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How will depriving yourself of income by not working help the Biafra cause? If this energy was channelled towards holding local governors' feet to the fire (ensuring they provided good governance), it would be a worthwhile cause. Most likely, people may not open for business due to fear of IPOB thuggery. This is how it starts, eventually IPOB could turn into a kidnapping and extortion racket enriching the rogues behind it without coming anywhere near actualising Biafra. |
eyeview:It's very difficult to initiate and complete a major infrastructural project within 2 years: how many had GEJ initiated and completed by 2012? |
The government should not under any circumstances increase the minimum wage. Here is a counterintuitive argument: increases of the minimum wage fuel poverty. In a country with mass unemployment, high inflation and low productivity growth, an increase in the minimum wage: reduces demand for labour increasing unemployment; fuels consumption/import growth increasing pressure on the Naira and spurring higher inflation; and diverts scarce resources away from capital investment to recurrent expenditure in the form of higher personnel/wage costs leading to low productivity growth. |
Kondomatic:Think of the logistical nightmare involved in arresting 10 thousand people during a one day exam (I'm assuming JAMB is still a one day exam). |
This IPOB business is a symptom of the cognitive challenges facing us. Igbos mock Yorubas for supporting Buhari & APC but the ease with which many are following charlatans like Kanu show we are as susceptible to vacuous ill-thought political movements. |
lilytender:So what good is the extradition if you cannot secure a conviction because all judges are corrupt? BTW, these corrupt judges are the same ones that often decide in favour of APC in electoral disputes. Somehow their corruption stops when it comes to deciding who who should get political power. |
ephi123:Nigerians underestimate how government debt can spiral out of control. From 12% to GDP in 2015 to 24% to GDP in such short order is a sign of out of control spending. Yes, I know some folks will be quick to draw parallels with industrialised countries with higher debt to GDP ratios - Japan has 240% public debt to GDP ratio - but we are not an industrialised country. The interest rate our debt attracts should make this clear. If we borrow in our domestic currency, we might retain some control over our debt but we risk increasing the market interest rate and crippling the domestic economy. This is because higher government borrowing leads to banks focusing their lending on the government at the expense of businesses. If we borrow in a foreign currency, we incur exchange rate risk. A billion dollars today may mean N380bn today but N1 trillion in 5 years time as the Naira depreciates. The reality is that we need to keep spending in control as Okonjo Iweala said in 2015. You cannot spend your way out of a currency crisis. I understand the need for infrastructure but the hurdle rate of return (particularly for a Nigerian government project) is insurmountable to make borrowing worthwhile: These infrastructure projects will not generate sufficient economic growth to produce enough tax revenues to cover the costs of the debt used to finance them. Reality is different from theory. We need to rely on structural reforms to do the heavy lifting to get our economy on a faster growth path: deregulation, tax reforms and a genuine crack down on corruption. The fixed exchange rate regime needs to go and the government should look to selling/privatizing assets. |
Amoto94:This is nonsense. On a certain level, no money can be spent without appropriation by the legislature but just as the government spend its tax revenue to meet its spending needs, it can spend the recouped money in the same manner. There is no requirement for a special appropriation process . The reality is that the recovered loot is grossly exaggerated and does not amount to much. Hence the government has to resort to borrowing. |
Jaideyone:Isn't it likely though that state governments are announcing major projects that they know will never see the light of the day? This is the oldest trick in the book and PDP governors are as guilty of it as APC governors. |
There isn't much money available for major government infrastructure projects (even if co-financed by private sector), particularly at the state level. Expect to see many of these projects shelved. |
You call it begging, we call it crowdfunding in the west and it has become increasingly a major source of funding for desperate students: Shameless e-begging, or a justified act of desperation? The ethics of crowdfunding university fees seem bound to divide opinion. But raising money on sites such as Hubbub, GoFundMe, and Indiegogo is becoming a go-to strategy for thousands of students.https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/education/2016/apr/25/meet-the-students-crowdfunding-their-university-tuition-fees |
To the extent that this notion has any credibility, a likely explanation may be speculators reacting to the possible end of the fixed exchange regime if Buhari dies or resigns. |
So how will a self-driving bus navigate pot holes that look like bomb craters on Nigerian roads? What about police checkpoints - what are the police supposed to do, collect money from passengers? |
DjAndroid:Nigeria went into recession under Shagari and Buhari took over during a recession. The Shagari recession was brutal: today's recession is a walk in the park by comparison. The reasons for the severity of the Shagari recession probably lay in the scale of consumption/import growth and dollar-denominated credit expansion prior to the oil price collapse that triggered the recession. In the GEJ era: we had a lot of consumption growth but government borrowing was mainly Naira denominated Buhari didn't help matters, just as now, but blaming him for starting the recession is an insult to history. |
It's sad that people are still trying to see the Chibok tragedy through the prism of the embarrassment it caused GEJ. Given the international focus on the matter, with the U.S. government's involvement, it's highly improbable that APC concoted the kidnap. To suggest, as the writer claims, that Boko Haram engaging in mass kidnap was a novelty is hogwash. I dislike Buhari but folks need to get off the whole Chibok conspiracy bandwagon. GEJ was an impotent leader and the Chibok debacle exemplified his inadequacies. |
omohayek:Yet more straw men. No, debt stock isn't sufficient to assess the health of a state's finances. My argument is that a state's finances ought to be assessed by looking at its income and debt - not either in isolation. There's no point in celebrating IGR in isolation without looking at a state's debt profile and its capacity to service its debt. omohayek:A bailout is an indicator of a state government's financial health because it illustrates the impotence of high IGR in itself in the face of unsustainable debt. If a state with high IGR requires external intervention to function, it is immaterial that its IGR is growing. The whole point of the IGR debate is to wean states off the FG: where a state cannot pay wages without FG bailout intervention, then suggesting that such a state might be in better financial health than a state which pays wages without such assistance is preposterous. Again, the Argentina-Mexico-Greece analogy is off kilter. Comparing the finances of 2 state governments in Nigeria is not similar to comparing a sub-Saharan nation's finance to Greece. The likes of Greece have Western partners/allies prepared to funnel huge sums of money at them (no matter how testy negotiations might get). State governments in Nigeria essentially have the same lender of last resort: if State A borrows more money than it can pay without FG bailout assistance, then it is in worse financial condition than State B which is able to function without such assistance. It is immaterial that State A has higher IGR than State B if State B is able to function without FG intervention. This goes to the root of the debate: the capacity of states to function independently of the FG. omohayek:The comparison is ridiculous as the faith of the credit markets - as reflected in the low yields it charged superpowers like British Empire - and the flexibility afforded the sovereign debt issuer makes putting the British Empire's borrowing ability in the same category as Ogun state, for instance, naive to put it mildly. This is not about furiously typing posts on Nairaland - if Ogun state and the British Empire are in an analogous position when accessing the credit markets, then the yield on Ogun debt will be lower than it has been. The high yields, indeed inability presently to further issue bonds, is reflective of the reality that the IGR is insufficient to dispel creditors' worries. omohayek:I am lost here: Britain came off the gold standards during the Napoleonic Wars to finance its participation by exploiting its position as a sovereign issuer of debt. It exploited its position as a credible sovereign, being the world's reigning superpower, to finance its debt. Comparisons, therefore, between its position and that of state governments in Nigeria are a bit naive. As for growth rates: of course, countries at the frontiers of economic development tend to grow much more slowly than developing countries like Nigeria. That Sierra Leone or Liberia can have fast economic growth rates would not mean their capacity to borrow can be compared to the British Empire. omohayek:In principle, I agree but not when it comes to "high IGR" states that cannot pay wages without FG assistance. omohayek:Another straw man. No, if you read my posts carefully you will see I am concerned about states touting high IGR but with demonstrable inability to pay their debt. My view about such states is that their financial health is weaker than the picture painted by looking at IGR in isolation. Again, this is a fairly uncontroversial and common sense view which the emotive environment of Nairaland debates seems to be obfuscating. A state with high IGR but requiring FG assistance to meet its debt obligations is as dependent on the FG as a state with low IGR but which does not need the FG's assistance for such. omohayek:I am not sure there are actually states with stagnant IGRs (from a longer term perspective). Some states with low IGR are probably the fastest growing as they are starting from a low base. To your point about wages, some high IGR states have notoriously unsettled salary arrears whilst some states with low IGR don't. Unsettled wages are a form of debt, I agree. It reinforces my argument that IGR in isolation is a small part of the picture in assessing Nigerian states. omohayek:This is all good in theory, but the reality is that both low and high IGR states can reduce their workforce but they cannot reduce their debt burden (without a bailout package) if unsustainable. My intervention in this thread is borne out of my concern that people are using the IGR metric in isolation when we have seen a lot of high IGR states tap the FG for assistance and left their workers unpaid. omohayek:The DMO maintains data on the debt stock. See here: https://www.dmo.gov.ng/debt-profile/sub-national-debts. Looking at the data, I suspect (indeed we know with the recent FG bailout) with the exception of Lagos, states with external debt larger than $100m have strained finances which, even in cases of high IGR, puts them in a precarious position. omohayek:You insist on using straw men. My point isn't that high IGR growth isn't commendable but that one ought to weigh both the growth in IGR and the debt stock. State budgets are somewhat like household budgets. I will not gauge a household's financial health simply by looking at their income: I will also consider their outgoings (particularly in relation to debt). I think in the Nigerian context, looking at IGR in isolation is misleading. If a state has relatively high IGR but fails to pay its workers and taps the FG's assistance in securing a bailout, it's arguably in worse shape than a state with lower IGR but which pays its workers and does not require a bailout. This is why I cited the Anambra state example: a state I often mock for its MOU propaganda loving Governor. It has relatively low IGR but a domestic debt stock of N4bn and sizeable foreign currency reserves (the latter increases in value with Naira depreciation). To me, this puts Anambra state in a better financial health than Edo, Kaduna or Ogun state who have both substantially larger debt (domestic and external). Unlike Lagos, the difference in IGR fails to compensate for the difference in debt burdens. So my conclusion remains the same: IGR is a small part of a bigger picture. For instance, that Bauchi has higher IGR than Bayelsa doesn't tell us much in itself. I think this is an obvious point which doesn't require much explanation. |
omohayek:Your example refutes a straw man. Of course, a government can sustain high debt if it has the tax revenues and most, importantly, if the debt is denominated in its own currency. I have addressed this in previous posts. But in judging the financial health of a state government in Nigeria, simply looking at its IGR tells you only very little without looking at the debt stock/obligations. This is a common sense proposition. Between Anambra and Oyo & Ogun states, which required FG's assistance in arranging a bailout? Anytime it's pointed out that debt sustainability is a problem in Nigeria, there are always people who cite the debt of sovereign advanced powers like the US, Japan or in your case, the British Empire. The capacity of the British Empire to issue debt (using their own currency) sustainably is different to the capacity of Benue state (or any state in Nigeria). If much of your IGR barely covers interest payments, touting the IGR as a sign of robust financial health is misleading. omohayek:My worry is IGR growth driven primarily by the need to service debt. There seems to be a strong correlation between high IGR and high debt. With the exception of Lagos, all states with major tax revenue growth have experienced an explosion in debt, in some cases requiring FG intervention to meet basic obligations like salary payments. A typical Nigerian state spends most of its money on recurrent expenditure of which public sector wages are the main component. If debt is increased dramatically, higher interest payments add to the problem of high recurrent expenditure. omohayek:Not onerous you say? Have you not been following the news on the dire state of state government finances in the last few years? High inflation is no protection against high nominal yields if the former is caused by economic collapse arising from a currency crisis. High inflation is as a result of economic stress which has strained state's finances more than any offsetting benefits arising from negative real yields. Woe betide those states when they try to rollover their debt (solely paying the principal upon maturity is probably out of the question) as the yields they will be subjected to will be a sight to behold. What is also lost in this debate is that a lot of those states with high IGR also have debt denominated in dollars, so their debt obligations (IGR is denominated in Naira) is rising faster than their IGR growth. Another reason why IGR only paints a small picture of a state's overall financial health. |
IGR is only a small part of the picture in analysing a state's financial sustainability. A high IGR matched with a high debt stock, the latter requiring huge debt repayment expenses, is unsustainable. In many respects, it's the debt burden that is driving "high" IGR as states increase the tax burden on their residents to meet interest payments on their debts. Ultimately, states expenses are dominated by recurrent expenditure so this increased tax burden goes to pay public sector workers and interest payments. States pay yields (interest) of circa 14% per year on their debt. A billion naira in debt will cost them circa N140m each year. The only viable solution is to reduce the number of states to about 12. The current number is unsustainable and a drain on resources. |
It's well known that people in the camps are not well looked after. There is nothing conspiratorial about this. Boko Haram remains fairly well resourced and a formidable fighting unit - they can afford to feed themselves and their female captives. It is a damning indictment of our government and illustrates the limits of government propaganda. |
nero2face:They got into power by lying so it should not surprise that they govern by lying. |
2n2k:They don't care. All they know is that GEJ stole all our money and Buhari is fighting corruption. Remember that the exchange rate was N155 to $1 before and is N305 in the 2nd half of 2016. If you adjust the 2016 figure for the exchange rate difference, the 2016 figure is even more alarming. |
Basfaq:The last DG made N93bn? I don't think we have produced figures lower than N100bn since the Abacha days. See my post below which I have excerpted below: The Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) raked in about N977.09 billion revenues in 2014 from its target of N1.2 trillion for the year.https://www.google.co.uk/amp/leadership.ng/business/400503/customs-rakes-n977-09bn-revenue-2014/amp This information is freely available on the net, though I doubt that Buhari fans are moved by evidence. |
News like this is very disturbing and should provoke serious contemplation amongst Nigerians. The primary rationale for the Buhari regime is the belief in its ability to tackle corruption in sharp contrast to the GEJ regime: but what if the new regime is causing more economic damage than any improved gains in the reduction of corruption? Contrast this 2016 revenue of N898bn with the 2014 revenue of N977bn under the famed corrupt buffoon: The Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) raked in about N977.09 billion revenues in 2014 from its target of N1.2 trillion for the year.https://www.google.co.uk/amp/leadership.ng/business/400503/customs-rakes-n977-09bn-revenue-2014/amp I know what Buhari apologists will claim: that Nigeria was in the midst of an oil boom in 2014 and its therefore an unfair comparison. But we forget that the exchange rate in 2016 was lower than in 2014 (N305 in the 2nd half of 2016) and that the GEJ was supposed to be "chopping all our money." Has anyone forgotten the scandal regarding the import waiver? This is the dilemma I have posed to some of Nairaland's Buhari apologists: why is there no discernible difference in revenue collection given we have moved from a supposedly hopelessly corrupt regime to an honest regime? Data do not lie and apart from the desire to sate some ethnically motivated ambitions/animosity or a naive investment of hope, the data suggests that supporting the Buhari regime represents a case of choosing medicine whose effects are worse than the disease one is seeking to cure. |
If you want to know why the oil "boom" of the GEJ era failed to produce more buoyant forex reserves, look no further than the rise in consumption driven by public sector wage increases. The minimum wage rose 260% from N5k under OBJ to N18k under GEJ. This fuelled import growth, like the Udorji awards of the 1970s, without a commensurate rise in export growth. Yes, I totally understand the appeal of such "pro-people" policies like increasing the minimum wage. Who doesn't want to help the poor? But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. A rise in wages not underpinned by productivity growth will strain government finances and fuel an unsustainable rise in imports driven by consumption. We need to be careful not to be seduced by fanciful talk that you can solve/reduce poverty in Nigeria by government-mandated wage rises. This is why the GEJ stole all our money narrative winds me up. Whilst his regime was obscenely corrupt, it is a less important explanatory variable for the fragility of the economy. |
psucc:Exactly. It is impossible for an uncorrupt person to emerge as president when the political system itself is inherently corrupt. How are you going to finance your candidacy, avoid impeachment, judicial sanction or gain the support/loyalty of the public service if you are not compromised? You will not be able to get through INEC elections or electoral tribunals without greasing a few palms. In effect, the hyper-corruption phenomenon in Nigeria has lots of gatekeepers ensuring its survival/perpetuation. The most plausible scenario an optimist can hope for is the development of institutions/policies influenced by public activism that erode the opportunities for corruption. It is why reducing government intervention in markets is crucial in Nigeria: things like government management of NNPC, fuel subsidy and a fixed exchange regime ought to be removed as they provide an opportunity for insiders to loot at the public's expense. |
Nothing tangible comes out of these photo ops. Just an opportunity for their media activists to convey the impression of a public official hard at work. |
He lost because he displayed remarkable insouciance to the insecurity and corruption going on in Nigeria. Of course, he lost to someone who was even more inept but his inadequacies as a leader provided the opening for this to happen. Blaming foreign conspiracies is a diversion and reflects a man and his supporters unwilling to confront the shortcomings of GEJ. |
texazzpete:I am one of the "worms" who thinks the article is indulgent of a narrative that seeks to exonerate Buhari by damning GEJ. The article repeats the falsehood that today's economic travails are down to GEJ (it is there in the third paragraph). This line of reasoning is an oft-repeated trope of every Buhari apologist (including you) who tries to rationalise their miscalculation. I am placed in the ignoble position of having to defend GEJ who I think was feckless, inept and in saner climes should be serving multiple life sentences. For all GEJ's faults however, he is not to blame for the state of the economy in April 2017. My gripe with articles like these is that in their deployment of yellow journalistic devices*(mistruths and exaggeration), they mis-attribute causality and help perpetuate Nigeria's multi-decade history of misrule. By claiming that GEJ was an "unmitigated disaster" who "ran the economy aground" and "despoiled all fiscal buffers", language they would never use to describe the present regime, they perpetuate the BMC narrative that Buhari is merely an unfortunate heir to today's economic travails. It is why all the BMC activists on this thread, see Jesuslovesyou's post before mine, applaud the article's contents for its "objectivity". I have tackled the recession-causality point in previous posts so no need to rehash but it is worth pointing out the glaring incoherence of the GEJ is largely at fault argument. Think of the GEJ regime as providing contractionary pressures on GDP through its gargantuan corruption: has no one wondered why the end of that regime has not provided a stimulatory effect on the economy? It cannot be merely the oil price collapse as this was already baked into GDP figures, most of the collapse having already happened by the end of the regime. Moving from a regime that steals aplenty to a regime that steals far less should offset some of the adverse effects of the oil price collapse- this has not happened. The article points to the import waiver as a specific example: Now that the waiver has been removed and the currency devalued officially from N155 to N305 (which, coupled with the end of the GEJ's era corruption should boost the reported Naira value of the levies paid on imports), we have learned that Customs revenue is still lower than when the "unmitigated disaster" was in charge. There is no discernible effect (not on non-oil taxes or reported oil production pre or post militants truce) which suggests that we have moved from an era of extreme corruption to an era of less corruption. The data fails to support the narrative which leads me to believe that 2 things are happening: GEJ era corruption was "sexed up" (any news on the $49/20bn Sanusi claim?) and corruption remains fairly in place. The corruption narrative has become a red herring to excuse today's inexcusable incompetence. True, corruption impoverishes Nigerians, but bad economics also impoverish Nigerians, the latter arguably to a far greater degree. Why is the North-East of Nigeria poorer (worse in any measure of human development) than the South-East? It's certainly not because the latter are more honest/less corrupt than the former, it's bad economics exemplified by a failure to invest in human capital. *References to GEJ's failure to diversify an already diversified economy, inaccurate claims of $2.1bn arms fund ending in private hands or forex reserves being depleted represent quintessential yellow journalism. |
manitoba:The irony is compelling. A country where the "recovery" of $43m grabbed public attention has failed to bat an eyelid as over a $1bn is flushed down the toilet. All this defence of the naira could have been avoided with a float. Yes, a float at this point would accelerate inflation (the longer it's avoided, the more painful the eventual float becomes). But it would also increase incentives for forex inflow from exporters and investors, reducing the dependence on oil exports. |
seunmsg:I agree, only the extremely ignorant believe the government's outlandish claims about money recovered. Shame you spend most of your time on Nairaland defending the government instead of condemning it for fostering the impression that it has recovered billions of dollars. You act like as if the source of those media headlines is not the government (look at the recent claim to have "recovered" N7trillion via the TSA). |
seunmsg:Government propaganda has created this dilemma. By making extraordinary claims about recovering loot, it gives the impression that it must have recovered enough to fund the budget deficit. It is, therefore, difficult to justify its borrowing spree given the outlandish claims the government has been making. Remember, the loot doesn't have to fund the entire budget. It simply needs to cover the deficit (the difference between spending and revenue). |
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