MikeZA's Posts
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2smooth2shout: did he mention he's a Togolese? you are stup1dHis Togolese? I'm dead with laughter. |
2smooth2shout: so your tiny brain couldn't summarize this article. shameShow us Nigerian military experience foo.l. |
NaijaPikinGidi: And you're a South African! Dumbest comment yet from another dull head South African!You don't get it. You're a Nigerian. |
NaijaPikinGidi: Weakling! You just don't know your left from your right! Fool-at-large!You're a Nigerian. |
agaugust: i have posted on this bush war so many times, and i wont repeat it again.The Offensive Begins 10 September 1987 On 10 September 21 Brigade sent 2 battalions with 5 T-55 tanks across the river, using a mobile bridge-layer. South African observers, watching the crossing, were amazed at the over-confident behaviour of the enemy, with infantrymen standing around casually, hands in pockets, watching the crossing. The South African reconnaissance force consisted of 4 Ratel-90 anti- tank armoured cars and 240 infantrymen in 30 Casspir infantry combat vehicles. The South Africans were ordered to wait and see what Fapla would do. When an armoured car began to roll over the bridge, the South Africans went into action. An anti-tank missile destroyed the armoured car and killed the infantrymen around it. A second missile destroyed the giant Soviet GAZ bridge- layer. The South Africans then concentrated on the T-55 tanks which were beginning to move westwards, and knocked out 3 of them within minutes. The remaining 2 immediately retreated. Artillery fire was called in from the South African G-5 guns situated some distance behind the South African lines, and by the end of the day 1 Fapla battalion had been completely destroyed, leaving the remainder of the enemy force to retreat back across the river in confusion. 13 September 1987 Three days later, on 13 September, Fapla sent 2 battalions of 59 Brigade with T-55 tanks across the river in a second attempt to establish a bridgehead. The South Africans and Unita again attacked immediately, the Ratel-90s firing anti- personnel shells which cut a swathe of destruction through the massed enemy infantry. From the Casspirs infantrymen poured machine- gun and rifle fire into the exposed enemy. The Angolans started to retreat, but were exposed on open ground, with a stretch of marshland hampering their path back to the river. Within a short space of time over 200 Fapla soldiers lay dead. The SADF/Unita force started mopping up the last groups of men left when the tanks suddenly joined in, causing chaos and sending the lightly- armoured Ratels and Casspirs fleeing in all directions. Once the South Africans had found cover in the bush, however, they began to fire anti-tank (HEAT) shells at the tanks, which were at a disadvantage with their long gun barrels in the bush. The Ratels, realising they had the advantages of speed and manoeuvrability, began to circle round the tanks, enticing them into chasing the armoured cars in ever-smaller cricles until the Ratels were able to come in behind the tanks and fire. By the end of the engagement 5 tanks had been destroyed and over 250 Fapla soldiers killed, for the loss of 8 dead and 3 destroyed armoured cars on the SADF side. The South Africans, after their initial shock at encountering the tanks, had adapted their tactics and proved that their armoured cars could cope with tanks by a combination of fast movement and accurate shooting, tactics reminiscent of those used by the Boers against the British over 80 years earlier. 14 to 23 September 1987 After the first series of clashes had taken place the South Africans were ordered not to cross the Lomba River, but to establish a line behind it to block the Angolan advance. The G5 heavy guns continued to pound the Angolans mercilessly, while the South African Air Force flew missions over the enemy to eliminate their anti-aircraft installations. At the same time Fapla artillery was bombarding the South African positions with mortars and heavy artillery. 21 Brigade continued to pile up supplies on their side of the Lomba, but the South African bombardments hampered them severely in their efforts to resume their advance. South African Recces (Special Forces, the SADF equivalent of SAS or Green Berets) kept the enemy under constant observation from hidden vantage points in the bush, often no more than 50 yards from the enemy positions. Throughout the campaign these Recces sat for days and even weeks in their observation posts, guiding the G5 artillery fire onto Fapla positions. The enemy knew they were close by, but were never able to locate them. 47 Brigade had also been slowed down in its advance by the South African artillery and air strikes. It was barely moving a kilometre per day, and the South Africans were slowly drawing it into a "killing ground" of their choice. There was a brief interlude in the fighting when South Africa and Angola finally agreed to exchange prisoners - a South African Recce, Captain Wynand du Toit, captured by Fapla in 1985, was exchanged for 170 Fapla soldiers captured by the SADF and Unita. A couple of Dutch arms smugglers, captured in South Africa, were included in the trade. According to Amnesty International sources, the 170 Faplan soldiers were taken to the Angolan capital, Luanda, where they were all executed by the Angolans for having failed in their duty... In view of this it was not surprising to the South African troops to find that many captured Fapla soldiers expressed an interest in joining Unita, or asked about the possibility of enlisting in the SADF! 47 Brigade, by now unable to retreat and desperate to join up with the other brigades, made an attempt to link up with 59 Brigade. The South Africans sent their Ratels in again to attack the enemy from the West. They had 250 men available to attack a force of over 1000 men with heavy weapons. The SAAF dropped fragmentation bombs on the Fapla positions and then 61 Mech manoeuvred behind them. The going was rough in the bush and they ended up on the enemy's flank instead of directly behind them. After a sharp engagement in the bush, the Ratels withdrew again because they simply could not see the enemy and were drawing a lot of artillery fire. 59 Brigade began to dig in and received welcome supplies and reinforcements from 21 Brigade, which had now succeeded in laying a mobile bridge over the Cunzumbia River. The SADF, worried now that 47 Brigade would manage to escape back across the river while 59 Brigade pushed forward against the thin South African defence line, decided it was time to close the trap they had been preparing. 3 October 1987 - the Decisive Battle On 2 October the South African Recces reported that 47 Brigade had managed to construct a wooden road across the marshes which were blocking their retreat to the Lomba River. Trucks, missile carriers, armoured cars and tanks were busy assembling at the treeline, preparing to make an orderly retreat across the road. The Recces watched from their vantage points in nearby trees and called in artillery fire on Fapla while the SADF combat groups worked furiously to get ready and into position. The first Fapla vehicles to try to cross were Soviet Sam-9s. One crossed to safety but the Recces guided artillery fire onto the second as it tried to cross, destroying it and effectively blocking the bridge. The Fapla troops sent a T-55 tank to try and move it out of the way, but without success. Every time Fapla tried to make a move the Recces would call in highly accurate artillery salvoes. For 48 hours without sleep or rest the Recces stood guard over Fapla's escape route, calling in artillery fire at the slightest movement, until at last they heard the distant rumble that announced the arrival of the armoured cars of 61 Mechanised Battalion. The Ratels of 61 Mech had a variety of armaments, from infantry carriers with 20mm guns to the tank-busting 90mm gun. Unita troops had by now positioned themselves to the south-east of 47 Brigade in case they tried to break away in that direction. Fapla artillery began to bombard the approaching Ratels and Migs flew overhead to lend support and cover 47 Brigade's escape. The Ratels went in to attack. Fapla, accustomed to seeing Unita beat a hasty retreat whenever their tanks appeared, tried the same tactic and sent their tanks towards the SADF positions. To their dismay the South Africans' reaction was the exact opposite - they attacked. The Ratels raced for the tanks, surrounding them and dodging back and forth until they could get behind them and shoot at the comparatively vulnerable rear ends of the tanks. Major Laurence Maree, second-in-command of 61 Mech, later told the British journalist and author, Fred Bridgland: "I can't tell you how much courage it takes in a Ratel driver and gunner when a tank is charging towards them to summon up the will to stop still for long enough to stabilise their firing platform and get their round off. [Unlike a T54/55 tank, which has built-in stabilisers and can fire on the move, a Ratel, like other armoured cars, can only fire from a static position]. Of course, as soon as they'd fired, off they sprinted like Turbo-charged hares. One of our guys died that afternoon facing down a T-55 in his Ratel. A 100mm shell from the tank skipped up from the sandy ground and went right through the turret. The Ratel commander, Lieutenant Hind, was terribly wounded and he died later. We had two others very seriously wounded that day, and another three with light wounds. The medics just pulled the shrapnel out of those who were slightly hurt, cleaned up the wounds, and they went straight back into combat." (1) The Fapla troops, although outgunning the South Africans and outnumbering them 4 to 1, began to lose their nerve and one of the battalions suddenly made a break towards the river. They streamed across the open grassland towards the river in an undisciplined mob and the South Africans brought down MRL fire and high- explosive mortar shells on them. A second battalion also broke and ran for the river, with the Ratels chasing them. Approximately 100 vehicles were now jostling to try and reach the bridge by way of the wooden road. Recces directed artillery fire from the G-5s onto them, causing havoc. The area was now a wasteland of shattered trees and burnt grass from the shells and shrapnel from both sides. Migs piloted by Cubans flew some 60 sorties that day, dropping bombs and trying to strafe the South African positions, but they were wildly inaccurate and had little effect. Fapla tanks made an effort to recover some of the abandoned vehicles, but were themselves destroyed by the pinpoint accuracy of the G-5 artillery fire. When the firing finally stopped at the end of the day over 600 Fapla soldiers lay dead on that stretch of open ground and 127 Fapla vehicles stood destroyed or abandoned near the river. On the morning of 4 October the South Africans were able to survey the remnants on the battlefield. Recovery teams were sent in to salvage whatever was still usable and the SADF generals were delighted to hear that their troops were able to salvage intact one of the Sam-8 missile systems, complete with missiles, radar and logistics vehicles, the first example of this highly- effective Soviet weapon ever to be captured by a western country. The remnants of 21 and 59 Brigades had joined forces and were trying to reorganize. A few firefights broke out as the SADF and Unita troops moved across the battlefield to salvage equipment. A few inexperienced Unita soldiers almost caused havoc as they attempted to drive off the undamaged tanks. The South Africans intercepted messages from Russian commanders ordering the Fapla Migs and troops to make an all-out effort to destroy the abandoned equipment, but by then the South Africans had moved the Sam-8 system back behind their positions and had it well camouflaged. Unita later tried to claim the Sam-8 for itself with a view to passing it on to the Americans, but South Africa, recalling the way America had abandoned its allies in Angola, refused and retained the missile system for its own arms research. October to December 1987 - The Last Phase After the battle was over mopping up operations continued on both sides. South African observers watched in disgust as Fapla soldiers shot many of their own wounded where they lay because they were unable to evacuate them or give them medical care. At the end of the day the South African commander, Deon Ferreira, sent a message to HQ that their mission had been accomplished and that the Angolan/Cuban advance on Mavinga had been stopped. His new orders were to clear all remnants of the enemy forces from the eastern side of the River Cuito and establish positions from which they would be able to prevent any further crossings into Unita territory. No mention was made of capturing Cuito Cuanavale itself. The SADF did, however, want to be in a position from which they could shell the airfield and neutralise the base as a starting point for a new offensive. Cuito allowed the Cuban Migs easy access to Unita territory and if it was destroyed the Migs would have to move 175 kilometres to the west. The G5 artillery groups were moved up and commenced bombarding Cuito. The SAAF sent in 4 Mirages as a decoy and while the Migs were being rolled out of their reinforced concrete hangars the G-5s pounded the runway with shells. Within a short space of time the airfield was destroyed and the remaining Migs were forced to move back to Menongue. Stinger missiles were also used to good effect by Unita and two Cuban pilots were taken prisoner after their Mig had been shot down. The Cuban/Faplan offensive had failed. Later the Cubans tried to save face and boost their demoralized troops by claiming loudly that they had won the "Battle for Cuito Cuanavale", which they claimed to have successfully defended against all South African attacks! Throughout the campaign the South Africans, mindful of the fact that they were involved in an undeclared war and without allies in the west, refrained from making any public statements on the progress of the war. This gave the Cubans and Angolans the advantage in the propaganda war. The SADF could not reveal that it only had a small combat force of less than 3000 lightly- armed troops in Angola, as this would have revealed their weaknesses to the enemy. The superior training and tactics of the SADF had convinced the Cubans and Angolans that they were facing a large, heavily-armed force. As Chester Crocker later wrote: "In early October the Soviet-Fapla offensive was smashed at the Lomba River near Mavinga. It turned into a headlong retreat over the 120 miles back to the primary launching point at Cuito Cuanavale. In some of the bloodiest battles of the entire civil war, a combined force of some 8,000 Unita fighters and 4,000 SADF troops destroyed one Fapla brigade and mauled several others out of a total Fapla force of some 18,000 engaged in the three-pronged offensive. Estimates of Fapla losses ranged upward of 4,000 killed and wounded. This offensive had been a Soviet conception from start to finish. Senior Soviet officers played a central role in its execution. Over a thousand Soviet advisers were assigned to Angola in 1987 to help with Moscow's largest logistical effort to date in Angola: roughly $1.5 billion in military hardware was delivered that year. Huge quantities of Soviet equipment were destroyed or fell into Unita and SADF hands when Fapla broke into a disorganized retreat... The 1987 military campaign represented a stunning humiliation for the Soviet Union, its arms and its strategy. It would take Fapla a year, or maybe two, to recover and regroup. Moreover the Angolan military disaster threatened to go from bad to worse. As of mid-November, the Unita/ SADF force had destroyed the Cuito Cuanavale airfield and pinned down thousands of Fapla's best remaining units clinging onto the town's defensive perimeters." (2) The results of the campaign up to April 1988 were 4,785 killed on the Cuban/Faplan side, with 94 tanks and hundreds of combat vehicles destroyed, against 31 South Africans killed in action, 3 tanks destroyed (SADF tanks entered the war after the Lomba River campaign) and 11 SADF armoured cars and troop carriers lost. A total of 9 Migs were destroyed and only 1 SAAF Mirage shot down. After 13 years in Angola the Cubans had still not achieved their aim of destroying Unita and marching into Namibia as "liberators". They had badly underestimated the South Africans and discovered to their cost that they were facing highly-trained, battle-hardened troops. If they had taken the trouble to examine South Africa's military history, they might perhaps have paused for thought at the fact that the forefathers of these troops, the Boers, had held the full might of the British Empire at bay during the Boer War, when 450,000 British troops took three years to subdue a force of little more than 20,000 Boers. |
agaugust: does your father have a second wife that is 'doing' you voodoo remote control ?You're eating the humble pie. Resorting to insults,to dress your naked stupid.ity. |
2smooth2shout: so your definition of a victory is inflicting only casualties without successfully subduing your enemy? you broke your enemy's arm but he went home with the trophy and you call yourself victorious?. You're highly mistaken. " The "bull horn" formation Most historians credit Shaka with initial development of the famous "bull horn" formation.[17] It was composed of three elements: 1. The main force, the "chest," closed with the enemy Impi and pinned it in position. The warriors who comprised the "chest" were senior veterans.[18] 2. The "horns," while the enemy Impi was pinned by the "chest," would flank the Impi from both sides and encircle it; in conjunction with the "chest" they would then destroy the trapped force. The warriors who comprised the "horns" were young and fast juniors.[18] 3. The "loins," a large reserve, was placed, seated, behind the "chest" with their backs to the battle. The "loins" would be committed wherever the enemy Impi threaten to break out of the encirclement.[18] Coordination was supplied by regimental " izinduna" (chiefs or leaders) who used hand signals and messengers. The scheme was elegant in its simplicity, and well understood by the warriors assigned to each echelon." Now counter this by showing me,any hausa,yuroba or Igbo invented battle tactic. |
2smooth2shout: same old excuse.. like the same excuses you'll always have about your failure in CAR. any excuse of your failure is lesotho?Like our Boer and Zulu ancestors,We always go to battle with less men but manage to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. |
2smooth2shout: am waiting for south africans to dispute the facts about your military failures you've been bragging about. SA didn't fight the bush war alone. they had all the external supports and lost. then mike..za wants to tell me about "war" that he doesn't know the meaning.The late Lt Gen Deon Ferreira (a colonel at the time and SADF force commander in South East Angola) was quoted in the Paratus (SADF publication) of March 1989 after the Lomba Battle as follows: "If defeat for South Africa meant the loss of 31 men, three tanks, five armoured vehicles and three aircraft, then we'd lost. If victory for Fapla and the Cubans meant the loss of 4,600 men, 94 tanks, 100 armoured vehicles, 9 aircraft and other Soviet equiptment valued at more than a billion Rands, then they'd won." Mike..ZA is still taking you Village Nigerian boys to school. |
2smooth2shout: yeah you did and failed woefully. am not a novice on SA matters bob.The late Lt Gen Deon Ferreira (a colonel at the time and SADF force commander in South East Angola) was quoted in the Paratus (SADF publication) of March 1989 after the Lomba Battle as follows: "If defeat for South Africa meant the loss of 31 men, three tanks, five armoured vehicles and three aircraft, then we'd lost. If victory for Fapla and the Cubans meant the loss of 4,600 men, 94 tanks, 100 armoured vehicles, 9 aircraft and other Soviet equiptment valued at more than a billion Rands, then they'd won." |
2smooth2shout: from the way you sound, i doubt you know the meaning of war. go and learn first before talking trashThe only war Nigeria has ever fought alone was against Boko Haram,which they're begging for ceasefire now. |
2smooth2shout: dumbo.. direct military intervention. not some UN blue beret honeymoon trip.South Africa intervened when UNITA,was threatened by the Angolan advance south. Remember Nigeria has never fought any war alone,you guys always share ground with other forces. |
2smooth2shout: where has SA ever brought peace to in Africa? of course you can't be in the list of peace enforcers cos your military need to learn to fight first.Burundi and Lesotho. And only officers were sent to Brazil,the Battalion and its parabats backers were trained in SA. And stop talking like Nigeria has ever been in any war. |
2smooth2shout: do you even have the moral justification to talk about military and strategic failures? SA is the master of failure in both"Cleverness has been associated with long delays". |
2smooth2shout: you must be crazy to say our government begged for ceasefire if you can't show proof. and about mend, dude your government took orders from us to arrest him after he fled to SA. the guy was living in SA all those years and your government didn't have the balls to hold him.South Africa taking orders from Nigerian government? Don't be ridiculous. Is this the same Nigerian government that because of its failiers,led to the creation of Boko Haram and MEND? |
NaijaPikinGidi: Except you have your head stuck in the sands you'd have realized or read Nigerians call it for Egypt! Egypt it is!! Hopefully South Africans can now get off their high horses!Egypt doesn't have the money to fund operations. If the USA was to cut aid to Egypt,their equipment would rust like Libya's air force under Muammar. I always challenged you on the ground of: which country on the continent can fund operations and produce quality weapons. In a war situation against another country,with both countries slapped with sanctions and arms ermbago. |
NaijaPikinGidi: Again Boko Haram has evaporated and MEND are socially re-integrated ... positively skilled and trained to bring development to their immediate community! Did you ever hear the word Amnesty for militants? They dropped their weapons and militant ideologies for good. SA cannot hold claim to such successes anywhere on planet earth! Deal ith it? Nigeria will dialogue ... But we will not lose a fight to maintain the peace anywhere we deem fit. We did it for you South Africans long ago!Boko Haram evaporated? Your government begged for a ceasefire agreement. You should be thankful to South Africa that it has put to jail the MEND leader. |
paniki: The question asked was simply but this thread has gone 600 pages which shows that there will never be any consensus. So in hope for some general agreement, let me ask another question: Which country has the weakest military in Africa?Swaziland. |
NaijaPikinGidi: Until the lions have their own historians, the history of the hunt will always glorify the hunter! SELEKA lions on my mind!Boko Haram and MEND on my mind. |
NaijaPikinGidi: If you cannot tell your left from you right, it would do you a lot of good to shut up your leaking proboscis! If you can't then kindly offer us your understanding of the terms -- globalisation and bilateral trade? I can't count on you and your dumb brain anyways!Globalisation? Don't start with your unfunny jokes. China is taking resources from stupid countries like Nigeria and manufacture products which they sell back to you again. No South African road is being built by some Chinese company,but as we speak of today Chinese companies are building roads in Abuja and Lagos. |
2smooth2shout: i can see how your police is saving you indeed. You are being poached everyday and your government will rather pour resources to save animals.The SA is pouring resources in fighting crime. But your government failed you by letting the "Boko Haram cancer" spread since 2009. And yes,your government is allowing people to abuse and keep animals. We won't allow people to dance with Hyenas,Pythons and monkeys in South Africa. Mzansi Africa is the champion of Human and Animal rights in Africa. |
2smooth2shout: ok why don't you answer why your government would rather send special forces both from abroad to protect rhinos while people are killed everyday in SA streets.The only reason for your country to deploy its troops on the streets is because there's a war going on. Cause crime is a job to be handled by the police not soldiers. |
Msauza: We will use them like condoms and flush them thereafter."We all know" China is coming to Africa to look for some minerals to fuel their rapid growth. China has outsmart the DUMB Nigeria AGAIN!!!!!!!!!!!LOL |
agaugust: you people are not safe....fire in sowetoSafe?,Let's us not talk about "being safe" please. Cause clearly you know which has bombs going out randomly and killing innocent. We also know which country has motorcycle riding militants armed with grenades and Kalashnikovs. |
agaugust:Egypt last went into combat against muammar Gaddafi,long time ago. I'm talking about modern warfare. |
2smooth2shout: then why did you retreat from CAR. you lost all credibility after that. even M23 laugh it off and warned your troops when they heard SANDF was going to join the offensive in DRC. the deadline UN gave the rebels expired by 4pm today and no offensive yet cos SANDF are still training. is it world war z they are going to fight?The SANDF is in DRC and ready for the fight which might even begin today. |
2smooth2shout: now this is more like itNigeria has a lot of experience?. Is the country that hired Egyptians to fly sorties against Biafra?. Nigeria has never tested a real "armour to armour" battle. Battling rebels is way different from going against a country,which will armoured fighting vehicles,main battle tanks and fighter jets. |
2smooth2shout: now this is more like itAnswer this can Nigeria fight against another well organised country or army. |
2smooth2shout: i just wonder if south africans purposely chose to be ignorant or are just being silly. tell me which country in the world that is currently countering insurgency that is not using heavy military hardware.. "You can say militants are winning when they start to claim territory".We all know that Taliban is winning in Afghanistan,without claiming large "territories". So Nigeria can't really defeat BH,all your country can do now is negotiate h with BH. |
NaijaPikinGidi: You continue to make stupid comments that reflect your poor level of reasoning! The Nigerian military is not in a war with rebels or whatever name you want to refer to Boko Haram. Rather we are in a needed security offensive against terrorists who have exploited Nigeria's religious diversity by unleashing mayhem on innocent citizens. The military has largely succeeded in less than 3 months to dislodged the foreign backed terrorists from Nigerian soil. Help yourself to a dose of basic education to improve your 33% brain capacity!But Boko Haram has just killed 20 innocent civilians on monday. That military operation is failing. Your government will soon share a table with Boko Haram negotiators. |
NaijaPikinGidi: Again ... I just wish you could get your head out of your stinking behind! You seem to be lost in your world of baseless fantasies! Nigeria's solid military history cannot be rewritten no matter how much you lie for your SA. Provide facts and reliable sources when you make your claims! Finish and klaar!Are you gonna tell me about sierra Leone and Liberia? Stop being funny. |
2smooth2shout: same thing i've been begging them for two weeks now. The only history they seem to have is about two conflicts they didn't win.No country on the African,can claim to have more experience in modern warfare like South Africa does. And oh South Africa only stepped in if UNITA was facing a serious threat. You mentioned Uganda and Kenya,first Uganda has never fought in any major conflict. They're even getting help from the USA to locate Joseph Kony. They're like Nigeria,fighting against rebels. |
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