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jason12345:Any Igbo should not have his/her position on these issues questioned. I personally don't like complex positions because they create room for perfidy and "jipiti". |
mikeansy:Because you sound incongruous to him. . No offense intended. |
alj harem:Just remember this statement when we launch Biafra 2.0 Remember that Gowon said the same thing in 1966, "either a northerner or Araba". I'm laughing because this time we have you by the balls. ![]() |
amingafar:You mean the north thinks Jonathan is "unelectable". What interesting. If that is not bigotry I wonder what is? Why do you think you can continue to keep Nigeria the way you want? That is retarded, frankly. |
I hope you are intelligent enough to distinguish between a pogrom (mass murder of hundreds and thousands of innocent people) and political killing -the death of a handful of politicians. Igboman will NEVER rampage for the death a few politicians. |
jason12345:It has never happened and will never happen in the east. We only fight in defense. Recent adjustment in Eastern values and conduct has added a new thing: You organize pogrom against our people, we organize same against yours in the East. This is not older than 1990. |
This is how Nigerians come across when they scapegoat Ojukwu for leading their war of survival. No one can in good faith single Ojukwu out as a "former rebel," except if we accept that such a person is a crass ignoramus.-Bolaji Aluko. |
jason12345:You know why I said that there will be war instead of pogrom against northerners? It is because Ojukwu was the leader of Biafra, and there are still elements within Igbo and Eastern population who believe that the war was abandoned and should be fought to a real conclusion. They are itching for an excuse because larger Igbo population would not subscribe to war unless something that bad happens. Just my views. ![]() I would repeat, Ndigbo don't attack innocent strangers in their land, unless there is a pogrom against Ndigbo in northern Nigeria or elsewhere. ![]() |
alj harem:Eziokwu? Are you sure about that? |
jason12345:If anyone touches Ojukwu, the reaction will not be killing of innocent Abokis and thier nama. The reaction will likely be a war. It may start like a joke but will blow into a full war from which Nigeria will never recover. Ndigbo don't attack innocent people. Simple. |
alj harem:Because they worship human beings. We don't. Different values systems. That has been at the core of why Nigeria is not working. That is why my folks decided to fight on empty stomachs than share a country with his people. 40 years on, that has not changed. |
jason12345:No, both your examples are wrong. We are talking about Nigeria and I have told you that Ndigbo will NEVER start killing innocent strangers in their land for the death of a politician. The only times Igbos killed strangers was in retaliation from killing of Igbos in the North. Our values are fundamentally different. You worship individuals, we don't! |
jason12345:You are comparing apple with oranges. Igbo was never as powerful as whites in the US. Also even if Obama is harmed (God forbid anything happening to my beloved President ) the worst blacks can do is to riot and break a few shops and buildings.There could never be organized pogrom in any part of the US. |
PhysicsQED:I agree. |
jason12345:If the Yoruba would have done the same, then you are totalitarian. Period. That is the truth, and that is why secessionists believe that you should not be in same country as us. You may succeed in a union with northern Nigeria, but NEVER Eastern Nigeria. |
amingafar:So Bello is GOD? He is not a politician? Wasn't he the Premier of Northern Nigeria. Wasn't he the leader of NPC? He was HUMAN and POLITICIAN which is why it was possible to target him and kill him by those who claim nationalism. |
jason12345:Frankly I understand your reasoning. Unfortunately most Igbo still don't get it. You and the north share a feudalistic culture where a politician is GOD while easterners see it oppositely: different culture and value system. Which is why we wanted to secede! How can you share a country with so much dissimilarity of cultures? I kill one of your politicians (for whatever reason), you wipe out my town. You kill one of my politicians (for whatever reasons), I go about my normal business. Can't you see CLEAR difference? How can we share a country then, since politics must happen and politicians will always be killed.? What happens when next they kill your GOD? ![]() |
jason12345:And what is the topic? Weren't you among those who accuse Ojukwu of launching a war he couldn't win? The war was FORCED upon us because we wanted to part ways. It was NOT because of Ojukwu's ambitions. If someone like Ifeanjuna or Madiebo led Biafra, you would have real reason to think like you do now. |
chyz:To think that he really believes that Igbos of the 60s could descend on unarmed neighbors for the death of Zik or Okpara or ANYONE, tells you what we are dealing with here. To much lies have been told by elements who fought a war they had earlier called "Unjust" (Awo). |
jason12345:If you really believe the bolded, either you are far worse than I thought (lack conscience) or you are completely clueless about Igbo mentality. I can say without any equivocation that Igbo population would NOT have descended on innocent foreigners in their midst just to avenge the death of a politician. The worst that can happen is we go to war (for instance if anyone touches Ojukwu today). But we would not kill innocents. But maybe time has come for us to review that mindset. |
amingafar:No problem mr amingafar, the problem is OURS for not understanding you well before fighting you. This is part of why I'm here on nairaland. I'm here because I'm afraid that my people Ndigbo are clueless and don't understand you and others like you in Nigeria. I've seem many of them trying in futility to present civilized and honorable arguments to your type. Luckily for you, your people are already built that way -kill innocents, r, ape women, cut open pregnant women, shoot and kill innocent people. My people are yet to digest all that and be ready for a next time, The good news for me and my people is that we are quick learners and our culture evolve constantly. Thanks for helping me make my case. ![]() |
I really have a hunch that a fulltime career soldier like Maj Gen Alexander Madiebo could have made a better Biafran leader. I suspect he would not have made the same strategic mistakes by Ojukwu. I really suspect that it was Ojukwu's idea to put the Biafran Expeditionary force under Col Victor Banjo because Ojukwu was too cosmopolitan. Ojukwu spoke fluent Yoruba and called Awolowo "Papa". That must have undermined his sense of cold strategic planning needed to win the war. Ojukwu was a graduate soldier and I don't think you needed to be that to win the type of war Biafra was supposed to fight. Because of that, Ojukwu and Effiong keep using standard British fighting strategy (with little or no weapons ) instead of a Maoist strategy needed to neutralize organized enemy forces.Just my hunch. ![]() |
amingafar:Compare that with an innocent man arrested, his hands and feet tied like a goat and shot in the head in full view of INTERNATIONAL Newsmen. |
jason12345:Like I told you, it happened. You need to find the material yourself or wait until someone charitable gives you the source. I don't have time for that. It is a common fact. Everybody knows it happened. |
jason12345:Oh you mean you didn't know about that part of the war history? Ol' boy I've told you to read up first before commenting here. It happened. |
Could it be that honor and maintenance of honorable conduct was the beginning of Biafra's failure? I have seen several evidence that Biafra could have at least taken some position devoid of honor, from Aburi to the war proper. Why did Biafra only hope for others' honor, when they don't share values with Biafrans? When Gowon blockaged Eastern Nigeria in October 1966, wasn't it enough signal of what to expect from his leadership in Nigeria? Why send home northern soldiers with their weapons, when they disarmed Eastern soldiers? Sounds really naive. I guess it is a pattern of Igbo thinking whereby we always assume that our enemy is like us. Quite childish. |
jason12345:I think he was talking about soldiers turning their weapons on civilians under any condition otherwise howsoever. Tribalism or not, the soldiers of eastern Nigeria ensured that all non-easterners were not harmed in the east. Even soldier of northern extraction in the East were allowed to return to their region ARMED. Eastern soldiers were DISARMED before sending them to the East. Clearly one region was honorable, others weren't. |
I am only interested in facts, not lies from those who want to deny their ignoble roles in the deaths of innocent people. Two things stand out for me: First: Gowon (and his advisers) imposed food blockade on Eastern Nigeria loooooooooooooooooog before Biafra was even conceived. They did so 7 months BEFORE Biafra was declared. Second: For Easterners to still insist on Biafra despite this blockade, tells me that they were convinced in their belief in secession. They basically decided to secede even if heavens fall. That to me is a rare demonstration of conviction and principle. ![]() And when Gowon launched the war proper, the easterners (by then Biafrans) went to war on empty stomachs! How many of us are as committed to anything these days? |
People who never wished the easterners to live may continue to vent their frustration on Ojukwu for fulfilling a responsibility. This is how Nigerians come across when they scapegoat Ojukwu for leading their war of survival. No one can in good faith single Ojukwu out as a "former rebel," except if we accept that such a person is a crass ignoramus. One does not have to be Igbo or easterner, or their friends to see this fact.Which explains why we have unscrupulous and cowardly elements coming to nairaland to revise history and blame a man who fought reluctantly in defense of his people. Left for Ojukwu, there would not have been a Biafra. Frankly, I wish someone more convinced took over from Ojukwu. We could have succeeded. This was Eastern peoples mandate to him : deliver Biafra for us! Anyway, he tried his best under the circumstance and I will always revere and salute his courage and efforts. |
On 19 October 1966, Gowon imposed a food blockade on Eastern Nigeria.This was SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE Biafra was declared. Which means that starvation was the first weapon lunched at Biafra. Quite interesting. |
The most common lie about Biafra and Ojukwu has been that he could have avoided secession. Historical facts show that he could not, because it was NOT HIS first choice of action. The Easterners wanted secession after series of pogroms. He successfully negotiated self determination at Aburi, only for Gowon and his allies to trash it which agitated Eastern people who went about shouting "On Aburi we stand!". How did Gowon respond? He imposed FOOD blockade on the East, and this was MONTHS BEFORE Biafra was declared. I can confidently conclude, that had Ojukwu not declared Biafra, other Eastern officers would have kicked him to the curb and declared it, which probably could have being a good idea because Ojukwu was not really for secession. He wanted confederation. |
On Wed, 19 Apr 1995, Mobolaji E. Aluko wrote in extending Orji's argument: > (1) WAS OUR OJUKWU MADE INTO A "FALL GUY" HERE ? HOW COULD > SUCH A FINAL SERIOUS DECISION BE PUT ON ONE SHOULDER ? > I SUSPECT THAT IT WAS MORE LIKE: LEAD US OR GET OUT > OF THE WAY ! PERSONAL ACCOUNT (AGAIN MY FATHER) > INDICATES THAT THE TIDE WAS BY THEN TOO FAR FOR HIM TO STEM, > AND HE IN FACT FEARED FOR HIS LIFE IF HE DID NOT GO ALONG WITH THE SECESSION. > > Bolaji Aluko Let us see the merits of Col. E.O.'s analysis. To be sure, Ojukwu was ambitious. He admitted this fact in an interview held in Umuahia on 4 November 1968. This is no news. The lack of ambition is not a virtue. Suffice it to say that in 1967 the question of ambition is secondary to what had happened to easterners and what was happening to them. To date, there has been no conclusive evidence suggesting that Ojukwu was bent on creating Biafra in order to satisfy some inordinate ambition. Available evidence points otherwise. After the initial phase of the pogroms in the north in July-August 1966, Ojukwu urged eastern survivors to return to the north after conferring with his friend, Ado Bayero (the Emir of Kano). (Ojukwu had just appointed this man the Chancellor of the UNN, as a replacement to Zik.) The easterners who heeded Ojukwu's call met more massacres. There is no need to revisit the pogroms of 1966 here. It is sufficient to say, a vast majority of easterners were disenchanted with a Nigeria that did not guarantee them freedom of life and property. An estimated thirty thousand had been murdered in other parts of Nigeria. Their relatives were not happy. Millions had returned empty-handed as refugees from other parts of Nigeria. Easterners' property had been "abandoned" for looting in other parts of Nigeria. Millions were looking up to Ojukwu to provide the kind of leadership that would lead to the fair resolution of this problem. On 19 October 1966, Gowon imposed a food blockade on Eastern Nigeria. On 31 October, Ojukwu wrote the other military governors inviting them to a meeting either in Port Harcourt or Calabar. The idea was to discuss the problems of course. Meanwhile, he also sent delegates for talks with representatives of other regions. These delegates were talking until the eastern participants felt unsafe to continue, or so they said. But tell me why I should not believe them. On 4 October, Gowon turned down the eastern proposal for confederation. UNN students began to protest chanting that "the push is complete." In effect, they were reminding Ojukwu of his earlier caveat that the east would not secede unless "pushed out". These demonstrations continued all around the region. On new Years' eve 1967, Ojukwu warned that time was "running out while the ship of state is drifting." These were the circumstances that foreshadowed Aburi. At Aburi, Ojukwu pressed his case. He did so successfully because he had one, not necessarily, as Kirk-Greene put it, that Ojukwu was "the cleverest" or had "skillful histrionics and superior intellectual adroitness." Indeed, this characterization of Ojukwu vis a vis the other actors is true. (In fact, Brigadier Adekunle said that it was because Gowon was indolent.) But I cannot see what Ojukwu could have done if he had no case. Ojukwu went to Aburi as the sole representative of a people struggling for survival. He successfully negotiated self-determination for them. On the other hand, Gowon had ascended the highest throne in the land. He was beginning to feel comfortable in that post. The majrity of non-eastern elites were also comfortable. The fleeing easterners had abandoned property, civil and military positions which people from other parts of the country were quick to fill. While his colleagues of the SMC were wishing away the past, Ojukwu was serious consolidating his argument on that past. Ojukwu's success at Aburi owed more to the logic of immediate circumstances than to his political brinksmanship. Back in the east, this success shored up Ojukwu's popularity. Rather than offset this popularity, Gowon's unilateral repudiation of the agreements fueled it. The crisis deepened because the interests of the two sides were diametrically opposed, in part, arising from the meddling of external interests. As easterners clamoured "On Aburi We Stand," the rest of the country clamoured for its repudiation. Ojukwu warned in a broadcast that, if by 31 March 1967, the federal side had not implemented Aburi, he would take "whatever measures may be necessary to give effect to those agreements." Ojukwu started to issue the "Survival Edicts" aimed at countering the federal blockade. The federal government declared a state of emergency in the Eastern Region and announced the creation of 12 states on 26 May 1967. In response, Ojukwu presented three options for the consideration of the Joint Secession of the Council of Chiefs and Elders. These were: (1) accepting the terms of the North and Gowon and, therefore, submitting to the domination of the North; (2) continuing the stalemate and to drift; and (3) to ensure the survival of the people of Eastern Nigeria by asserting their autonomy. It is now history that the assemblymen and chiefs chose the third option. On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu proclaimed the independent state of Biafra. If one accepts the ambition thesis, then the Joint Session had given legitimacy to Ojukwu's inordinate desires. But one cannot successfully condemn Ojukwu's action in presenting these options without suggesting [viable] alternatives that Ojukwu may have left out in his submission to the Joint Session. Could Ojukwu have postponed secession? In view of the federal government measures, such a postponement would have been unwarranted. For instance, the creation of states was unilateral and designed to undermine the geographical basis of Eastern Nigeria. Apart, from secession, the only option left to Ojukwu was to step down. This would have been dishonorable at a time when Easterners' grievances had not been addressed. In these circumstances, the real option open to Ojukwu was resignation. But this was dishonourable. People who never wished the easterners to live may continue to vent their frustration on Ojukwu for fulfilling a responsibility. This is how Nigerians come across when they scapegoat Ojukwu for leading their war of survival. No one can in good faith single Ojukwu out as a "former rebel," except if we accept that such a person is a crass ignoramus. One does not have to be Igbo or easterner, or their friends to see this fact. The unpreparedness of Biafra to withstand the rigours of independence at that time was widely known, even by Ojukwu himself. He took time to warn the Joint Session of the grave consequences of secession. (Don't mind that he would tell the world a few days later that no power in "Black Africa" could beat Biafra in war.) Most people in Eastern Nigeria realized that it was better to try and die fighting than just wait to be annihilated. The dangers were real. They were not merely "perceived", as i read often on Naijanet. [b]Ojukwu realized that the people were not looking for a wimp. A good number of capable officers could have filled the void, had Ojukwu created one. Some of these were the surviving executioners of the January 1966 coup such as Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Chukwuma Nzeogwu, Tim Onwuatuegwu and Ben Gbulie. There were also their Yoruba counterparts who had taken refuge in the east. These were Major Ademoyega, Col. Banjo, Lt. Olafemihon and Lt. Oyewole. All these January officers had no jobs or commands in the army parlance. (To give them commands to Nzeogwu & co. would be to give them power. Their remaining idle was not good as well.) I am sure that the saying, which my elementary school teacher later thought me, "an idle man is a devil's workshop," was already in vogue at the time. The January officers played cards and chequers. Nobody, including Ojukwu, was at ease with these men's presence. They had done it before and could well do it again. Actually, Major General Alex Madiebo, who later became the Biafran Army Commander, grumbles in his book that Ojukwu gave these men a lot of amenities in order to placate them. Proper attention has not been given to the implications the presence of these men may have had on the declaration of Biafra.[/b] http://groups.google.com/group/usaafricadialogue/browse_thread/thread/f5be1064339a1613 |
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he lost whatever Southern indifference or neutrality that still existed. Had he gone the other route, and actually thrashed the Nigerian military directly in battle and then overrun the North, that would have been "honorable conduct," and settled the question of whether there was to be a Biafra without any additional question of whether the not at all honorable situation in the Midwest would be sustained after Biafra's victory or the more crucial question of whether a similar situation would have arisen in the West following Biafra's takeover of the West.