₦airaland Forum

I could think of a lot of more qualified Yorubas to run Nigeria. As far as I am concerned, musicians tend to be dumber than average. No point taking risk with people of music. What Nigeria needs is someone with a masters in Political science and Economics. The morons (Military men, Business men e.t.c.) have had their chance.

12 yrs old

kazey, I won't be suprised if the voter turn out from the Northern States in 2003 are not in line with the results from the 2006 census.

Kazey, I won't be so sure about that. I actually believe that it would be a lot easier to convince Northerners to go and vote. Or, at the very least, it would be a lot easier to rigg in the north where a majority of the people can't read or write.

Twinstaiye, you and I know that surveys out of Nigeria are hard to come by. However, you must admit that their findings are in line with what we have come to expect from Nigeria. Everything passes through an ethnic prism. In fact, a northerner on this forums that goes by the name of JosBoy4lif, has on many occasions supported the implementation of Sharia even though he is a Christian. Now, why would a Christian support sharia if not for the fact that he is a Northerner and as far as he is concerned, they can do no wrong?

According to the Nigerian constition, for a person to win the Presidential election, he or she must get at least 25 percent of the vote in 24 out of the 36 States in the union. In addition to this, they must also win the popular vote.

Now, the question you might be asking is, how is this harmful to an Igbo bid for presidency?

Well, how is an Igbo, a group notorious for being Christian and relatively anti-North expected to win 25 percent in a couple of the Northern State? Out of the 36 States in Nigeria, 17 States are what would be called southern, and 19 are Northern (20 if you count Abuja). So, an Igbo man will have to win a landslide victory in all 17 States and then have a relative strong showing (over 25 percent of the vote) in 7 Northern States to win a Presidential election.

Note: Hausas will also face a similar up-hill battle but it would not be as tough when you take into account that the number of Northern States are superior Southern States.

If you look closely, you would notice that smaller African countries are actually doing really well when you consider what they have to work with. Countries like Benin Republic, Ghana, Ivory Coast (even with their mini civil war) are all able to provide constant electricity, access to water and decent education to their populous. However, if you look closely, the so called African Giants, such as Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (is it even a Democratic nation? Lies!), and Sudan are all in terrible state of affairs. In fact, the only big African nation in sub-saharen Africa that is not a complete failure is South Africa.

Now, we can all come up with reason as to why this is so, but I think we can all agree that sensible measures must be taken to relieve the fears of internal domination that lead these "Giants" to act in ways that are against the interests of the nation as a whole. Take for instance Nigeria, ethnic clashes (religious issues are very closely related to this) over control of resources, are in the short term interest of the ethnic group on the offensive, but in the long run, both the aggressor and the victim suffer for it.

Seeker, thanks for posting, but I can't help but feel that better articles that tell how Nigeria achieved Independence can be found. I will add what I consider to be better source material later on.

But I fully understand the reasoning behind choosing a short article. Afterall, only those that are really into politics, such as myself, would even bother to read anything beyond 2 pages.

Here's yet more information to illustrate the manner in which ethnicity manages to play a role in virtually every conflict that occurs in Nigeria. What might seem at first to be purely a religious phenomenon - the increasing militancy of Nigerian muslims and the attendent calls for the imposition of Sharia - turns out to have a substantial underlying ethnic component. This isn't surprising, as the primary utility of Sharia for the Northern political class has been as an instrument for defying President Olusegun Obasanjo, a southern Christian.

To measure the degree of acceptance of Sharia law among Nigerians, RMS Media Services inserted some questions in the political section of its omnibus survey 1. The following pages present the key findings of the survey.

Nigerians’ opinion on the introduction of Sharia in Zamfara State is largely unfavourable: while 38% approve, 49% reject the implementation. About one tenth (9%) had no opinion on the issue. Quite expectedly, disapproval was unanimous across the entire South; surprisingly, however, even in the North, Zamfara’s move meets with opposition with one third (32%) rejecting it. Unfortunately, we don’t know the opinion of the people in Zamfara itself; the Sharia system prevented fieldwork in this state.

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The spread of Sharia into other states is widely rejected by Nigerians. 50% are opposed, 6% remain neutral and an additional 8% had not yet formed an opinion. Thus, a bare 36% of Nigerians favour the implementation of Sharia in other states. Even among Muslims, about one in five reject the further spread of Sharia.

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The entire South, i.e. Lagos, the Yoruba West and Igbo and ethnic minority East, are strongly opposed to more states joining the league of Sharia states. In the North, the scenario varies considerably from state to state.

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The list of problems, which are faced acutely by the better part of Nigerians, remains remarkably consistent across all demographic breakdowns, e.g. sex, age, region etc. Thus, the introduction of Sharia law may well be interpreted as a move to detract from the severe economic and infrastructural crisis, which no government, federal or state, could hope to solve within the foreseeable future. To fire up the populace’s religious sentiments, on the other hand, can be achieved practically overnight. Complementary to this strategy, the debate surrounding Sharia points at regional and ethnic conflicts, which, suppressed by consecutive military regimes, have never been resolved and now erupt violently.

Consent to implementation of Sharia depends more on ethnicity than religious affiliation. Whereas 89% of Hausa Muslims (88% Kanuri, 79% Fulani) approve of Sharia law, less than a third (32%) of Yoruba Muslims (the one Southern ethnic group with the highest proportion of Muslims) concur. Christian (or canon) law is likewise rejected by Yoruba Christians (24% approval), strongly pointing at the Yoruba’s desire for secular rule. Slight majorities in favour of Christian law can be found only among Igbo (52%) and Ijaw (62%) Christians.

Almost simultaneously with the introduction of Sharia in Zamfara, militant groups have entered the political scene in all corners of the country; e.g. Oodua People’s Congress, Arewa People’s Congress etc. Sharia may, therefore, be an expression of social and political disintegration rather than a debate over religious dogma; it seems to aim at ethnic segregation more than at a quest for a religious lifestyle. The states, which have declared their intention to implement Sharia law (and in which majorities would facilitate such a move), are concentrated in the North-Western sector of the country.

Now, what was that again about ethnic heterogeneity being an "ad hoc" explanation for the woes of African states like Nigeria?

Putting such claims aside for the moment, this sort of ethno-religious split is one reason why an African "Swiss Confederation" model is bound to fail. If one group believes it is duty bound by Allah to impose Islamic religious law on the entire nation, while another group believes that faithfulness to the Bible demands Canon Law be the universal legal system, and yet a third group desires no legal code other than a purely secular one, what hope can there be for amity, even under a confederation? Sharia, Canon Law and the Common Law tradition cannot be reconciled, and there is little hope is for any confederation, however loose, if even the basic framework of the law cannot be agreed upon. To say that not every ethnic group in Africa has the numbers to constitute a state in its own right is not to establish that states like Nigeria ought to remain whole, even if as loose federations.

http://reti..com/2004_01_11_reti_archive.html

This is an excellent article that has some juicy surveys that many might like. Especially those that are wondering what the views of Nigerians are on the implementation of Sharia and Canon religious law in the country.

BIG African states are among the least successful on the continent. Countries with a large land mass and sizeable population tend to be chronically unstable. They perform poorly economically, even thought many are rich in natural resources and all have established internal markets. They have been among the least successful in overcoming the early post-colonial legacy of single-party or military regimes and in moving toward democracy. Forty-plus years after independence, most are still struggling to find a political system capable of holding together their diverse populations.

Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Angola together account for about 40 percent of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa. Their chronic internal problems have repercussions that go well beyond their boundaries. The disintegration of the DRC has had particularly devastating consequences, affecting all the neighboring countries and even pulling in some farther afield. Sudan and Ethiopia have meddled dangerously in each other’s civil wars for decades, destabilising the entire Horn of Africa. War in the southern Sudan has a spillover effect in Uganda. Angola, which has the potential for rapid economic growth, instead exports refugees. And Nigeria, which aspires to play the role of benevolent hegemon stabilizing West Africa, perennially teeters on the verge of an internal collapse.

The only true exception is South Africa. Though still facing a host of major socioeconomic problems, South Africa is a functioning state with both the strong administrative system and the transport and communication infrastructure that allow modern states to implement policies, collect taxes, and deliver services in return. The unity of the state is not contested by its citizens. Although the dominant role of the African National Congress hampers true political competition, the country has developed a more stable political system than any other large African states.

To be sure, many small and medium states in Africa also perform poorly and their internal conflicts are sometimes intertwined. But the problems of smaller states more often have little spillover effect. Several small and medium states, furthermore, are showing improved in economic and political performance, making the most progress toward consolidated democratisation.

The same factors that make large states so dangerous — their size and the resulting complexity of their problems — also make intervention unlikely. Confronted with conflicts that have caused hundreds of thousands of deaths over a long period of time, the international community has offered endless mediation but very little concrete help. At present, there are some 13,000 UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, which has a population of 5.7 million, but only about 10,000 peacekeepers in the DRC, which has a population 10 times as large. The various UN missions to Angola in the 1990s were chronically understaffed and under-resourced.

The international community needs a new approach to the problems of large African states. A nostalgic commitment to the territorial integrity of these countries does not help them stay together. Classic UN or other international interventions are almost impossible in large countries, because the resources of personnel and finances required are prohibitive.

Size and Instability
Africa’s big states, with the exception of South Africa, do not serve the interests of their citizens, their neighbours or the broader international community.

Despite the advantage for growth that large states with resource bases and domestic markets should theoretically enjoy, Africa’s three most populous countries — Nigeria, Ethiopia and the DRC — have an average per capita income under $300 a year, virtually unchanged in the last 20 years and representing a substantial decline in real income and living conditions for most citizens. Such per capita income is well below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, which has increased slightly to about $1,000 in the last 20 years. Even more striking, per capita income in countries with lower than 2 million inhabitants has shown steady growth for the last 15 years and now tops $2,000. Other indices of social welfare, such as those measured by the UN Human Development Index, confirm the disparities in fortunes between large and small states.

The most serious dysfunctionality has affected the state itself. Big African states have not succeeded in establishing political and administrative systems capable of coping with the challenge posed by their size. They remain poorly governed, poorly administered and perpetually unstable. Sudan and Nigeria have each experienced 11 leadership turnovers since 1960. The DRC had eight turnovers, Ethiopia five.

Long-running civil wars reveal the failure of big African states to reconcile their internal political, ethnic, and religious differences and to establish political systems capable of accommodating the demands and interests of their various constituencies. These internal failures, rather than the interventions by outsiders pursuing their own agendas, explain the instability of big states. Angola became the theatre of a proxy war between the US, allied with South Africa, and the Soviet Union, relying on Cuban personnel, only because the dissension between its leadership provided outsiders with an entry point. When the outsiders withdrew following a 1988 agreement, the war continued as a domestic phenomenon for another 14 years.

Nor can the conflicts in these states be attributed solely to the ambitions of specific leaders. Although nearly all large African countries have been ruled at one time or another by ruthless strongmen, conflicts have extended past the political life span of any one individual. Angola may be the exception here. UNITA, the armed opposition group in Angola, was so dependent on its leader Jonas Savimbi that his death in 2002 spelled the end of the fighting. But it is still too early to tell whether Angola will be able to develop a system of government that can turn the cessation of hostilities into real peace with economic and social development.

Even in countries where wars have ended, the development of a political system that can address the underlying problems has been elusive. Indeed, all the civil wars in big African states have ended by a military victory, not by a political agreement. In the aftermath of war, both Nigeria and Ethiopia have experimented with federal formulas in an attempt to prevent conflict from recurring, but neither Nigeria’s territorial federalism nor Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism have provided a fully-tested solution. In Angola, meanwhile, a government flush with its military victory is still trying to avoid real political reform.

Administrative failure has received much less attention than political failure. Big African states do not control their territory well, do not have adequate administrative structures and thus encounter serious problems in implementing policies and delivering services. Despite the often decried bloating of the civil service, big African states are today even more “under-administered” than they were in colonial days. In the most extreme case — the DRC — transport and communications infrastructure has been sorely neglected, depriving the population of services, leaving civil servants and soldiers unpaid and undermining private-sector growth.

Experiments in Governance
Unlike Angola and the DRC, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sudan have sought to address directly the problem of how to govern a large, diverse state, but still seek lasting systemic solutions.

Nigeria. At independence a federal state composed of three large regions, Africa’s most populous nation has tried to refine a federal formula since the end of the Biafra war in 1970. It has repeatedly increased the number of states, which now number 36. Nigeria has adopted a constitutional clause, subsequently copied by other African countries, that stipulates that a presidential candidate must show nationwide support by winning at least 25% of the vote in two-thirds of the states to be declared the winner. It has tried to provide representation for all major groups in the civil service and cabinet posts. It has also experimented with different formulas for the distribution of the oil revenue — most recently increasing the share that goes directly to state and local governments.

None of these steps, however, has provided a real solution. Increasing the number of states has eliminated the danger of a direct confrontation among large regions, but it has not eliminated traditional divisions. There is no longer a predominantly Muslim northern state; rather, there are now 12 states in the north and central regions that have incorporated sharia, Islamic law, in their legal codes. Increasing the number of states also has not eliminated the potential for further fragmentation: With several hundred different languages spoken in the country, the number of groups that could demand their own state is virtually endless. Similarly, the revision of the oil revenue distribution has not quelled discontent among the population of the oil-producing Niger Delta. If anything, the new formula has also created incentive for the formation of new states and led to the decentralisation of corruption rather than to more accountable government.

Ethiopia. A loosely structured feudal empire until the 20th century, Ethiopia started directly confronting the problem of how to become a modern state after World War II. Emperor Haile Selassie tried to develop a formal bureaucratic administration, but it remained quite thin on the ground, never extending below the district level and leaving local communities to the authority of landlords and traditional authorities. Selassie also tried to develop a common Ethiopian identity and culture by making Amharic the language of instruction and government. In feudal style, he also attempted to bridge domestic divides by carefully building a network of intercultural marriages for the royal family. It worked for a while, but when the emperor was deposed in 1974, the country started to fall apart.

A new Marxist-oriented military regime sought to set up a centralised, party-dominated system. The outcome was disastrous. The regime did not have the tools to control the system it envisaged. With the help of Eritrean insurgents, ethnic liberation movements rose up throughout the country. When the military regime was defeated by the Eritrean and Tigrean movements in 1991, Eritrea seceded, leaving the Tigrean insurgents to find a means to govern the divided country. The outcome was a bold experiment in ethnic nationalism. Ethiopia became a federation of ethnic states with a considerable level of autonomy. Following the Soviet example, Ethiopia adopted a constitution recognising the right of nationalities to self-determination — even to the point of secession. It remains to be seen whether such a right would be respected in practice any more than it was in the Soviet Union.

The system is held together by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, a Tigrean-dominated amalgam of the ethnic parties of each region. It has been successful in keeping together a country that in 1991 appeared headed for disintegration, but unity in the country remains somewhat precarious.

Sudan. Since independence in 1956, Sudan has wavered between repression and federalism in its response to southern dissent. In 1972, the government in Khartoum adopted an asymmetrical federal system, with a northern government ruling the entire country and the south having limited autonomy. A decade later, in 1983, President Jafaar Nimeiri tried to break up the southern region into three provinces less threatening to Khartoum, and war resumed. The conflict was made worse when a radical Islamist movement took over the government and declared sharia the legal code of the country. Now a second agreement, again giving autonomy to the south, may be in the offing, but, as argued earlier, it does not claim to provide a definitive answer.

South Africa. Despite its size, South Africa considered but rejected a federal solution for two reasons. First, the apartheid regime had attempted to maintain minority control by setting up 10 independent homelands that would be united to white South Africa in a ‘constellation of independent states.’ The attempt failed, but also left a legacy of suspicion of decentralization. Second, the country already had a strong unitary system in place that allowed limited power to four large provinces—the original states that were merged in the Union of South Africa following the South Africa (Anglo-Boer) War of 1899–1902. With a functioning system in place, it was easier for South Africa to continue along the same lines. In 1994 the country increased the number of provinces from four to nine, each with an elected legislature and premier. At the same time, the national government was able to use its central control of the public purse to equalise spending across the territory, transfer revenue among levels of government and monitor the fiscal performance of the provinces. Arguably, South Africa has been successful in part because it rejected extreme decentralisation.

Rethinking Engagement
The international community has not dealt with big African states as a separate category requiring a special approach. Rather, it has dealt with them on the basis of a mixture of political expediency and general principles that are often of scant relevance. Countries with economic or strategic interests in the big states have, not surprisingly, sought to protect those interests at all costs. With the weakening of colonial ties, most recently those of France with its former colonies, and the end of the Cold War, the emphasis is less on safeguarding interests than avoiding becoming involved directly in the work of stabilising troubled countries.

But the basic rules have not changed — and are increasingly out-moded. The first is territorial integrity. Enshrined in the charter of the Organisation of African Unity and its successor the African Union, this principle was more plausible in the immediate aftermath of decolonisation — when new countries did not want to open themselves to one another’s territorial revendications — than it is today. It was also in keeping with the historically unprecedented worldwide free-zing of international borders that characterized the Cold War period.

Since the late 1980s, however, more than 20 new states have been formed, primarily in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, but the international community remains theoretically committed to the territorial integrity of all African states. Only Eritrea has changed the continent’s map, breaking off from Ethiopia in 1991.

The second principle is that the most effective political systems are decentralised — and in the big states, decentralisation becomes federalism. Federalism is usually taken to mean a territorial arrangement, not one based on ethnic identities. The Ethiopian solution has been only grudgingly accepted by the international community; it is certainly not held up as a model for solving the problem of large, diverse states.

The third principle, which has only prevailed since the end of the Cold War, is that democracy and a strong bill of rights provide the solution to internal conflicts in states big and small. Political systems should be blind to ethnicity and religion and should not recognise the rights of groups. The US is particularly emphatic on this point.

There is nothing wrong with these principles per se, but they bear little relation to reality. Ethnicity and religion are highly politicized in all African states. The example of Canada, still struggling to find a solution to the problem of Quebec, is a sobering reminder that democracy and federalism are no panacea. Furthermore, the international community has neither the tools nor the political will to help big African states become federal democracies.

It is time to consider a different approach to big African states. Several new rules apply:

Limit commitment to territorial integrity to defending states against outside aggression. The international system needs to protect countries from being attacked, but it should not guarantee the survival to countries threatened by internal factions. Ultimately, shape and cohesion of states should be determined from within.

Define external aggression. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a clear case of external aggression. When the neighbours of the DRC send troops into a territory nobody controls, the international community needs to worry about state disintegration, not external aggression.

Accept partition if it happens. Africa does not need another Berlin Conference and more lines drawn on maps. Nor does it need stubborn international determination to keep states alive that remain dysfunctional more than four decades after independence.

Avoid all-purpose federal prescriptions. Federalism may eliminate the demand for partition in some cases, but this will only happen if the component units of the federal system reflect political reality. In troubled big African states, federalism will predominantly be based on ethnicity and/or religion. The role of the international community is not to dictate the boundaries of the component units, but to help the participants reach the needed compromises.

Do not push democracy as a panacea. A democratic process can only take place when there is a functioning state. State building should come first.

Develop a model for peacekeeping in large states. Peace support operations must be more than symbolic. They should use decisive military force where necessary. Above all, they must find a balance between rebuilding local armies and police forces and helping to build durable civilian administration.

Encourage big African states to look inward first. With the exception of South Africa, big states are too dysfunctional to be encouraged to deal with conflicts in their regions. Nigeria and other big African states will become forces for stability and peace in their regions only if they find ways to manage their own considerable political and economic problems. They must focus on their domestic problems first. — Jeffrey Herbst, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University; Greg Mills, national director of the South African Institute of International Affairs; and Marina Ottaway, senior associate of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

http://www.saiia.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=233

I just came across this article that offers helpful alternative ways to looking at problems facing larger African nations. Let me know what you think once you read it. (Yes, its long. But it is worth reading!) [quote][/quote]

diddy4, I had no idea you were bluenubian.

bluenubian, we have a bond. Its called master servant bond. Guess which role you play?

In a Yoruba State, the economy will be dominated by Southern-Yorubas and everyone knows it. And there just isn't enough hate on the ground to generate a Yoruba civil war. Besides, if the in-land Yorubas wanted to leave, no one would stop them. If the coastal Yorubas wanted to leave, they would lose access to parsly populated farm land. So, it is mutually beneficial. I doubt anyone will be fighting for domination. Expecially since different Yoruba sub-groups have been inter-marrying for hundreds of years.

In my family, my mother is from Ijebu and my father is from Abeokuta and they got married with out any problems. In my mothers family, 3 out of the 5 children of them are Christian. In my fathers family, 2 out of the 3 of them are muslim. And yet, I have not seen any problems arise of difference in faith. The culture is not one that promotes breaking of order.

As far as I know, most Yorubas are Yoruba first, Christian/muslim/traditional believes second, and Nigerian/State of orgin and local government third if that even makes it on their indentity list.

Drusilla, if you look closely, you will noticed that non of Yoruba territories were rocked by the Sharia riots that led to the killings of thousands in other parts of the country. This is really amazing when you consider out of the major ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo), Yorubas have the most even distribution of Christians and Muslims. So, you would expect, that if there was any massive clashes, the fuel for those clashes would be found in abundance in Yoruba land.

Now, I am not sure exactly how or why this peaceful co-existence developed, but it does exist in Yoruba land. While there are inter-ethnic division, it is very rare for it show itself in inter-ethnic violence. Furthermore, these inter-ethnic groupings in Yorubas are so complexed that the vast majority of new generation Yorubas are barely aware of their existence. Yorubas consider themselves Yorubas before they attach their State of origin. Unity has been achieved. All that is needed is a Yoruba nation.

Seun, all social animals practice prebendalism. You should watch a documentary on inter-group relations amongst chimpanzees.

Now, you make a very good point, but I can't help but find that in this current form of democracy, instead of looking for your own group for favors, what we are seeing is that candidates look for favors from the opposition groups. Take for instance, the current President, Obasonja did not win any of the south-west States in 1999, even though the mere fact that he was Yoruba should have guaranteed a victory in at least 2/3 of those States. Instead, he was put into power by support from the East and North. So, they might be a reverse effect in which case, people vote for candidates from opposing regions that are unable to muster support within their ethnic/regional base. Once they get elected, they have no choice but to serve the wishes of their newly adopted region. And you can see proof of this by the reluctance of Obasonjo to do anything about Sharia even though it is in blatant violation of the constition.

And lastly, the problem of prebendalism, will not be so rampant if the borders were made with respect to the location and heritage of ethnic groups.

Its funny you would say that. I said the recipe for progress was to allow the major ethnic groups to form individual States, and surrounding minority groups would be attached to the majority group they share the most in common with.

Drusilla, being black people means nothing. Only because you are African American can you think that being black is somehow some basis for unity. Well, I don't.

Hell no!!

Am I the only one that feels Nigeria has to focus on Stable power supply before they continue revamping their road system? Afterall, what are you using the roads to transport, when lack of electricity is crippling the ability of the Country to produce?

Nigeria has a very large work force, (about 46 million) and labour is dirt cheap, but requiring employers to generate their own electricity is too much of a turn off for employers.

What I see going on in Nigeria is socialism gone mad. How else can you explain this never ending drive to create more and more roads when nothing is being produced. In fact, many of those roads are hurting the country because Nigeria is not in a position to take advantage of them. So, we build a road from Lagos to Kano, that just means that the foreign goods that flood Lagos, make it all the way across the nations to flood the markets in Kano. This in turn drives what little jobs that are available in the country to other countries since, unlike in the past, you don't need to have a farm in the North to adequately supply Northerners with rice. Now, you can just import the rice from Thailand and use the newly constructed nice roads to make sure your goods make it to Kano in time to drive the local farmers out of business.

Nigeria need to wake. It is not nuclear science. Focus on Energy production and don't worry about the local roads. Uneven development is the most efficient way to develop a country.

lol. Diddy, you just got put in check.

Are you going to just take it like that?

An Igbo man can win in the South-West, as long as he has spent some time in Yoruba land. An Igbo man will never win in the Core-North.

ToyM28, its already too late. You are already on the list!

All right, from what I have read so far, Rhodaly, ToyM28, and Retro have all volunteered. Well, I will wait a little longer before I begin the interview with these ladies (Rhodalyn is a girl? )

my2cent, everyone knows that.

Pretty Tom boy, maybe. Handsome boy? no way!