MikeZA's Posts
Nairaland Forum › MikeZA's Profile › MikeZA's Posts
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agaugust: i was just ignoring your above foolish post, south africa used the G6 artillery to attack Cuban position that is a fixed target, an unmovable target, a geographically known airport that is available in a high school student's atlas map/textbook.Should I post the battle of Lomba river. Where the recces called in artillery on moving targets trying to cross a wooden bridge. Thanks for saying "South Africa used the G6 artillery to ATTACK Cuban". |
agaugust: i was just ignoring your above foolish post, south africa used the G6 artillery to attack Cuban position that is a fixed target, an unmovable target, a geographically known airport that is available in a high school student's atlas map/textbook.I should I post the battle of Lomba river. Where the recces called in artillery on moving targets trying to a wooden bridge. Thanks for saying "South Africa used the G6 artillery to ATTACK Cuban". |
agaugust: show us a source that says nigeria does NOT have any Otomat missiles. simple.itweb.co.za/mobilesite/defenceweb/home/item_id-6540/ |
agaugust: i had 3 weblink sources in my post, you had zero sources in your post, so why should we believe what you write from the privacy of your bedroom in soweto ? dummyUmkhonto missile has destroyed the Denel Skua target drone,on many occasions during training and testing. Soon it will be upgraded to "area defence",meaning a single SAN frigate can protect a whole convoy of ships "riding" together. We all know living standards in Soweto are away better than,those of your best suburbs. |
agaugust: show us a source that says nigeria does NOT have any Otomat missiles. simple.Stop running around ignoring my post. I have proven to you that Denel's G5 and G6 was used to strike targets 40km to 50km away with deadly accuracy. Counter this by showing me how will your army destroy this mighty guns.....I'm asking you this for the forth time. |
agaugust: you were very luck i was too busy at work yesterday. i read your many foolish posts that look like an anti-rhio poacher bush ranger trying to plan a military operation at international level. you are a mumu and mugu at the same time with some maga tendencies in your medula oblongata.The G5 and the G6 have been used primarily in battlefield interdiction roles and have been very accurate due to coinputerised firing calculations. Artillery observers were deployed on the front line and targets which presented themselves were exploited immediately. When the Cubans wanted to launch an air strike from the Angolan airfield at Cuito Cuanavale, artillery observers on one occasion called for G6 fire support and destroyed four Russian MiG 21 jet fighters as they taxied for take off.(46) The G5 shelled the runways and associated infrastructure of the airfield at Cuito Cuanavale over a long period of time and this prevented the enemy fighters from taking off to participate against South African forces. The G5 played a primary role in destroying the enemy, including aircraft and tanks. The fact remains that the G5 played a critical role during this campaign and without it the war in Angola would have run a different course. The G5 proved to be the backbone of the South African forces during the conflict. The G5 was a great psychological booster for the members of the SADF operating on the ground. The role that the G5 fulfilled should therefore not be underestimated under any circumstances.(47) Before being operationally employed the G6 was evaluated, amongst others, during Exercise Zenula in May 1986 at Omuthiya, the base camp of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The G5 was used operationally for the first time by the SADF on 9 August 1986 during Operation Alpha Centauri. This operation lasted until 16 August 1986. One battery of G5s (a battery consists of eight guns) was employed in conjunction with one battery of multiple rocket launchers (MRL). The operation was an artillery attack against Cuban and FAPLA formations concentrating in Cuito Cuanavale for their 1986 offensive against UNITA. The 25th Cuban-FAPLA Brigade was situated east of Cuito Cuanavale near Tumpo. The 13th Brigade was situated in Cuito Cuanavale and the 8th Brigade operated between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale, the former being a large logistics depot. Convoys regularly travelled from Menongue to supply Cuito Cuanavale.(48) The G5 assault began at last light, about 18:00. By 23:00 the back of the opposition was broken. Heavy fire was brought down upon the enemy in the first five hours resulting in large scale destruction. This destroyed the 1986 Cuban and FAPLA offensive against UNITA and showed the tremendous destructive force that lay within one battery of G5s. Owing to the long range and the accuracy with which the G5 could fire and the effect of the ammunition, authority was forced upon the enemy. As a result of the daylight activities of the MiG jet fighters employed by the enemy, artillery fire missions could only be executed at night. As it was the first time that the G5 was used operationally there was great cause for concern that the MiGs would spot the G5s. The MiGs were continuously in the air trying to locate the G5s and bombed the surrounding area at random in the hope of hitting the artillery.(49) This operation proved to the SADF that survival was possible despite an unfavourable air situation. As a result of the enemy's air superiority, great attention was given to passive defensive measures such as camouflage, track discipline and the concealment of movement. Special techniques of concealment were practised beforehand which prevented the enemy from observing the artillery. Before the operation was undertaken these techniques of concealment were also tested under conditions similar to those that the artillery would experience during the operation. Another factor in favour of the artillery was the unprofessional manner in which the enemy employed its air force. The MiG fighters flew at a very high altitudes, making observation very difficult for the pilots. The apparent reason for this was to avoid being shot down by UNITA's Stinger missiles. In addition, the many bush fires in the area, owing to the dryness of the season, created a lot of dust and smoke in the air. During this operation approximately 2 500 MRL projectiles and approximately 4 500 G5 projectiles were used.(50) During 1987 Cuban and FAPLA forces were concentrated in the east of Angola known to them as 5th Military District. Operations launched by them were aimed at destroying UNJTA, including their main base at Jamba. As a counter- measure, the SADF undertook Operation Modular in aid of UNITA which lasted from 1 July to 15 December 1987. This was followed up by Operation Hooper and culminated in Operation Packer which ended in March 1988. During this period two G5 batteries were employed, playing a prominent role in destroying enemy forces. During these operations it was found that the HE projectiles of the G5 could be used to great effect against the T-55 tanks employed by the opposing force. Between 20 and 30 tanks were in this way put out of action by the G5s. It was also found that when an HE projectile hit the ground and detonated 15 in from a tank, chances were good that the tank concerned would be disabled. The enemy had no tactical equipment that could withstand the 155 mm shell of the G5. After Operation Packer, a further operation took place in south eastern Angola. This was Operation Displace during which the G5 was also used. (51) The artillery found that the G5 was flexible owing to its long range and the convenient top traverse of the barrel for the arc of fire. When the top traverse was impeded by trees, the gun crews would use, amongst others, chain saws and explosives to remove the trees, but this was not done to the detriment of camouflage. It was also found that the G5 gave tactical advantage owing to its mobility. During the above-mentioned operations, the MiGs again took to speculative bombing of the area in the hope of flushing out the G5s. As in 1986 the G5s were regarded as the prime target. One of the factors causing the MiGs to be unsuccessful was the discipline shown by the SA troops in adhering to passive defensive measures. As a result of the prolonged duration of these operations, gun unservicibility started becoming more of a problem. This resulted in greater logistical problems for the SADF as even large components such as barrels had to be replaced in the field. Special hoisting apparatus and tools were needed to replace the barrels but in spite of this no great problems were experienced in changing the barrels in the field. This experience proved that the G5 was technically maintainable in the field.(52) Under the prevailing, difficult cross-country conditions the auxiliary power unit proved to be of tremendous assistance to the gun tractor. The gun tractor and the G5 formed a long train in the bush and the trees and thick undergrowth stripped certain equipment off the G5 when it turned. The bush-breaking also caused some damage to the gun tractor as well as to the G5 and certain modifications were therefore made, eg the battery box which was situated on the outside of the trails is now situated on the inside of the trails.(53) Some of these modifications were not introduced on G5s which were destined for the international market owing to the difference in terrain.(54) The last operational deployment of the G5 in Angola was during Operation Prone near Tchipa, during June 1988. (55) The G6 made its operational debut in December 1987 during Operation Modular. The mobility of the G6 in dense bush proved to be highly successful. The greatest cause for concern was whether the tyres would stand up to the rugged conditions, especially while breaking the bush. Fortunately there was no cause for concern as the tyres gave very few problems. They proved to be very robust and survived very well during Operation Modular and were found to be more robust than those of most other operational vehicles |
patriot4: We only hired egyptizns when we didn't have an airfoece yet.For you to say the French air craft carrier is obsolete,is a bit of a joke. Cause this ship was commissioned in 1994. |
patriot4: We only hired egyptizns when we didn't have an airfoece yet.The French air carrier is still in services. And oh what will Nigeria use to sink French destroyers and Frigates? NN Aradu?. Let me be clear with you,all your air bases can be destroyed within a single night. Making way for ships like the Mistral Class,to bring in attack helos like the Tiger to deal with your armour. |
blackchris: dude, you just keep talking like a drunkStop typing while you're hiding under the table from BH. Quote Mike..Za where he said "all Nigerian warships are used USA ships". |
blackchris: geNew comers....smh....Your brother,clearly said "Nigeria will invade South Africa with 10 battalions". That where the issue of sanctions started. Smh. Now let's talk military stuff!!!! |
blackchris: how many used US warships do we have. guy i told you only drunks talk the way you do.What I'm trying to tell you here is: France's aircraft craft might be old,but your obsolete warships don't the capability to defend Nigeria against a French battlegroup compromising of Destroyers,Frigates and a submarine. Are gonna tell me NN Aradu will defend and destroy an entire battlegroup. |
blackchris: dude, you should have noticed by now that Nigeria is not a country that cares about racism. your comrades e.g @CrabB have said worst and Nigerians' mentality is far beyond that. it's your society that is more vulnerable to such threat. so get it clear, we don't give a fvck.Lol he said mature!!!!!!!!! I called him immature,. Let's talk about your armoured forces perishing in front of G6 gun. Cause they simply don't have an artillery piece or war plane to take it out. |
blackchris: omo na your head dey blow bulb like this.South Africa doesn't need propaganda to sell Denel land systems artillery. Cause the world knows about SA artillery,do you think propaganda attracted the USA to show interest in the G7 105mm howitzer (range:36 km) which Denel has completed three-quarters of the development work. And the fact is South Africa actually sells more MRAPS than artillery pieces. |
blackchris: what the heck have you ever managed to prove here? all you've been doing is copy and paste every information on internet since you lack the mental capacity to critically process everything you read.Since you guys say Mike..ZA is racist I will address you nicely: Look I told you(Nigerians) that the G5 and G6 were capable of destroying targets 3km to 70km away. And you asked for prove,I posted records of the Lomba river battle,where this guns were called in by the recces to hit targets 40km-50km away from where they were stationed and well camourflashed. Now I'm asking you,since you say Nigeria can "neutralise" this guns quick to prove what will Nigeria use to "put them out". Or you want me to quote something from Heitman's books since you love him so much. |
NaijaPikinGidi: Empty vessels ... Mike..ZA and crew!!Your Brother ran off after I showed him that the G5 and G6 gun. Did hit targets 40km-50km away during the bush war and that the Recces were capable of calling in artillery on concentrated troops and armour. Now your turn has come,to prove it how will your armed forces destroy the this mighty guns. Cause clearly you won't be enjoy air superiority,with your 12 F7 fighter jets. |
Donian007: Well I think you are not the type I should be interacting with here, your analysis depict that of an ignorant juvenile. Frace attacking Nigeria because of a percieved threat about Nigeria exterminating Cameroon in a war would result in unlawful invasion and aggression and no deals would deter other powers from doing same in defence of Nigeria. However such a scenario is impossible without probably causing a 3rd world war. The best France can ever do is to mediate or advice Cameroon through a legal process. I won't reply if you quote me in response.Please read what I was reply to before you can say I'm ignorant. Cause clearly you could have seen I was reply to one of your brothers,who talking about "OMo" Nigeria can defeat France. |
patriot4: As it is, France can not even dream of attacking Nigeria. You seem to value the Charles de Gaule aircraft carier a lot, here in france everybody know it is obsolete and it is always experiencing malfunctionnings, there are even talks about retiring it. France has only 1 aircraft carier, it wouldn't risk losing it in a fight with Nigeria.Is this the same Nigeria which hired Egyptians to fly sorties?. Don't be ridiculous about France losing an air craft carrier against some armed forces which don't even have an submarine. Aircraft carriers "ride" in battlegroups of ships protected by submarines,destroyers or Frigates at time. Which are mostly armed with "area defence" missiles. And if you say the French carrier is obsolete,why don't you say the same with your warships. Some are even used USA patrol vessels. |
blackchris: omo na your head dey blow bulb like this.I've shown him where the G5 and G6,were used to stop an entire battalion armed with anti craft missiles,main battle tanks and armoured vehicles. Should I post the "the battle of Lomba river" again? |
sambos994: Very mature of you....SMH...Very immature of you......SMH. Respond with something about military or just scroll down ignoring my posts. GET IT? |
sambos994: Very mature of you....SMH...Very immature of you......SMH. Respond with something about military or just scroll down ignoring posts. GET IT? |
Donian007: Youngman I also read that chris' post. However, your reponses clearly show you never understood it or maybe you are just being ignorant. The war was not with France but Cameroon, and Cameroon being a former colony she backed her up using her strong international influence but that never detered Nigeria. Your statements about France attacking Nigeria in defence of Cameroon is clear assertion by you that Cameroon is not up to Nigeria, but that statement also presents you as a foolish thinker. That would attract allies such as Israel, Britain and Russia to massively arm Nigeria or even do same in Nigeria's defence and guess where that leads. Smarten up boy!I was responding to stupi..d thought like "britain and russia will massively arm Nigeria". Lesson here Nigerian: If France attacked Nigeria,no country will dare fly in weapons into your country. Cause fighter jets launching from the French aircraft carrier will destroy all your major airports. And Russia will never risk losing the military deals(like the Mistral class amphibious assault ship) it currently has with French over Nigeria. |
NaijaPikinGidi: This boy cracks me up with laughter!Hiding behind those shades,cause Mike..ZA has proven the Nigerian army can be destroyed by 2 batteries of the G5+2 batteries of the G6 howitzers?. Enjoy eating the humble pie,while screaming CHINEKE OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO!!!!!!!!!!!! In your monkey language. |
NaijaPikinGidi: This boy cracks me up with laughter!Stop showing me yellow coloured teeth monkey!!!!!!! Prove to me how will forces deal with the G6 system,backed by aerial patrols by the Griffins. |
agaugust: are you a soldier, policeman, anti-poaching ranger, or total civilian ?In the Bushes,the recces will hunt and find your weapons sites. South Africa did this during the bush war. You're now acting "defensive",a month ago you were telling us how Nigeria can advance and invade Mzansi Africa. Now why is your army hidden in bushes and cities? Fearing a HE round from the mighty G6 howitzer? |
blackchris: omo the your copy and paste brain na big problem oNigerians are sub species of humans,pure monkeys!!!!!!!!!!. When we(south Africans) tell you something you ask for sources and links. When we put links,pastes and "sources". You(Nigerians) say something meaningless like "omo the your copy and paste brain na big". In South Africa "Omo" is a washing powder. I challenged you monkeys to prove how will your ground forces destroy the G5 and G6 guns,which can take out your Rolands in from 40km to 50km away. Like the sam-8 during the bush war. |
agaugust: good you have now admitted that about 5.5km is a realistic land battlefield distance, not the wasted 70km range of south african G6 artillery that 99% of world armies have decided to ignore and not buy. say thank you to me for opening your blind eyesThat 5,5km is for tanks and armoured vehicles. Which don't have "forward targeting systems"" like drones,special forces and helicopter. The 5,5km is maximum distance a tank or other armoured fighting vehicles can engage each other. But if a country's communication systems are advanced missiles like the mokopa of SA with a range of 10km can used. |
agaugust: show us how that will make you see enemy weapons hidding behind 5 storey buildings 50km away.The end is closer. In buildings(cities),the recces are highly trained in urban warfare meaning artillery can be called on building housing or sections housing the enemy. Or the Vulture drone can be used. |
agaugust: are you a soldier, policeman, anti-poaching ranger, or total civilian ?The British Challenger Main battle tank holds the record for destroy an Iraqi tank 5km away. Unless Nigerian doesn't have the technology to design target sites,but 5,5km is the maximum distance in the battlefield. That's why the South African Ingwe missile has 5,5km range. |
agaugust: are you a soldier, policeman, anti-poaching ranger, or total civilian ?The G5 and the G6 have been used primarily in battlefield interdiction roles and have been very accurate due to coinputerised firing calculations. Artillery observers were deployed on the front line and targets which presented themselves were exploited immediately. When the Cubans wanted to launch an air strike from the Angolan airfield at Cuito Cuanavale, artillery observers on one occasion called for G6 fire support and destroyed four Russian MiG 21 jet fighters as they taxied for take off.(46) The G5 shelled the runways and associated infrastructure of the airfield at Cuito Cuanavale over a long period of time and this prevented the enemy fighters from taking off to participate against South African forces. The G5 played a primary role in destroying the enemy, including aircraft and tanks. The fact remains that the G5 played a critical role during this campaign and without it the war in Angola would have run a different course. The G5 proved to be the backbone of the South African forces during the conflict. The G5 was a great psychological booster for the members of the SADF operating on the ground. The role that the G5 fulfilled should therefore not be underestimated under any circumstances.(47) Before being operationally employed the G6 was evaluated, amongst others, during Exercise Zenula in May 1986 at Omuthiya, the base camp of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The G5 was used operationally for the first time by the SADF on 9 August 1986 during Operation Alpha Centauri. This operation lasted until 16 August 1986. One battery of G5s (a battery consists of eight guns) was employed in conjunction with one battery of multiple rocket launchers (MRL). The operation was an artillery attack against Cuban and FAPLA formations concentrating in Cuito Cuanavale for their 1986 offensive against UNITA. The 25th Cuban-FAPLA Brigade was situated east of Cuito Cuanavale near Tumpo. The 13th Brigade was situated in Cuito Cuanavale and the 8th Brigade operated between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale, the former being a large logistics depot. Convoys regularly travelled from Menongue to supply Cuito Cuanavale.(48) The G5 assault began at last light, about 18:00. By 23:00 the back of the opposition was broken. Heavy fire was brought down upon the enemy in the first five hours resulting in large scale destruction. This destroyed the 1986 Cuban and FAPLA offensive against UNITA and showed the tremendous destructive force that lay within one battery of G5s. Owing to the long range and the accuracy with which the G5 could fire and the effect of the ammunition, authority was forced upon the enemy. As a result of the daylight activities of the MiG jet fighters employed by the enemy, artillery fire missions could only be executed at night. As it was the first time that the G5 was used operationally there was great cause for concern that the MiGs would spot the G5s. The MiGs were continuously in the air trying to locate the G5s and bombed the surrounding area at random in the hope of hitting the artillery.(49) This operation proved to the SADF that survival was possible despite an unfavourable air situation. As a result of the enemy's air superiority, great attention was given to passive defensive measures such as camouflage, track discipline and the concealment of movement. Special techniques of concealment were practised beforehand which prevented the enemy from observing the artillery. Before the operation was undertaken these techniques of concealment were also tested under conditions similar to those that the artillery would experience during the operation. Another factor in favour of the artillery was the unprofessional manner in which the enemy employed its air force. The MiG fighters flew at a very high altitudes, making observation very difficult for the pilots. The apparent reason for this was to avoid being shot down by UNITA's Stinger missiles. In addition, the many bush fires in the area, owing to the dryness of the season, created a lot of dust and smoke in the air. During this operation approximately 2 500 MRL projectiles and approximately 4 500 G5 projectiles were used.(50) During 1987 Cuban and FAPLA forces were concentrated in the east of Angola known to them as 5th Military District. Operations launched by them were aimed at destroying UNJTA, including their main base at Jamba. As a counter- measure, the SADF undertook Operation Modular in aid of UNITA which lasted from 1 July to 15 December 1987. This was followed up by Operation Hooper and culminated in Operation Packer which ended in March 1988. During this period two G5 batteries were employed, playing a prominent role in destroying enemy forces. During these operations it was found that the HE projectiles of the G5 could be used to great effect against the T-55 tanks employed by the opposing force. Between 20 and 30 tanks were in this way put out of action by the G5s. It was also found that when an HE projectile hit the ground and detonated 15 in from a tank, chances were good that the tank concerned would be disabled. The enemy had no tactical equipment that could withstand the 155 mm shell of the G5. After Operation Packer, a further operation took place in south eastern Angola. This was Operation Displace during which the G5 was also used. (51) The artillery found that the G5 was flexible owing to its long range and the convenient top traverse of the barrel for the arc of fire. When the top traverse was impeded by trees, the gun crews would use, amongst others, chain saws and explosives to remove the trees, but this was not done to the detriment of camouflage. It was also found that the G5 gave tactical advantage owing to its mobility. During the above-mentioned operations, the MiGs again took to speculative bombing of the area in the hope of flushing out the G5s. As in 1986 the G5s were regarded as the prime target. One of the factors causing the MiGs to be unsuccessful was the discipline shown by the SA troops in adhering to passive defensive measures. As a result of the prolonged duration of these operations, gun unservicibility started becoming more of a problem. This resulted in greater logistical problems for the SADF as even large components such as barrels had to be replaced in the field. Special hoisting apparatus and tools were needed to replace the barrels but in spite of this no great problems were experienced in changing the barrels in the field. This experience proved that the G5 was technically maintainable in the field.(52) Under the prevailing, difficult cross-country conditions the auxiliary power unit proved to be of tremendous assistance to the gun tractor. The gun tractor and the G5 formed a long train in the bush and the trees and thick undergrowth stripped certain equipment off the G5 when it turned. The bush-breaking also caused some damage to the gun tractor as well as to the G5 and certain modifications were therefore made, eg the battery box which was situated on the outside of the trails is now situated on the inside of the trails.(53) Some of these modifications were not introduced on G5s which were destined for the international market owing to the difference in terrain.(54) The last operational deployment of the G5 in Angola was during Operation Prone near Tchipa, during June 1988. (55) The G6 made its operational debut in December 1987 during Operation Modular. The mobility of the G6 in dense bush proved to be highly successful. The greatest cause for concern was whether the tyres would stand up to the rugged conditions, especially while breaking the bush. Fortunately there was no cause for concern as the tyres gave very few problems. They proved to be very robust and survived very well during Operation Modular and were found to be more robust than those of most other operational vehicles |
agaugust: are you a soldier, policeman, anti-poaching ranger, or total civilian ?Post-war followed Project Klooster, a new target acquisition and fire control system that built on the lessons learnt in Angola and Namibia - "especially the problem of observation and target fixation," Wilsworth adds. The Artillery Target Engagement System (ATES) that resulted and is only now coming into service includes: the Basic Artillery Observation System (man portable observation post equipment), the Enhanced Artillery Observation System (Ratel mounted sensors for day and night observation etc), the Gun Muzzle velocity analyzer for G5 and 6, the Vulture Unmanned Air Vehicle Observation System, fire control computers, artillery command computers, digital communications for the artillery, and and the S700 meteorological system. |
agaugust: are you a soldier, policeman, anti-poaching ranger, or total civilian ?Post-war followed Project Klooster, a new target acquisition and fire control system that built on the lessons learnt in Angola and Namibia - "especially the problem of observation and target fixation," Wilsworth adds. The Artillery Target Engagement System (ATES) that resulted and is only now coming into service includes: the Basic Artillery Observation System (man portable observation post equipment), the Enhanced Artillery Observation System (Ratel mounted sensors for day and night observation etc), the Gun Muzzle velocity analyzer for G5 and 6, the Vulture Unmanned Air Vehicle Observation System, fire control computers, artillery command computers, digital communications for the artillery, and and the S700 meteorological system. |
NaijaPikinGidi: Foolishness is the mainstay of your type. You confuse two (2) different entities because your blockhead CraigB is your mentor? I am NaijaPikinGidi!! All4Naija and NaijaPikinGidi are two differnt individuals. Except you want to recall All4Naija who bade the thread goodbye long ago! As for me NaijaPikinGidi ... I full ground gidigbam!! Die if you want!The G5 and the G6 have been used primarily in battlefield interdiction roles and have been very accurate due to coinputerised firing calculations. Artillery observers were deployed on the front line and targets which presented themselves were exploited immediately. When the Cubans wanted to launch an air strike from the Angolan airfield at Cuito Cuanavale, artillery observers on one occasion called for G6 fire support and destroyed four Russian MiG 21 jet fighters as they taxied for take off.(46) The G5 shelled the runways and associated infrastructure of the airfield at Cuito Cuanavale over a long period of time and this prevented the enemy fighters from taking off to participate against South African forces. The G5 played a primary role in destroying the enemy, including aircraft and tanks. The fact remains that the G5 played a critical role during this campaign and without it the war in Angola would have run a different course. The G5 proved to be the backbone of the South African forces during the conflict. The G5 was a great psychological booster for the members of the SADF operating on the ground. The role that the G5 fulfilled should therefore not be underestimated under any circumstances.(47) Before being operationally employed the G6 was evaluated, amongst others, during Exercise Zenula in May 1986 at Omuthiya, the base camp of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The G5 was used operationally for the first time by the SADF on 9 August 1986 during Operation Alpha Centauri. This operation lasted until 16 August 1986. One battery of G5s (a battery consists of eight guns) was employed in conjunction with one battery of multiple rocket launchers (MRL). The operation was an artillery attack against Cuban and FAPLA formations concentrating in Cuito Cuanavale for their 1986 offensive against UNITA. The 25th Cuban-FAPLA Brigade was situated east of Cuito Cuanavale near Tumpo. The 13th Brigade was situated in Cuito Cuanavale and the 8th Brigade operated between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale, the former being a large logistics depot. Convoys regularly travelled from Menongue to supply Cuito Cuanavale.(48) The G5 assault began at last light, about 18:00. By 23:00 the back of the opposition was broken. Heavy fire was brought down upon the enemy in the first five hours resulting in large scale destruction. This destroyed the 1986 Cuban and FAPLA offensive against UNITA and showed the tremendous destructive force that lay within one battery of G5s. Owing to the long range and the accuracy with which the G5 could fire and the effect of the ammunition, authority was forced upon the enemy. As a result of the daylight activities of the MiG jet fighters employed by the enemy, artillery fire missions could only be executed at night. As it was the first time that the G5 was used operationally there was great cause for concern that the MiGs would spot the G5s. The MiGs were continuously in the air trying to locate the G5s and bombed the surrounding area at random in the hope of hitting the artillery.(49) This operation proved to the SADF that survival was possible despite an unfavourable air situation. As a result of the enemy's air superiority, great attention was given to passive defensive measures such as camouflage, track discipline and the concealment of movement. Special techniques of concealment were practised beforehand which prevented the enemy from observing the artillery. Before the operation was undertaken these techniques of concealment were also tested under conditions similar to those that the artillery would experience during the operation. Another factor in favour of the artillery was the unprofessional manner in which the enemy employed its air force. The MiG fighters flew at a very high altitudes, making observation very difficult for the pilots. The apparent reason for this was to avoid being shot down by UNITA's Stinger missiles. In addition, the many bush fires in the area, owing to the dryness of the season, created a lot of dust and smoke in the air. During this operation approximately 2 500 MRL projectiles and approximately 4 500 G5 projectiles were used.(50) During 1987 Cuban and FAPLA forces were concentrated in the east of Angola known to them as 5th Military District. Operations launched by them were aimed at destroying UNJTA, including their main base at Jamba. As a counter- measure, the SADF undertook Operation Modular in aid of UNITA which lasted from 1 July to 15 December 1987. This was followed up by Operation Hooper and culminated in Operation Packer which ended in March 1988. During this period two G5 batteries were employed, playing a prominent role in destroying enemy forces. During these operations it was found that the HE projectiles of the G5 could be used to great effect against the T-55 tanks employed by the opposing force. Between 20 and 30 tanks were in this way put out of action by the G5s. It was also found that when an HE projectile hit the ground and detonated 15 in from a tank, chances were good that the tank concerned would be disabled. The enemy had no tactical equipment that could withstand the 155 mm shell of the G5. After Operation Packer, a further operation took place in south eastern Angola. This was Operation Displace during which the G5 was also used. (51) The artillery found that the G5 was flexible owing to its long range and the convenient top traverse of the barrel for the arc of fire. When the top traverse was impeded by trees, the gun crews would use, amongst others, chain saws and explosives to remove the trees, but this was not done to the detriment of camouflage. It was also found that the G5 gave tactical advantage owing to its mobility. During the above-mentioned operations, the MiGs again took to speculative bombing of the area in the hope of flushing out the G5s. As in 1986 the G5s were regarded as the prime target. One of the factors causing the MiGs to be unsuccessful was the discipline shown by the SA troops in adhering to passive defensive measures. As a result of the prolonged duration of these operations, gun unservicibility started becoming more of a problem. This resulted in greater logistical problems for the SADF as even large components such as barrels had to be replaced in the field. Special hoisting apparatus and tools were needed to replace the barrels but in spite of this no great problems were experienced in changing the barrels in the field. This experience proved that the G5 was technically maintainable in the field.(52) Under the prevailing, difficult cross-country conditions the auxiliary power unit proved to be of tremendous assistance to the gun tractor. The gun tractor and the G5 formed a long train in the bush and the trees and thick undergrowth stripped certain equipment off the G5 when it turned. The bush-breaking also caused some damage to the gun tractor as well as to the G5 and certain modifications were therefore made, eg the battery box which was situated on the outside of the trails is now situated on the inside of the trails.(53) Some of these modifications were not introduced on G5s which were destined for the international market owing to the difference in terrain.(54) The last operational deployment of the G5 in Angola was during Operation Prone near Tchipa, during June 1988. (55) The G6 made its operational debut in December 1987 during Operation Modular. The mobility of the G6 in dense bush proved to be highly successful. The greatest cause for concern was whether the tyres would stand up to the rugged conditions, especially while breaking the bush. Fortunately there was no cause for concern as the tyres gave very few problems. They proved to be very robust and survived very well during Operation Modular and were found to be more robust than those of most other operational vehicles |
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