosed the
document.
Major Albert Okonkwo, later appointed military
administrator, did not know in advance. Lieutenant (later
Major) Joseph Isichei and Lieutenant Colonel Chukwurah
were not informed in advance. “Major Samuel Ogbemudia
participated in the invasion, properly by prior agreement,”
the document stated.
That night of 8 August, Biafran army units blazed across the
Onitsha Bridge and disarmed the Asaba garrison that was
then stationed at St Peter’s Teachers’ Training College. Then
they went on to the Catering Rest House, where Midwest
officers were living, and disarmed the officers. The only
exception was Major Asama, the local commander, who
escaped and drove to Agbor at about 22.30hrs.There were no casualties except for one officer with a gunshot wound in the leg. The invading force drove to Agbor, where it split into three columns. One column drove northwards towards Auchi and Aghenebode. A second column went to Warri and Sapele. “The main force led by Victor Banjo was supposed to drive on to Benin and capture Ijebu-Ode, reach Ibadan on 9
August, reach Ikeja near Lagos by 10 August, setting up a
blockade there to seal off the capital city,” the document
quoted Okonkwo as saying.
However, this main column stopped in Agbor for six hours,
reaching Benin at dawn. There was no real resistance in
Benin, where no civilian was killed. The main column left
Benin for Ijebu-Ode early in the afternoon. It stopped at
Ore, just at the Western Region’s border.
According to US Defense Attaché report, three weeks before, Ejoor informed the Supreme Headquarters that he had information that Ojukwu was planning to send soldiers in mufti to conquer the Midwest. So, the 3rd Battalion, which was heading towards the Okene – Idah route to join the 1st Division on the Nsukka frontline, was ordered to stop at Owo. The first Recce Squadron from Ibadan, which had already reached Okene, was reassigned to take care of any surprise in the Midwest. By the time Lagos heard of the
invasion, this squadron was quickly upgraded from company strength to a battalion, with troops of Shuwa’s 1st
Division across the river, and another battalion was
stationed at Idah to hold a defensive alignment against any
Biafran surprise from Auchi.
Upon receiving the telephone call from Major Asama about
the Biafran invasion at Asaba, Ejoor hurriedly left his wife
and children at the State House, went to his friend, Dr Albert
Okonkwo at Benin Hospital to borrow his car. He then
sought asylum in the home of Catholic Bishop of Benin,
Patrick Kelly.
In his first radio address to the people of Midwest on 9
August 1967, Banjo said Ejoor was safe and “efforts were
being made to enlist his continued service in Midwest and in
Nigeria.” Ejoor stayed in the seminary next door to the
bishop’s house for almost two weeks, receiving visitors
including Banjo, Colonels Nwawo and Nwajei, Major (Dr.)
Okonkwo, who were trying to persuade him to make a
speech supporting the new administration.
Ejoor refused. He was told that he was free to go wherever
he wished without molestation. Not trusting what they might
do, he went back to Isoko his native area, where he
remained till federal forces captured it on 22 September
1967. Before Banjo knew the full score, he met with Mr. Bell, UK Deputy High Commissioner, the evening of Benin invasion. Bell summarized his and Banjo’s words as:

Concluding Part

a. There were no fatal casualties though some were
wounded.
b. Ejoor and two senior officers were not in Benin when
Eastern troops arrived. Bell had firm impression that they
had been warned about the day’s event.
c. All the Midwest is now under the control of combined
East/Midwest forces.
d. East was asked to cooperate by certain Midwest officers
because an invasion of the Midwest by the North was
imminent.
e. That he does not agree with Ojukwu on the separate
existence of Biafra. He is convinced that a united Nigeria is
essential.
f. Bell said he saw only three officers at the army
headquarters: one was a Midwestern medical officer (Major
Okoko). All others were Easterners.
Meanwhile when Banjo made the first radio address, he
announced the impending appointment of a military
administrator, but there was considerable difficulty among
the Biafran and Midwestern leaders in selecting a suitable
man.
First choice was to be someone from the Ishan or Afemai
areas. Someone from the Delta was next, preferably an Ika-
Igbo. However, the stalemate continued until Ojukwu
intervened and selected Albert Okonkwo. Ojukwu knew
Okonkwo only by reputation.
Okonkwo had certain things that recommended him. First,
he had an American wife, which cut the family/tribe
relationship problem of those times in half. Second, he was
considered to be politically “sterile,” having been in the US
for 13 years and was not associated with any political party
or faction. Third, he was commissioned a captain in the
medical corps on 2 October 1965 and just made a Major on
22 June 1967. The implication was that he was not tainted by
army politics. He was also very pro-Biafra.
As soon as Okonkwo became military administrator, Banjo
was recalled to Enugu to explain the failure of the military
campaign. During his absence, the Midwest Administration
was established (an Advisory Council and an Administrative
Council). Banjo succeeded in convincing Biafran leaders in
Enugu that his halt at Ore had been dictated by military
expediency. He then returned to the Midwest front. Banjo
informed Okonkwo of the military situation through Major
Isichei, Chief of Staff of the Midwest. Isichei later commented that he had noticed that Banjo’s headquarters
staff never discussed plans or operations in his presence.
Through Isichei, Banjo told Okonkwo that Auchi had been
lost after a fierce battle when, in fact, it was not defended at
all.
Suspicions began to thicken around Banjo. Okonkwo, in a
confidential statement made available to the Americans,
said he also noticed that Banjo obtained money by
requisition from him for materials, food and officers
salaries’, thus drawing on the Midwest treasury. On 19
September, when Okonkwo telephoned Enugu, he
discovered from the Biafran Army HQ that Banjo was
simultaneously drawing funds from Biafra for all these
supplies. Okonkwo sent Major Isichei to arrest Banjo for
embezzlement, but they found that he had already left
Benin and had left orders for all Midwest and Biafran
soldiers to fall back to Agbor.
Okonkwo ordered his Midwest government to move from
Benin to Asaba, which it did that day. The seat of the
government was behind the textile factory, in homes once
inhabited by expatriates. In August, Okonkwo tape-recorded
five broadcasts to be used when possible. Those included
the Declaration of Independence and the Proclamation of
the Republic of Benin, as well as a decree setting up a Benin
Central Bank, a Benin University, etc. The Republic of Benin
Proclamation was delayed while the consent of the Oba of
Benin was sought. Finally, just when the Oba had been
convinced that the Republic was “best for his people,” the
actions of Banjo were discovered and the Midwest seemed
about to be lost, or at least Benin was undefended.
Okonkwo went ahead with the broadcast early on 20
September 1967 in order to record for history that the
Midwest was separate from Biafra. It was the last act of his
government in Benin.
Early afternoon on 9 August, Banjo’s main force left Benin
for Ijebu-Ode. It was composed of both Biafran and Midwest
units. Midwest troops, who were mostly Igbo, had joined the
“liberation army”. Commanding the Midwest forces with
Banjo was Major Samuel Ogbemudia, who had been nursing
the idea of defection. When the troops reached Ore and
halted, Ogbemudia disappeared to later rejoin the Nigerian
Army. Lt. Col Bisalla, acting Chief of Army Staff, confirmed
that Ogbemudia, in the morning of 9 August, telephoned
him precisely at 7:20am to inform him of the “trouble in
Benin.”
According to Standish Brooks, the US Defense Attaché,
Ogbemudia was the first Nigerian officer to attend American
Military School’s counterinsurgency course in Fort Bragg,
1961. Brooks said after his arrival in Lagos on 9 September
1967, Ogbemudia said: “He escaped with a small group of
non-Ibo troops from the Benin garrison and have been
waging a guerrilla warfare against Eastern units. Having run
out of ammo, he made his way back to Lagos.”
Army Headquarters believed him and Brooks’ report further stated: “Ogbemudia would be sent to the headquarters of Second Division in Auchi to assist in operational planning because of his intimate knowledge of the Midwest area and his recent experience in the Midwest under Eastern control.”From 20 September onwards, the Midwest and Biafran Army began to fall apart. The 17th Battalion in Ikom mutinied and fled. So did the 12th and 16th Battalion in the Midwest.
In the evening of 22 September, the Midwest paymaster, Col. Morah, from Eze near Onicha Olona, offered an American expatriate in Asaba £3, 000 if the American would arrange for Morah to get $5,000 upon his arrival in the United States. This would have been a profit of about $3, 400 to the American. The offer was refused. Later on September 25, Morah disappeared with £33, 000, the document said. This was the time six NAF planes went on reconnaissance and reported back to the Defence Headquarters that they had noticed “heavy movements of civilians over the bridge from Asaba to Onitsha,” but did not have the details. On 27 September, Okonkwo called a meeting of all Midwest civil servants, where he said if the Nigerian Army reached Agbor, he would close the Onitsha Bridge. He would not let the civil servants abandon the population of Asaba to the inevitable massacre when the Federal Army reached the town. The people of Asaba knew by this time of the killings of Igbos in Benin when the federal forces reached it on 20 September. Everyone assumed that it would happen in Asaba. From 20 September, there were no Biafran soldiers stationed west of Umunede, east of Agbor.
On 1 October, Midwest commanders in Umunede and
Igueben, south of Ubiaja on the Auchi-Agbor Road, fled from
their positions. Their Biafran subordinates promptly
retreated. Constant streams of retreating Biafran and
Midwest troops filed through Asaba on 2 and 3 October. The
Biafrans were usually mounted in vehicles, while the
Midwesterners had to walk. The attitude of the Biafran
soldiers and officers was that they would not fight for the
Midwest if the Midwest Army did not want to fight. In Asaba
on 2 October, the elders and chiefs met to consider sending
a delegation to the approaching Nigerian Army to surrender
the town and ask for protection in return for help in finding
and capturing Biafran soldiers in the town. Cadet Uchei, who brought soldiers to stop the delegation with death threats, thwarted this effort. At this time, some 35 non-Igbos were rounded up and given shelter at St. Patrick’s College, Asaba.
Twice, Cadet Uchei brought soldiers to kill the refugees and
arrest the Americans in charge of the school. On the first
occasion, Lt. Christian Ogbulo, ADC to Okonkwo, stopped the attempt. Cadet Williams from Ogwashi-Uku brought soldiers to rescue only the Americans from Uchei’s second attempt.
Also on 2 October, Col. Chukwurah, who had been the
commanding officer at Agbor, came to Asaba and told the
Midwest Army HQ staff that he had overthrown Okonkwo
and he was now military governor of the Midwest.
Chukwurah fled across the bridge to Biafra before nightfall.
Only two of the officers of the Midwest Army were known
not to have fled from battle during the campaign: Major Joe
Isichei (who was a Lieutenant on August 9) and Lt-Col. Joe
Achuzia. Gathering a few soldiers, they attempted to shoot
their way out. Okwechime was seen in Onitsha at this time;
he had been wounded. By the evening of 2 October, the
Midwest Army was completely dissolved.
From 6 a.m on 4 October, machine gun-and mortar fire was
heard near Asaba, but the direction was uncertain. It was
later discovered that the firing came from Asaba-Isele-Uku
Road. At about 1p.m, as the staff members of St. Patrick’s
College were leaving the dining room, the first mortar shell
landed on the school football field. Mortar shelling
continued until dusk. Federal troops reached the northern
edge of the campus, along the Asaba-Agbor Road, at about
5p.m. By noon of 5 October, there were six battalions lining
up on the road in front of the college, according to Captain
Johnson, who was third in command of the 71st Battalion.
By the evening of 6 October, Federal forces held the road all
the way into the Catholic Mission, two miles inside Asaba.
Biafran resistance west of the Niger was over.
Major Alani Akinrinade commanded the 71st Battalion.
(Akinrinade in a clarification, said his command was the 6th
Brigade and truly he was in Asaba at this time. His second in command was a Tiv officer, older than Alani. The men of this battalion were mostly Yoruba and Tiv, with some Delta (Ijaw) men. “Most spoke English. They were disciplined, courageous and polite,” the American report stated.
Captain Johnson ordered the Americans to leave Asaba by
the morning of 6 October. The reason was understood to be
that the 71st Battalion was unable to guarantee their safety
from the “second wave” of federal soldiers, known as “the
Sweepers” coming behind. “The Sweepers” were only briefly
observed, but they wore long hair, had “cross-hatching tribal marks on both cheeks” and apparently willing to live up to their reputation as “exterminators.” According to secret cables sent from American embassies in Niger and Chad to the Embassy and consulates in Nigeria, thousands of Nigeriens and Chadians crossed the border to enlist for the war.
Ten trucks of Nigerien soldiers were seen being transported
for service in the Nigerian Army from Gusau to Kaduna and
over 2,000 more waiting on Niger-Nigeria border for
transportation to Kaduna. The secret document went on:
“1,000 Chadian soldiers passed through Maiduguri en route
Kaduna. These mercenary soldiers constituted the “Sweepers.” The captured American teachers aptly observed
that there were soldiers regarded as fighting soldiers and
there were other units that came behind to conduct mass
exterminations.
Major Alani, it was understood, was trying to get as many
civilians as possible into the bush before the sweepers could arrive.
On the 5 October, when they came, a lieutenant attempted
to arrest the American teachers at St. Patrick’s College and
their non-Igbo refugees, who had hidden from retreating but still vicious Biafran troops.
Captain Johnson quickly summoned Major Alani. The
lieutenant claimed to be acting for a “Major Jordane,” but a
check proved this as false. Alani sent the lieutenant and his
men away and posted a guard to the school until the staff
and refugees left Asaba. There were too many civilians to be
executed that Captain Paul Ogbebor and his men were
asked to get rid of a group of several hundred Asaba citizens rounded up on 7 October. Not wanting to risk
insubordination, he marched the contingent into the bush,
told the people to run and had his men fire harmlessly into
the ground. Eyewitness accounts confirmed that he
performed the same life-saving deception in Ogwashi-Uku.
However, other civilian contingents the sweepers rounded
up were shot behind the Catholic Mission and their bodies
thrown into the Niger River. This incident and many others
were reported to Colonel Arthur Halligan, the US military
attaché in Nigeria at that time, the document concluded.
At night on 19 September, Banjo was arrested in Agbor. He
was court martialed in Enugu three days later. Okonkwo
participated in the court-martial and Ojukwu was present
too. Banjo was found guilty, together with Emmanuel
Ifeajuna (“the man from Ilaah who shot Abubakar” –the
Prime Minister), Phillip Alale and Sam Agbam.
Bob Barnard, American consul in Enugu, said Ojukwu told
him that he ordered the killing of Banjo, Ifeajuna, Alale and
Agbam because they had planned to oust him from office,
oust Gowon as well and install Awolowo as Prime Minister.
The American military attaché, Arthur Halligan and Brooks,
the Defense Attaché who had some prior intimation of the
coup cabled the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington
3 August 1967 that “in the long run, Njoku will unseat
Ojukwu.” Ojukwu told Barnard: “The plotters intended to take Brigadier Hillary Njoku, the head of Biafran Army into
custody and bring him to the State House under heavy
armed guard ostensibly to demand of him that Njoku be
relieved of command on the grounds of incompetence.”
They had been behind the withdrawal of troops and
reverses of prior Biafran victories. He continued: “Once
inside the State House, Njoku’s guards would be used
against him. Ifeajuna would then declare himself acting
Governor and offer ceasefire on Gowon’s terms. Banjo
would go to the West and replace Brigadier Yinka Adebayo,
the military governor of Western Region. Next, Gowon would be removed and Awolowo declared Prime Minister of
Reunited Federation…Victor Banjo, Ifeajuna and others kept
in touch with co-conspirators in Lagos via British Deputy
High Commission’s facilities in Benin.” When the American consul asked Ojukwu for evidence, Ojukwu replied: “Banjo is a very meticulous man who kept records and notes of everything he did. The mistake of the plotters was they talked too much, their moves too conspicuous and they made notes. As a result, the conspirators came under surveillance from the early stages of the plot’s existence. Their plans then became known and confirmed by subsequent events.”
In a separate document, Clint Olson, American Deputy Chief of Mission wrote: “Much of the information recounted came from Major (Dr.) Okonkwo. Banjo freely admitted in his testimony that a group of Yorubas on both sides of the
battle were plotting together to take over Lagos and Enugu
governments and unite Nigeria under Chief Awolowo.
Gowon, Ojukwu, and Okonkwo were to be eliminated;
Gowon was to have been killed by Yoruba officers in the
Federal Army.”
The document stated further: “When arrested on the night of 19 – 20th September, Banjo offered no resistance because he said then it was too late to stop the affair and the plot was already in motion. His role, Banjo said, was already accomplished. As far as is known, Banjo died without revealing the names of his collaborators in Lagos.”
Before Banjo got to Enugu after his arrest, Okonkwo had
telephoned Gowon to warn him of a threat to his life.
Okonkwo said he was afraid that the assassination of Gowon would prevent the Heads of State Mission of the
Organization of African Unity from coming to Nigeria. The
OAU mission held the best hope of resolving the war,
Okonkwo believed.
Whether Ojukwu knew of or agreed with Okonkwo’s warning to Gowon was not known. However according to the
American Olson, roadblocks appeared in many places in
Lagos and were severely enforced. They were removed after
about 48 hours as mysteriously as they had appeared.
Gowon, in an exclusive interview with New Nigeria after
Banjo revealed himself as the head of an invading army,
said he once met Banjo and Ojukwu in 1965 during the crisis that followed the 1964 parliamentary elections. They were discussing the merits of the army taking over governance.

Acknowledgement — "Damola Awoyokun/London"

RANDOM PICTURES

Picture of a nigeria soldier on duty helping a young girl to wear her sandal/shoe, in sokoto .

NIGERIA ARMY ASSESTS

How did we get to these stage ? Can someone tell me how Boko Haram got these heavy weapon while Nigeria army soldiers battle with obsolete weapons ?
Download 5 minutes video"editted collections" of BH showing them with heavy captured weapons,hardware and ammunitions !

https://video.xx.fbcdn.net/hvideo-xap1/v/t42.1790-2/10662311_10204558211137843_1128965702_n.mp4?efg=eyJybHIiOjcwMiwicmxhIjoyMzYzfQ%3D%3D&rl=702&vabr=390&oh=a8d5b1fe5df6050e55ab5e1ab9956e42&oe=558B80C5&refsrc=https%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2Fauth.php

NIGERIA ARMY CV - III, LINED UP

bidexiii:
How did we get to these stage ? Can someone tell me how Boko Haram got these heavy weapon while Nigeria army soldiers battle with obsolete weapons ?
Download 5 minutes video"editted collections" of BH showing them with heavy captured weapons,hardware and ammunitions !

https://video.xx.fbcdn.net/hvideo-xap1/v/t42.1790-2/10662311_10204558211137843_1128965702_n.mp4?efg=eyJybHIiOjcwMiwicmxhIjoyMzYzfQ%3D%3D&rl=702&vabr=390&oh=a8d5b1fe5df6050e55ab5e1ab9956e42&oe=558B80C5&refsrc=https%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2Fauth.php

Old video

Fynline:


Old video

Yeap Old but,there was some new clips/part that just being shown ? And that's why I said edited collections !

bidexiii:


Yeap Old but,there was some new clips/part that just being shown ? And that's why I said edited collections !

Bro no part of the video is new. ALL the clips in the video were clips before the offensive.

Fynline:


Bro no part of the video is new. ALL the clips in the video were clips before the offensive.

Those it really matter, the Army is still in a shocking and dilapidated state with so few armour.

This was the same thing that ghanaian girl who writes for the Guardian wrote about, and we were all in arms, attacking her.

A 10 year female suicide bomber attacks Yobe state


A female suicide bomber believed to be about 10 years old this morning attacked a crowded market in Wagir, Gujba local government area of Yobe state. There are unconfirmed reports that about 10 people died while many sustained injuries and have been taken to the hospital. Picture of one of the victims below.

PICTURES OF SADF WITH GECKO 8x8 ATV
RAPID DEPLOYMENT LOGISTIC VEHICLE

SHELLS FIRES BY A T-55 MBT, VICKERS EAGLES MBT & LIGHT SCORPION TANK ON DISPLAY .

NICE ONE. KIP IT UP

tmann626:
NICE ONE. KIP IT UP

Tnks mate

OPERATIONAL PICTURES

1st pic is a recaptured nigeria army bofors artillery to be transported back for servicing

2nd pic are nigeria army commandos

3rd pic is a hind helo

NIGERIA ARMY RADIO/COMM'S


1st pic is a RADIO MAN with radio com's system, used by NA infantry.

2nd pic is a RADIO COM's system used by NA ammored vehicles/tanks.

RANDOM PICTURES

Egypt receives its first FREMM frigate

French naval shipbuilder DCNS transferred the FREMM
frigate Tahya Misr (FFG-1001, ex- Normandie [D651]) to the
Egyptian Navy on 24 June; a delivery that marks a major
milestone towards a strategic partnership between France
and Egypt.
The flag ceremony took place at the company's shipyard in
Lorient, Britanny, in the presence of French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, his Egyptian counterpart General Sedki Sobhy, the two navies' chiefs of staff (Admiral Osama Rabie for Egypt and Admiral Bernard Rogel for France), and Hervé Guillou, chairman and CEO of DCNS.
During his speech Le Drian indicated the delivery was the
first major milestone towards a strategic partnership
between France and Egypt and better interoperability
between the two naval forces. "A high-ranking French naval
officer will be posted to the Egyptian Navy headquarters in
Alexandria to ensure optimal use of the frigate and positive
customer [feedback]," said the French minister. France's
Direction Générale pour l'Armement (DGA) defence
procurement agency will also post an attaché at the French
embassy in Cairo to support Egypt and facilitate military-
related exchanges.
DCNS not only sold a ship but also a five-year through-life
support contract, which includes on-the-job training and
technical support. "A third of DCNS's activities currently
involve the provision of support and services and we want to increase this business," Nathalie Smirnov, head of support and services with DCNS, told IHS Jane's . More than 3,900 people are working in this division and a task force of 40 technicians and engineers are currently seconded to the
Royal Moroccan Navy to assist with the first maintenance
period of FREMM vessel Mohammad VI . Over the five years
of its support deal Tahya Misr will undergo nine short
maintenance periods (of six weeks each, the first one being
already set for end of this year) and a three-month-long
overhaul. DCNS has a permanent force of five technicians in
Alexandria, which will be augmented by 40 other specialists
during the maintenance periods.
The operational training will be conducted by DCI-NAVFCO.
The day after the flag ceremony, Tahya Misr sailed out to
sea for a two-day training session with DCI's instructors. Two
other sessions will take place within the next three weeks,
each time with two to four days at sea. The ship is expected
to sail to Brest after 14 July (Bastille Day) to load
ammunition. Before the ship sails back to Egypt, it will take
part in a short firing exercise, where 20 or so 76 mm shells
will be fired at surface targets. When Tahya Misr sails home
in the second half of July, a nine-day transit at an average
speed of 15-16 kt, the Egyptian crew will be fully capable of
manoeuvring the ship and defending it against low-level
threats.
The second part of the operational training will take place
between August and October next year, after which Tahya
Misr and its crew should reach full operational capacity.

bidexiii:
OPERATIONAL PICTURES

1st pic is a recaptured nigeria army bofors artillery to be transported back for servicing

2nd pic are nigeria army commandos

3rd pic is a hind helo

it is rly mind boggling that our boys will allow a 155 mm howitzer to fall into d hands of those scumbags ,I mean can't they sabotage it b4 retreatin ? Can't they attach to a truck and move it to a safe location haba I pray we don't those dark days of 2013 and 2014

realnas:
it is rly mind boggling that our boys will allow a 155 mm howitzer to fall into d hands of those scumbags ,I mean can't they sabotage it b4 retreatin ? Can't they attach to a truck and move it to a safe location haba I pray we don't those dark days of 2013 and 2014

Firstly I'll blame our field officers and the top brass planning battle field strategy, for such a big assets falling into those scumbags hands. Artellery positions should be weLl fortified and protected.
I think they should av just alter or remove someone vital mechanism from it that will not making it functional/operational and the those boko bois can never repair it again.
The bofors artillery is a heavy GUN,not like the D30's and D74 that is easily towed by our towering/recovery;"our mt-lb can't do the job !",vehicle or heavy lorries, the bofors is transported using low-birds like uv seing in the picture.
I posted a video link; "its a collection of old edited video of capture NA vehicles" by BH, anytime I watch the video my heart bleeds,which makes me think how many NA assets or hardware has falling into wrong hands ?

https://video.xx.fbcdn.net/hvideo-xap1/v/t42.1790-2/10662311_10204558211137843_1128965702_n.mp4?efg=eyJybHIiOjcwMiwicmxhIjoyMzYzfQ%3D%3D&rl=702&vabr=390&oh=a8d5b1fe5df6050e55ab5e1ab9956e42&oe=558B80C5&refsrc=https%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2Fauth.php
Like ur prayer! ; I pray the dark days do not re-occur again; #NEVER AGAIN !

NIGERIAN ARMY AVIATION WING: CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF CHARGES STUDENT PILOTS TO BE READY FOR ACTION.

WorldStage Newsonline
25 June 2015

The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt. General Kenneth Minimah has charged Nigerian Army student pilots to be ready to work and live with troops wherever operational exigency demands without any thought of leaving their chosen line of flying combat helicopters.

According to a statement, the COAS gave the charge while addressing student pilots undergoing helicopter flying training at the International Helicopter Flying School, Enugu.
In his words “You should all be ready to at all times live and work with troops wherever operational exigency demands. You should also banish all thoughts of leaving your chosen line of flying combat helicopters. The Nigerian Army will not train you and afterwards allow you to branch out to other arms or services on flimsy excuses.”

Speaking during his assessment visit to the 10 Nigerian Army student officers at the School, the COAS stated that he was pleased to hear that the students were doing well and encouraged them to put in their utmost best in all written and practical aspects of the course to ensure their graduation. He informed the students that they will form the nucleus of the newly established Nigerian Army Aviation Wing.

The COAS further revealed that the Nigerian Army established its Aviation Wing to complement the Nigerian Air Force based on the experiences gathered fighting terrorists in the North Eastern region where gaps in air support leading to reverses brought to fore the need for combat helicopters to provide intimate support to troops.This means apart from support from the Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Army will have its own air support element that will always be with the ground troops and readily provide air support whenever required.

The COAS informed the students that the Army will ensure their accommodation, hangar and all necessary facilities are put in place before their graduation. He also expressed the resolve of the Nigerian Army in ensuring that the Service gets the issue of establishing the Army Aviation Wing right as opposed to several failed attempts in the past.

The COAS was accompanied by the General Officer Commanding 82 Division Major General Shehu Yusuf and the Chief of Staff to the COAS Brigadier General Solomon Udounwa. He was received by the Air Secretary Air Vice Marshal CN Chukwu, the Commander 305 Helicopter Group, Air Commodore I Yahaya and the Rector, International Helicopter Flying School, Group Captain Ayo Jolasinmi.

NA ARMORED CAR/VEHICLE'S

OPERATIONAL PICTURES

1st picture is NA soldier and a BMP-I

2nd picture are soldiers crossing a river with an improvised canoe.

NAF PICTURES

Even Jihadists have webbings for extra ammo.

M14A1:
Even Jihadists have webbings for extra ammo.

Yeaap NA soldiers do not carry extra ammo but you know what ? they always go with extra in the armored carriers that's the way they fight, I have watched of NA videos they work/treck kilometers daily which other countries don't do in modern war fare,they rather used there APC/IFV/MRAPs etc .
So u don't use other army to judge ur own army,don't forget the way we fight r different ?
Not that I don't like NA soldiers in appropriate webbing for ammo and other accessories, but in life u learn how to use what u av to achieve maximum success ! That's what makes u r a victor !!!

bidexiii:


Yeaap NA soldiers do not carry extra ammo but you know what ? they always go with extra in the armored carriers that's the way they fight, I have watched of NA videos they work/treck kilometers daily which other countries don't do in modern war fare,they rather used there APC/IFV/MRAPs etc .
So u don't use other army to judge ur own army,don't forget the way we fight r different ?
Not that I don't like NA soldiers in appropriate webbing for ammo and other accessories, but in life u learn how to use what u av to achieve maximum success ! That's what makes u r a victor !!!

keeping Ammo in APCs/ IFVs ( which we don't even have) is balderdrash!!!

Every other military still keeps extra Ammo in their APCs, with every man carrying 8 Mags, 7 in the load-out, and one locked in the rifle.

Fact is, the Nigerian Army and military is poorly funded, poorly equipped and poorly organised.

It isn't a question of the way we fight been different, it is simply having a military that is incompetently lead from unit level to the top brass.

M14A1:
Even Jihadists have webbings for extra ammo.

There is a shocking video of our military on facebook, it is now on beegeagles blog. The video lays bare all that is inefficient with Nigeria.

Some deluded Nigerians like Igbi, were claiming there was nothing wrong in the video. Nigerian troops without proper armour, ammo, webbing and mismatched uniform been transported in lorries used in transporting cows.

I mean that is not acceptable. It just seems as though there is a much much larger disconnect between our troops on the ground and the political and military top brass.

Nigeria army Soldier. Pose with a "RIFFLE GRENADE" attached to an "FN FAL" riffle.