Andre Uweh:
The issue of conferderation was not implemented and Gowon did not show signs of implementing it.
Ojukwu did not go to war as he did not declare any war. Biafra was attacked, first by Shuwa of the fiorst division. Biafra defendeded her territories

Mr Andre, don't jump the gun. Let's take it gradually.

Katsumoto:

and failed to surrender when it was obvious he was going to lose.

Ojukwu regularly met with his war time service chiefs and there was no time they discussed surrender. Even if you were a member of that cabinet, you will be in a difficult position to accept defeat. For example, Oguta is lost today and in 4 days time Biafra reclaims it. The situation remained like that till the end of hostilities.

ACM10:

How sure are you that decree 8 addressed Aburi agreement? If you are convinced within yourself that Aburi agreement was sufficiently addressed, then provide the full agreement and I will provide the one in my possession for us to analyze. Let's place your comment on the truth-o-meter.

Dude,

The onus is always on the person making the charge. What school did you attend?

If Ojukwu accuses Gowon of not implementing the Aburi accord, Gowon would reply that he implemented decree 8. It is then left for Ojukwu to point out which provisions were left out. You have to tell us what was not implemented.

The problem here is that most Igbo sons shout about Aburi but they don't even know what Aburi is about. Can an Igbo son state what wasn't implemented as part of Decree 8 1967?

Katsumoto:

Please read decree 8 that I provided. Regional governments had the powers which they had before Ironsi's unification decree.

Why are you like this? Are you mischievous in real life?

Andre Uweh:
Ojukwu regularly met with his war time service chiefs and there was no time they discussed surrender. Even if you were a member of that cabinet, you will be in a difficult position to accept defeat. For example, Oguta is lost today and in 4 days time Biafra reclaims it. The situation remained like that till the end of hostilities.

Of course they didn't discuss surrender because their territory was growing daily and it wasn't their wives and children who were dying daily. There was no need for Ojukwu to surrender as long as Federal soldiers had not entered his street.

Andre Uweh:
ignore the half literate boy

. Woow! Mr Andrew! The total child, the Mr literate, however, in ur utterance u just exihibited ur folly,.I'm known not to b a tribalist, all I do is state out the obvious fact and I also do that as a historian or wiv ma interel knowledge. Its also on the obv ious that uve come here to feast from others and top up ur knowledge wiv d question u asked "who declared d war?"...Well, its just a fact that Ojukwus demand after the accord was unconstitutional cos Gowon met other demands except that which was wrong and unconstitutional. He (ojuwkwu)also declared that the oil revenue be put in their coffers rather than it going to the purse of the nation as was the custom. In all spirit of objectivity, should such demands be met..? I dare say again, that everything that befell the biafra, without bias, was the handy work of the rebellious Ojukwu(rest in peace) and his cohorts

ACM10:

Why are you like this? Are you mischievous in real life?

Soon I will adopt Sagamite's policy of dealing with idiots when I address you.

Find the provisions that weren't implemented or sod off. This is my last response to you. You don't have the faculty to engage in stimulating debate yet you want to be at the forefront.

Katsumoto:

Of course they didn't discuss surrender because their territory was growing daily and it wasn't their wives and children who were dying daily. There was no need for Ojukwu to surrender as long as Federal soldiers had not entered his street.

Biafrans continued for a long time to fight as they were also reclaiming territories lost to the enemy.
I wish Biafra surrendered early but it was not possible because they also fought well.

Katsumoto:

Dude,

The onus is always on the person making the charge. What school did you attend?

If Ojukwu accuses Gowon of not implementing the Aburi accord, Gowon would reply that he implemented decree 8. It is then left for Ojukwu to point out which provisions were left out. You have to tell us what was not implemented.

The problem here is that most Igbo sons shout about Aburi but they don't even know what Aburi is about. Can an Igbo son state what wasn't implemented as part of Decree 8 1967?

@Bolded. . .is it really necessary?

@others. . .were you taught in your school to make a bold declaration without having all the facts available on the ground? Why should I be the one to do your homework for you? I gave you an option of sharing your work with you by producing the Aburi agreement in my possession after you have produced yours. But all you want is for us to swallow your conjecture without questioning it.

Andre Uweh:
Biafrans continued for a long time to fight as they were also reclaiming territories lost to the enemy.
I wish Biafra surrendered early but it was not possible because they also fought well.

Apart from Owerri, can you tell us the other parts that were recovered by Biafra? Was it Calabar, Nsukka, Enugu, Ikot Ekpene, Port Harcourt, Aba?

Katsumoto:

Soon I will adopt Sagamite's policy of dealing with idiots when I address you.

Find the provisions that weren't implemented or sod off. This is my last response to you. You don't have the faculty to engage in stimulating debate yet you want to be at the forefront.

I always treat you with respect. Hope it will continue that way?

dayokanu:

Secession from any country is a declaration of war. That was what caused the Balkan wars and the American civil war

2nd indochina war also!

Katsumoto:

Apart from Owerri, can you tell us the other parts that were recovered by Biafra? Was it Calabar, Nsukka, Enugu, Ikot Ekpene, Port Harcourt, Aba?

Apart frpom Owerri, Biafrans continued to resist the enemies even in territories that were in enemy hands. Some of this towns were not completely in enemies hands until the end of war.
Believe me, it was too difficult to surrender. Even with the fall of Enugu and the air port, one would have expected Biafra to surrender. Yet they came up immediately with another idea-Uli and Uga air strips. Did they fall also before the war ended?. NOOO.

ACM10:

I always treat you with respect. Hope it will continue that way?

That is not completely true but I apologize nonetheless for any derogatory remarks against your person.

This thread was about Gowon's memoirs
Why are these Yoruba boi boi tribal scar faced goats answering Gowon
It must suck to be she.male
Work it girls!

Katsumoto:

That is not completely true but I apologize nonetheless for any derogatory remarks against your person.

. Now if scholarly intercourse, and resppect for one anothers views seeing things from eachothers perspective without hatred like u nd AmC10 have exhibited is emulated by others on nairaland, it would b a happy site to visit cos I'm seeing such intellectual respect for one another on Nairaland for the first time.... Afterall, it is the mark of an educated mind, to entertain a thought without necessarily accepting it.

Katsumoto:

Do people organize coups to install individuals who are not sympathetic to their cause or share their pains? There is a reward or punishment for executing a coup.

Thats one point you have raised in isolation amidst a myriad of questions.

If the aim of the second coup was as claimed to "save the country from the 'igbo coup' then why did it become a northern affair. One question i will ask was whose coup was it and who gave the plotters the right to unceremoniously brush off the next most senior officer in the nigerian army after ironsi was assassinated? I read somewhere that during the second coup Ogundipe was rebuffed by a northern nco who told him that he could only take orders from Joe Garba who was a small boy compared to him in rank. Adebayo nko was he not senior to gowon? Even Wu Bassey could have been made head of state. It was a northern elitist/military affair that most likely disgusted southern officers and lets not look at it with our 2013 hardened and de-sensitized eyes o. We are talking about 1966 when there was still a lot of integrity and naivety in nigeria. Gowon to all intents and purposes was the beneficiary of s cabal arrangement that put him in office as head of state above many of his seniors.

joeyfire:

Thats one point you have raised in isolation amidst a myriad of questions.

If the aim of the second coup was as claimed to "save the country from the 'igbo coup' then why did it become a northern affair. One question i will ask was whose coup was it and who gave the plotters the right to unceremoniously brush off the next most senior officer in the nigerian army after ironsi was assassinated? I read somewhere that during the second coup Ogundipe was rebuffed by a northern nco who told him that he could only take orders from Joe Garba who was a small boy compared to him in rank. Adebayo nko was he not senior to gowon? Even Wu Bassey could have been made head of state. It was a northern elitist/military affair that most likely disgusted southern officers and lets not look at it with our 2013 hardened and de-sensitized eyes o. We are talking about 1966 when there was still a lot of integrity and naivety in nigeria. Gowon to all intents and purposes was the beneficiary of s cabal arrangement that put him in office as head of state above many of his seniors.

The Northerners never said it was a coup to save Nigeria from Igbo. It was a revenge and secede coup. They achieved the revenge bit but were talked out of seceding by the American and British diplomats. If Ogundipe wasn't acceptable, then Adebayo, or any other Southerner wouldn't have been acceptable. Imagine you were a Northern coup plotter between January and July 1966. No one is justifying Gowon's ascension above senior officers but the fact is that there isn't a manual for planning and executing coups. If you fail, you die (Dimka, Orkar, Vatsa); if you succeed, then you select the HOS (Murtala, Buhari, Babangida, Abacha). Its that simple.

Gowon himself was a consensus candidate. Even though the coup was planned by Murtala, Martins Adamu, and Danjuma, other Northern officers preferred Gowon since there was an impasse between Murtala/Adamu and Ogundipe. There were no precedents at this time and the end result was what it was.

There were approximately 10,000 soldiers in 1966. Yoruba contributed to the senior officer echelons but only 700 soldiers. Ndigbo dominated through the officer cadre and contributed approximately 3300 soldiers. The Northerners had approximately 5000 soldiers and had junior officers. At that point, it was all about numbers and since the Eastern officers didn't come out to support Ogundipe, Adewale Wey, and Mobolaji Johnson, how was Ogundipe going to quell the coup? He had sent two units that were ambushed as a result of being surrounded by Northerners who were sabotaging his efforts.

FULL TRANSCRIPT OF ABURI ACCORD (MAKE OF IT WHAT YOU WILL)
Attitudes at Aburi a. How the military looks at the politicians
General Ankrah (Ghana): I will not like to dwell rigidly on any point whatsoever because I feel this is a domestic affair of Nigeria and, as I have always said, it is not difficult for military people to understand each other. It is a saying that if Generals were to meet and discuss frontiers, wars or even go into the details to forestall war, there will never be any differences or discrepancies but unity and understanding. There will be no war because the two old boys will meet at the frontier and tell each other: 'Old boy, we are not going to commit our boys to die, come on, let us keep the politicians out' and that is the end. I am quite confident that having met here to-day, you will continue and achieve what you are here for. What I want to stress is this, that through the annals of history we have not seen failures with military statesmen and when military personnel do take over the reins of Government they have proved their worth and, I am sure and confident that the Military regimes that have been saddled with the onerous responsibility of rebuilding and reconstructing the various countries in Africa will not let us down. You are aware that in Nigeria now the whole world is looking up to you as military men and if there is any failure to reunify or even bring perfect understanding to Nigeria as a whole, you will find that the blame will rest with us all through the centuries. There is no gainsaying this whatsoever. Whatever the situation we are soldiers and soldiers are always statesmen not politicians. They deal with a little bit of politics and diplomacy when the time comes but they are statesmen. The people first and they themselves second but if you think like the politicians do that they want fame or they want to be heard of and neglect your people then, of course, I am quite sure that we as soldiers will live to regret, even our future generations will live to regret. They will be blaming us whenever our names are called or mentioned....

Major Johnson: Gentlemen, if I can start talking on this one, please do not think I am taking undue advantage. Quite honestly I think we all know what brought this country to where we are to-day and while talking yesterday Emeka [first name of Lt.-Col. Ojukwu] touched on a point of how, due to the situation, the politicians got what they have been waiting for to come in. While I very much welcome this Item 4 and while I know that definitely we are not going to be in Government forever, I will like to say that, please for the next six months let us leave everything that will bring the politicians back into the limelight out of the question. Let us go on all these things we have been discussing since yesterday because this is on the basis at which we can get our country back on its feet. Once we can get the papers on these things out and we see them working then we can call the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee to come and discuss but for now they are just going to confuse the issues more if you bring them out to come and talk anything again. I will say let the Military Government continue for now and after working for six months and we see how far we can go before we start thinking of calling these people back.

Commodore Wey: I 100% support what you have said. Candidly if there had ever been a time in my life when I thought somebody had hurt me sufficiently for me to wish to kill him it was when one of these fellows opened his mouth too wide. I think we should let them stay where they are for the moment. It was simply because we could not get together and handle our affairs. Now that we have established the basis under which we can work please let us leave them where they are and let us try and see how far we can work.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On this statement, Gentlemen, a lot depends on what the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee is. I agree indeed that regarding other Regions it was indeed a platform for politicians, in the East it was not. I did not send politicians to it but be it as it may, if we say we are going to continue then we must obviously get quite satisfied the terms of running this thing properly. We have got to be able to meet and I said it outside and I repeat it here, I, as the Military Governor of the East cannot meet anywhere in Nigeria where there are Northern troops.

b. The events of 29 July and the issue of Supreme Commander: the Colonels speak
Major Johnson: Sir, before we go on if I may say something. I am happy we have got to this point again. I had wanted to take this Conference back all along because as my people say 'If you still have lice in your head, there will still be blood on your fingers :' May I ask one question, gentlemen, is there a Central Government in Nigeria to-day?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: That question is such a simple one and anyone who has been listening to what I have been saying all the time would know that I do not see a Central Government in Nigeria to-day.
Major Johnson: Thank you, Gentlemen. I think this is the crux of the whole thing and I think if I can take you back this can be a personality clash or something. I am saying here to-day that this is the backbone of our problem. As far as the Governor of the East is concerned there is no central government in Nigeria. You say, Supreme Commander, but as far as he is concerned there is no Supreme Commander. I think this is where we must start from, gentlemen. Why is he not accepting that there is a Supreme Commander and we accept there is a Supreme Commander. This brings me to this Conference that was held in August. As was rightly said, this Committee was a Steering Committee. We are all Military personnel here and we know one thing. We have all been pointing accusing fingers at politicians that they used to take military decisions without military men. The main problem now is that as far as the East is concerned, there is no Central Government. Why? This is what we must find out. I mentioned something about personality clash. I remember that there was a long letter written by the Governor of the East sometime ago referring to the hierarchy in the Army, the policy on seniority and things like that. He said among other things in the letter that if even Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon is Supreme Commander is he not right to ask whether it is for a period or something. For all the East knows the former Supreme Commander is only missing and until such a time that they know his whereabouts they do not know any other Supreme Commander. These are the points that have been brought out by the East. Gentlemen, we said this morning that we have come with open minds and we must hit the nail at the head. The East should tell us now what are their views, what are the conditions they want to demand before they can say that there is a Central Government in Nigeria. For all we know now, nobody has seceded, the East is still part of Nigeria, the West, the North and we know Nigeria as a Federation.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: The Mid-West please.
Major Johnson: And Lagos. Nigeria is still a Federation and in a Federation there is a Central Government. Where is this Central Government and who is Head of this Central Government? Gentlemen, unless we clear this one, all what we are discussing will not be good enough. What are the conditions the East demand before they can recognise what the rest of us recognise as the Central Government?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I agree with you in essence on what you have just said, Bolaji [First name of Major Johnson], but the last bit is badly put. If you will forgive me it is not 'What conditions do they demand before....' If the problem is that we are trying to see how to solve the problem of Government in the centre then I will come in. I will seek your indulgence as I go a little bit back into what a number of people would perhaps wish to call history. At a certain stage, we all accepted General Ironsi as the Supreme Commander and Head of the National Military Government. During his regime we met or rather whilst he was about we met as often as it was practicable, and sat and jointly discussed and took decisions. When the decisions were good we all shared the kudos, when those decisions were bad it is only natural that we should all share the blame. On the 29th of July, whilst he was visiting the Governor of the West, he was said to be besieged in that residence in Ibadan and later kidnapped, further abducted. Subsequent to that, it appeared in his absence the normal thing was whoever is the next senior person to manage the affairs of this country until such a time as he reappeared; or it was necessary he was deposed or if he had suffered certain accident, until such a time as the circumstances were made known. Which ever is the case, the question of the headship of the Government and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces would normally be subjected to a discussion and agreement unless, of course, one party felt he was strong enough to push everybody aside and get to the seat. When this affair of the 29th July occurred, I remember for certain, the first 24 hours nobody thought it necessary to contact the East from Lagos. I made the contact later and I know the advice I gave Brigadier Ogundipe at that time. I said to him, 'Sir, the situation is so confused that I feel that somebody must take control immediately. Also, I would suggest that you go on to the air and tell the country what has happened and that you were taking control of the situation.' Then I was told about concern for the whole country. I knew that if this thing resolved itself into factions we would get ourselves into so much trouble that we would never or we would find it difficult to get out. I maintained and still do that the answer would have been for the responsible officers of the Army to get together thereby trying to get the Army together to solve the problem that we had on our hands. I said to him 'As soon as you have made your speech I guarantee you within 30 minutes, I needed time to write my own, in 30 minutes I would come on to the air in the East and say that I, the entire Army in the East and the entire people in the East wholeheartedly support you.' Forgive me, David [first name of Lt.-Col. Ejoor], that I have never said this to you, but I told him too that I was sure that within fifteen minutes you would say the same in the interest of the country as a whole. He told me that he thought it was a good idea but it did not seem likely that it would be accepted by the faction. Very soon after, I had occasion to talk to you, Jack [nickname of Lt.-Col. Gowon], I did mention amongst other things, two things. The first one was this question of solving the problem and I thought the Army together should solve it. I said also that any break at this time from our normal line would write in something into the Nigerian Army which is bigger than all of us and that thing is indiscipline. How can you ride above people's heads and sit in Lagos purely because you are at the Head of a group who have their fingers poised on the trigger? If you do it you remain forever a living example of that indiscipline which we want to get rid of because tomorrow a Corporal will think because he has his finger on the trigger he could just take over the company from the Major Commanding the company and so on. I knew then that we were heading for something terrible. Despite that and by force of circumstance as we did talk on the telephone, I think twice, you brought up the question of supreme command and I made quite plain my objections, but despite those objections you announced yourself as the Supreme Commander. Now, Supreme Commander by virtue of the fact that you head or that you are acceptable to people who had mutinied against their Commander, kidnapped him and taken him away ? By virtue of the support of Officers and men who had in the dead of night murdered their brother Officers, by virtue of the fact that you stood at the head of a group who had turned their brother Officers from the Eastern Region out of the barracks which they shared ? Our people came home, there are other circumstances which even make the return more tragic. Immediately after I had opportunity to speak to you again, I said on that occasion that there had been too much killing in Nigeria and it was my sincere hope that we can stop these killings. I said then, and have continued to say that in the interest of peace I would co-operate with you to stop the fighting, to stop the killing but I would not recognise. I would not recognise because as I said we have a Supreme Commander who is missing. I would not recognise and to underline the validity of that claim of mine you appointed another Officer, be he senior to you, Acting Governor in the West, presumably acting for the Governor who was then abducted and that I saw no reason why your position would not then be acting. From there I think we started parting our ways because it was clear that the hold on Lagos was by force of conquest. Now, these things do happen in the world, we are all military Officers. If an Officer is dead 'Oh! he was a fine soldier', we drop the national flag on him, we give him due honours and that is all. The next person steps in. So, the actual fact in itself is a small thing with military men but hierachy, order is very important, discipline are sine qua non for any organisation which prides itself for being called an Army. So, the mutiny had occurred, the mutineer seemed in control of the North, the West, Lagos. By international standards when that does happen then a de facto situation is created immediately where whoever is in a position get a de facto recognition of himself in a position over the area he controls. In this situation, Nigeria resolved itself into three areas. The Lagos, West and North group, the Mid-West, the East. What should have been done is for us to get round to discuss the future, how to carry on in the absence of our Supreme Commander.We could not get together because of the situation so we sent our accredited representatives, delegates of Governments and personal representatives of Governors to Lagos to try and resolve certain issues on bringing normalcy to the country. They met and unanimously agreed to certain points. Bolaji, I think in fact from this, if nothing else you do know what I consider went wrong. Perhaps at this juncture I might stop for others to contribute otherwise I would go on and tell you what I consider to be my solution to the problem even now, irrespective of the amount of water that had gone under the bridge. I think there is still a solution provided we are honest with ourselves and we are really very serious about solving this problem. I agree with you it is vital, it is crucial, without it I do not think we can really go anywhere. I leave it for the time being.

Col. Adebayo: I think Emeka has narrated what happened on the 29th July and thereafter. We have all agreed and I am sure you still agree that what we are looking for now is a solution for the future. I do not want us to go into the past anymore, we want a solution for the future. I will suggest with the permission of the other members here that we ask Emeka to give us his solution. Thereafter there might be some others too who would have their own solutions, then we can make a compromise from the solutions we get.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: Gentlemen, General Ankrah told us not to go back into the past, if we are to go back into the past we will sit here for two months talking. Let us forget the past and I agree with Robert [first name of Col. Adebayo] that we ask the East to tell us their solution. If their solution is quite acceptable then we adopt it, amend or whatever we think is good for the country for peace. We are not going to say ourselves what efforts we have put in individually; let us find peace for Nigeria. This is the major issue, unless this is done whatever we are going to discuss is not going to work out well.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I believe that before we start suggesting solutions we must examine certain principles vis a vis the Governors. To me, we should not go too far into history but there is one valid point which must be considered and that is the coup we have had so far. The January 15 one was a failure and the Army came in to correct it, the one of the 29th I personally believe was a mutiny to start with but it has now turned out to be a coup. If it is a coup we have to ask ourselves 'is it a successful coup or is it a partial one ?' I believe it is a partial one, it is not a fully successful one. This is the main point which has brought us here, trying to negotiate as opposed to receiving orders from the Commander. I think we must bear this in mind in reaching a decision or a Resolution affecting the re-organisation of the Army. To-day, the Army is faced with four main problems. Firstly, the problem of leadership; Secondly, the crisis of confidence amongst Officers and amongst the soldiers; Thirdly, the chain of command is badly disrupted; and Fourthly, we cannot now have any Nigerian from anywhere serving in the same unit as an effective unit of the Army. These are bare facts and whatever solution we evolve must go to solve these main problems. I leave these basic principles and what solutions offered should be considered alongside these problems.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: David spoke on re-organisation but the current topic is on Bolaji's point which Emeka narrated. I think this is the major point.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: When you consider leadership you have to tell us what happened to the former leader.


Commodore Wey: Gentlemen, I think I have been properly placed in this issue from the 15th of January up till now. Unfortunately, I do not put them down because I think I can carry quite a bit in my head. The whole issue is unfortunate, it has happened and it has happened. The truth now is that we want to repair, we do not intend to point accusing fingers at anybody. When the trouble of the 29th July started I was present, you came and joined us, therefore, I can tell any other person better. I was there when you phoned Brigadier Ogundipe and I knew what you said. At one stage, it was even said that I carried him in my ship and took him out to sea. I must say one thing that it is impossible for any man to expect to command any unit which he has not got control over. Bolaji would bear witness, he was there, he started it. He was the one who went out first and came back to say that a Private refused to take orders from him; it all happened in the Police Headquarters. The Inspector-General complained, I went into it and I said if they cannot take orders from an Army Officer like themselves they will not take from a Naval Officer. I retired and called Brigadier Ogundipe. He went out and if an ordinary Sergeant can tell a Brigadier 'I do not take orders from you, until my Captain comes,' I think this was the limit and this is the truth about it. Therefore, it would have been very unfair to Ogundipe or any other person for that matter to take command and there is no point accepting to command a unit over which you have no control. It was after that negotiations started, I do not know what conversation went on between Ogundipe and Jack. On the long run I was consulted and what I have just said now was exactly my advice. Bob was with me, I went out and we did not finish until two o'clock in the morning. Jack then came into the issue, how he got there I have got the story; he himself has never told me. I have been doing private investigations myself. I knew how he got into Ikeja and how it came about. I want to repeat that if we did not have the opportunity of having Jack to accept, God knows we would have been all finished. If you remember, you dragged me out, things changed. I do not think people can appreciate the difficulty we were in, therefore, if anybody accepted to lead them candidly I doff my hat for him, I accept it purely from the point of respect. If 55 million people can be saved let us forget everything about position and for God's sake because of our 55 million people let us forget our personal pride. Whether it was a coup or a mutiny let us forget it. If this man comes out and everybody accepts him, please let us accept him. One thing I would like to repeat, I am a sailor and I want to remain a sailor. I do not see why you soldiers should not remain soldiers. We were not trained to be politicians, let us run the Government, draw up a Constitution, hand-over to the politicians and we get back into our uniforms. Whatever people may say, I think I will take this advantage to tell you here that when all of you were appointed Governors I was one of those who sat and appointed you Governors but right does not come into this at all; please let us forget personal feelings. I know my rank but if it is the wish of the 55 million people, please let us put our hearts into our pockets and forget our personal pride. Personally, I am 100 per cent in support that we should mention the whereabouts of Ironsi, even I have advised on this. When that has been done, he is a Head of State and he should be given the proper honour; thereafter, who-so-ever is in the Chair now let us help him to run the country peacefully, no more bloodshed, we have shed enough. We cannot create why should we destroy. If we can help to save please let us do so but we must say the whereabouts of Ironsi. He is a Head of State and we should give him his due respect as a Head of State. It is a temporary issue, four, five years, maybe I would have retired by then.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: It is all well and good, Gentlemen, but I will be vehement on this. The point is that if a room is dirty you do not sweep the dirt under the carpet because whenever you raise the carpet the dirt will be there. It is not so simple as all that. Indeed, on the very principle that you have enunciated here, it is a question of command and control. I like to know who will stand up here and tell me that he commands and controls the Eastern Army or the Army in the East.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: You alone.

Commodore Wey: I can tell you also here now that you are doing it illegally because when we had the first Government no Governor was supposed to have the command of any Army.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: You have started on the basis of the principles of command and control. If you control a group who will take orders from you, according to you, everybody doffs his hat, well done. Right, that person you doff your hat to cannot command and control those under him and indeed those of the East. What do you do to that?