₦airaland Forum

Ngodigha:
No Somalia is better, in Somalia, they do not line up their dirty, ugly and hungry Unclad mothers in demonstrations.

OAM4J:
I dont think he is lying.  Fact is; he is not an Obasanjo and he is not from the North, even if he wants to return in 2015, it will be difficult or near impossible for him to achieve it. Let's remember how difficult it was for him to emerge as the PDP presidential flag bearer, he literarily begged the PDP Governors by assuring them he will not seek 2nd term and he squandered the excess crude account to please them in other to emerge. He just doesn't have the balls. As someone who had no shoes to wear to school, he should be satisfied with a single term.

ezeagu:
Same way other religions did.

ezeagu:
Nri is a religious state without a military and had no militaristic tactics to gain influence. Nri gained influence from religion. Arochukwu gained influence from intimidation. Arochukwu played an indirect hand in destroying Nri which declined before Arochukwu was defeated by the British. Nri influence has died off from what it once was hundreds of years ago, it's not an exageration of Nri's influence otherwise the Eze Nri wouldn't be flown over the Atlantic as the representative of Igbo culture, or maybe it was an Nri conspiracy. We also know that Nri agents were called throughout Igboland to help in spiritual problems.

Eze Nri is the head of Igbo religion and culture on earth, anything else including politics is irrelevant.

Eko Ile:
lol @ foreign investors are already keying into it.


who won invest inside you 419, fake  drugs and kidnapping business? you must think foreign investors are mumu.

Ngodigha:
Monkey shitt-licker, renounce the above or else you will die within 72 hours. I decree it.

PAGAN 9JA:
oh vulgar man. you are a disgusting fella. I decree that you will undergo some serious suferring within the next two years if you dont repent and revert back to the old Gods and also apologize to me.

Becomrich}:
look if I attend that federal executive meeting, they will have to call the police to arrest me.

tpia@:
it means lagoon.

is there a problem.

Katsumoto:
It simply means that the information regarding Okafor's origin is missing in most books and articles. At least I provided the origins of the others; which is more than you could have hoped for. Oh lawd, you just keep making it easy. You are being flogged in every which way and you are resorting to childish tactics.

At least acknowledge your failed attempts at lying and mis-representing. You were caught making bold faced lies. You also posted some thrashy article without any source, link, or author. You are a waste of time. I could have said u should up your game but it isnt that easy.

Katsumoto:
Chyz,

Any more lies or factual inaccuracies? You ignored the fact that your lies about origin were exposed and attempted to mis-represent my post by claiming Oji wasn't in my original list. Clearly, you didn't read the post well.

Katsumoto:
Chyz,

I hope you have not gone to the author of that rubbish article to manufacture another article with all the plotters coming from Ijebu?

Look at the list I posted again and see whether Oji is listed there under Captains.

You are free to manufacture animosity on my part if it suits you. As far as you are concerned, [size=14pt]I am a bigot but I could care less[/size]. That is what people like you resort to when facts are handed to you. I was merely stating that it is dumb to expect non-easterners to care about sub-groups. In Nigeria, you are either Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Urhobo, Igbo, etc. Most people don't go down to sub-groups or villages. To hammer on that is plain disingenuous on your part. They were Igbo, end of story.

Like I said, Okafor is the only individual that I don't know the particular area that he is from. The rest, I got from books. You should try reading them (books) every now and then. If you did, you wouldn't be asking whether I am sure about what I posted.

Katsumoto:
Like I said,[size=13pt] Okafor is the only individual that I don't know the particular area that he is from[/size]. The rest, I got from books.You should try reading them (books) every now and then. If you did, [size=13pt]you wouldn't be asking whether I am sure about what I posted[/size].

Katsumoto:
Dude,

No one cares whether they were Anioma, Ngwa, Owerri, etc to you; to the rest of the world, they were Igbo. Plain and simple; you can't sort out the issue of who came from where amongst yourself. Quit debating like a dummy.

Also, you are a bloody liar.

Anuforo is from Imo
Chukwuka is from Nnobi in Anambra
Onwuategwu is from Nnewi, Anambra
Chude-Sokei is from Onitsha
Obienu is from Oba, Anambra
Oji (one of the original three planners) is from Umuahia, Abia.
Nzeogwu is from Okpanam, Delta
Ifeajuna is from Onitsha (u are correct about this)
Okafor is the only one I don't know where he comes from.
We all know Ademoyega is Yoruba, so no point. Whether he was Ijebu, Egba, Ekiti; he was a Yoruba son.

Aghaya was not a plotter; he was arrested but he wasn't prosecuted like a few others.

So it was the British that separated Onitsha from Asaba, and not River Niger? It appears you keep beating your record.


We are still waiting for the author of that crap you posted.


Yes he came back for more thrashing.

Katsumoto:
So it was the British that separated Onitsha from Asaba, and not River Niger? It appears you keep beating your record.

Katsumoto:
Aghaya was not a plotter; he was arrested but he wasn't prosecuted like a few others.

Katsumoto:
Bear in mind that there is a distinction between those involved in the planning and those involved by circumstance.

Majors
Ifeajuna
Nzeogwu
Okafor
Anuforo
Chukwuka
Aghaya
Onwuatuegwu
Ademoyega
Chude-Sokei
Obienu

Captains
Gbulie
Nwobosi
Oji
Udeaja
Ude

Lieutenants
Oyewole
Adeleke
Ezeigbo

Second Lieutenants
Azubuogor
Nwokocha
Ojukwu
Onyefuru
Igweze
Egbibor
Olafimihan
Ngwuluka
Nweke
Ikejiofor

NB. Major Aghaya was also arrested but his involvement remains indeterminate. He wasn't involved in the execution but he was aware of the coup

Katsumoto:



LWKMD

Chyz, I hope you are not done?

This was important for three reasons; it explains why the accusation that the
whole affair was an ibo plot to overthrow constitutional rule and install ibo
domination of nigeria was an invention adduced long after the coup and at variance
with the facts; it belies the later suggestion that subsequent massacres of
easterners living in the north were excusable or at any rate explicable on the
grounds that 'they started it all'; and it throws light on the conviction to this
day of lieutenant colonel ojukwu that ironsi's accession to power was both
constitutional and legal while that of lieutenant-colonel gowon six months later
after ironsi's murder was illegal and therefore invalid.

the situation had deteriorated, too. nzeogwu, realizing his colleagues in the
south had muffed their job, took a column of troops and drove south, and reached
jebba on the niger river. if the garrisons of the south had split into warring
factions for or against nzeogwu, civil war could have been the only outcome.
fifteen minutes before midnight ironsi broadcast from lagos that since the
government had ceased to function, the armed forces had been asked to form an
interim military government and that he, general ironsi, had been invested with
authority as head of the federal military government.
the crisis swung in his favour. the army obeyed his orders. nzeogwu withdrew to
kaduna barracks whence he too later emerged to go into custody.
it may be that the nigerian cabinet (meeting under the chairmanship of alhaji
dipcharima, transport minister, a hausa, and senior npc minister after balewa) had
no option but to accede to general ironsi's request for authority to take over.
but it is equally true that ironsi had no choice but to make the request, if civil
war was to be averted between rival units of the army.

in lagos general ironsi had taken command of the army and had restored order, but
it was not that which put him later in power. it was the reaction of the
population as much as anything else that made quite plain to all that the reign of
the politicians was at an end. this public reaction, often forgotten today, gives
the lie most firmly of all to the idea that the january coup was a factional
affair.
in kaduna a throng of cheering hausas sacked the palace of the dead autocrat. a
smiling major hassan usman katsina, son of the fulani emir of katsina, sat beside
nzeogwu at a press conference prior to which the latter had named hassan military
governor of the north. alhaji ali akilu, head of the northern civil service
offered his support to nzeogwu. but the ibo major's star was falling.
in lagos and the rest of the south, ironsi held the reins and would have no truck
with the"plotters. but he had the sense to realize that, although what the
plotters had done went against all his own training and inclinations, they had
still performed a popular service and had a lot of mass support. on saturday
afternoon, 15 january, he asked the acting president to appoint a deputy premier
from whom, according to the constitation, ironsi could take valid orders. but the
politicians procrastinated through into the sunday morning, and when the cabinet finally met he had to tell them that he could not ensure the loyalty
of his officers and prevent civil war unless he himself took over. in this he was
almost certainly right, as numerous officers have made known since. even those who
had not taken part in the coup would not have accepted a return to the rule of the
now thoroughly discredited politicians.

minutes later pam was dead. 1ronsi put down the phone as his
driver, a young hausa soldier, came in to say there were troops driving through
the streets. ironsi moved fast.
he jumped into his car and ordered the driver to take him straight to ikeja
barracks, the biggest barracks in the area and home of the army headquarters. he
was stopped by a roadblock of ifeajuana's soldiers who pointed their guns at him.
ironsi climbed out, stood up straight and roared 'get out of my way'. they moved.
at ikeja he headed for the regimental sergeant-major's quarters and rallied the
garrison. from ikeja he sent out a
stream of orders throughout the morning. troops loyal to him and the government
took over. major ejoor, reporting to him just before dawn, was ordered to get back
to enugu and re-
sume command as fast as he could. ejoor went to nearby ikeja airport, took a light
plane, and headed for enugu airport. on the way he overtook ifeajuana's mercedes
driving along the road below.
ejoor, arriving first in enugu, took over the garrison and withdrew the troops
around dr. okpara's home. at 10 a.m.
the same troops stood guard of honour as a fearful premier said good-bye at the
airport to president makarios of cyprus who had been finishing a tour of nigeria
in enugu. later dr. okpara was allowed to leave for his hometown of umuahia.
in the midwest dissident troops arrived at the premier's lodge at 10 a.m., but
were withdrawn on orders from general ironsi at 2 p.m. the coup had failed.
ifeajuana and okafor
arrived in enugu to find ejoor in the saddle. they hid in the house of a local
chemist, whence okafor was arrested; ifeajuana fled to ghana, later

to return and join the other plotters in prison.
it was not a bloodless coup, but it was far from a bloodbath. the premiers of the
north, the west and the federation were dead, as was one federal minister. among
senior army officers three northerners, two wcsterners and two easterners were
dead. (another ibo major had been killed, this time by loyal troops who thought
wrongly that he was among the plotters.) apart from that a handful of civilians
including the wife of one of the officers and some houseboys from sir ahmadu
bello's household, together with less than a dozen soldiers, had died. nzeogwu
maintained later that there should have been no deaths at all, but that some of
his colleagues became over-enthusiastic.

one of the props for the idea that the coup of 15 january was an all-ibo affair
aimed at bringing about ibo domination of nigeria has always been that there was
no coup in enugu. the evidence does not support this theory. troops of the first
battalion, garrisoning enugu, moved against the premier's lodge at 2 a.m.; they
surrounded it, but waited for orders before attacking the house and its occupants.
the commanding officer, lieutenant-colonel adekunle fajuyi, a yoruba, was away on
a course; the second-in-command, major david ejoor, a midwesterner, was in lagos.
the troops, not predominantly ibo as has been suggested but largely middlebelt
infantrymen from the northern region, crouched round the house as dawn rose and
waited for orders. meanwhile ifeajuana and okafor were speeding across country to
give those orders.no man did more to foil the coup than the army g.o.c. major-general ironsi.
himself an ibo from umuahia, he had joined the army as a boy soldier and come up
through the ranks. he was a big bull of a man, a thorough-going professional
soldier who knew where his duty lay and stood no nonsenseit seems he too was
destined for death that night. earlier he had been at a party given by brigadier
maimalari and had gone on to another party on the mailboat aureol, moored at lagos
docks. when he returned home after midnight his telephone was ringing. it was
colonel pam, to say there was
something afoot.

it is still largely
presumed that balewa was shot, although one eyewitness has sworn he died of a
heart-attack. the bodies were found on the abeokuta road a week later.
ifeajuana and his collaborator in lagos, major david okafor, commander of the
federal guard, seem to have made the crass error of not leaving anyone of calibre
in the federal capital when they left. this was largely why the plot failed,
coupled with the brisk action of the g.o.c., major-general ironsi.
the result was that when the ibadan group swept into lagos shortly after dawn with
the body of akintola and the trussed but living form of fani-kayode in the back of
the car, the city had changed hands. the ibadan group were arrested by soldiers
loyal to ironsi, and fani-kayode was freed.
meanwhile ifeajuana and okafor realized there was no officer to take charge of
enugu, capital of the east and the last of the four cities they aimed to control.
they then set off in the mercedes, followed by a volkswagen with some soldiers,
for the 400-mile cross-country drive to enugu.

at ibadan, capital of the west, the obvious target was the hated akintola.
soldiers surrounding his house were met by a
volley of automatic rifle fire. the premier kept his own private arsenal. after
storming the house, during which three soldiers were killed, akintola was dragged
out badly wounded and finished off . elsewhere in ibadan his deputy premier chief
fani kayode was arrested. as the soldiers dragged him away he cried, 'i knew that
the army was going to come, but i did not know that was the way they would come'.
so far the coup had gone roughly according to, plan. by the small hours the
insurgent officers, if they had consolidated, could have, claimed to control the
capitals of the north, west, and lagos, the federal capital. benin city, the
capital of the tiny midwest region, seems to have been left out of their plan; not
without reason, for the midwest could have been taken later.
even from eye-witnesses and participants, versions of what
,exactly went wrong vary considerably; one can only try to draw some kind of
coherent account from the varying impressions. major ifeajuana and his co-plotters
in lagos seem to have headed back towards abeokuta in the mercedes,dumping the bodies of balewa and okotie-eboh on the way.

some hours after dark he drove into lagos with several truckloads of troops from abeokuta. barracks. small
detachments went off all over lagos seeking their objectives. three senior army
officers of northern origin, brigadier maimalari, commanding the second brigade,
lieutenant-colonel pam, the adjutant-general, and lieutenant-colonel largema,
commanding the fourth battalion, were killed, the first two at their homes and the
third at the ikoyi hotel where he was staying. major ifeajuana himself went after
the politicians. the prime minister, balewa, was
arrested at his home and bundled into the back of a mercedes where he was made to
lie on the floor. the finance minister, chief festus okotie-eboh, a mid-westerner
who had made himself a bye-word for corruption and venality even in nigerian
politics, was shot at his home and his body dumped in the boot of the mercedes.
the troops also went after dr. kingley mbadiwe, the ibo minister of trade, who
escaped across open gardens and hid in the empty state house, home of the absent
president azikiwe. it was the one place the soldiers never thought of searching.
the last casualty in lagos that night was another ibo, major arthur unegbu. he was
in charge of the ammunition store at ikeja barracks, and was shot dead for
refusing to hand over the keys of the armoury to the dissidents.

When they arrived at sir ahmadu's splendid
residence nzeogwu told the soldiers they had come to kill the sardauna. they made
no demur. 'they had bullets. . , if they had disagreed, they could have shot me,'
he said later. they stormed the gate killing three of the sardauna's guards and
losing one of their own number in the process. inside the compound they shelled
the palace with mortars; then nzeogwu tossed a hand grenade at the main door,
coming too close in the process and injuring his hand. once inside the sardauna
was shot along with two or three house servants. elsewhere in kaduna another group
entered the house of brigadier ademolegun and shot him and his wife while in bed.
a third group killed colonel shodeinde, the yoruba second-in-command at the
defence academy. with that the bloodshed in the north was over.
in the afternoon of 15 january nzeogwu broadcast from kaduna radio, telling his
listeners, 'our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, men in high and
low places that seek bribes and demand ten per cent, those that seek to keep the
country permanently divided so that they can remain in office as ministers and
vips of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big
for nothing before international circles.' later he said privately: 'our purpose
was to change our country and make it a place we could be proud to call our home,
not to wage war, . tribal considerations were completely out of our minds at
this stage.'
in lagos the coup was in the hands of major emmanuel ifeajuana, a young ibo who
had had a taste of fame for his earlier performances as an athlete.

[size=13pt]The coup that failed[/size]

Two coups were probably brewing during the first fortnight of 1966. the evidence
for the one that did not occur is largely circumstantial; but subsequent
assertions that the coup of 15 january baulked another coup scheduled for 17
january are certainly very plausible.
the other coup which was planned would have begun with a
brief reign of terror in the niger delta of the eastern region, headed by a
student at nsukka university, isaac boro, who was supplied with funds for the
purpose. this would have offered prime minister balewa the chance of declaring a
state of emergency in the east. simultaneously, according to the charges later
made in the west, units officered by northerners were to carry out a 'ruthless
blitz' against opposition (that is, upga) elements in that region, the two-pronged
action would have broken the upga opposition party, again reinforced akintola in
the premiership of a region which by now, hated him, and left the sardauna of
sokoto's nna party in supreme control of nigeria.
a number of moves were made which seem to give credence to this. on 13 january sir
ahmadu bello, who had been on a
pilgrimage to mecca, returned to his northern capital kaduna. the following day
there was a secret meeting between him, akintola who flew north for the day, and
the commanding officer of the first brigade, a. pro-akintola western officer,
brigadier ademolegun. previously the federal defence minister, a npc northerner,
had ordered the army commander major-general ironsi to take his accumulated leave;
the inspector-general of police, mr. louis edet, another easterner, was also
ordered on leave; the deputy inspector general, mr. m. roberts, a westerner, was
sent into premature retirement to be replaced by the hausa alhaji kam salem, who
would thus have been in control of the federal police by 17 january. the
president, dr. azikiwe, was in england on a health cure. if that was the plot, it
failed because it was pre-ceded by the other coup, plotted in equal secrecy by a small group of junior
officers, led mainly though certainly not exclusively by men of eastern origin.
in kaduna the group leader was the left-leaning and highly idealistic major
chukwuma nzeogwu, an ibo from the midwest region who had lived all his life in the
north and spoke hausa better than ibo. on the evening of the 14th this brilliant
but erratic chief instructor at the nigerian defence academy of kaduna led a small detachment of soldiers, mostly hausas, out of town
ostensibly on routine exercises.