MikeZA's Posts
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agaugust: same way south africa used that same G6 howitzer to crush the entire Cuban army in Angolan bush war by rushing to the peace negotiation table to beg Cuba for settlement ?Show me how will Nigeria "neutralise" or destroy the G6 and G5 guns. Nigeria doesn't have the air power to destroy SA ground forces. Your Rolands will be taken out QUICK like the sam-8 in the bush war. |
agaugust: .Local assembled!!!!!!!!! |
agaugust: same way south africa used that same G6 howitzer to crush the entire Cuban army in Angolan bush war by rushing to the peace negotiation table to beg Cuba for settlement ?The G5 and the G6 have been used primarily in battlefield interdiction roles and have been very accurate due to coinputerised firing calculations. Artillery observers were deployed on the front line and targets which presented themselves were exploited immediately. When the Cubans wanted to launch an air strike from the Angolan airfield at Cuito Cuanavale, artillery observers on one occasion called for G6 fire support and destroyed four Russian MiG 21 jet fighters as they taxied for take off.(46) The G5 shelled the runways and associated infrastructure of the airfield at Cuito Cuanavale over a long period of time and this prevented the enemy fighters from taking off to participate against South African forces. The G5 played a primary role in destroying the enemy, including aircraft and tanks. The fact remains that the G5 played a critical role during this campaign and without it the war in Angola would have run a different course. The G5 proved to be the backbone of the South African forces during the conflict. The G5 was a great psychological booster for the members of the SADF operating on the ground. The role that the G5 fulfilled should therefore not be underestimated under any circumstances.(47) Before being operationally employed the G6 was evaluated, amongst others, during Exercise Zenula in May 1986 at Omuthiya, the base camp of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The G5 was used operationally for the first time by the SADF on 9 August 1986 during Operation Alpha Centauri. This operation lasted until 16 August 1986. One battery of G5s (a battery consists of eight guns) was employed in conjunction with one battery of multiple rocket launchers (MRL). The operation was an artillery attack against Cuban and FAPLA formations concentrating in Cuito Cuanavale for their 1986 offensive against UNITA. The 25th Cuban-FAPLA Brigade was situated east of Cuito Cuanavale near Tumpo. The 13th Brigade was situated in Cuito Cuanavale and the 8th Brigade operated between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale, the former being a large logistics depot. Convoys regularly travelled from Menongue to supply Cuito Cuanavale.(48) The G5 assault began at last light, about 18:00. By 23:00 the back of the opposition was broken. Heavy fire was brought down upon the enemy in the first five hours resulting in large scale destruction. This destroyed the 1986 Cuban and FAPLA offensive against UNITA and showed the tremendous destructive force that lay within one battery of G5s. Owing to the long range and the accuracy with which the G5 could fire and the effect of the ammunition, authority was forced upon the enemy. As a result of the daylight activities of the MiG jet fighters employed by the enemy, artillery fire missions could only be executed at night. As it was the first time that the G5 was used operationally there was great cause for concern that the MiGs would spot the G5s. The MiGs were continuously in the air trying to locate the G5s and bombed the surrounding area at random in the hope of hitting the artillery.(49) This operation proved to the SADF that survival was possible despite an unfavourable air situation. As a result of the enemy's air superiority, great attention was given to passive defensive measures such as camouflage, track discipline and the concealment of movement. Special techniques of concealment were practised beforehand which prevented the enemy from observing the artillery. Before the operation was undertaken these techniques of concealment were also tested under conditions similar to those that the artillery would experience during the operation. Another factor in favour of the artillery was the unprofessional manner in which the enemy employed its air force. The MiG fighters flew at a very high altitudes, making observation very difficult for the pilots. The apparent reason for this was to avoid being shot down by UNITA's Stinger missiles. In addition, the many bush fires in the area, owing to the dryness of the season, created a lot of dust and smoke in the air. During this operation approximately 2 500 MRL projectiles and approximately 4 500 G5 projectiles were used.(50) During 1987 Cuban and FAPLA forces were concentrated in the east of Angola known to them as 5th Military District. Operations launched by them were aimed at destroying UNJTA, including their main base at Jamba. As a counter- measure, the SADF undertook Operation Modular in aid of UNITA which lasted from 1 July to 15 December 1987. This was followed up by Operation Hooper and culminated in Operation Packer which ended in March 1988. During this period two G5 batteries were employed, playing a prominent role in destroying enemy forces. During these operations it was found that the HE projectiles of the G5 could be used to great effect against the T-55 tanks employed by the opposing force. Between 20 and 30 tanks were in this way put out of action by the G5s. It was also found that when an HE projectile hit the ground and detonated 15 in from a tank, chances were good that the tank concerned would be disabled. The enemy had no tactical equipment that could withstand the 155 mm shell of the G5. After Operation Packer, a further operation took place in south eastern Angola. This was Operation Displace during which the G5 was also used. (51) The artillery found that the G5 was flexible owing to its long range and the convenient top traverse of the barrel for the arc of fire. When the top traverse was impeded by trees, the gun crews would use, amongst others, chain saws and explosives to remove the trees, but this was not done to the detriment of camouflage. It was also found that the G5 gave tactical advantage owing to its mobility. During the above-mentioned operations, the MiGs again took to speculative bombing of the area in the hope of flushing out the G5s. As in 1986 the G5s were regarded as the prime target. One of the factors causing the MiGs to be unsuccessful was the discipline shown by the SA troops in adhering to passive defensive measures. As a result of the prolonged duration of these operations, gun unservicibility started becoming more of a problem. This resulted in greater logistical problems for the SADF as even large components such as barrels had to be replaced in the field. Special hoisting apparatus and tools were needed to replace the barrels but in spite of this no great problems were experienced in changing the barrels in the field. This experience proved that the G5 was technically maintainable in the field.(52) Under the prevailing, difficult cross-country conditions the auxiliary power unit proved to be of tremendous assistance to the gun tractor. The gun tractor and the G5 formed a long train in the bush and the trees and thick undergrowth stripped certain equipment off the G5 when it turned. The bush-breaking also caused some damage to the gun tractor as well as to the G5 and certain modifications were therefore made, eg the battery box which was situated on the outside of the trails is now situated on the inside of the trails.(53) Some of these modifications were not introduced on G5s which were destined for the international market owing to the difference in terrain.(54) The last operational deployment of the G5 in Angola was during Operation Prone near Tchipa, during June 1988. (55) The G6 made its operational debut in December 1987 during Operation Modular. The mobility of the G6 in dense bush proved to be highly successful. The greatest cause for concern was whether the tyres would stand up to the rugged conditions, especially while breaking the bush. Fortunately there was no cause for concern as the tyres gave very few problems. They proved to be very robust and survived very well during Operation Modular and were found to be more robust than those of most other operational vehicles" Show any account,where the cuban Wiped out an entire battalion. |
agaugust: you quoted from wikipedia ? an invisible weblink ? how do we verify your claim ? 33% south african brainSouth Africa is the first African country to fly a manned war plane. Did you know "village Ni-gay-rian boy"? |
agaugust: you quoted from wikipedia ? an invisible weblink ? how do we verify your claim ? 33% south african brainLet's talk about how South Africa can destroy or crush,the entire Nigerian army with 2 batteries of the G5+ 2 batteries of the G6 howitzers. |
agaugust: you quoted from wikipedia ? an invisible weblink ? how do we verify your claim ? 33% south african brainthe Decisive Battle On 2 October the South African Recces reported that 47 Brigade had managed to construct a wooden road across the marshes which were blocking their retreat to the Lomba River. Trucks, missile carriers, armoured cars and tanks were busy assembling at the treeline, preparing to make an orderly retreat across the road. The Recces watched from their vantage points in nearby trees and called in artillery fire on Fapla while the SADF combat groups worked furiously to get ready and into position. The first Fapla vehicles to try to cross were Soviet Sam-9s. One crossed to safety but the Recces guided artillery fire onto the second as it tried to cross, destroying it and effectively blocking the bridge. The Fapla troops sent a T-55 tank to try and move it out of the way, but without success. Every time Fapla tried to make a move the Recces would call in highly accurate artillery salvoes. For 48 hours without sleep or rest the Recces stood guard over Fapla's escape route, calling in artillery fire at the slightest movement, until at last they heard the distant rumble that announced the arrival of the armoured cars of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The Ratels of 61 Mech had a variety of armaments, from infantry carriers with 20mm guns to the tank-busting 90mm gun. Unita troops had by now positioned themselves to the south-east of 47 Brigade in case they tried to break away in that direction. Fapla artillery began to bombard the approaching Ratels and Migs flew overhead to lend support and cover 47 Brigade's escape. The Ratels went in to attack. Fapla, accustomed to seeing Unita beat a hasty retreat whenever their tanks appeared, tried the same tactic and sent their tanks towards the SADF positions. To their dismay the South Africans' reaction was the exact opposite - they attacked. The Ratels raced for the tanks, surrounding them and dodging back and forth until they could get behind them and shoot at the comparatively vulnerable rear ends of the tanks. Major Laurence Maree, second-in-command of 61 Mech, later told the British journalist and author, Fred Bridgland: "I can't tell you how much courage it takes in a Ratel driver and gunner when a tank is charging towards them to summon up the will to stop still for long enough to stabilise their firing platform and get their round off. [Unlike a T54/55 tank, which has built-in stabilisers and can fire on the move, a Ratel, like other armoured cars, can only fire from a static position]. Of course, as soon as they'd fired, off they sprinted like Turbo- charged hares. One of our guys died that afternoon facing down a T-55 in his Ratel. A 100mm shell from the tank skipped up from the sandy ground and went right through the turret. The Ratel commander, Lieutenant Hind, was terribly wounded and he died later. We had two others very seriously wounded that day, and another three with light wounds. The medics just pulled the shrapnel out of those who were slightly hurt, cleaned up the wounds, and they went straight back into combat." (1) The Fapla troops, although outgunning the South Africans and outnumbering them 4 to 1, began to lose their nerve and one of the battalions suddenly made a break towards the river. They streamed across the open grassland towards the river in an undisciplined mob and the South Africans brought down MRL fire and high- explosive mortar shells on them. A second battalion also broke and ran for the river, with the Ratels chasing them. Approximately 100 vehicles were now jostling to try and reach the bridge by way of the wooden road. Recces directed artillery fire from the G-5s onto them, causing havoc. The area was now a wasteland of shattered trees and burnt grass from the shells and shrapnel from both sides. Migs piloted by Cubans flew some 60 sorties that day, dropping bombs and trying to strafe the South African positions, but they were wildly inaccurate and had little effect. Fapla tanks made an effort to recover some of the abandoned vehicles, but were themselves destroyed by the pinpoint accuracy of the G-5 artillery fire. When the firing finally stopped at the end of the day over 600 Fapla soldiers lay dead on that stretch of open ground and 127 Fapla vehicles stood destroyed or abandoned near the river. On the morning of 4 October the South Africans were able to survey the remnants on the battlefield. Recovery teams were sent in to salvage whatever was still usable and the SADF generals were delighted to hear that their troops were able to salvage intact one of the Sam-8 missile systems, complete with missiles, radar and logistics vehicles, the first example of this highly- effective Soviet weapon ever to be captured by a western country. |
agaugust: show me war history where armies fighting each other were 70km apart and made progress in the war.the Decisive Battle On 2 October the South African Recces reported that 47 Brigade had managed to construct a wooden road across the marshes which were blocking their retreat to the Lomba River. Trucks, missile carriers, armoured cars and tanks were busy assembling at the treeline, preparing to make an orderly retreat across the road. The Recces watched from their vantage points in nearby trees and called in artillery fire on Fapla while the SADF combat groups worked furiously to get ready and into position. The first Fapla vehicles to try to cross were Soviet Sam-9s. One crossed to safety but the Recces guided artillery fire onto the second as it tried to cross, destroying it and effectively blocking the bridge. The Fapla troops sent a T-55 tank to try and move it out of the way, but without success. Every time Fapla tried to make a move the Recces would call in highly accurate artillery salvoes. For 48 hours without sleep or rest the Recces stood guard over Fapla's escape route, calling in artillery fire at the slightest movement, until at last they heard the distant rumble that announced the arrival of the armoured cars of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The Ratels of 61 Mech had a variety of armaments, from infantry carriers with 20mm guns to the tank-busting 90mm gun. Unita troops had by now positioned themselves to the south-east of 47 Brigade in case they tried to break away in that direction. Fapla artillery began to bombard the approaching Ratels and Migs flew overhead to lend support and cover 47 Brigade's escape. The Ratels went in to attack. Fapla, accustomed to seeing Unita beat a hasty retreat whenever their tanks appeared, tried the same tactic and sent their tanks towards the SADF positions. To their dismay the South Africans' reaction was the exact opposite - they attacked. The Ratels raced for the tanks, surrounding them and dodging back and forth until they could get behind them and shoot at the comparatively vulnerable rear ends of the tanks. Major Laurence Maree, second-in-command of 61 Mech, later told the British journalist and author, Fred Bridgland: "I can't tell you how much courage it takes in a Ratel driver and gunner when a tank is charging towards them to summon up the will to stop still for long enough to stabilise their firing platform and get their round off. [Unlike a T54/55 tank, which has built-in stabilisers and can fire on the move, a Ratel, like other armoured cars, can only fire from a static position]. Of course, as soon as they'd fired, off they sprinted like Turbo-charged hares. One of our guys died that afternoon facing down a T-55 in his Ratel. A 100mm shell from the tank skipped up from the sandy ground and went right through the turret. The Ratel commander, Lieutenant Hind, was terribly wounded and he died later. We had two others very seriously wounded that day, and another three with light wounds. The medics just pulled the shrapnel out of those who were slightly hurt, cleaned up the wounds, and they went straight back into combat." (1) The Fapla troops, although outgunning the South Africans and outnumbering them 4 to 1, began to lose their nerve and one of the battalions suddenly made a break towards the river. They streamed across the open grassland towards the river in an undisciplined mob and the South Africans brought down MRL fire and high- explosive mortar shells on them. A second battalion also broke and ran for the river, with the Ratels chasing them. Approximately 100 vehicles were now jostling to try and reach the bridge by way of the wooden road. Recces directed artillery fire from the G-5s onto them, causing havoc. The area was now a wasteland of shattered trees and burnt grass from the shells and shrapnel from both sides. Migs piloted by Cubans flew some 60 sorties that day, dropping bombs and trying to strafe the South African positions, but they were wildly inaccurate and had little effect. Fapla tanks made an effort to recover some of the abandoned vehicles, but were themselves destroyed by the pinpoint accuracy of the G-5 artillery fire. When the firing finally stopped at the end of the day over 600 Fapla soldiers lay dead on that stretch of open ground and 127 Fapla vehicles stood destroyed or abandoned near the river. On the morning of 4 October the South Africans were able to survey the remnants on the battlefield. Recovery teams were sent in to salvage whatever was still usable and the SADF generals were delighted to hear that their troops were able to salvage intact one of the Sam-8 missile systems, complete with missiles, radar and logistics vehicles, the first example of this highly- effective Soviet weapon ever to be captured by a western country. |
agaugust: http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/31/world/africa/south-africa-military-crashSouth African Rangers are armed with the FN FAL rifle sir. And are receiving advice from a former SANDF General who commanded the 32 battalion. |
Zeus_Ayo: @awodwagyanoniwe. Ç A lemur calling someone A monkey......nd last time I checked, monkeys where smarter..... Well mayb it is U̶̲̥̅̊я̩̥̊ fada dat wld convert me to islam.......Fooool!!!!!At least 35 people have been killed in two separate gun battles between Nigerian security forces and Islamist sect Boko Haram in northeast Borno state, the army said on Monday. Boko Haram, which wants to impose sharia law in Nigeria's north, and other spin-off Islamist groups have become the biggest threat to stability in Africa's top oil exporter. In mid-May, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency and launched an offensive against the group in its stronghold in the northeast. The insurgency was initially weakened but remains active and is stretching the army. Boko Haram gunmen on Sunday attacked a police base in Bama, a town close to the Cameroon border that has been frequently hit by violence in recent months. "Troops have successfully repelled Boko Haram terrorist attacks on a police base in Bama ... on 4 August," said military spokesman Sagir Musa. Musa said one policeman and 17 members of Boko Haram were killed during the fighting, while two soldiers were injured. He said four trucks, three motorbikes, dozens of explosive devices, three rocket-propelled grenades, 10 AK-47 rifles and over 100 rounds of ammunition were recovered from the Islamists. Boko Haram members also attacked a military base in the town of Malam Fatori, triggering a gun battle that left two soldiers and 15 of its members dead, Musa said. Nigerian police and military often play down their losses and those of civilians, security sources say. Boko Haram launched its insurgency in 2009 and has become increasingly sophisticated, learning bomb-making techniques from al Qaeda-linked militants in the Sahara to the north of Nigeria. Civilian vigilantes have sprung up to help Nigerian forces identify and arrest Boko Haram members but there are concerns among some northeast residents and security experts that the spread of vigilantes could further break down law and order. Five people died in clashes on Sunday between two such vigilante groups over control of the town of Biu in Borno state, witness Suleiman Barka told Reuters by phone. Nigeria began last week withdrawing some of its 1,200 troops from Mali to support security operations at home. |
agaugust: south africa too has never produced any manned warplane. simple.I have proven to you that the G5,G6,T5 and G7 can take out your anti craft system on the ground,from distances ranging from 30km to 70km. Now prove to me how your armed forces,can destroy such systems with your "limited air capabilities". |
blackchris: like the way south africans have been changing theirs? 400, 600, 800? meaning you and seleka share the same deceitful tendencies? cry me a river abeg.Should I get General Solly Shoke statement about the battle for you?,Show me any info stating 400 or 600 were killed by the bats. |
blackchris: like i said, your words against theirs. and I'll rather believe them cos you have not shown yourselves to be honest.You're a caveman to believe people who change their story everyday. |
agaugust: France attacks nigeria....we have a defence pact with Ukraine, and Ukraine has defence past with Russia...go read history of how world wars I and II started with just 2 countries.Now Nigeria depends on Ukraine for protection? LOOL. For your info Ukraine has soviet era weapons which can be easily be dstroyed by western made systems. |
agaugust: show me war history where armies fighting each other were 70km apart and made progress in the war.The G5 and the G6 have been used primarily in battlefield interdiction roles and have been very accurate due to coinputerised firing calculations. Artillery observers were deployed on the front line and targets which presented themselves were exploited immediately. When the Cubans wanted to launch an air strike from the Angolan airfield at Cuito Cuanavale, artillery observers on one occasion called for G6 fire support and destroyed four Russian MiG 21 jet fighters as they taxied for take off.(46) The G5 shelled the runways and associated infrastructure of the airfield at Cuito Cuanavale over a long period of time and this prevented the enemy fighters from taking off to participate against South African forces. The G5 played a primary role in destroying the enemy, including aircraft and tanks. The fact remains that the G5 played a critical role during this campaign and without it the war in Angola would have run a different course. The G5 proved to be the backbone of the South African forces during the conflict. The G5 was a great psychological booster for the members of the SADF operating on the ground. The role that the G5 fulfilled should therefore not be underestimated under any circumstances.(47) Before being operationally employed the G6 was evaluated, amongst others, during Exercise Zenula in May 1986 at Omuthiya, the base camp of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The G5 was used operationally for the first time by the SADF on 9 August 1986 during Operation Alpha Centauri. This operation lasted until 16 August 1986. One battery of G5s (a battery consists of eight guns) was employed in conjunction with one battery of multiple rocket launchers (MRL). The operation was an artillery attack against Cuban and FAPLA formations concentrating in Cuito Cuanavale for their 1986 offensive against UNITA. The 25th Cuban-FAPLA Brigade was situated east of Cuito Cuanavale near Tumpo. The 13th Brigade was situated in Cuito Cuanavale and the 8th Brigade operated between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale, the former being a large logistics depot. Convoys regularly travelled from Menongue to supply Cuito Cuanavale.(48) The G5 assault began at last light, about 18:00. By 23:00 the back of the opposition was broken. Heavy fire was brought down upon the enemy in the first five hours resulting in large scale destruction. This destroyed the 1986 Cuban and FAPLA offensive against UNITA and showed the tremendous destructive force that lay within one battery of G5s. Owing to the long range and the accuracy with which the G5 could fire and the effect of the ammunition, authority was forced upon the enemy. As a result of the daylight activities of the MiG jet fighters employed by the enemy, artillery fire missions could only be executed at night. As it was the first time that the G5 was used operationally there was great cause for concern that the MiGs would spot the G5s. The MiGs were continuously in the air trying to locate the G5s and bombed the surrounding area at random in the hope of hitting the artillery.(49) This operation proved to the SADF that survival was possible despite an unfavourable air situation. As a result of the enemy's air superiority, great attention was given to passive defensive measures such as camouflage, track discipline and the concealment of movement. Special techniques of concealment were practised beforehand which prevented the enemy from observing the artillery. Before the operation was undertaken these techniques of concealment were also tested under conditions similar to those that the artillery would experience during the operation. Another factor in favour of the artillery was the unprofessional manner in which the enemy employed its air force. The MiG fighters flew at a very high altitudes, making observation very difficult for the pilots. The apparent reason for this was to avoid being shot down by UNITA's Stinger missiles. In addition, the many bush fires in the area, owing to the dryness of the season, created a lot of dust and smoke in the air. During this operation approximately 2 500 MRL projectiles and approximately 4 500 G5 projectiles were used.(50) During 1987 Cuban and FAPLA forces were concentrated in the east of Angola known to them as 5th Military District. Operations launched by them were aimed at destroying UNJTA, including their main base at Jamba. As a counter- measure, the SADF undertook Operation Modular in aid of UNITA which lasted from 1 July to 15 December 1987. This was followed up by Operation Hooper and culminated in Operation Packer which ended in March 1988. During this period two G5 batteries were employed, playing a prominent role in destroying enemy forces. During these operations it was found that the HE projectiles of the G5 could be used to great effect against the T-55 tanks employed by the opposing force. Between 20 and 30 tanks were in this way put out of action by the G5s. It was also found that when an HE projectile hit the ground and detonated 15 in from a tank, chances were good that the tank concerned would be disabled. The enemy had no tactical equipment that could withstand the 155 mm shell of the G5. After Operation Packer, a further operation took place in south eastern Angola. This was Operation Displace during which the G5 was also used. (51) The artillery found that the G5 was flexible owing to its long range and the convenient top traverse of the barrel for the arc of fire. When the top traverse was impeded by trees, the gun crews would use, amongst others, chain saws and explosives to remove the trees, but this was not done to the detriment of camouflage. It was also found that the G5 gave tactical advantage owing to its mobility. During the above-mentioned operations, the MiGs again took to speculative bombing of the area in the hope of flushing out the G5s. As in 1986 the G5s were regarded as the prime target. One of the factors causing the MiGs to be unsuccessful was the discipline shown by the SA troops in adhering to passive defensive measures. As a result of the prolonged duration of these operations, gun unservicibility started becoming more of a problem. This resulted in greater logistical problems for the SADF as even large components such as barrels had to be replaced in the field. Special hoisting apparatus and tools were needed to replace the barrels but in spite of this no great problems were experienced in changing the barrels in the field. This experience proved that the G5 was technically maintainable in the field.(52) Under the prevailing, difficult cross-country conditions the auxiliary power unit proved to be of tremendous assistance to the gun tractor. The gun tractor and the G5 formed a long train in the bush and the trees and thick undergrowth stripped certain equipment off the G5 when it turned. The bush-breaking also caused some damage to the gun tractor as well as to the G5 and certain modifications were therefore made, eg the battery box which was situated on the outside of the trails is now situated on the inside of the trails.(53) Some of these modifications were not introduced on G5s which were destined for the international market owing to the difference in terrain.(54) The last operational deployment of the G5 in Angola was during Operation Prone near Tchipa, during June 1988. (55) The G6 made its operational debut in December 1987 during Operation Modular. The mobility of the G6 in dense bush proved to be highly successful. The greatest cause for concern was whether the tyres would stand up to the rugged conditions, especially while breaking the bush. Fortunately there was no cause for concern as the tyres gave very few problems. They proved to be very robust and survived very well during Operation Modular and were found to be more robust than those of most other operational vehicles |
agaugust: south africa too has never produced any manned warplane. simple.The AHRLAC is the first manned war plane is Africa,it can be armed with 20mm cannon,rocket pot and beyond visual range air-to-air and air to ground missiles(Mokopa missile). America doesn't need long range artillery cause,they have long range bombers,MRLS and Cruise missiles and Nigeria doesn't those. South Africa destroyed targets 40km to 50 km away during the bush war. It would be the same story if Nigeria attacked SA,shells would rain down on your forces before they can come close enough to return fire or counter battery. And oh the USA is showing much interest in the G7 gun. |
blackchris: guy stop typing rubbish with your rotten fingers. give me proof of such resolution to sanction two nations at war with each other and give example of affected countries.Resolution are discussed. Like the Libyan one. |
blackchris: We killed 36 SA troops, CAR rebels sayFirst it was 52,then 32 now 36?. A rebel colonel said it well that he lost half of his 250 strong rebels when faced with the bats. |
blackchris: that's the second proof you've tried to escape today. stop thinking with your fingers before posting your ignorant comments.Do I have to keep reminding Nigerian,that the Biafran war was fought by mercenaries?. If you disagree put a list of weapons Biafra had during the war. |
sheyie2007: you called the first African industrial power weak,Biafra was weak. In terms of military equipment and trained personnel. |
sheyie2007: a proof Would Do..Your nearest Library "would do". |
blackchris: so i'll take it that 90% of what you say is out of ignoranceIf war between Nigeria and South Africa broke out. You and I know that a UN security council will be held,and sanctions or ermbargo would be discussed. It is predictable that one or the two of the country slapped with those. |
blackchris:How long did it take Nigeria to crash weak Biafra? After getting the answer to that,calculated how long it would take to crash Cameroon. I estimated 2 months because that would be for the first phase of the war. During that phase no French boots will be on the ground but jet fighters launching from an aircraft carrier to destroy all your personnel and obsolete weapons. Let me dare ask you this: Can Nigeria armed forces with its large number of troops,invade South Africa. |
LT SHANGY: Brothers, a fool is someone who does not know, does not know that he does not know and do not want to know, the description is best attributed to CraigB. Its better to ignore the fool and have a tete a tete with MIKE ZA, I think he knows 1 or 2 about military equipments. This is not a forum for country bashing but it is a platform to weigh the powers of two great, influencial countries in africa(NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA) and see which of the twothat far outweighs the other militarily. Last word for CraigB from me: there's a cartoon network on dstv, its specially meant for your age grade. Do visit it. U might learn quite alot from it(that is, if you ever learn).What do you know about military hardware?. Show me any "heavy equipment" your country produces. YOU KNOW NOTHING LIL S..UCKER!!!!!!!!!! |
CraigB: It's over loser. You defer to google now?Brother before a child learns how to sing he/she needs to learn how to speak. First. |
blackchris: dude be honest with yourself by giving proof for every serious claims you make. show us a UN resolution that says two countries that are at war will be faced with economic sanctions and arms embargo.Did you know: France has nuclear weapons and an aircraft carrier which can put more than "12" fighter jets(The Rafaele) in your airspace?. Did you also know: That the Leclerc Main battle tank can take out any Nigerian armoured vehicle or tank?. France can take out Nigeria in 2 months,so don't dare say your armed forces have a chance in defeating France. |
NaijaPikinGidi: Wanderer!Sub human! |
blackchris: dude be honest with yourself by giving proof for every serious claims you make. show us a UN resolution that says two countries that are at war will be faced with economic sanctions and arms embargo.You were in your hibernation mode? Cause I already answered all ago. On the issue of South Africa can't produce heavy weapons,If the war winning G5 and G6 guns are not heavy weapons then show any Nigerian made "heavy wespons". And please we(South Africans) have proved on many occasions that South Africa is capable of producing helicopter engines. If our armies were to meet in the battlefield,how will your forces counter the a battery of the G6 gun. Don't talk about planes,cause Nigeria has 12 F7 jets to take on the Griffins and Hawks(which will focus on ground bombings). |
LT SHANGY: Am sorry, that is definitely not an answer to my question. More over, Producing war planes and tanks will not be a problem for Nigeria. Artillery system? Hahaha. Please, answer my question.Nigeria has never produced any manned war plane. Artillery systems? South Africa is the world leader in designing artillery systems,example being the G7 105mm Howitzer which can put a shell 36km away. Outranging all 105mm howitzers and all 155mm Nigerian guns. |
Msauza: Sadam Hussain procured 100 units of G5s Howitzers from South Africa and used them to frustrate Americans during Gulf war. No wonder the US have confiscated them after his successful defeat by the help of his people. The US have now put all Saddam's G5 in their war museum to remind them of the most powerful weapon from Saddam Hussain's arsenal that really gave them headache. The power of G5 howitzer.During the gulf war Saddam's communication centres were destroyed by the coalition aerial bombings. Meaning the G5 systems couldn't pin point or locate were the enemy was. The G5 is deadly weapon,Infact it is best towed howitzer. |
LT SHANGY: I'm still waiting for answers, south africans..It is not about numbers or size. Here the thing if Nigeria and South Africa were gonna go down the war path .First Relations between both would deteriorate,then indirect threats would be exchanged followed by UN sanctions and International arms ermbargo. Now here's why South Africa is above the rest: Seeing war was on the way both countries start preparing and re arming their armed forces. With this point mentioned we know which country is capable of producing Artillery systems,war planes and tanks. |
agaugust: .Let's not talk about crashes,cause we all know Nigeria crashed 3 of its 15 its F7 fighter jets. What would happen in war situation? Remember the crashed helo was a light utility helicopter the A109. |
agaugust: you see why we call you south africans 33% barins ?The G5 and the G6 have been used primarily in battlefield interdiction roles and have been very accurate due to coinputerised firing calculations. Artillery observers were deployed on the front line and targets which presented themselves were exploited immediately. When the Cubans wanted to launch an air strike from the Angolan airfield at Cuito Cuanavale, artillery observers on one occasion called for G6 fire support and destroyed four Russian MiG 21 jet fighters as they taxied for take off.(46) The G5 shelled the runways and associated infrastructure of the airfield at Cuito Cuanavale over a long period of time and this prevented the enemy fighters from taking off to participate against South African forces. The G5 played a primary role in destroying the enemy, including aircraft and tanks. The fact remains that the G5 played a critical role during this campaign and without it the war in Angola would have run a different course. The G5 proved to be the backbone of the South African forces during the conflict. The G5 was a great psychological booster for the members of the SADF operating on the ground. The role that the G5 fulfilled should therefore not be underestimated under any circumstances.(47) Before being operationally employed the G6 was evaluated, amongst others, during Exercise Zenula in May 1986 at Omuthiya, the base camp of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The G5 was used operationally for the first time by the SADF on 9 August 1986 during Operation Alpha Centauri. This operation lasted until 16 August 1986. One battery of G5s (a battery consists of eight guns) was employed in conjunction with one battery of multiple rocket launchers (MRL). The operation was an artillery attack against Cuban and FAPLA formations concentrating in Cuito Cuanavale for their 1986 offensive against UNITA. The 25th Cuban-FAPLA Brigade was situated east of Cuito Cuanavale near Tumpo. The 13th Brigade was situated in Cuito Cuanavale and the 8th Brigade operated between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale, the former being a large logistics depot. Convoys regularly travelled from Menongue to supply Cuito Cuanavale.(48) The G5 assault began at last light, about 18:00. By 23:00 the back of the opposition was broken. Heavy fire was brought down upon the enemy in the first five hours resulting in large scale destruction. This destroyed the 1986 Cuban and FAPLA offensive against UNITA and showed the tremendous destructive force that lay within one battery of G5s. Owing to the long range and the accuracy with which the G5 could fire and the effect of the ammunition, authority was forced upon the enemy. As a result of the daylight activities of the MiG jet fighters employed by the enemy, artillery fire missions could only be executed at night. As it was the first time that the G5 was used operationally there was great cause for concern that the MiGs would spot the G5s. The MiGs were continuously in the air trying to locate the G5s and bombed the surrounding area at random in the hope of hitting the artillery.(49) This operation proved to the SADF that survival was possible despite an unfavourable air situation. As a result of the enemy's air superiority, great attention was given to passive defensive measures such as camouflage, track discipline and the concealment of movement. Special techniques of concealment were practised beforehand which prevented the enemy from observing the artillery. Before the operation was undertaken these techniques of concealment were also tested under conditions similar to those that the artillery would experience during the operation. Another factor in favour of the artillery was the unprofessional manner in which the enemy employed its air force. The MiG fighters flew at a very high altitudes, making observation very difficult for the pilots. The apparent reason for this was to avoid being shot down by UNITA's Stinger missiles. In addition, the many bush fires in the area, owing to the dryness of the season, created a lot of dust and smoke in the air. During this operation approximately 2 500 MRL projectiles and approximately 4 500 G5 projectiles were used.(50) During 1987 Cuban and FAPLA forces were concentrated in the east of Angola known to them as 5th Military District. Operations launched by them were aimed at destroying UNJTA, including their main base at Jamba. As a counter- measure, the SADF undertook Operation Modular in aid of UNITA which lasted from 1 July to 15 December 1987. This was followed up by Operation Hooper and culminated in Operation Packer which ended in March 1988. During this period two G5 batteries were employed, playing a prominent role in destroying enemy forces. During these operations it was found that the HE projectiles of the G5 could be used to great effect against the T-55 tanks employed by the opposing force. Between 20 and 30 tanks were in this way put out of action by the G5s. It was also found that when an HE projectile hit the ground and detonated 15 in from a tank, chances were good that the tank concerned would be disabled. The enemy had no tactical equipment that could withstand the 155 mm shell of the G5. After Operation Packer, a further operation took place in south eastern Angola. This was Operation Displace during which the G5 was also used.(51) The artillery found that the G5 was flexible owing to its long range and the convenient top traverse of the barrel for the arc of fire. When the top traverse was impeded by trees, the gun crews would use, amongst others, chain saws and explosives to remove the trees, but this was not done to the detriment of camouflage. It was also found that the G5 gave tactical advantage owing to its mobility. During the above-mentioned operations, the MiGs again took to speculative bombing of the area in the hope of flushing out the G5s. As in 1986 the G5s were regarded as the prime target. One of the factors causing the MiGs to be unsuccessful was the discipline shown by the SA troops in adhering to passive defensive measures. As a result of the prolonged duration of these operations, gun unservicibility started becoming more of a problem. This resulted in greater logistical problems for the SADF as even large components such as barrels had to be replaced in the field. Special hoisting apparatus and tools were needed to replace the barrels but in spite of this no great problems were experienced in changing the barrels in the field. This experience proved that the G5 was technically maintainable in the field.(52) Under the prevailing, difficult cross-country conditions the auxiliary power unit proved to be of tremendous assistance to the gun tractor. The gun tractor and the G5 formed a long train in the bush and the trees and thick undergrowth stripped certain equipment off the G5 when it turned. The bush-breaking also caused some damage to the gun tractor as well as to the G5 and certain modifications were therefore made, eg the battery box which was situated on the outside of the trails is now situated on the inside of the trails.(53) Some of these modifications were not introduced on G5s which were destined for the international market owing to the difference in terrain.(54) The last operational deployment of the G5 in Angola was during Operation Prone near Tchipa, during June 1988. (55) The G6 made its operational debut in December 1987 during Operation Modular. The mobility of the G6 in dense bush proved to be highly successful. The greatest cause for concern was whether the tyres would stand up to the rugged conditions, especially while breaking the bush. Fortunately there was no cause for concern as the tyres gave very few problems. They proved to be very robust and survived very well during Operation Modular and were found to be more robust than those of most other operational vehicles |
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you have issues with your brain